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Preface 
 
We are fortunate to live in incredibly exciting and incredibly challenging time. The 
world is rapidly growing; country economies developing at accelerated growth rates, 
technology advances improve quality of life and become available to larger and larger 
populations. At the same time we are coming to a realization that we are responsible 
for our planet. We have to make sure that our continuous quest for prosperity does not 
backfire via catastrophic irreversible climate changes, and depleted or limited 
resources that may challenge the very existence of future generations. We are at the 
point in our history when we have to make sure that our growth is sustainable. Energy 
demands due to economic growth and increasing population must be satisfied in a 
sustainable manner assuring inherent safety, efficiency and no or minimized 
environmental impact. New energy sources and systems must be inherently safe and 
environmentally benign.  
These considerations are among the reasons that lead to serious interest in deploying 
nuclear power as a sustainable energy source. Today’s nuclear reactors are safe and 
highly efficient energy systems that offer electricity and a multitude of co-generation 
energy products ranging from potable water to heat for industrial applications. At the 
same time, catastrophic earthquake and tsunami events in Japan resulted in the 
nuclear accident that forced us to rethink our approach to nuclear safety, design 
requirements and facilitated growing interests in advanced nuclear energy systems, 
next generation nuclear reactors, which are inherently capable to withstand natural 
disasters and avoid catastrophic consequences without any environmental impact. 
This book is one in a series of books on nuclear power published by InTech. It consists 
of six major sections housing twenty chapters on topics from the key subject areas 
pertinent to successful development, deployment and operation of nuclear power 
systems worldwide: 
Nuclear Power Deployment 
1. Nuclear Naval Propulsion 
2. Deployment Scenarios for New Technologies 
3. The Investment Evaluation of Third-Generation Nuclear Power - from the 
Perspective of Real Options 
4. Characteristic Evaluation and Scenario Study on Fast Reactor Cycle in Japan 
X Preface 
 
5. Nuclear Proliferation 
6. Ethics of Nuclear Power: How to Understand Sustainability in the Nuclear 
Debate 
Operation and Decommissioning 
7. Long-Term Operation of VVER Nuclear Power Plants 
8. Novel, In-situ Spent Fuel Pool Decommissioning 
9. Post-Operational Treatment of Residual Na Coolant in EBR-II Using 
Carbonation 
Environment and Nuclear Energy 
10. Carbon Leakage of Nuclear Energy – The Example of Germany 
11. Effects of the Operating Nuclear Power Plant on Marine Ecology & 
Environment- a Case Study of Daya Bay in China 
12. Microbial Leaching of Uranium Ore 
Advances in Nuclear Waste Management 
13. Storage of High Level Nuclear Waste in Geological Disposals: The Mining 
and the Borehole Approach 
14. Isotopic Uranium and Plutonium Denaturing as an Effective Method for 
Nuclear Fuel Proliferation Protection in Open and Closed Fuel Cycles 
Thorium 
15. Implementation Strategy of Thorium Nuclear Power in the Context of Global 
Warming 
16. Thorium Fission and Fission-Fusion Fuel Cycle 
17. New Sustainable Secure Nuclear Industry Based on Thorium Molten-Salt 
Nuclear Energy Synergetics (THORIMS-NES) 
Advances in Energy Conversion 
18. Water Splitting Technologies for Hydrogen Cogeneration from Nuclear Energy 
19. Reformer and Membrane Modules (RMM) for Methane Conversion Powered 
by a Nuclear Reactor 
20. Hydrogen Output from Catalyzed Radiolysis of Water. 
Our book opens with the section on general aspects of nuclear power deployment. 
Later sections address selected issues in operation and decommissioning, economics 
and environmental effects. The book shows both advantages and challenges 
emphasizing the need for further development and innovation. Advances in nuclear 
waste management and thorium-based fuel cycles lead to environmentally benign 
nuclear energy scenarios and ultimately, towards nuclear energy sustainability. 
Improvements in applications and efficiency of energy conversion facilitate economics 
competitiveness of nuclear power. 
With all diversity of topics in 20 chapters, the nuclear power deployment, operation 
and sustainability is the common thread that is easily identifiable in all chapters of our 
book. The “system-thinking” approach allows synthesizing the entire body of 
provided information into a consistent integrated picture of the real-life complex 
engineering system – nuclear power system – where everything is working together. 
Preface      XI 
 
The goal of the book is to bring nuclear power to our readers as one of the promising 
energy sources that has a unique potential to meet energy demands with minimized 
environmental impact, near-zero carbon footprint, and competitive economics via 
robust potential applications. Continuous technological advances will lead towards 
sustainable nuclear energy via closed fuel cycles and advanced energy systems. 
The book targets everyone as its potential readership groups - students, researchers 
and practitioners - who are interested to learn about nuclear power. The idea is to 
facilitate intellectual cross-fertilization between field experts and non-field experts 
taking advantage of methods and tools developed by both groups. The book will 
hopefully inspire future research and development efforts, innovation by stimulating 
ideas.  
We hope our readers will enjoy the book and will find it both interesting and useful. 
 
Pavel V. Tsvetkov 
Department of Nuclear Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
United States of America 
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Nuclear Naval Propulsion 
Magdi Ragheb 
Department of Nuclear, Plasma and Radiological Engineering 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
216 Talbot Laboratory, Urbana, Illinois  
USA 
1. Introduction 
The largest experience in operating nuclear power plants has been in nuclear naval 
propulsion, particularly aircraft carriers and submarines. This accumulated experience may 
become the basis of a proposed new generation of compact-sized nuclear power plants 
designs. The mission for nuclear powered submarines is being redefined in terms of signal 
intelligence gathering and special operations. The nuclear powered vessels comprise about 
40 percent of the USA Navy's combatant fleet, including the entire sea based strategic 
nuclear deterrent. All the USA Navy’s operational submarines and over half of its aircraft 
carriers are nuclear-powered.  
The main considerations here are that nuclear powered submarines do not consume oxygen 
like conventional power plants, and that they have large endurance or mission times before 
fuel resupply; limited only by the available food and air purification supplies on board. 
Another unique consideration is the use of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) to provide a 
compact reactor system with enough built-in reactivity to overcome the xenon reactor dead 
time for quick restarts and long fuel burnup periods between refuelings. 
During World War II, submarines used diesel engines that could be run on the water 
surface, charging a large bank of electrical batteries. These could later be used while the 
submarine is submerged, until discharged. At this point the submarine had to resurface to 
recharge its batteries and become vulnerable to detection by aircraft and surface vessels. 
Even though special snorkel devices were used to suck and exhaust air to the submarine 
shallowly submerged below the water's surface, a nuclear reactor provides it with a 
theoretically infinite submersion time. In addition, the high specific energy, or energy per 
unit weight of nuclear fuel, eliminates the need for constant refueling by fleets of vulnerable 
tankers following a fleet of surface or subsurface naval vessels. On the other hand, a single 
refueling of a nuclear reactor is sufficient for long intervals of time.  
With a high enrichment level of 93 percent, capable of reaching 97.3 percent in U235, modern 
naval reactors, are designed for a refueling after 10 or more years over their 20-30 years 
lifetime, whereas land based reactors use fuel low-enriched to 3-5 percent in U235, and need 
to be refueled every 1-1 1/2 years period. New cores are designed to last 50 years in carriers 
and 30-40 years in submarines, which is the design goal of the Virginia class of submarines. 
Burnable poisons such as gadolinium or boron are incorporated in the cores. These allow a 
high initial reactivity that compensates for the build-up of fission products poisons over the 
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core lifetime, as well as the need to overcome the reactor dead time caused by the xenon 
poison changes as a result of operation at different power levels.  
Naval reactors use high burn up fuels such as uranium-zirconium, uranium-aluminum, and 
metal ceramic fuels, in contrast to land-based reactors which use uranium dioxide, UO2. 
These factors provide the naval vessels theoretical infinite range and mission time. For all 
these considerations, it is recognized that a nuclear reactor is the ideal engine for naval 
propulsion. 
A compact pressure vessel with an internal neutron and gamma ray shield is required by 
the design while maintaining safety of operation. Their thermal efficiency is lower than the 
thermal efficiency of land based reactors because of the emphasis on flexible power 
operation rather than steady state operation, and of space constraints. Reactor powers range 
from 10 MWth in prototypes to 200 MWth in large subsurface vessels, and 300 MWth in 
surface ships.  
Newer designs use jet pump propulsion instead of propellers, and aim at an all electrical 
system design, including the weapons systems such as electromagnetic guns. 
2. Historical evolution 
In the USA, initially the General Electric (GE) Company developed a liquid metal reactor 
concept; and the Westinghouse Company, a pressurized water reactor concept. Each 
company built an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) owned and financed development 
laboratory. Westinghouse used the site of the Allegheny County Airport in a suburb of 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania for what became known as the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory. 
GE built the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in the state of New York.  
The Westinghouse program used pressurized water as the coolant. It revealed how 
corrosive hot water could be on the metal cladding surrounding the fuel. It realized that the 
use of zirconium resisted such corrosion. The pure metal was initially used as the cladding 
for the fuel elements, to be later replaced by a zirconium alloy, Zircaloy that improved its 
performance. Zirconium has a low neutron absorption cross section and, like stainless steel, 
forms a protective, invisible oxide film on its surface upon exposure to air. This oxide film is 
composed of zirconia or ZrO2 and is on the order of only 50 to 100 angstroms in thickness. 
This ultra thin oxide prevents the reaction of the underlying zirconium metal with virtually 
any chemical reagent under ambient conditions. The only reagent that will attack zirconium 
metal at room temperature is hydrofluoric acid, HF, which will dissolve the thin oxide layer 
off of the surface of the metal and thus allow HF to dissolve the metal itself, with the 
concurrent evolution of hydrogen gas. 
Jules Verne, the French author in his 1870 book: “20,000 Leagues Under the Sea,” related the 
story of an electric submarine. The submarine was called the “Nautilus,” under its captain 
Nemo. Science fiction became reality when the first nuclear submarine built by the USA 
Navy was given the same name. Construction of the Nautilus (SSN-571) started on June 14, 
1952, its first operation was on December 30, 1954 and it reached full power operation on 
January 13, 1955. It was commissioned in 1954, with its first sea trials in 1955. It set speed, 
distance and submergence records for submarine operation that were not possible with 
conventional submarines. It was the first ship to reach the North Pole. It was 
decommissioned in 1980 after 25 years of service, 2,500 dives, and a travelled distance of 
513,000 miles. It is preserved at a museum at Croton, Connecticut, USA. 
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Fig. 1. The "Nautilus", the first nuclear powered submarine (Photo: USA Navy). 
An experimental setup designated as the S1W prototype was built for the testing of the 
Nautilus’s nuclear reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in 1989. The section of the 
hull containing the reactor rested in a “sea tank” of water 40 feet deep and 50 feet in 
diameter. The purpose of the water was to help the shielding designers study the 
“backscatter radiation” that might escape the hull, scatter off the water, and reflect back into 
the living quarters of the ship. 
The reactor for the Nautilus was a light water moderated, highly enriched in U235 core, with 
zirconium-clad fuel plates. The high fuel enrichment gives the reactor a compact size, and a 
high reactivity reserve to override the xenon poison dead time. The Nautilus beat numerous 
records, establishing nuclear propulsion as the ideal driving force for the world's submarine 
fleet. Among its feats was the first underwater crossing of the Arctic ice cap. It traveled 1,400 
miles at an average speed of 20 knots. On a first core without refueling, it traveled 62,000 
miles. Another nuclear submarine, the Triton reenacted Magellan's trip around the Earth. 
Magellan traveled on the surface, while the Triton did it completely submerged. 
3. Reactor design concepts 
There have been more reactor concepts investigated in the naval propulsion area by 
different manufacturers and laboratories than in the civilian field, and much can be learned 
from their experience for land applications, particularly for small compact systems. 
According to the type of vessel they power, they have different first letter designations: A 
for Aircraft carrier, C for Cruiser, D for Destroyer and S for Submarine. They are also 
designated with a last letter according to the designer institution or lead laboratory: B for 
Bechtel, C for Combustion Engineering, G for General Electric and W for Westinghouse. A 
middle number between the first and last letter refers to the generation number of the core 
design. For instance, the A1B is the first generation of a core design for aircraft carriers with 
Bechtel operating the lead laboratory for the design. 
Naval reactors designs use boron as a burnable neutron poison. The fuel is an alloy of 15 
percent zirconium and 85 percent uranium enriched to a level of about 93 percent in U235. 
The burnable poisons and high enrichment allow a long core lifetime and provide enough 
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reactivity to overcome the xenon poisoning reactor dead time. An axial direction doping 
provides a long core life, and a radial doping provides for an even power and fuel burnup 
distributions. 
3.1 STR or S1W pressurized water reactor design 
The Westinghouse Electric Corporation under contract to the USA Navy constructed, tested 
and operated a prototype Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) submarine reactor plant. This first 
reactor plant was called the Submarine Thermal Reactor (STR). On March 30, 1953, the STR 
was brought to power for the first time. In 1953 it achieved a 96 hours sustained full power run 
simulating a crossing of the Atlantic Ocean. The second S1W core sustained in 1955 an 66-day 
continuous full power run, simulating a high speed run twice around the globe.  
The STR was redesigned as the first generation submarine reactor S1W, which reached 
criticality on March 30, 1953, was the prototype of the USS Nautilus (SSN 571) reactor and 
was followed in the middle to late 1950s by the Aircraft carrier reactor A1W, the prototype 
for the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise plant. Westinghouse's Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory 
was assigned the responsibility for operating the reactor it had designed and built, hence the 
W in the name.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Plate fuel element configuration (Ragheb, 2011).  
The fuel elements are sandwich plates made of U and Zr and clad in Zr. The maximum 
temperature in the fuel was 645 oF and the sheath temperature was 551 oF with an average 
cycle time of 600 hours or just 600 / 24 = 25 days. The reactor temperature is limited by the 
pressure needed to prevent boiling, necessitating high pressure vessels, piping and heat 
exchangers. The steam was generated at a relatively low pressure. A high level of pumping 
power was required, and the fuel was costly. However this design presented few hazards, 
was proven in service, and an expensive moderator was not needed. 
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The S1C reactor used an electric drive rather than a steam turbine like in the subsequent 
S5W reactor design rated at 78 MWth and a 93 percent U235 enriched core that was the 
standard in the 1970s. The S6G reactor plant was rated at 148 MWth and the D2W core was 
rated at 165 MWth. The S6G reactor is reported to be capable of propelling a Los Angeles 
class submarine at 15 knots or 27.7 km/hr when surfaced and 25 knots or 46.3 km/hr while 
submerged. The Sea Wolf class of submarines was equipped with a single S6W reactor, 
whereas the Virginia class of submarines is equipped with an S9G reactor.  
It is worth noting that the higher achievable submerged speed is partly due to the absence of 
wave friction resistance underwater, suggesting that submarine cargo ships would offer a 
future energy saving alternative to surface cargo ships. 
3.2 Large ship reactors, A1W-A, A1W-B prototype plants 
The A1W (Aircraft carrier, 1st prototype, Westinghouse) plant consisted of a pair of 
prototype reactors for the USS Enterprise USA Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. 
Located at the Naval Reactors Facility, the two PWRs designated A and B, were built within 
a portion of a steel hull. The plant simulated the Enterprise’s engine room. The A1W plant 
was the first in which two reactors powered one ship propeller shaft through a single-
geared turbine propulsion unit. As the Navy program evolved, new reactor cores and 
equipment replaced many of the original components. The Navy trained naval personnel at 
the A1W plant and continued a test program to improve and further develop its operational 
flexibility. 
The A1W prototype plant was started in 1956 for surface ships using two PWRs. The plant 
was built as a prototype for the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65), which was the first 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Power operation of the A1W plant started in October of 
1958. In the A1W and A2W designs, the coolant was kept at a temperature between 525-545 
°F or 274-285 °C. In the steam generators, the water from the feed system is converted to 
steam at 535 °F or 279 °C and a pressure of about 600 psi or 4 MPa. The reactor coolant water 
was circulated by four large electric pumps for each reactor. The steam was directed from 
each steam generator to a common header, where the steam is then sent to the main engine, 
electrical generators, aircraft catapult system, and various auxiliaries. The main propulsion 
turbines are double ended, in which the steam enters at the center and divides into two 
opposing streams. The main shaft was coupled to a reduction gear in which the high 
rotational velocity of the turbine shaft is stepped down to a usable rotational rate for ship 
propulsion.  
In the A3W reactor design used on the USS John F. Kennedy a 4-reactor plant is used. In the 
A4W design with a life span of 23 years on the Nimitz Class carriers only two reactors per 
ship are used with each providing 104 MWth of power or 140,000 shaft HP. The A1B is also 
a two reactor design for the Gerald R. Ford class of carriers. 
3.3 SIR or S1G intermediate neutron flux beryllium sodium cooled reactor 
This reactor design was built by the General Electric (GE) Company, hence the G 
designation. The neutron spectrum was intermediate in energy. It used UO2 fuel clad in 
stainless steel with Be used as a moderator and a reflector. The maximum temperature in the 
fuel could reach 1,700 +/- 300 oF with a maximum sheath temperature of 900 oF, with a cycle 
time of 900 hours or 900 / 24 = 37.5 days.  
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A disadvantage is that the coolant becomes activated with the heat exchangers requiring 
heavy shielding. In addition Na reacts explosively with water and ignites in air, and the fuel 
element removal is problematic. On the other hand, high reactor and steam temperatures can 
be reached with a higher thermal efficiency. A low pressure is used in the primary system. 
Beryllium has been used as a moderator in the Sea Wolf Class of submarines reactors. It is a 
relatively good solid moderator, both from the perspectives of slowing down power and of 
the moderating ratio, and has a very high thermal conductivity. Pure Be has good corrosion 
resistance to water up to 500 oF, to sodium to 1,000 oF, and to air attack to 1,100 oF. It has a 
noted vapor pressure at 1,400 oF and is not considered for use much above 1,200 oF even 
with an inert gas system. It is expensive to produce and fabricate, has poor ductility and is 
extremely toxic necessitating measures to prevent inhalation and ingestion of its dust during 
fabrication. 
A considerably small size thermal reactor can be built using beryllium oxide as a moderator. 
It has the same toxicity as Be, but is less expensive to fabricate. It can be used with a sodium 
cooled thermal reactor design because BeO is corrosion resistant to sodium. It has similar 
nuclear properties to Be, has a very high thermal conductivity as a ceramic, and has a good 
resistance to thermal shock. It can be used in the presence of air, Na and CO2. It is volatile in 
water vapor above 1,800 oF. In its dense form, it resists attack by Na or the Na-K alloy 
eutectic, which remains liquid at room temperature, at a temperature of 1,000 oF. BeO can be 
used as a fuel element material when impregnated with uranium. Low density increases its 
resistance to shock. A BeO coating can be applied to cut down on the fission products 
release to the system.  
The USS Seawolf submarine initially used a Na-cooled reactor that was replaced in 1959 by a 
PWR to standardize the fleet, because of superheater bypass problems causing mediocre 
performance and as a result of a sodium fire. The steam turbines had their blades replaced 
to use saturated rather than superheated steam. The reactor was housed in a containment 
vessel designed to contain a sodium fire. 
The eighth generation S8G reactor was capable of operating at a significant fraction of full 
power without reactor coolant pumps. The S8G reactor was designed by General Electric for 
use on the Ohio Class (SSGN/SSBN-726) submarines. A land based prototype of the reactor 
plant was built at Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory at Ballston Spa, New York. The 
prototype was used for testing and crew training throughout the 1980s. In 1994, the core was 
replaced with a sixth generation S6W Westinghouse reactor, designed for the Sea Wolf Class 
submarines.  
3.4 Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor, EBOR 
The Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor (EBOR)’s objective was to develop beryllium 
oxide as a neutron moderator in high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors. The project was 
cancelled in 1966 before construction was complete. Among the reasons for the cancellation 
was the encouraging progress achieved, concurrent with the EBOR construction, in 
developing graphite as a moderator. This reduced the importance of developing beryllium 
oxide as an alternate. No uranium fuel ever was loaded into the EBOR and it never operated 
or went critical before the program was cancelled. 
3.5 SC-WR super critical water reactor 
The Super Critical Water Reactor (SC-WR) was considered with an intermediate energy 
neutron spectrum. The fuel was composed of UO2 dispersed in a stainless steel matrix. It 
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consisted of 1 inch square box with parallel plates and sine wave filters with a type 347 
stainless steel cladding 0.007 inch thick. The maximum temperature in the fuel reached 1,300 
oF with an average cycle time of 144 hours or 144 / 24 = 6 days. 
The materials for high pressure and temperature and the retention of mechanical seals and 
other components caused a service problem. The water coolant reached a pressure of 5,000 
psi. The high pressure and temperature steam results in a high cycle efficiency, small size of 
the reactor with no phase change in the coolant. 
3.6 Organic Moderated Reactor Experiment, OMRE 
The Organic Cooled and Moderated Reactor has been considered as a thermal neutron 
spectrum shipboard power plant. The Terphenyl waxy organic coolant was considered 
promising because it liquefied at high temperatures but did not corrode metals like water. 
Also, it operated at low pressure, significantly reducing the risk of coolant leak and loss of 
coolant through depressurization. A scaled-up reactor, the Experimental Organic Cooled 
Reactor, was built in anticipation of further development of the concept. 
The rectangular-plates fuel clad in aluminum can be natural uranium since the organic 
coolant can have good moderating properties. The cladding temperature can reach 800 oF 
with an average cycle time of 2,160 hours or 2,160 / 24 = 90 days. The overall heat transfer 
coefficient of the coolant is low with the formation of polymers under irradiation that 
require an adequate purification system. The perceived advantages are negligible corrosion 
and the achievement of low pressure at a high temperature. 
A Diphenyl potential coolant broke down under irradiation. The hydrogen in the compound 
turned into a gas, forming bubbles. The bubbles reduced the moderator density and made it 
difficult to maintain the chain reaction. The initially clear liquid turned into a gummy and 
black breakup product. No uranium fuel ever was loaded into the reactor and it never 
operated or went critical before the program was cancelled.  
3.7 Lead-bismuth cooled fast reactors 
The alpha class of Russian submarines used an alloy of Pb-Bi 45-50 percent by weight cooled 
fast reactors. The melting point of this alloy is 257 oF. They faced problems of corrosion of 
the reactor components, melting point, pump power, polonium activity and problems in 
fuel unloading. Refueling needed a steam supply to keep the liquid metal molten. Bismuth 
leads to radiation from the activated products, particularly polonium. An advantage is that 
at decommissioning time, the core can be allowed to cool into a solid mass with the lead 
providing adequate radiation shielding. This class of submarine reactors has been 
decommissioned. 
3.8 Natural circulation S5G prototype 
The S5G was the prototype of a PWR for the USS Narwhal. It was capable of operating in 
either a forced or natural circulation flow mode. In the natural circulation mode, the cooling 
water flowed through the reactor by natural convection, not by pumps. Use of natural 
circulation instead of pumps reduced the noise level in the submarine. To prove that the 
design concept would work in an operating ship at sea, the prototype was built in a 
submarine hull section capable of simulating the rolling motion of a ship at sea.  The S5G 
continued to operate as part of the Navy’s nuclear training program until that program was 
reduced after the end of the Cold War. 
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The S5G reactor had two coolant loops and two steam generators. It had to be designed with 
the reactor vessel situated low in the ship hull and the steam generators high in order for 
natural circulation of the coolant to be developed and maintained using the chimney effect. 
It was largely a success, although the design never became the basis for any more fast attack 
submarines besides the Narwhal. The prototype testing included the simulation of the 
engine room of an attack submarine. By floating the plant in a large pool of water, the whole 
prototype could be rotated along its long axis to simulate a hard turn. This was necessary to 
determine whether natural circulation would continue even during hard maneuvers, since 
natural circulation is dependent on gravity. 
The USS Narwhal had the quietest reactor plant in the USA naval fleet. Its 90 MWth reactor 
plant was slightly more powerful than the other fast attack USA nuclear submarines of that 
era such as the third generation S3G and the fifth generation S5W. The Narwhal contributed 
significantly to the USA effort during the Cold War. With its quiet propulsion and the pod 
attached to its hull, it used a towed sonar array and possibly carried a Remotely Operated 
Vehicle (ROV) for tapping into communication cables and maintaining a megaphones 
tracking system at the bottom of the oceans.  
It was intended to test the potential contribution of natural circulation technology to 
submarine noise suppression by the avoidance of forced flow pump cooling. The reactor 
primary coolant pumps are one of the primary sources of noise from submarines in addition 
to the speed reduction gearbox and cavitation forming collapsing bubbles from the 
propeller. The elimination of the coolant pumps and associated equipment would also 
reduce mechanical complexity and the space required by the propulsion equipment. The 
S5G was the direct precursor to the eighth generation S8G reactor used on the Ohio class 
ballistic missile submarines; a quiet submarine design. 
The S5G was also equipped with coolant pumps that were only needed in emergencies to 
attain high power and speed. The reactor core was designed with very smooth paths for the 
coolant. Accordingly, the coolant pumps were smaller and quieter than the ones used by the 
competing S5W core, a Westinghouse design, and were also fewer in number. In most 
situations, the submarine could be operated without using the coolant pumps, useful for 
stealth operation. The reduction in the electrical requirements enabled this design to use 
only a single electrical turbine generator plant. 
The S8G prototype used natural circulation allowing operation at a significant fraction of 
full power without using the reactor pumps, providing a silent stealth operation mode. To 
further reduce engine plant noise, the normal propulsion setup of two steam turbines 
driving the propeller screw through a reduction gear unit was changed instead to one large 
propulsion turbine without reduction gears. This eliminated the noise from the main 
reduction gears, but at the expense of a large main propulsion turbine. The turbine was 
cylindrical, about 12 feet in diameter and 30 feet in length. This large size was necessary to 
allow it to rotate slowly enough to directly drive the propulsion screw and be fairly efficient 
in the process.  
3.9 Fail-safe control and load-following S7G design 
The S7G core was controlled by stationary gadolinium-clad tubes that were partially filled 
with water. Water was pumped from the portion of the tube inside the core to a reservoir 
above the core, or allowed to flow back down into the tube. A higher water level in the tube 
within the core slowed down the neutrons allowing them to be captured by the gadolinium 
tube cladding rather than the uranium fuel, leading to a lower power level.  
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The design constituted a unique fail-safe control system. The pump needed to run 
continuously to keep the water level pumped down. Upon an accidental loss of pump 
power, all the water would flow back into the tube, shutting down the reactor.  
This design also had the advantage of a negative reactivity feedback and a load-following 
mechanism. An increase in reactor power caused the water to expand to a lower density 
lowering the power. The water level in the tubes controlled the average coolant 
temperature, not the reactor power. An increase in steam demand resulting from opening 
the main steam throttle valves would automatically increase reactor power without action 
by the operator. 
3.10 S9G high energy density core 
The S9G is a PWR built by General Electric with increased energy density, and new plant 
components, including a new steam generator design featuring improved corrosion 
resistance and a reduced life cycle cost. This reactor in the Virginia Class SSN-774 
submarines is designed to operate for 33 years without refueling and last the expected 30 
year design life of a typical submarine. It produces about 40,000 shaft horsepower, or about 
30 MWth of power. 
The higher power density decreases not only the size of the core, but also enhances quiet 
operation through the elimination of bulky control and pumping equipment. It would be 
superior to any Russian design from the perspective of noise reduction capability, with 30 
units planned to be built. The core for a contemplated New Attack Submarine is expected to 
last for the operational life of the ship. The design goals include eliminating the need for a 
refueling, will reduce life cycle costs, cut down the radiation exposure of shipyard staff, and 
lessen the amount of radioactive waste generated. This is possible because of many 
developments such as the use of advanced computers to perform three-dimensional nuclear, 
thermal, and structural calculations; further exploitation of a modified fuel process; and 
better understanding of various reactor technologies which permits more highly optimized 
designs. Performance improvements are gained through advances in such areas as thermal 
hydraulics and structural mechanics, and by optimizing reactor-to-systems interfaces.  
The new reactor with increased energy density has new plant components, such as a new 
concept steam generator, with improved corrosion resistance and reduced life-cycle costs. 
The new steam generators allow greater plant design flexibility and decreased construction 
costs due to a smaller size, spatial orientation, and improved heat transfer efficiency which 
reduces coolant flow requirements. They alleviate the corrosion concerns encountered in 
existing designs of steam generators, while reducing component size and weight and 
providing greater flexibility in the overall arrangement.  
4. Commercial nuclear ships 
The USA built one single nuclear merchant ship: the Savannah. It was designed as a national 
showpiece, and not as an economical merchant vessel. For compactness, the steam 
generators and steam drums surround the reactor core. This Integral Design configuration 
also provides shielding for the crew. It was retired in 1970. 
The 630-A reactor, a low-power critical experiment, was operated at the Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL) to explore the feasibility of an air-cooled, water-moderated system for 
nuclear-powered merchant ships. Further development was discontinued in December 1964 
when decisions were made to lower the priority of the entire nuclear power merchant ship 
program. 
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Nuclear Ice Breakers like the Russian Lenin and the Arktica were a good success, not 
requiring refueling in the arctic regions. The Otto Hahn bulk ore carrier was built by 
Germany. It operated successfully for ten years. The Mutsu was an oceanographic research 
vessel built in Japan in 1974. Due to a design flaw causing a radiation leakage from its top 
radiation shield, it never became fully operational. The Sturgis MH-1A was a floating 
nuclear power plant ship. It was carrying a 45 Megawatts Thermal (MWth) PWR providing 
remote power supplies for the USA Army. 
 
Reactor type Rated power 
shaft horse power, 
[shp] 
[MW]* 
A2W 35,000 26.1 
A4W/A1G 140,000 104.4 
C1W 40,000 29.8 
D2G 35,000 26.1 
S5W 15,000 11.2 
S5G 17,000 12.7 
S6W 35,000 26.1 
S8G 35,000 26.1 
S9G 40,000 29.8 
*1 shp = 745.6999 Watt = 0.7456999 kW 
Table 1. Power ratings of naval reactor designs. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The Savannah, the first USA merchant ship. 
5. Power plant configurations 
The nuclear navy benefited the civilian nuclear power program in several ways. It first 
demonstrated the feasibility of the PWR concept, which is being currently used in the 
majority of land based power reactors worldwide. Second, naval reactors accumulated a 
large number of operational experience hours, leading to improvements in the land based 
reactors. The highly trained naval operational crews also become of great value to the 
civilian nuclear utilities providing them with experienced staffs in the operation and 
management of the land based systems. 
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Fig. 4. The loop-type naval reactor design for the nuclear ship Savannah. The reactor core is 
surrounded by the heat exchangers and the steam drums providing a compact shielding 
design. The horizontal steam generator was replaced by a vertical tube steam generator and 
an integrated system in subsequent designs. 1: Reactor core, 2: Water shield, 3: Coolant inlet, 
4: Pb Shield layer, 5: Steam drum, 6: Heat exchanger, 7: Pressurizer, or volume compensator, 
8: Equalizer line, 9: Cutoff channel, 10: Gate valve, 11: Coolant pumps, 12: Instrumentation 
channel. (Broder, 1970). 
Land based reactors differ in many ways from naval reactors. The thermal power of land 
based reactors is in the range of 3,000 MWth or higher. In contrast, a submarine reactor's 
power is smaller in the range of the hundreds of MWths. Land based systems use uranium 
fuel lightly enriched to the 3-5 percent range. This low level enrichment was imposed on the 
designers of land-based reactors to primarily avoid the circulation of highly enriched fuel. It 
is an impediment since it forces the use of a large volume for the core, increases the capital 
cost and hence the cost of the electricity produced. Highly enriched fuel at the 93-97 percent 
level is used in naval reactors to provide enough reactivity to override the xenon poison 
dead time, compactness as well as provide higher fuel burnup and the possibility for a 
single fuel loading over the useful service time of the powered ship.  
Table 2 shows the composition of highly enriched fuel used in nuclear propulsion as well as 
space reactor designs such as the SAFE-400 and the HOMER-15 designs (Poston, 2002). Most 
of the activity is caused by the presence of U234, which ends up being separated with the U235 
component during the enrichment process. This activity is primarily alpha decay and does 
not account for any appreciable dose. Since the fuel is highly purified and there is no 
material such as fluorine or oxygen causing any (α, n) reactions in the fuel, the alpha decay 
of U234 does not cause a neutron or gamma ray dose. If uranium nitride (UN) is used as fuel, 
the interaction threshold energy of nitrogen is well above the alpha emission energies of 
U234. Most of the dose prior to operation from the fuel is caused by U235 decay gammas and 
the spontaneous fission of U238. The total exposure rate is 19.9 [µRöntgen / hr] of which the 
gamma dose rate contribution is 15.8 and the neutron dose rate is 4.1. 
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Isotope Composition 
(percent) 
Activity 
(Curies) 
Decay 
Mode 
Exposure Rate 
Contribution 
[µR/hr] 
U234 0.74 6.1 Alpha decay unappreciable 
U235 97.00  Decay gammas appreciable 
U238 2.259  Spontaneous 
fissions 
appreciable 
Pu239 0.001  Alpha decay unappreciable 
Total  6.5  19.9 
Table 2. Composition of highly enriched fuel for naval and space reactors designs (Poston, 
2002). 
Reactor operators can wait for a 24 hours period; the reactor dead time, on a land based 
system for the xenon fission product to decay to a level where they can restart the reactor. A 
submarine cannot afford to stay dead in the water for a 24 hour period if the reactor is 
shutdown, necessitating highly enriched fuel to provide enough high reactivity to overcome 
the reactor dead time effect. A nuclear submarine has the benefit of the ocean as a heat sink, 
whereas a land based reactor needs sufficiently large water reservoirs to be available for its 
safety cooling circuits  
For these reasons, even though the same principle of operation is used for naval and land 
based reactor designs, the actual designs differ substantially. Earlier naval reactors used the 
loop type circuit for the reactor design for the Savannah reactor. There exists a multitude of 
naval reactor designs. More modern designs use the Integral circuit type. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Integral type of naval reactor vessel (Collier, 1987).  
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Because of the weight of the power plant and shielding, the reactor and associated steam 
generation equipment is located at the center of the ship. Watertight bulkheads isolating the 
reactor components surround it. The greater part of the system is housed in a steel 
containment, preventing any leakage of steam to the atmosphere in case of an accident. The 
containment vessel for the Savannah design consisted of a horizontal cylindrical section of 
10.7 meters diameter, and two hemispherical covers. The height of the containment was 15.2 
meters. The control rod drives are situated in a cupola of 4.27 m in diameter, on top of the 
containment. The containment vessel can withstand a pressure of 13 atm. This is the 
pressure attained in the hypothetical maximum credible accident, or design-basis accident. 
It is postulated as the rupture of the primary loop and the subsequent flashing into steam of 
the entire coolant volume. 
The secondary shielding consists of concrete, lead, and polyethylene and is positioned at the 
top of the containment. A prestressed concrete wall with a thickness of 122 cm surrounds 
the lower section of the containment. This wall rests on a steel cushion. The upper section of 
the secondary shielding is 15.2 cm of lead to absorb gamma radiation, and 15.2 cm of 
polyethylene to slow down any leaking neutrons. The space between the lead plates is filled 
with lead wool. The lead used in the shielding is cast by a special method preventing the 
formation of voids and inhomogeneities.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Layout of the OK-150 plant. 1: Reactor, 2: Steam generator, 3: Main circulation pumps, 
4: Control rod drives mechanism, 5: Filter, 6: Cooler, 7: Emergency cooling pump, 8: Primary 
circuit pressure relief valve, 9: Feedwater inlet, 10: Steam outlet (Reistad et. al., 2006). 
The polyethylene sheets are spaced so as to allow thermal expansion. Thick collison mats 
consisting of alternate layers of steel and wood are placed on the sides of the containment. 
The effective dose rate at the surface of the secondary sheet does not exceed 5 cSv 
(rem)/year. The containment is airtight. Personnel can remain in it for up to 30 minutes after 
reactor shutdown and the radiation level would have fallen to less than 0.2 cSv (rem)/hr. 
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The primary shielding is here made of an annular water tank that surrounds the reactor and a 
layer of lead attached to the outer surface of the tank, to minimize space. The height of the tank 
is 5.2 m, the thickness of the water layer, 84 cm, and the thickness of the lead is 5-10 cm. The 
weight of the primary shields is 68.2 tons, and with the water it is 118.2 tons. The weight of the 
containment is 227 tons. The secondary shielding weights 1795 tons consisting of: 561 tons of 
ordinary concrete, 289 tons of lead, 69 tons of polyethylene, and 160 tons of collison mats. The 
latter consist of 22 tons of wood and 138 tons of steel. The shielding complex is optimized to 
minimize the space used, while providing low radiation doses to the crew quarters. It is 
comparatively heavy because of the use of lead and steel, and is complicated to install. 
The Integral circuit design offers a substantial degree of inherent safety since the pumps; the 
steam generators and reactor core are all contained within the same pressure vessel. Since 
the primary circulating fluid is contained within the vessel, any leaking fluid would be 
contained within the vessel in case of an accident. This also eliminates the need for extensive 
piping to circulate the coolant from the core to the steam generators. In loop type circuits, a 
possibility exists for pipe rupture or leakage of the primary coolant pipes. This source of 
accidents is eliminated in an integral type of a reactor (Collier, 1987). 
6. Xenon generation 
The fission process generates a multitude of fission products with different yields (Lamarsh, 
1983). Table 3 shows some of these fission products yields resulting from the fission of three 
fissile isotopes: 
 
Isotope 92U233 92U235 94Pu239 
53I135 0.04750 0.06390 0.06040 
54Xe135 0.01070 0.00237 0.01050 
61Pm149 0.00795 0.01071 0.01210 
Table 3. Fission products yields from thermal 2200 m/sec neutrons, i  [nuclei/fission event] 
(Lamarsh, 1983). 
The most prominent of these fission products from the perspective of reactor control is 
54Xe135. It is formed as the result of the decay of 53I135. It is also formed in fission and by the 
decay of the tellurium isotope: 52Te135. This can be visualized as follows: 
 
135 135 135
52 53 54
135 135 0 *
52 53 -1
135 135 0 *
53 54 -1
135 135 0 *
54 55 -1
135 135 0 *
55 56 -1
      
   
    
    
  ( )  
Fission Te I Xe
Te I e
I Xe e
Xe Cs e
Cs Ba stable e
  
   
   
   
   
 (1) 
The half lives of the components of this chain are shown in Table 4. The end of the chain is 
the stable isotope 56Ba135. Because 52Te135 decays rapidly with a half life of 11 seconds into 
53I135, one can assume that all 53I135 is produced directly in the fission process. 
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Denoting I(t) as the atomic density of iodine in [nuclei/cm3], ψ as the thermal neutron flux 
[n /(cm2.sec)] one can write a rate equation for the iodine as: 
 
( )  [       ] 
-  [      ]
( )    -    ( )I f I
dI t rate of formation of iodine from fission
dt
rate of radioactive transformations of iodine
dI t I t
dt

    
 (2) 
where:  I  is the fission yield in [nuclei/fission event], 
  f  is the thermal fission cross section in [cm-1], 
  λI is the decay constant in [sec-1], with I 1
21
2
.
ln2λ = , T is the half life
T
 
 
Isotope Half Life, T1/2 
52Te135 11 sec 
53I135 6.7 hr 
54Xe135 9.2 hr 
55Cs135 2.3x106 yr 
56Ba135 Stable 
Table 4. Half lives of the isotopes in the xenon decay chain. 
A rate equation can also be written for the xenon in the form: 
 
( )   [       ] 
        [           ] 
        -  [      ] 
        -  [  
dX t rate of formation of xenon from fission
dt
rate of formation of Xe from the transformation of the Iodine
rate of radioactive transformations of xenon
rate of


   ( )   ],
 :
( )         ( ) -    ( ) -     ( )X f I X aX
disappearance of xenon X through neutron absorptions
or
dX t I t X t X t
dt
        
 (3) 
where aX  is the thermal microscopic absorption cross section for xenon equal to 2.65 x 106 
[b]. 
The large value of the absorption cross section of Xe, and its delayed generation from iodine, 
affect the operation of reactors both under equilibrium and after shutdown conditions. 
7. Iodine and xenon equilibrium concentrations 
Under equilibrium conditions, the rate of change of the iodine as well as the xenon 
concentrations is zero: 
 ( ) ( )  0dI t dX t
dt dt
   (4) 
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This leads to an equilibrium concentration for the iodine as: 
 0    
I f
I
I
     (5) 
The equilibrium concentration for the xenon will be:  
  00
        
    X f I
X aX
I
X
          (6) 
Substituting for the equilibrium concentration of the iodine, we can write: 
 0
(    )  
     X I f
X aX
X
          (7) 
8. Reactivity equivalent of xenon poisoning 
Ignoring the effects of neutron leakage, since it has a minor effect on fission product 
poisoning, we can use the infinite medium multiplication factor for a poisoned reactor in the 
form of the four factor formula (Ragheb, 1982): 
    k pf   (8) 
and for an unpoisoned core as: 
 0 0   k pf   (9) 
We define the reactivity  of the poisoned core as: 
 0 00 -   -           1 -  f f fk k k
k k f f
      (10) 
In this equation, 
f
aF
   , is the regeneration factor, 
 is the fast fission factor, 
p is the resonance escape probability, 
 is the average neutron yield per fission event, 
f is the macroscopic fission cross section, 
aF is the macroscopic absorption cross section of the fuel, 
f is the fuel utilization factor. 
The fuel utilization factor for the unpoisoned core is given by: 
 0    aF
aF aM
f      (11) 
And for the poisoned core it is: 
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    aF
aF aM aP
f        (12) 
where: 
aM is the moderator's macroscopic absorption coefficient, 
aP is the poison's macroscopic absorption coefficients. 
From the definition of the reactivity in Eqn. 10, and Eqns. 11 and 12 we can readily get: 
    -  aP
aF aM
     (13) 
It is convenient to express the reactivity in an alternate form. For the unpoisoned critical 
core: 
 0 0
 1       aF
aF aM
k pf p          (14) 
From which: 
   aF aM aFp       (15) 
Substituting this value in the expression of the reactivity, and the expression for the 
regeneration factor, we get: 
 
1    -  aP
fp
    (16) 
For equilibrium xenon: 
 0
(   )   
       X I f aXaP aX
X aX
X
         

  (17) 
Inserting the last equation for the expression for the reactivity we get: 
 (   )     -  
( )
X I aX
x aX p
       
   (18) 
Dividing numerator and denominator by σaX we get: 
  
(   )    -  
(
X I
x
aX
p
     

 )
 (18)’ 
The parameter: 
 130.77 10X
aX
x   (19) 
at 20 degrees C, and has units of the flux [neutrons/(cm2.sec)]. 
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The expression for the reactivity is written in terms of   as: 
 (   )     -  
(
X I
p
    
  )ψ  (18)’’ 
For a reactor operating at high flux,  
  , 
and we can write: 
 (   )   -   X I
p
     (20) 
Example 
For a reactor fueled with U235,  =2.42, p=  =1, the value for  for equilibrium xenon is: 
 
( 0.00237 + 0.06390) 0.06627= - 0.027384
2.42 2.42
     
or a negative 2.74 percent. 
9. Reactor dead time 
A unique behavior occurs to the xenon after reactor shutdown. Although its production 
ceases, it continues to build up as a result of the decay of its iodine parent. Therefore the 
concentration of the xenon increases after shutdown. Since its cross section for neutrons is so 
high, it absorbs neutrons and prevents the reactor from being restarted for a period of time 
denoted as the “reactor dead time.”  
In a land based reactor, since the xenon eventually decays, after about 24 hours, the reactor 
can then be restarted. In naval propulsion applications, a naval vessel cannot be left in the 
water unable to be restarted and vulnerable to enemy attack by depth charges or torpedoes. 
For this reason, naval reactor cores must be provided with enough reactivity to overcome 
the xenon negative reactivity after shutdown. 
To analyze the behavior, let us rewrite the rate equations for iodine and xenon with   equal 
to 0 after shutdown: 
 ( )  -   ( )I
dI t I t
dt
   (21) 
 ( )   ( ) -  ( )I X
dX t I t X t
dt
     (22) 
Using Bateman's solution (Ragheb, 2011), the iodine and xenon concentrations become 
respectively: 
 -    0( )    I
tI t I e   (23) 
 -   -    -    0 0( )         (   -   )IX X
tt tI
I X
X t X e I e e        (24) 
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Substituting for the equilibrium values of X0 and I0 we get: 
 -  -  -   
X
( )
( )   (  -  )X X IX I f t t tI f
aX I X
X t e e e  
                (25) 
 
 
Fig. 7. Negative reactivity due to xenon poisoning. Flux = 5x1014 [n/(cm2.sec)] (Ragheb, 
2011). 
The negative reactivity due to xenon poisoning is now a function of time and is given by: 
 
( )
-   -  -    
1 ( ) -  
( )1-  
-  [  (  -  )]X X I
aP t
f
aP
f
t t taP X I I
X aX I X
t
p
X t
p
e e e
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  
  
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           



 (26) 
Figure 7 shows the negative reactivity resulting from xenon after reactor shutdown. It 
reaches a minimum value, which occurs at about 10 hours after shutdown. This post 
shutdown reactivity is important in reactors that have operated at a high flux level. If at any 
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time after shutdown, the positive reactivity available by removing all the control rods is less 
than the negative reactivity caused by xenon, the reactor cannot be restarted until the xenon 
has decayed. In Fig. 7, at an assumed reactivity reserve of 20 percent, during the time 
interval from 2.5 hours to 35 hours, the reactor cannot be restarted. This period of 35-2.5 = 
32.5 hours is designated as the “Reactor Dead Time.” 
This reactor dead time is of paramount importance in mobile systems that may be prone to 
accidental scrams. This is more important at the end of core lifetime, when the excess 
reactivity is limited. For this reason, mobile reactors necessitate the adoption of special 
design features, providing the needed excess reactivity to override the negative xenon 
reactivity, such as the use of highly enriched cores.  
In land based systems such as the Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor concept, 
booster rods of highly enriched U235 are available to override the xenon dead time after 
shutdown, leading to a higher capacity factor. Power fluctuations induced to follow demand 
in any power reactor lead to xenon oscillations without any reactor shutdown. The changes 
of xenon concentrations due to load following are compensated for by adjusting the 
chemical shim or boron concentration in the coolant, and by control rods adjustments. 
10. Nuclear navies 
The USA nuclear fleet grew rapidly at the height of the East West Cold War in the 1980s. 
About one fourth of the submarine fleet carried intercontinental ballistic missiles. These can 
be ejected by the use of compressed air while the submarine is totally submerged, with the 
rocket engine starting once the missile is above the water surface. 
In the Falkland Islands War, a single nuclear British submarine paralyzed the entire 
Argentinean Naval fleet. It sunk the cruiser “General Belgrano” and forced the Argentine 
Navy to not deploy out of port. 
During the first and second Gulf Wars, and in the Lybia conflict, the USA Navy launched 
Tomahawk missiles, had unchallenged use of the oceans and protected 85 percent of the war 
supplies that were transported by ships. 
10.1 Navy carrier force 
The mission of the aircraft carrier force is to provide a credible, sustainable, independent 
forward presence and a conventional deterrence in peace times. In times of crisis, it operates 
as the cornerstone of joint and/or allied maritime expeditionary forces. It operates and 
support air attacks on enemies, protects friendly forces and engages in sustained 
independent operations in times of war. As an example, the vital statistics of the nuclear 
Nimitz Class aircraft carrier are: 
 
Power Plant:  Two nuclear reactors, four shafts. 
Length:   1,092 feet. 
Beam:   134 feet. 
Displacement:  97,000 tons at full load. 
Speed:   30 knots, 34.5 miles per hour. 
Aircraft:   85. 
Crew:   500 officers, 5,000 enlisted. 
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10.2 Nuclear submarine force 
The USA submarine force maintains its position as the world’s preeminent submarine force. 
It incorporates new and innovative technologies allowing it to maintain dominance 
throughout the naval battle space. It incorporates the multiple capabilities of submarines 
and develops tactics for high seas control, land battle support as well as strategic deterrence. 
It also fills the role of a stealthy signal and intelligence gathering and a full spectrum of 
special operations and expeditionary missions. It includes forces of ballistic missiles 
submarines (SSBN), guided missile submarines (SSGN), and attack submarines (SSN). The 
vital statistics of the Ballistic Missile Trident submarines and the guided missiles submarines 
are: 
 
Armament, SSBN: Trident missiles. 
Armament, SSGN: 154 Tomahawk missiles, 66 Special operation Forces. 
Power Plant:  One nuclear reactor, one shaft. 
Length:   560 feet. 
Beam:   42 feet. 
Displacement:  18,750 tons, submerged. 
Speed:   20 knots, 23 miles per hour. 
Crew:   15 officers, 140 enlisted. 
 
The statistics for the fast attack Los Angeles class submarines are: 
 
Power Plant:  One nuclear reactor, one shaft. 
Length:   360 feet. 
Beam:   33 feet. 
Displacement:  6,900 tons, submerged. 
Speed:   25 knots, 28 miles per hour. 
Crew:   12 officers, 121 enlisted. 
10.3 Russian navy 
The nuclear Russian navy also reached its peak at the same time as the USA navy. The first 
of the Typhoon Class 25,000 ton strategic ballistic missile submarines was launched in 1980 
from the Severodvinsk Shipyard on the White Sea. In the same year the first Oscar Class 
guided missile submarine was launched. It is capable of firing 24 long range anti-ship cruise 
missiles while remaining submerged. Five shipyards produced seven different classes of 
submarines.  
The Delta IV class is nuclear-powered with two VM-4 pressurized water reactors rated at 
180 MWth. There are two turbines, type GT3A-365 rated at 27.5MW. The propulsion system 
drives two shafts with seven-bladed fixed-pitch propellers. 
10.4 Chinese navy 
Five hundred years ago the contender for the dominance of the world’s oceans was the 
Chinese imperial exploration fleet which was at its peak technologically centuries ahead of 
its competitors. A strategic mistake by its emperor was to neglect its sea access with the 
result of opening the door to European (The Opium Wars) and then Japanese military 
intervention and occupation. Being the world’s second largest importer of petroleum after 
the USA, China seeks to protect its energy corridors by sea and free access to Southeast Asia 
sea lanes beyond the Indochinese Peninsula.  
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China’s naval fleet as of 2008 had 5 nuclear powered fast attack submarines and one ballistic 
missiles submarine carrying 12-16 nuclear tipped missiles with a range of 3,500 km. This is 
in addition to 30 diesel electric submarines with 20 other submersibles. 
The Chinese submarine fleet is expected to exceed the number of USA’s Seventh Fleet ships 
in the Pacific Ocean by 2020 with the historic patience and ambition to pursue a long term 
strategy of eventually matching and then surpassing the USA’s regional dominance. 
11. Nuclear cruise missile submarines 
The nuclear powered Echo I and II, and the Charlie I and II can fire eight antiship 
weapons cruise missiles while remaining submerged at a range of up to 100 kilometers 
from the intended target. These cruise missile submarines also carry ASW and anti-ship 
torpedoes. 
The nuclear cruise missile submarines are meant to operate within range of air bases on 
land. Both forces can then launch coordinated attacks against an opponent's naval forces. 
Reconnaissance aircraft can then provide target data for submarine launched missiles. 
12. Nuclear ballistic missile submarines 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) on Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile 
Submarines (SSBNs) have been the basis of strategic nuclear forces. Russia had more land 
based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) than the SLBM forces (Weinberger, 1981). 
The Russian ICBM and SLBM deployment programs initially centered on the SS-9 and SS-11 
ICBMs and the SS-N-6/Yankee SLBM/SSBN weapons systems. They later used the Multiple 
Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) SS-N-18 on the Delta Class nuclear 
submarines, and the SS-NX-20 on the nuclear Typoon Class SSBN submarine. 
The Russian SLBM force has reached 62 submarines carrying 950 SLBMs with a total of 
almost 2,000 nuclear warhead reentry vehicles. Russia deployed 30 nuclear SSBNs, and the 
20 tube very large Typhoon SSBN in the 1980s. These submarines were capable to hit targets 
across the globe from their homeports. 
The 34 deployed Yankee Class nuclear submarines each carried 16 nuclear tipped missiles. 
The SS-N-6/Yankee I weapon system is composed of the liquid propellant SS-N-6 missile in 
16 missile tubes launchers on each submarine. One version of the missiles carries a single 
Reentry Vehicle (RV) and has an operational range of about 2,400 to 3,000 kilometers. 
Another version carries 2 RVs , and has an operational range of about 3,000 kilometers. 
The Delta I and II classes of submarines displaced 11,000 tons submerged and have an 
overall length of about 140 meters. These used the SS-N-8 long range, two stages, liquid 
propellant on the 12-missile tube Delta I and the 16 missile tube Delta II submarines. The SS-
N-8 has a range of about 9,000 kilometers and carries one RV. The SS-N-18 was used on the 
16 missile tube Delta III submarines, and has MIRV capability with a booster range of 6,500 
to 8,000 kilometers, depending on the payload configuration. The Delta III nuclear 
submarines could cover most of the globe from the relative security of their home waters 
with a range of 7,500 kilometers.  
The Typhoon Class at a 25,000 tons displacement, twice the size of the Delta III with a length 
of 170 m and 20 tubes carrying the SS-NX-20 missile each with 12 RVs, has even greater 
range at 8,300 kms, higher payload , better accuracy and more warheads.  
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13. Nuclear attack submarines 
At some time the Russian Navy operated about 377 submarines, including 180 nuclear 
powered ones, compared with 115 in the USA navy. The Russian navy operated 220 attack 
submarines, 60 of them were nuclear powered. These included designs of the November, 
Echo, Victor, and Alfa classes. The Victor class attack submarine, was characterized by a 
deep diving capability and high speed. 
14. Alfa class submarines 
The Alfa Class submarine is reported to have been the fastest submarine in service in any 
navy. It was a deep diving, titanium hull submarine with a submerged speed estimated to 
be over 40 knots. The titanium hull provided strength for deep diving. It also offered a 
reduced weight advantage leading to higher power to weight ratios resulting in higher 
accelerations. The higher speed could also be related to some unique propulsion system. The 
high speeds of Russian attack submarines were meant to counter the advanced propeller 
cavitation and pump vibration reduction technologies in the USA designs, providing them 
with silent and stealth hiding and maneuvering. 
 
 
Fig. 8. The Nuclear Powered Russian VICTOR I class Attack Submarine (Weinberger, 1981). 
The Alfa Class of Russian submarines used a lead and bismuth alloy cooled fast reactors. 
They suffered corrosion on the reactor components and activation through the formation of 
the highly toxic Po210 isotope. Refueling needed a steam supply to keep the liquid metal 
molten above 257 oF.  
Advantages were a high cycle efficiency and that the core can be allowed to cool into a solid 
mass with the lead providing adequate radiation shielding. This class of submarines has 
been decommissioned. 
15. Seawolf class submarines 
The Seawolf class of submarines provided stealth, endurance and agility and are the most 
heavily armed fast attack submarines in the world.  
They provided the USA Navy with undersea weapons platforms that could operate in any 
scenario against any threat, with mission and growth capabilities that far exceed Los 
Angeles-class submarines. The robust design of the Seawolf class enabled these submarines 
to perform a wide spectrum of military assignments, from underneath the Arctic icepack to 
littoral regions of the world. These were capable of entering and remaining in the backyards 
of potential adversaries undetected, preparing and shaping the battle space and striking 
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rapidly. Their missions include surveillance, intelligence collection, special warfare, cruise 
missile strike, mine warfare, and anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare 
 
Builder General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division. 
Power plant One S6W nuclear reactor, one shaft. 
Length SSN 21 and SSN 22: 353 feet (107.6 meters) 
SSN 23: 453 feet (138 meters) 
Beam 40 feet (12.2 meters) 
Submerged Displacement SSN 21 and SSN 22: 9,138 tons (9,284 metric tons) 
SSN 23 12,158 tons (12,353 metric tons) 
Speed 25+ knots (28+ miles / hour, 46.3+ kilometers / hour) 
Crew 140: 14 Officers; 126 Enlisted 
Armaments Tomahawk missiles, MK-48 torpedoes, eight torpedo tubes 
Commissioning dates Seawolf: July 19, 1997 
Connecticut: December11, 1998;  
Jimmy Carter: February 19, 2005. 
Table 5. Seawolf class of submarines technical specifications. 
16. Ohio class submarines 
The Ohio Class submarine is equipped with the Trident strategic ballistic missile from 
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space. The Trident was built in two versions, Trident I (C4), 
which is phased out, and the larger and longer range Trident II (D5), which entered service 
in 1990. The first eight submarines, (SSBN 726 to 733 inclusive) were equipped with Trident 
I and the following ten (SSBN 734 to 743) carry the Trident II. Conversion of the four Trident 
I submarines remaining after the START II Treaty (Henry M. Jackson, Alabama, Alaska and 
Nevada), to Trident II began in 2000 and completed in 2008. Lockheed Martin produced 12 
Trident II missiles for the four submarines. 
The submarine has the capacity for 24 Trident missile tubes in two rows of 12. The 
dimensions of the Trident II missile are length 1,360 cm x diameter 210 cm and the weight is 
59,000 kg. The three-stage solid fuel rocket motor is built by ATK (Alliant Techsystems) 
Thiokol Propulsion. The USA Navy gives the range as “greater than 7,360 km” but this 
could be up to 12,000 km depending on the payload mix. Missile guidance is provided by an 
inertial navigation system, supported by stellar navigation. Trident II is capable of carrying 
up to twelve MIRVs, each with a yield of 100 kilotons, although the SALT treaty limits this 
number to eight per missile. The circle of equal probability, or the radius of the circle within 
which half the strikes will impact, is less than 150 m. The Sperry Univac Mark 98 missile 
control system controls the 24 missiles.  
The Ohio class submarine is fitted with four 533 mm torpedo tubes with a Mark 118 digital 
torpedo fire control system. The torpedoes are the Gould Mark 48 torpedoes. The Mark 48 is 
a heavy weight torpedo with a warhead of 290 kg, which has been operational in the USA 
Navy since 1972. The torpedo can be operated with or without wire guidance and the 
system has active and/or passive acoustic homing. The range is up to 50 km at a speed of 40 
knots. After launch, the torpedo carries out target search, acquisition and attack procedures 
delivering to a depth of 3,000 ft.  
The Ohio class submarine is equipped with eight launchers for the Mk 2 torpedo decoy. 
Electronic warfare equipment is the WLR-10 threat warning system and the WLR-8(V) 
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surveillance receiver from GTE of Massachusetts. The WLR-8(V) uses seven YIG tuned and 
vector tuned super heterodyne receivers to operate from 50MHz up to J-band. An acoustic 
interception and countermeasures system, AN/WLY-1 from Northrop Grumman, has been 
developed to provide the submarine with an automatic response against torpedo attack. 
The surface search, navigation and fire control radar is BPS 15A I/J band radar. The sonar 
suite includes: IBM BQQ 6 passive search sonar, Raytheon BQS 13, BQS 15 active and 
passive high-frequency sonar, BQR 15 passive towed array from Western Electric, and the 
active BQR 19 navigation sonar from Raytheon. Kollmorgen Type 152 and Type 82 
periscopes are fitted. 
The main machinery is the GE PWR S8G reactor system with two turbines providing 60,000 
hp and driving a single shaft. The submarine is equipped with a 325 hp Magnatek auxiliary 
propulsion motor. The propulsion provides a speed in excess of 18 knots surfaced and 25 
knots submerged. 
It is designed for mine avoidance, special operations forces delivery and recovery. It uses 
non acoustic sensors, advanced tactical communications and non acoustic stealth. It is 
equipped with conformal sonar arrays which seek to provide an optimally sensor coated 
submarine with improved stealth at a lower total ownership cost. New technology called 
Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sonar (CAVES) could replace the existing Wide Aperture 
Array technology and is to be implemented in units of the Virginia Class.  
 
Power Plant Single S9G PWR 
Single shaft with pump jet propulsion 
One secondary propulsion submerged motor 
Displacement 7,800 tons, submerged 
Length 277 ft 
Draft 32 ft 
Beam 34 ft 
Speed 25+ knots, submerged 
Horizontal tubes Four 21 inches torpedo tubes 
Vertical tubes 12 Vertical Launch System Tubes 
Weapon systems  39, including: 
Vertical Launch System Tomahawk Cruise Missiles 
Mk 48 ADCAP Heavy weight torpedoes 
Advanced Mobile Mines 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
Special warfare Dry Deck Shelter 
Sonars Spherical active/passive arrays 
Light Weight Wide Aperture Arrays 
TB-16, TB-29 and future towed arrays 
High frequency chin and sail arrays 
Counter measures 1 internal launcher 
14 external launchers 
Crew 113 officers and men 
Table 6. Technical Specifications of the Virginia Class of Submarines. 
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High Frequency Sonar will play a more important role in future submarine missions as 
operations in the littorals require detailed information about the undersea environment to 
support missions requiring high quality bathymetry, precision navigation, mine detection or 
ice avoidance. Advanced High Frequency Sonar systems are under development and testing 
that will provide submarines unparalleled information about the undersea environment. 
This technology will be expanded to allow conformal sonar arrays on other parts of the ship 
that will create new opportunities for use of bow and sail structure volumes while 
improving sonar sensor performance. 
17. Nuclear ice-breakers 
Nuclear-powered icebreakers were constructed by Russia for the purpose of increasing the 
shipping along the northern coast of Siberia, in ocean waters covered by ice for long periods 
of time and river shipping lanes. The nuclear powered icebreakers have far more power 
than their diesel powered counterparts, and for extended time periods. During the winter, 
the ice along the northern Russian sea way varies in thickness from 1.2 - 2 meters. The ice in 
the central parts of the Polar Sea is 2.5 meters thick on average. Nuclear-powered 
icebreakers can break this ice at speeds up to 10 knots. In ice free waters the maximum 
speed of the nuclear powered icebreakers is 21 knots. In 1988 the NS Sevmorpu was 
commissioned in Russia to serve the northern Siberian ports. It is a 61,900 metric tonnes, 260 
m long and is powered by the KLT-40 reactor design, delivering 32.5 propeller MW from the 
135 MWth reactor. 
Russia operated at some time up to eight nuclear powered civilian vessels divided into 
seven icebreakers and one nuclear-powered container ship. These made up the world's 
largest civilian fleet of nuclear-powered ships. The vessels were operated by Murmansk 
Shipping Company (MSC), but were owned by the Russian state. The servicing base 
Atomflot is situated near Murmansk, 2 km north of the Rosta district.  
Icebreakers facilitated ores transportation from Norilsk in Siberia to the nickel foundries on 
the Kola Peninsula, a journey of about 3,000 kms. Since 1989 the nuclear icebreakers have 
been used to transport wealthy Western tourists to visit the North Pole. A three week long 
trip costs $ 25,000.  
The icebreaker Lenin, launched in 1957 was the world's first civilian vessel to be propelled 
by nuclear power. It was commissioned in 1959 and retired from service in 1989. Eight other 
civilian nuclear-powered vessels were built: five of the Arktika class, two river icebreakers 
and one container ship. The nuclear icebreaker Yamal, commissioned in 1993, is the most 
recent nuclear-powered vessel added to the fleet. 
The nuclear icebreakers are powered by PWRs of the KLT-40 type. The reactor contains fuel 
enriched to 30-40 percent in U235. By comparison, nuclear power plants use fuel enriched to 
only 3-5 percent. Weapons grade uranium is enriched to over 90 percent. American 
submarine reactors are reported to use up to 97.3 percent enriched U235. The irradiated fuel 
in test reactors contains about 32 percent of the original U235, implying a discharge 
enrichment of 97.3 x 0.32 = 31.13 percent enrichment. 
Under normal operating conditions, the nuclear icebreakers are only refueled every three to 
four years. These refueling operations are carried out at the Atomflot service base. 
Replacement of fuel assemblies takes approximately 1 1/2 months. 
For each of the reactor cores in the nuclear icebreakers, there are four steam generators that 
supply the turbines with steam. The third cooling circuit contains sea water that condenses 
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and cools down the steam after it has run through the turbines. The icebreaker reactors' 
cooling system is especially designed for low temperature Arctic sea water. 
18. Discussion: Defining trends 
Several trends may end up shaping the future of naval ship technology: the all electrical 
ship, stealth technology, littoral vessels and moored barges for power production. Missions 
of new naval systems are evolving towards signal intelligence gathering and clandestine 
special forces insertion behind enemy lines requiring newer designs incorporating stealth 
configurations and operation. 
The all-electric ship propulsion concept was adopted for the future surface combatant 
power source. This next evolution or Advanced Electrical Power Systems (AEPS) involves 
the conversion of virtually all shipboard systems to electric power; even the most 
demanding systems, such as propulsion and catapults aboard aircraft carriers. It would 
encompass new weapon systems such as modern electromagnetic rail-guns and free 
electron lasers.  
Littoral vessels are designed to operate closer to the coastlines than existing vessels such as 
cruisers and destroyers. Their mission would be signal intelligence gathering, stealth 
insertion of Special Forces, mine clearance, submarine hunting and humanitarian relief. 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), monitored by nuclear-powered Virginia Class 
submarines would use Continuous Active Sonar (CAS) arrays which release a steady stream 
of energy, the sonar equivalent of a flashlight would be used as robots to protect carrier 
groups and turning attacking or ambushing submarines from being the hunters into being 
the hunted. 
18.1 All electric propulsion and stealth ships 
The CVN-21's new nuclear reactor not only will provide three times the electrical output of 
current carrier power plants, but also will use its integrated power system to run an Electro 
Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) to replace the current steam-driven catapults, 
combined with an Electromagnetic Aircraft Recovery System (EARS). To store large 
amounts of energy, flywheels, large capacitor banks or other energy storage systems would 
have to be used. 
A typical ship building experience involved the design conversion of one class of 
submarines to an all-electric design. The electric drive reduced the propulsion drive system 
size and weight; eliminating the mechanical gearbox. However, the power system required 
extensive harmonic filtering to eliminate harmonic distortion with the consequence that the 
overall vessel design length increased by 10 feet. 
Tests have been conducted to build stealth surface ships based on the technology developed 
for the F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter. The first such system was built by the USA Navy as 
“The Sea Shadow.” The threat from ballistic anti ship missiles and the potential of nuclear 
tipped missiles has slowed down the development of stealth surface ships. The USA Navy 
cut its $5 billion each DDG-1000 stealth destroyer ships from an initially planned seven to 
two units. 
Missile defense emerged as a major naval mission at the same time that the DDG-1000’s 
stealth destroyer design limitations and rising costs converged, all while shipbuilding 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 30
budgets were getting squeezed. The SM-3 Standard missile, fired only by warships, is the 
most successful naval missile defense system; having passed several important trials while 
other Ballistic Missile Defense, BMD weapons are under testing. The ballistic-missile threat 
is such that the USA Navy decided it needed 89 ships capable of firing the SM-3 and that the 
DDG-1000 realistically would never be able to fire and guide the SM-3 since the stealth 
destroyer is optimized for firing land-attack missiles not Standard missiles. 
 
 
Fig. 9. The DDG-1000 stealth destroyer is optimized for firing land-attack missiles; not 
Ballistic Missile Defense, BMD missiles. The Raytheon Company builds the DDG-1000’s 
SPY-3 radar, and Bath Iron Works, the Maine shipyard builds the DDG-1000. (Source: 
Raytheon). 
The USA Navy has 84 large surface combatants, split between Arleigh-Burke Class 
destroyers and the Ticonderoga Class cruisers, capable of carrying the combination of 
Standard missiles and the BMD capable Aegis radar. The DDG-1000 cannot affordably be 
modified to fire SM-3s. So the Navy needs another 12 SM-3 “shooters” to meet the 
requirement for missile defense, and there was no time to wait for the future CG-X cruiser. 
With new amphibious ships, submarines, carriers and Littoral Combat Ships in production 
alongside the DDG-1000s, there was no room in the budget for five extra DDG-1000s. 
18.2 Multipurpose floating barges 
The vision of floating barges with nuclear reactors to produce electrical power for industrial 
and municipal use, hydrogen for fuel cells, as well as fresh desalinated water at the shores of 
arid areas of the world may become promising future prospects. The electricity can be used 
to power a new generation of transportation vehicles equipped with storage batteries, or the 
hydrogen can be used in fuel cells vehicles. An urban legend is related about a USA Navy 
nuclear submarine under maintenance at Groton, Connecticut, temporarily supplying the 
neighboring port facilities with electricity when an unexpected power outage occurred. This 
would have required the conversion, of the 120 Volts and 400 Hz military electricity 
standard to the 10-12 kV and 60 Hz civilian one. Submarines tied up at port connect to a 
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connection network that matches frequency and voltage so that the reactors can be shut 
down. The two electrical generators on a typical submarine would provide about 3 MWe x 2 
= 6 MWe of power, with some of this power used by the submarine itself. In case of a loss of 
local power, docked vessels have to start their reactors or their emergency diesel generators 
anyway. 
The accumulated experience of naval reactors designs is being as the basis of a trend toward 
the consideration of a new generation of modular compact land-based reactor designs. 
 
 
Fig. 10. The Phalanx radar-guided gun, nicknamed as R2-D2 from the Star-Wars movies, is 
used for close-in ship defense. The radar controlled Gatling gun turret shooting tungsten 
armor-piercing, explosive, or possibly depleted uranium munitions on the USS Missouri, 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (Photo: M. Ragheb). 
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Assessment of Deployment Scenarios 
of New Fuel Cycle Technologies 
J. J. Jacobson, G. E. Matthern and S. J. Piet 
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1. Introduction 
There is the beginning of a nuclear renaissance. High energy costs, concern over fossil fuel 
emissions, and energy security are reviving the interest in nuclear energy. There are a 
number of driving questions on how to move forward with nuclear power. Will there be 
enough uranium available? How do we handle the used fuel, recycle or send to a geologic 
repository? What type of reactors should be developed? What type of fuel will they need? 
2. Why assess deployment scenarios? 
Nuclear fuel cycles are inherently dynamic. However, fuel cycle goals and objectives are 
typically static.1,2,3 Many (if not most) comparisons of nuclear fuel cycle options compare 
them via static time-independent analyses. Our intent is to show the value of analyzing the 
nuclear fuel cycle in a dynamic, temporal way that includes feedback and time delays.  
Competitive industries look at how new technology options might displace existing 
technologies and change how existing systems work. So too, years of performing dynamic 
simulations of advanced nuclear fuel cycle options provide insights into how they might 
work and how one might transition from the current once-through fuel cycle.  
Assessments can benefit from considering dynamics in at least three aspects – A) transitions 
from one fuel cycle strategy to another, B) how fuel cycles perform with nuclear power 
growth superimposed with time delays throughout the system, and C) impacts of fuel cycle 
performance due to perturbations.  
To support a detailed complex temporal analysis of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, we have 
developed a system dynamics model that includes all the components of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. VISION tracks the life cycle of the strategic facilities that are essential in the fuel cycle 
such as, reactors, fuel fabrication, separations and repository facilities. The facility life cycle 
begins by ordering, licensing, construction and then various stages of on-line periods and 
finally decommission and disposition. Models need to allow the user to adjust the times for 
various parts of the lifecycle such as licensing, construction, operation, and facility lifetimes. 
Current energy production from nuclear power plants in the once through approach is 
linear. Uranium is mined, enriched, fabricated into fuel, fed to nuclear reactor, removed 
from a nuclear reactor and stored for future disposal. This is a once through cycle, with no 
real “cycle” involved. Future fuel cycles are likely to be real cycles where nuclear fuel and 
other materials may be reused in a nuclear reactor one or more times. This will increase the 
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dependency among the steps in the process and require a better understanding of the 
technical limitations, the infrastructure requirements, and the economics. All three of these 
elements are time dependent and cyclical in nature to some degree. Understanding how 
these elements interact requires a model that can cycle and evolve with time – a dynamic 
model. Understanding these new fuel cycles also requires extrapolation beyond current fuel 
cycle operating experience. The goal is not to be able to predict the exact number or size of 
each of the elements of the fuel cycle, but rather to understand the relative magnitudes, 
capacities, and durations for various options and scenarios. A systems-level approach is 
needed to understand the basics of how these new fuel cycles behave and evolve. 
3. Vision nuclear fuel cycle model 
The Verifiable Fuel Cycle Simulation (VISION) model was developed and is being used to 
analyze and compare various nuclear power technology deployment scenarios4. The scenarios 
include varying growth rates, reactor types, nuclear fuel and system delays. Analyzing the 
results leads to better understanding of the feedback between the various components of the 
nuclear fuel cycle that includes uranium resources, reactor number and mix, nuclear fuel type 
and waste management. VISION links the various fuel cycle components into a single model 
for analysis and includes both mass flows and decision criteria as a function of time. 
This model is intended to assist in evaluating “what if” scenarios and in comparing fuel, 
reactor, and fuel processing alternatives at a systems level. The model is not intended as a 
tool for process flow and design modeling of specific facilities nor for tracking individual 
units of fuel or other material through the system. The model is intended to examine the 
interactions among the components of the nuclear fuel system as a function of time varying 
system parameters; this model represents a dynamic rather than steady-state approximation 
of the nuclear fuel system. 
3.1 VISION introduction 
VISION tracks the flow of material through the entire nuclear fuel cycle. The material flows 
start at mining and proceed through conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, fuel in and out 
of the reactor and then used fuel management, either recycling, storage, or final waste 
disposition. Each of the stages in the fuel cycle includes material tracking at the isotopic 
level, appropriate delays and associated waste streams. VISION is able to track radioactive 
decay in any module where the material resides for a minimum of a year.  
VISION also tracks the life cycle of the strategic facilities that are essential in the fuel cycle 
such as, reactors, fuel fabrication, separations, spent fuel storage and conditioning and 
repository facilities. The life cycle begins by ordering, licensing, construction and then 
various stages of on-line periods and finally decommission and disposition. The model 
allows the user to adjust the times for various parts of the lifecycle such as licensing time, 
construction time and active lifetime. 
VISION calculates a wide range of metrics that describe candidate fuel cycle options, 
addressing waste management, proliferation resistance, uranium utilization, and economics. 
For example, waste metrics include the mass of unprocessed spent fuel, mass in storage, 
final waste mass and volume, long-term radiotoxicity, and long-term heat commitment to a 
geologic repository. Calculation of such metrics requires tracking the flow of 81 specific 
isotopes and chemical elements.5 
Figure 1 is a schematic of a nuclear fuel cycle, which is organized into a series of modules 
that include all of the major facilities and processes involved in the fuel cycle, starting with 
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uranium mining and ending with waste management and disposal. The arrows in the 
diagram indicate the mass flow of the material. Not shown, but included in each module 
within the model, are the information and decision algorithms that form the logic for the 
mass flow in VISION. The mass flows are combined with waste packaging data to provide 
insight into transportation issues of the fuel cycle. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of VISION modules representing the nuclear fuel cycle processes and facilities. 
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3.2 VISION functionality 
VISION is designed around the methodology of system dynamics. System dynamics is a 
computer-based method for studying dynamic, problematic behavior of complex systems. 
The method emerged in the 1960s from the work of Jay Forrester at the Sloan School of 
Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A detailed description of the system 
dynamics approach was first given in "Principles of Systems".6 VISION is designed to run on 
a desktop personal computer with run times less than 10 minutes for any single scenario 
simulated over a 200-year period. Users can run scenarios by selecting pre-defined base 
cases or by modifying the options that make up a scenario. Currently, there are 
approximately 60 predefined scenarios available that range from the more simple case of 
thermal reactors without recycling to more advanced cases that include advanced reactor 
types such as fast reactors with various recycle options. Results are displayed in a variety of 
charts and graphs that are part of the interface or the user can open up the Excel charts that 
include many more tables and charts. The charts include comparative charts of data within 
the scenario such as the number of light water reactors (LWR) versus Fast Reactors. 
VISION simulates the nuclear fuel cycle system with as many of its dynamic characteristics 
as possible, to name a few, it simulates impacts from delays, isotopic decay, capacity 
building and fuel availability. The VISION model has three modes of reactor ordering, the 
first takes a projected energy growth rate and nuclear power market share over the next 
century and builds reactors in order to meet this demand, second the user can manually set 
the number of reactors that are ordered each year and lastly, the user can specify an end of 
the century target in GWe and allow the model to build reactors to meet that projection. 
Options are included in the model that allow the user to recycle used nuclear fuel with up to 
10 different separation technologies, use up to 10 different reactor and fuel types, and have 
up to 15 different waste management options. The technology performance can be varied 
each year. The results of the model will help policy makers and industry leaders know and 
understand the impacts of delays in the system, infrastructure requirements, material flows, 
and comparative metrics for any combination of advanced fuel cycle scenarios. 
The subsections below describe key algorithms and approaches that comprise VISION’s 
functionality. The first several subsections address the issue of when new facilities are 
ordered. VISION has a complex look-ahead ordering algorithm for new facilities. The user 
can override this instead and force the model to build facilities by inputting the capacity for 
each type of facility. The discussion on facility ordering entails subsections on facilities 
themselves as an introduction, supplies needed for the facility, and outputs from each 
facility. After ordering facilities, the section turns to energy growth rate, and then the 
physics issues of which isotopes are tracked in VISION and how VISION uses reactor 
physics data. 
3.2.1 Facilities 
The mathematical model for ordering facilities is based upon a demand-supply model, 
where facilities for one or more stages of the fuel cycle create demand, which is serviced by 
the supply produced by facilities for another stage. The overall driver triggering the 
demand is electrical energy growth and nuclear power market share that is expected over 
the next 200 years. 
To further explain the ordering process by way of example, for a closed (recycle) fuel cycle, 
the future electrical energy demand will require increased supply of electrical energy. If this 
supply is not adequate, new nuclear power plants will need to be built. In turn, this will 
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result in an increased demand for fuel fabrication services. If supply and usable inventory is 
not adequate, new fuel fabrication plants will be built; this will result in an increased 
demand for separation services. Again, if supply and usable inventory is not adequate, new 
separation plants will be built, which will result in an increased demand for used fuel. If 
supply and usable inventory is not adequate for this, new nuclear power plants will be built, 
bringing us back to the beginning of the cycle. 
Note that a circular logic has developed, where we started with building new nuclear power 
plants due to electrical demand and return to this at the end due to used fuel demand. This 
implies that some decisions, e.g., mix of light water reactor multiple fuels (LWRmf) 
(multiple fuels means uranium oxide (UOX), mixed oxide (MOX) or inert matrix fuel (IMF)) 
and fast consumer/breeder reactor (FBR) or conversion ratio of FBR, must be made such 
that the starting and ending states are consistent. In order to prevent a mismatch of fuel 
available for advanced reactors which rely on used fuel from LWR and LWRmf reactors for 
their fuel supply, a predicted used fuel calculation must be performed at the time of 
ordering reactors that will inform the system how much used fuel is available for use in 
advanced reactors.  
This demand function looks a certain number of years into the future (t + Δtx), where t is the 
current time and Δtx is the time it takes to license and build a supply facility of type “x.” The 
demand function also projects out to the year t’, where t’ is the year that demand facilities 
utilize the services provided by supply facilities. 
The demand function (Eq. 1) is as follows: 
 ' ''
,
x x
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y x y yx
t tt t t t t
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D N C   
   (1) 
x
tD  - Demand rate for time period “t” for service or product of facility of type “x” based on 
the number of type “y” facilities that are operating at time period t’. 
'
y
tN  - Number of operating facilities of type “y” at time t’ that require the service from type 
“x” facility. This includes planned facilities and those now operating at “t” that will 
continue to operate at t’. 
'
y
tC  -  Expected capacity factor for facilities of type “y” at time t’. 
' x
y x
t t t

   - Conversion factor that converts the demand rate for time period t’ for service or 
product of facility “y” into a demand rate for time period “ xt t  ” for service or product of 
facility “x” that will service facility “y.” It is assumed that the product or service of facility 
“x” can be produced over one time period, e.g., one year, which implies 
' x
y x
t t t

   only takes 
on a nonzero value for one value of t’ when ( )xt t t      time to start offering/production 
of service/product of facility “x” to have completed, i.e., manufactured + delivered + stored, 
for facility “y.” 
The supply function takes the number of operating facilities and their respective 
availabilities and determines how much available supply of a certain service via production 
there is in the system. The supply function (Eq. 2) is as follows: 
 ௧ܵା∆௧௫ = ߚ௫ ௧ܰା∆௧௫ ܥ௧ା∆௧௫   (2) 
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x
x
t tS   - Rated supply rate of product at “
xt t  ” that can be produced by type “x” facility. 
x
x
t tN   -  Number of operating facilities of type “x,” including planned facilities and those 
now operating who at “ xt t  ” will continue to operate. 
ܥ௧ା∆௧௫ - Capacity factor of facility type “x” that is in operation. 
x  - Converts the number of facilities of type “x” into a supply rate of type “x.” 
The capacity factor, ܥ௧ା∆௧௫ , is a user defined function which typically depends on maturity 
level of the technology. For instance, capacity factor for LWR’s is set at around 90%, for new 
Fast Reactor’s it would probably be set closer to 80%. Such choices are made by the user. 
In order to get the current demand, or the demand for services that the system is currently 
requesting, simply take Equation 1 and set Δtx equal to zero. This will make the demand 
function equal to the current demand to produce a product or service. This demand (Eq. 3) 
will be labeled ˆ xtD for further use in the methodology. 
 ' ' '
,
ˆ y x y yx
t t t t t
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D N C

   (3) 
In order to get the current supply, simply set the Δtx in Equation 2 equal to zero. This will 
cause the equation to only use the facilities that are in operation at the current time “t.” The 
current supply (Eq. 4) will be labeled ˆxtS for further use in the methodology. 
 ˆx x x xt t tS N A   (4) 
The actual available output of facilities is based on the capacity factor of the facilities of type 
“x.” The capacity factor (Eq. 5) will change automatically for the system as new facilities 
come online and start requesting services. The capacity factor is a user defined value that is 
typically adjusted upward as more facilities come on line from an initial low capacity factor 
representing new types of facilities to a theoretical high value for facility with years of 
operational experience. 
 xtO
x x x
t tN C   (5) 
x
tO  - Actual output of facility of type “x” at time “t.” 
x  - Converts the number of facilities of type “x” into a supply rate of type “x.” 
x
tC  - Capacity factor for facilities of type “x” at time “t.” 
In order to implement this methodology, a projected energy demand growth and used fuel 
prediction is calculated in order to determine the number and type of reactors that can come 
online. The model looks ahead a prescribed number of years (the longest construction time 
of all of the facilities plus time to manufacture and deliver the product) and calculate supply 
and demand for reactors, fuel fabrication, and separations. At the beginning of the 
simulation, before the first time step, the model calculates the energy growth for every year 
of the simulation plus the number of years the model is looking ahead. The growth function 
(Eq. 6) is as follows: 
  1 * 1 /100t t tE E p   (6) 
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where tE  in (Eq. 6) is the electric demand at year t and tp  is the growth percentage at year t. 
When the function reaches the last growth rate 100p  provided by the input, it will hold that 
value in order to project out values beyond the 200-year time period. 
The next step is to calculate the number of reactors that need to be ordered based on the 
growth rate and energy gap during the initial look-ahead time. During the initial look-ahead 
time, lookt , the model will only build LWRmf reactors because it is assumed that there will 
not be any FBRs deployed before the initial look-ahead time. The initial number of reactors 
for each of the look-ahead years is stored in an initialization vector so that at the beginning 
of the simulation the model will know how many reactors need to come online and when 
they need to come online. These reactors are then sent to an order rate array ( RO ) where 
they will be stored and called upon when it is time to order reactors. As the model starts, the 
simulation will progress forward with the t  variable moving one year out for each year of 
the simulation. Reactors during the initial look-ahead time will be built based on the initial 
estimate of reactor ordering at the start of the simulation As the simulation moves forward, 
new reactors after the initial look ahead years are ordered based on the energy growth rate 
and energy gap that is predicted in those future years. That is, if the initial look ahead is 20 
years, in year 2001 and estimate will be made on energy growth and energy gap in 2021 and 
reactors will be ordered that will meet that demand. 
The model runs for a specified time period—typically, from year 2000 to year 2200. The user 
can define a growth rate that nuclear power will grow at and allow the model to determine 
the number of reactors that are ordered to meet the demand or the user can be more specific 
and specify the reactor numbers. The model allows the user to define which reactor types to 
activate at specific times throughout the simulation period. In addition, the user can define 
the specific fuel to use in each reactor type, as well as the separation technology available 
and the capacities for all facilities in the fuel cycle (i.e., fuel fabrication, separations, etc.). 
For each reactor type the user can set a variety of operational parameters, such as thermal 
efficiency, load factor, power level, and fuel residence time. In addition, the user can also set 
time parameters, such as reactor construction time, licensing time, reactor lifetime, used fuel 
wet storage time, separations time, and fuel fabrication time. Additional parameters can be 
set to adjust fuel fabrication rate, repository acceptance rate, and separations capacity and 
processing rate. Overall, there are over 200 parameters that the user can set and adjust 
between simulations. Because of the large number of parameters, there are a number of 
predefined scenarios that the user can select from a menu. These predefined scenarios set all 
the parameters for the selected scenario so these cases can be run with minimal effort.  
3.2.2 Tracked isotopes 
VISION tracks mass at an isotopic level, which is valuable from several aspects. First, the 
model is able to calculate some important metrics, such as, decay heat, toxicity and 
proliferation resistance. Second, it allows the model to use specific isotopes, such as 
Plutonium, for flow control in separations and fuel fabrication based on availability of 
Pu239, Pu240 and Pu241 from separated spent fuel. Lastly, it allows the estimate of isotopic 
decay whenever the material is residing in storage of at least 1 year. 
Table I lists the 81 isotopes that VISION currently tracks the main fuel flow model. For the 
four radionuclide actinide decay chains (4N, 4N+1, 4N+2, 4N+3), it will track all isotopes 
with half-life greater than 0.5 years, with the exception of 5 isotopes whose inventory 
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Actinides and Decay Chain Fission Products 
He4  H3 Other gases 
Pb206 Transition Metals C14 
Pb207 C-other 
Pb208 Kr81 Inert gases (Group 0) 
Pb210 Kr85 
Bi209 Inert gas other (Kr, Xe) 
Ra226 Group 2A Rb Group 1A/2A 
Ra228 Sr90 w/Y90 decay 
Ac227 Actinides Sr-other 
Th228 Zr93 w/Nb93m decay Zirconium 
Th229 Zr95 w/Nb95m decay 
Th230 Zr-other 
Th232 Tc99 Technetium 
Pa231 Tc-other 
U232 Uranium Ru106 w/Rh106 decay Transition metals that 
constrain glass waste forms U233 Pd107 
U234 Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd-other 
U235 Se79 Other transition metals 
U236 Cd113m 
U238 Sn126 w/Sb126m/Sb126 
Np237 Neptunium Sb125 w/Te125m decay 
Pu238 Plutonium  Transition Metal-other (Co-Se, Nb, 
Ag-Te) 
Pu239 I129 Halogens (Group 7) 
Pu240 Halogen-other (Br, I) 
Pu241 Cs134 Group 1A/2A 
Pu242 Cs135 
Pu244 Cs137 w/Ba137m decay 
Am241 Americium  Cs-other 
Am242m Ba 
Am243 Ce144 w/Pr144m/Pr144 decay Lanthanides 
Cm242 Curium Pm147 
Cm243 Sm146 
Cm244 Sm147 
Cm245 Sm151 
Cm246 Eu154 
Cm247 Eu155 
Cm248 Ho166m 
Cm250 LA-other plus Yttrium 
Bk249 Berkelium   
Cf249 Californium   
Cf250   
Cf251   
Cf252   
Table 1. Tracked Isotopes and Chemical Elements 
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appears never to be significant. For fission products, VISION calculates isotopes found to 
dominate each possible waste stream, CsSr (Group 1A/2A), halogens, inert gases, transition 
metals, Zr, Tc, lanthanides, H-3, and C-14. In each case, both key radioactive isotopes and 
stable mass must be tracked because for the key elements, it is needed to calculate the mass 
of the key fission product divided by the total mass of that element. For example, to assess 
the “CsSr” waste option, VISION tracks Sr90 (with Y90 decay energy), Cs134, Cs135, Cs137 
(with Ba137m decay energy), stable Rb, other Sr mass, other Cs mass, and stable Ba. 
Only isotopes with halflife greater than 0.5 year are candidates for being tracked in fuel 
cycle simulations. A half year is two VISION time steps when running simulations with the 
typical 0.25-year time step. Not tracking such short-lived isotopes does not significantly 
impact mass and radiotoxicity assessments. (Spot checks of gamma and heat indicate the 
same thing.) Short-lived progeny of other isotopes, however, must be considered. Their heat 
and decay energy emission must be included when their parent isotopes decay. For 
example, Y90 decay energy must be included with decay of Sr90. 
For actinide and decay chain isotopes, we started with all isotopes with halflife greater than 
0.5 year. The behavior of actinide and decay chain isotopes is so complex that we essentially 
have to include all isotopes with halflife greater than 0.5 years. However, we do discard five 
of the candidate isotopes (Np235, Np236, Pu236, Cf248, and Es254) because their yield is so 
low. In subsequent calculations of radiotoxicity, heat, etc, the decay input of those isotopes 
less than 0.5 years must be accounted for as being in equilibrium with longer-lived parents. 
Compared to actinide and decay chain isotopes, the complexity of behavior is less and the 
number of candidate isotopes is greater for fission products. We started with the set of 
fission product isotopes previously studied in Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) system 
studies and added isotopes (and blocks of “stable” elements) such that the mass and 
radiotoxicity of each of the candidate waste streams (inert gases, lanthanides, CsSr, 
transition metal, Tc, halogens) calculated from the reduced set of isotopes and elements was 
within a few percent of calculations using all the isotopes for UOX at 51 MWth-day/kg-iHM 
burnup. 
The current version of the code evaluates the heat loads, radiotoxicity, proliferation metrics 
and other parameters at key location in the fuel cycle (repository, dry storage, etc.). For 
separation and recycle of used thermal fuel, the youngest (shortest time out of the reactor) 
and then least cycled fuel has priority for the available capacity. The repository capacity can 
be varied with time, and includes permanent and retrievable capacities, and the rate 
material can be sent to the repository can also be varied with time. In contrast to separations, 
the oldest (longest time out of the reactor) and then most cycled fuel has priority for the 
repository. 
3.2.3 Neutronics parameters 
A key feature of the VISION model is that direct neutronics calculations are not performed 
within model, which makes it much simpler and more user friendly compared to other fuel 
cycle system codes that include this type of calculations such as COSI and NFCSIM codes.8,9 
The neutronics calculations are made external to the model and parameters from those 
calculations are used as fixed parameters within the model. The important parameters are 
the composition of fresh and spent fuel that corresponds to a certain type of reactor/fuel, 
and the initial reactor core loading and the loading per a batch of fuel. More than one 
composition vector (recipe) can be provided for the same fuel, e.g., in case of recycling in 
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fast reactors, a non-equilibrium (startup) composition is needed for early cycled fuel and an 
equilibrium (recycle) composition is needed for fuel cycled greater than or equal to 5 times. 
Users can input whatever input/output fuel recipes they wish. 
Most of our calculations have been done with LWR uranium oxide (UOX) with an initial 
enrichment of 4.3% U-235 and a discharge burnup of 51,000 MWth-day/tonne-iHM.10 Other 
sources of data include Hoffman, Asgari, Ferrer, and Youinou.11,12,13,14,15,16 The user can 
alternatively input their own input and output isotopic recipes. 
Transmutation in low conversion ratio fast reactor is based on a compact fast burner reactor 
design that can achieve low conversion ratios.11 This design is the basis for all transmutation 
options that used TRU from UOX, MOX or IMF spent fuel into a burner fast reactor in the 
VISION calculations. 
3.3 Simulation 
The real power of simulation models lies in learning insights into total system behavior as 
time, key parameters, and different scenarios (e.g. growth rate, reactor type) are considered. 
This is more valuable (and more credible) than attempting to make design and management 
decisions on the basis of single-parameter point estimates, or even on sensitivity analyses 
using models that assume that the system is static. System dynamic models allow users to 
explore long-term behavior and performance, especially in the context of dynamic processes 
and changing scenarios. When comparing different management/design scenarios did the 
system perform better or worse over the long term? 
System dynamic models serve many of the same purposes as flight simulators. Indeed, the 
reason the user input is described as a “cockpit” is that such a model allows the 
designer/stakeholder to simulate management of the system over time. After repeated 
simulations, a student pilot gains deeper understanding of how the aircraft systems will 
respond to various perturbations (none of which will exactly match a real flight) – without the 
expense and risk of gaining such experience solely in real flights. Instead of simulating an 
aircraft flight, VISION simulates the nuclear fuel cycle system with as many of its dynamic 
characteristics as possible. This allows decision makers and developers to learn how the fuel 
cycle system may respond to time and various perturbations – without having to wait decades 
to obtain data or risk a system disconnect if a poor management strategy is used. VISION also 
allows users to test a range of conditions for parameters such as energy growth rate and 
licensing time which are not controlled by developers of nuclear energy but affect its 
implementation so that robust and flexible strategies can be identified to address uncertainties. 
For high-stakes strategy analysis, a system dynamics model, as a result of upfront scientific 
work, is easier to understand, more reliable in its predictions, and ultimately far more useful 
than discussion and debate propped up by traditional data analysis techniques such as 
histograms, Pareto charts and spreadsheets. System Dynamics is an analytical approach that 
examines complex systems through the study of the underlying system structure. By 
understanding a system's underlying structure, predictions can be made relative to how the 
system will react to change. 
4. Illustrative deployment scenario simulations 
The examples in this chapter are based on the following fuel cycles: 
 Once through, Light Water Reactor (LWR) with uranium oxide (UOX) fuel at 51 GWth-
day/tonne-iHM burnup. 
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 MOX recycle, Light Water Reactor (LWR) with a combination of mixed oxide fuel 
(MOX) and uranium oxide fuel (UOX). 
 2-tier, plutonium and uranium from LWR-UOX are first recycled once in LWR as mixed 
oxide (MOX) fuel. The remaining material and the minor actinides from separation of 
used LWR-UOX are then recycled in fast reactors. 
 1-tier, transuranic material from LWR-UOX is recycled in fast reactors with a range of 
transuranic (TRU) conversion ratios (CR) from 0.00 to 1.1. The TRU CR is defined as the 
production of transuranic material divided by all destruction pathways of transuranic 
material. 
4.1 Illustrative assumptions and input parameters 
All of the examples below use the following assumptions: 
 Analysis of US domestic systems 
 Growth of nuclear energy is flat until 2015, when it resumes growth at an annual rate of 
1.75%, resulting in 200 GWe-year of electricity generated in 2060 and 400 GWe-year in 
2100. (Current annual output is 86 GWe-year.) 
 A centralized facility accepts LWR used fuel for direct disposal starting in 2017 and 
ending in 2039 for a total of 63,000 MTiHM. For the once-through case, additional used 
fuel is disposed in generic additional repository capacity when sufficiently cooled (20 
years). For the closed fuel cycle cases, additional used fuel is recycled. 
The MOX, 2-tier and 1-tier examples also use the following assumptions: 
 Separation of LWR used fuel begins in 2020, initially with a small plant (800 
MTiHM/year capacity) with additional plants added as needed to work off any excess 
stores of used fuel by 2100. LWR used fuel is cooled 10 years before shipment for 
recycling. The TRU from separations is used to make recycle fuel (either MOX-Pu for 
LWRs or TRU fuel for fast reactors).  
 The MOX cycle takes at least 15 years (5 years in the reactor, 10 years cooling) before the 
used fuel is available for recycle as MOX in thermal reactors or in fast reactors. 
 A small fast reactor starts up in 2022 to prove the reactor and transmutation fuel 
technologies. Follow-on commercial fast reactors use a TRU conversion ratio (CR) of 0.5, 
metal fuel, and on-site recycling. (Sensitivity studies examine other options.) 
 For the 1-tier scenario, commercial fast reactors follow 10 years later (2032), with 
construction rates limited for the first decade to allow for learning. 
 For the 2-tier scenario, the MOX cycle takes at least 15 years before the used fuel is 
available for recycle into fast reactor fuel, so commercial fast reactors are delayed 
15 years (to 2047).  
 All TRU elements are recovered whenever used fuel is separated. Cesium and 
Strontium (CsSr) together are separate waste products. Separations losses are defined 
by the user with the default of 0.1% processing loss. 
The once-through scenario provides the basis for comparison with the closed fuel cycle 
scenarios (fuel recycle). All electricity generation is based on LWRs using standard UOX 
fuel. The growth curve is depicted in figure 2 and shows the current growth “pause”, with 
no new reactors until 2015. After 2015, growth is modeled with simple compounding at 
1.75%. This growth rate assumes nuclear energy use for electricity only. 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 44
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Nuclear electricity generation for the once-through scenario. 
4.2 Where do the transuranics reside? 
The location of used fuel for the once-through scenario is shown in figure 3. The used fuel 
graph shows some used fuel in wet storage and some in dry storage. This is not reflective of 
actual practice, which will vary at each reactor – it instead reflects the assumption of 10 
years of wet storage for cooling before used fuel is moved followed by a minimum 10 years 
of additional cooling storage before it is emplaced in the repository. The total cooling time 
from reactor discharge to repository disposal is assumed to be a minimum of 20 years, based 
on burnup and thermal limits for Yucca Mountain. The “additional repository inventory” 
reflects how much more used fuel would be available for direct disposal (cooled more than 
20 years), without any assumption about where the additional repository capacity would be 
located. Note the decrease in dry storage between ~2020 and 2040 – this reflects excess fuel 
in storage today which is transferred to geologic disposal once the initial repository becomes 
available.  
The location of used fuel is very different with the closed fuel cycle. Figure 4 shows the used 
fuel for the 1-tier scenario, LWR and fast reactors. The 2-tier scenario (LWR-UOX, LWR-
MOX, fast reactors) is very similar. When compared to figure 3, there are large differences, 
with the fuel previously in “additional repository inventory” now recycled. 
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Fig. 3. Used fuel quantities and location in the once-through scenario. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Used fuel quantities and location in the 1-tier scenario. 
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4.3 How quickly new fuels and reactors penetrate the fuel cycle? 
The closed fuel cycle scenarios follow the same growth curve as shown in Figure 2, except 
the reactor fleet is a combination of UOX and MOX fueled LWRs or a combination of LWRs 
and fast reactors. Figure 5 shows electricity generation based on fuel type, with the yellow 
area representing the fast reactor generation and the other areas representing LWR 
generation using both standard UOX and MOX (in the 2-Tier scenario). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Electricity generation for 1-tier and 2-tier scenarios as a function of fuel and reactor 
type. 
Figure 6 shows the new fast reactor electricity generation projected for the closed fuel cycle 
scenarios, as well as the portion of total nuclear-generated electricity coming from the fast 
reactor fraction of the fleet. The 2-tier scenario includes fewer fast reactors and the reactors 
start up later due to the impact of the MOX pass in the thermal reactors. The MOX pass 
delays the availability of TRU for the fast reactors. The MOX pass also reduces the TRU 
available to the fast reactors through two mechanisms. First, some TRU is consumed in the 
MOX reactors – approximately two-thirds of a tonne per GWe-year. Second, the electricity 
produced from MOX offsets electricity from UOX, avoiding the generation of an additional 
quarter tonne of TRU. When these two mechanisms are combined, the amount of TRU 
eventually supplied to the fast reactors is reduced by almost a tonne per MOX-fueled GWe-
year. 
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Fig. 6. Fast reactor electricity generation in absolute and percentage terms for 1-tier and 2- 
tier scenarios. 
The portion of fast reactors for the 1-tier case levels out near 25% (and may be decreasing) as 
excess LWR used fuel is worked off and the fast reactors reach a dynamic equilibrium with 
the LWRs. This number is much lower than what is calculated by a simple static material 
balance (36%). This is an important finding from the transitional analysis, as it substantially 
reduces the number of fast reactors required for a “balanced” system. 
The difference is due to several factors: 
 The amount of TRU needed to start up a fast reactor is much greater than what is 
needed to keep it going. This includes the first core, as well as 100% of the initial 
refueling needs (until used fast reactor fuel can be recycled). The static analysis assumes 
the fast reactors already have their initial cores and most of their refueling needs are 
met by recycling of their own used fuel, with only ~20% coming as new makeup fuel 
from the LWRs. 
 The fast reactors are using TRU generated at least 10 years earlier by the LWRs. While 
the LWR used fuel cools, more LWRs are added, so even without the startup effect the 
fast reactors would always be “behind”. 
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 Some amount of TRU is caught up in buffer storage as a hedge against temporary 
shutdown of the separations or fabrication facilities or the transportation links. 
Several factors impact the number of fast reactors added during transition. This section uses 
the results of sensitivity analyses to show the relative impact of some of the more important 
factors. The 1-tier nominal scenario is used as the basis of analysis. 
For all sensitivity runs, the same assumptions are used as for the nominal case except for the 
factor being examined and some associated parameters which need to be modified in 
tandem to keep the model in balance. For example, if a sensitivity analysis involves different 
values for the total nuclear growth rate, then startup dates for technologies, etc. are kept the 
same but the total amount of separations will be modified such that excess initial stocks of 
used fuel are still worked off but there is no excess separations capacity sitting idle due to a 
lack of feedstock. 
The fast burner reactors assumed for the GNEP scenarios require TRU, including large 
amounts for initial startup and smaller continuing amounts as makeup for refueling. The 
initial core material for enough fast reactor capacity to produce 1 GWe-year of electricity 
includes ~7 tonnes of TRU, and additional TRU would be needed for the initial refueling 
cycles when 100% of the fuel would still come from used UOX. After a few years, the fast 
reactor fuel could be recycled and the amount of “makeup” fuel from used UOX would 
drop by ~80%. The annual makeup TRU needed for refueling the same capacity of 
established fast reactors would be slightly less than half a tonne.11  
The source for the TRU feedstock is the LWR used fuel, which must be recycled. Assuming 
all available TRU is used for fast reactors, the reprocessing capacity is the single largest 
factor impacting fast reactor availability. (The analyses assumed that fuel fabrication was 
not a constraint.) In the VISION model, if there isn’t sufficient TRU to start a fast reactor 
when a new reactor is needed, then an LWR is built instead. Fig. 7. Figure 7 shows the 
results of a sensitivity study on used UOX separations capacity – with lower total capacity, 
there are fewer fast reactors. 
The separations capacity analysis is based on UOX at current burnup. Another feedstock 
consideration is the burnup of the used UOX. If burnup was significantly increased, many 
fewer tonnes of used fuel would be generated for the same level of electricity generation. 
However, the amount of TRU per tonne of used fuel would increase. At current burnup, the 
TRU content in used fuel is ~1.3%. If burnup could be doubled to ~100 GWd/MTiHM then 
tonnes of used fuel discharged would be cut in half, while the TRU content per tonne would 
increase to ~2%. Thus the total amount of TRU would decreases, but the amount made 
available per tonne of separations capacity would increase. The isotopic makeup of the TRU 
also changes as burnup increases, with less fissile and more non-fissile content. This would 
equate to somewhat higher TRU content in the fast reactor fuel, so for the same fast reactor 
capacity slightly more TRU would be needed. (For the 2-tier scenario the impact of isotopic 
changes on Pu enrichment in MOX fuel would be greater because LWRs are more sensitive 
to fissile content.) 
4.4 Is growth rate important? 
Another major impact on the number of fast reactors is the overall growth rate of nuclear 
electricity. Higher growth equates to more used fuel, and assuming all available used UOX 
fuel is reprocessed, to higher numbers of fast reactors. Fig. 8. shows the impact of growth 
rate on both the total electricity output from fast reactors and the percent output. 
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Fig. 7. Impact of varying UOX separations capacity on the amount of fast reactors. 
One important finding from dynamic analysis is that as the growth rate increases the 
absolute level of fast reactors also increases, but the relative amount (percent of the fleet) 
decreases. This is primarily because the impacts of time lags increase with increasing growth 
rate (e.g. more LWRs are added while fuel is cooling). This finding has implications on 
system economics, since the cost of fast reactors is currently projected to be higher than 
LWRs. At low growth rates, this cost difference will have a greater impact on the overall 
cost competitiveness of nuclear energy versus other energy sources, but as the growth rate 
increases, the cost difference due to closing the fuel cycle becomes smaller. 
4.5 What is the impact of fast reactor conversion ratio? 
The TRU conversion ratio (CR) is calculated as the ratio of TRU produced to TRU consumed 
during fuel irradiation. Fast burner reactors are defined as having a CR < 1.0. The CR has a 
large impact on the level of fast reactors for two reasons: 
 In the initial core, changes in conversion ratio require virtually no change in TRU 
content. However, in refueling there is a very large difference. At a CR of 1.0 no 
additional TRU would be needed, whereas in an equilibrium core at a CR of 0.0, 
roughly 1 tonne of makeup TRU would be required per GWe-year of generation.  
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 Since at higher conversion ratios less makeup TRU is needed, more fast reactors can be 
built from the TRU provided by the LWRs. However, at a constant growth rate, more 
fast reactors means fewer LWRs, and less TRU generated. Thus at higher CR, while less 
TRU is consumed, more TRU generation is avoided (by generating electricity using 
recycle fuels instead of UOX). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Fast reactors as a function of growth rate. 
Figure 9 shows the impact of conversion ratio on both the total electricity output from fast 
reactors and the percent output. At higher conversion ratio, both the absolute and relative 
level of fast reactor generation increases. The reason for this is as the conversion ratio 
increases, the total amount of TRU consumed plus avoided declines, so on net more TRU is 
available for more fast reactors.  
4.6 What is the impact of fuel cooling times? 
Used fuel cooling time is another parameter affecting feedstock availability, and therefore 
fast reactor capacity. The nominal cases are based on a system that is efficiently functioning 
by the end of the century – meaning no excess stocks of fuel at intermediate stages in the 
system, such as the excess fuel currently stored at reactor sites. The used fuel cooling time is 
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Fig. 9. Fast reactors as a function of conversion ratio. 
assumed to be 10 years for LWR fuel (both UOX and MOX). This is based on the decay heat 
wattage limits of current shipping cask designs, which can accept full loads of used fuel at 
current burnup approximately 6 or more years after discharge. The value was rounded up, 
both to account for potential higher burnup and for MOX fuel. However, an “efficiently 
functioning” system could also be defined with longer cooling times. This would mean 
more TRU would be tied up in used fuel not yet available for reprocessing, and therefore 
fewer fast reactors. 
Cooling time for fast reactor used fuel is a much larger factor than cooling time for LWR 
used fuel in determining the number of fast reactors deployed. The nominal case assumes 
on-site recycling of fast reactor fuel, which means it does not need to cool sufficiently for 
efficient shipping. For this reason, the assumed cooling time is only 1 year. (An additional 
year is assumed for separations and fuel fabrication; resulting in 2 years total recycle time.) 
One alternative is regional or centralized reprocessing of fast reactor fuel. A number of 
factors may lead to centralized facilities, including economies of scale and fuel type. 
However, significant transportation considerations must also be considered. 
Centralized reprocessing is more likely if an aqueous technology is used, because this 
technology has significant economies of scale. The overall plant complexity stays fairly 
constant with size, while the lines, tanks, and other equipment scale up. If an 
electrochemical (Echem) process is used, there is not as significant a gain in scale economies. 
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Echem is essentially a batch process with limits on equipment size, so a larger plant would 
involve more processing stations, and therefore more equipment and complexity. Aqueous 
processing is usually equated with oxide fuels and Echem with metal fuels - both fuels have 
been used successfully in fast test reactors. A decision on fuel type for the initial fast reactor 
has not yet been made, as more information is needed. 
Fast reactor fuel produces higher levels of decay heat per MTiHM than LWR UOX fuel. The 
fresh fuel has a high percentage of TRU, including plutonium-238 (Pu-238), americium-241 
(Am-241) and curium-244 (Cm-244). Used fuel has large percentages of both TRU and 
fission products (due to much higher burnup than UOX). The fuel also contains heavy 
isotopes with high energy decay products, requiring substantial shielding. These properties 
of fast reactor fuel make shipping more difficult, and longer cooling times or less fuel per 
shipment may be required. 
Figure 10 shows the impact of fast reactor fuel cooling time on the fraction of fast reactors at 
the end of the century. The impact of fuel type is also shown – oxide fuel has a softer 
spectrum, allowing for longer fuel cycles but also requiring more TRU to support those 
cycles, and therefore more initial TRU for startup. However, overall impact of fuel type is 
minimal when compared to the impact of cooling time. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Impact of cooling time and fuel type on fast reactor level. 
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4.7 What is the impact of delaying implementation of fast reactors? 
The final factor considered in determining the level of fast reactors is the time of 
introduction of the technology. The 2-tier case has the effect of delaying fast reactor 
introduction by ~15 years due to the delay in TRU becoming available for fast reactors while 
it is in the MOX cycle. But the timing of fast reactor introduction could also be later for the 1-
tier case. Figure 11 shows the impact of delaying fast reactor introduction by 5, 10 and 15 
years, while including the nominal 2-tier case for comparison. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Impact of delayed fast reactor introduction. 
Delaying fast reactor introduction has little long-term impact on the numbers of fast 
reactors. In fact, there are more fast reactors toward the end of the century than in the 
nominal scenario. This is due to more TRU being generated by LWRs in the middle of the 
century (less TRU avoided), providing more feedstock. While initial separations is delayed 
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(because there are no fast reactors to take the separated TRU), the final separations capacity 
must be brought on line sooner to achieve the elimination of excess used fuel by 2100. Stores 
of cooled fuel are twice to three times as high throughout much of the century. 
5. Lessons from dynamic analyses  
Fuel cycle system analyses can be either static or dynamic; they each have value. Static 
equilibria are easier to calculate, to understand, and to use to compare options. By static 
equilibria, we mean the system is not changing. For example, static equilibria can include 
constant time lags for used fuel cooling but not technology changes, deployment, 
displacement, etc. Dynamic simulations are more realistic.17 The 2005 AFCI objectives 
provided to Congress1 and recent U.S. comparisons2,3 are primarily static in nature. 
Consider three examples of the differences between static and dynamic. First, assume in fast 
reactors that zirconium (fast reactor metal fuel alloy) and steel (fast reactor metal fuel 
cladding) are recycled. At static equilibrium, the only required makeup zirconium and steel 
would be the small amount required to balance processing losses. However, in a dynamic 
analysis with increasing numbers of fast reactors, zirconium and steel would be required to 
supply the new fast reactors. The amount of makeup material required would increase as 
either the growth rate or recycle time lag from fuel fabrication back around to new fuel 
fabrication increase. 
The second example is system evolution. A static equilibrium analysis tells us little about 
how to manage the system; or, how the system can evolve from one strategy to another. A 
dynamic analysis or simulation provides some insights into the sequencing of events. 
Understanding the true system evolution requires a fully time dependent calculation, as 
provided by system analysis models such as VISION. Under some circumstances, a system 
establishes a “dynamic equilibrium” in which the relative relationship among parts of the 
system is fairly constant, but the entire system continues to grow. 
The third example is economics. A static equilibrium is appropriate when discount rates, the 
time value of money, and cash flows are not addressed. If the time value of money is 
accounted for, then cash flows that lead others are given greater weight; cash flows that lag 
others are given less weight. 
5.1 Deployment 
All advanced fuel cycles require separation of used UOX fuel. All simulation results depend 
not only on when the first UOX separation plant starts, but also its capacity. In the 
simulations presented here, the first separation plant starts in 2020 at 800 tonnes-iHM/yr. It 
also matters how soon a second UOX separation plant might be deployable. In these 
simulations, the second plant starts in 2030 at 1600 tonnes-iHM/yr. Consider that the U.S. is 
currently accumulating used UOX at ~2000 tonnes-iHM/yr and there are few proposals that 
the first UOX plant be that large. So, just to build capacity equal to the anticipated UOX 
discharge rate in 2020-2030, multiple separation plants will be required and simulation 
results depend on how soon that is possible. 
All advanced fuel cycles require new fuels that recycle some or all of the transuranic 
material. Many options require new types of reactors. In most simulations, commercial fast 
reactor deployment starts in 2032 (1-tier) or 2047 (2-tier). Simulation results also depend on 
how soon new technologies can be deployed, not just when deployment starts. For example, 
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many of the calculations in this report constrain fast reactor deployment to 1 GWe of 
capacity/yr for 5 years, followed by 2 GWe/yr for 5 years. MOX or fast reactor deployment 
is also constrained by availability of recycled material, which is in turn constrained by 
deployment of UOX separation capacity. Reactor deployment can also be constrained in low 
nuclear growth scenarios because new reactors are not built until existing reactors retire. 
This growth constraint does not occur at 1.75%/yr growth assumed in most of the 
calculations. Many of the same reactor deployment constraints would hold for fuel 
fabrication capacity but in the current simulations fuel fabrication capacity was not 
constrained. 
Changes in fuel cycle technology combinations (reactors, fuels, separation, waste forms, 
waste disposal sites) take decades to be significantly manifest in system-level parameters 
such as uranium utilization or used fuel inventories in wet storage. That is, the fuel cycle has 
long response times. Reasons include new technologies take decades to deploy and it can 
take a decade for fuel to go once around the recycle loop. 
The sequence of deployment of new fuel cycle technologies is generally constrained. An 
obvious example is that MOX fuel in LWRs cannot occur before LWR UOX separation 
begins. Proper sequencing of technology and facility deployments is a contributor to the 
long response times. 
The adaptability, resilience, and robustness (versus fragility) of fuel cycle options vary. For 
example, LWRs with MOX are robust in the sense that if MOX fuel is unavailable, one can 
use enriched UOX without hesitation; enriched UOX fuel is typically assumed to be a 
“commodity” without dependence on unique facilities. A burner fast reactor is “fragile” in 
that it requires separated TRU for both startup and throughout its operating life, making it 
dependent on sources of used fuel, separation of that used fuel, and fabrication of new fuel – 
which are likely to each be unique facilities that must be deployed in sequence and matched 
in capacity size to avoid choke points and excessive stockpiles. The adaptability of new 
reactors is enhanced (at a cost) to the extent that multiple fuel types or fuel compositions are 
considered in reactor design and licensing, e.g., LWR UOX versus MOX or varying 
conversion ratio fast reactors. 
5.2 Waste management 
Our first observation is that one way to reduce waste burden is not to make the waste. 
Reactors fueled with enriched uranium are net producers of TRU (TRU CR>1),1 while 
reactors fueled with recycled TRU may be net producers (CR>1) or consumers (CR<1). 
Fig. 12 shows the reduction of TRU inventory this century as a function of fast reactor 
TRU CR for 1-tier dynamic simulations. TRU reduction occurs for two reasons; one is 
consumption of TRU in fast reactors. (In other simulations, TRU is consumed in thermal 
reactors.) The other is avoidance of TRU production by displacing reactors with net TRU 
                                                                 
1The TRU conversion ratio is TRU production/destruction. CR=1 means the output TRU content equals 
the input TRU content. Systems with uranium fuel thus create TRU. For systems operating with TRU 
fuel, the TRU CR is often numerical similar to the fissile breeding ratio as U238 (non-TRU, fertile) is 
converted to TRU, which is mostly fissile. Indeed, as the TRU CR increases, it approaches the fissile 
breeding ratio as a higher fraction of the produced TRU is Pu239, which is fissile. As an example of the 
difference between TRU conservation ratio and fissile breeding ratio, note that conversion of Pu240 to 
Pu241 does not impact the TRU conversion ratio but does impact fissile breeding ratio. The AFCI 
program tended to use TRU conversion ratio rather than fissile breeding ratio as relatively more 
indicative of waste management and proliferation resistance/physical protection issues. 
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production (such as LWR-UOX) with other reactors and fuels. As an example, a CR=1 fast 
reactor is not a net consumer of TRU; but the more electricity generated by such reactors, 
the less that must be generated by LWR-UOX and therefore significant TRU production is 
avoided.  
 
 
Fig. 12. Consumption and avoidance of TRU, both reduce TRU inventories. 
Below CR=1, there is more uranium recovered from separation of used fuel (“recovered 
uranium”) than used; it goes into storage. Similarly, uranium depleted by enrichment 
(“depleted uranium”) is not used and goes to storage. Above CR=1, both recovered uranium 
and depleted uranium is eventually used. In the analyses and results presented below, for 
CR<1; RU and DU are considered in storage and are not included in either the active or 
waste inventories. 
Below CR=1, the introduction of fast reactors does not increase the production of TRU this 
century relative to the once through fuel cycle. This cross-over point between increasing 
versus decreasing TRU this century depends on many parameters, notably the nuclear 
power growth rate. In all cases, it takes a CR significantly greater than one before there is a 
net TRU production by the fleet this century. 
The second waste management observation is that the radiotoxicity results depend strongly 
on which transuranics are recycled, processing loss rates, and the time at which 
radiotoxicity is to be evaluated. Individual isotopes vary as to their contribution (per mass) 
to radiotoxicity. Consider the example in fig. 13. It shows that if UOX-51 is not recycled or if 
only uranium from UOX-51 is recycled; the radiotoxicity stays above natural uranium ore 
until ~300,000 years; there is no reduction in the radiotoxicity source term. If 99% to 100% of 
the uranium and plutonium are recycled, the radiotoxicity remains above natural uranium 
ore until 10,000 to 20,000 years; a reduction of LTR-1000 by factors of 7.9 to 8.5. U and Pu 
constitute 94.6% of used UOX-51 or 99.89% of the heavy metal in used UOX-51. (Of used 
UOX-51, 0.1% is minor actinides and 5.3% is fission products.) If 99%/99.5%/99.9%/100% of 
uranium, neptunium, plutonium, americium, curium, and californium are recycled, the 
LTR-1000 is reduced by factors of 100/200/950/20000; and the time to reach uranium ore 
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drops to 2000/700/400/300 years. A recent NEA study17 shows similar trends. At very long 
times, even the longest-lived minor actinides decay into uranium isotopes and their progeny 
so that the two “no MA recycled” curves actually increase back toward 1.0 (natural 
uranium) as the uranium progeny isotopes such as Po210 grow in. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Radiotoxicity of residual waste from 5-year old UOX-51 as function of minor 
actinide (MA) recycling. 
The third waste management observation is that significant material accumulates 
throughout the system during recycling; thus, achievement of high waste management 
benefits depends on continuation of recycling. Don’t stop! 
The metric is the long-term decay heat emitted by material from 50 to 1500 years; this is a 
rough approximation of the long-term thermal response in a repository.18 It is the same 
concept as the “decay heat integral”.17 We call it a “commitment” because once emplaced, 
the energy that will be deposited has been committed; this is analogous to the concept of 
“dose commitment”; radioactivity taken into the human body commits the body to 
receiving a dose integrated over time. The heat units are energy (GWth-yr), heat rate (GWth) 
integrated over time (years). Figure 14 shows the heat commitment in a 1-tier CR=0.50 case. 
The heat commitment in 2100 would be 86 GWth-yr with the once through fuel cycle; 
adoption of 1-tier CR=0.50 recycling reduces that to 47 GWth-yr. So, if recycling were to stop 
in 2100 and all the material in the system went to a repository, the heat-commitment 
improvement factor to the repository would be only 1.8=86/47. 
Relative to used fuel and HLW, there is nil heat commitment in depleted uranium (DU), 
recovered uranium (RU), low-level waste (LLW), or even TRU waste. (There is little TRU 
waste in these scenarios; virtually all TRU-containing waste is considered HLW.) But, there 
is 7 GWth-yr in decay heat storage (CsSr). So, if recycling were to stop in 2100 and that 
material were not sent to a repository, the improvement factor would increase from 1.8 to 
2.1 = 86/(47-7). 
If recycling continues beyond 2100, the 39 GWth-yr active material in the system (reactor, 
wet storage, separation, fabrication) and 0.8 GWth-yr in dry storage avoid going to the 
repository. The repository only has 0.2 GWth-yr, so the maximum improvement factor 
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could approach 430 = 86/0.2; this is an overestimate because some of the 40 GWth-yr 
(active, dry) will end up in the repository as recycling continues. 
Consider if the material in decay storage is sent to a repository. Then, the repository heat 
commitment is 7.2 GWth-yr instead of 0.2 GWth-yr and the maximum improvement factor, 
even if recycling continues, would be 86/7.2 = 12. Again, this is an overestimate because 
some of the 40 GWth-yr in active systems would eventually go to the repository. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Long-term heat commitment for 1-tier CR=0.50 fast reactor case. 
So, achieving high improvements in repository heat commitment requires continuation of 
recycling, recycle of Pu and MA, and use of decay storage for CsSr. 
The fourth observation is that uranium dominates the mass of the system. Figure 15 shows 
the composition of the mass in the system for a 1-tier case over the simulation time. The 
mass at the end of the simulation is dominated by DU and RU; the mass of fuel products 
and total waste is small. This case uses CR=0.50 fast reactors. To help understand this, 
consider the static equilibrium in figure 16. At CR=0.50 only 1.3% of the RU and none of the 
DU is used as fuel. (Uranium in discharged fast reactor fuel is assumed recycled into new 
fast reactor fuel.) Use of RU increases to 4.2% at fast reactor CR=0.75. At CR=0.986, all of the 
RU is used but only some of the DU is used. Above TRU CR=0.9985, all of the RU and DU is 
used as fuel (other than processing losses). Dynamic simulations show somewhat worse 
results than figure 15 because of the time lags involved in building and operating fast 
reactors in a growing system, i.e., LWRs are built first and their TRU is used to fuel later fast 
reactors. 
The final waste management observation is that one must put TRU “in play” in order to 
reduce waste burdens. Use it to lose it. TRU that is sitting in storage does not help reduce 
waste burdens, except in so far as high-heat load isotopes decay; the notable example is 
Cs137 and Sr90 with ~30-year half-lives. Similarly, the holdup of transuranic material in the 
system impacts system performance so that short time lags, e.g., when facilities are co-
located instead of at different locations, can lead to faster waste management benefits via 
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consumption and avoidance of TRU at a given TRU CR. Certainly the rate of TRU 
consumption from the standpoint of an individual reactor depends on the reactor power 
and CR; however, from the standpoint of the entire fleet, the rate of TRU consumption and 
avoidance additionally depends on how fast TRU-consuming reactors (burner FR in this 
instance) displace TRU-producing reactors (LWRs in this instance), how quickly discharged 
fuel can be separated and recycled material re-inserted into reactors. Figure 17 shows the 
impact of increasing the “wet” storage time from 1 to 10 years for a 1-tier CR=0.50 fast 
reactor case, approximating a shift from onsite to offsite separation and fuel fabrication. The 
total time from reactor discharge to reinsertion changes from 2 to 11 years. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Waste, uranium, and fuel product mass for a 1-tier recycle case, CR=0.50 fast 
reactors, no packaging included. 
 
Fig. 16. Percent of RU and DU from LWRs used as fast reactor fuel with fast reactors and 
LWRs in static equilibrium. 
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Fig. 17. Long-term radiotoxicity of 1-tier fast reactor CR=0.50 with either 1 or 10 year “wet” 
cooling before a year of separation and fuel fabrication. 
5.3 Uranium utilization 
To start, consider the range of estimates of world uranium resources in Table II relative to 
the 2006 production rate of 40,000 tonne-U.19 The current nuclear power production rate 
would exhaust total estimated conventional resources (16,000,000 tonnes-U) in 400 years. 
That time scale can drop to within a century with modest nuclear power growth, but extend 
many centuries if unconventional resources become practical. 
 
Conventional resources Reference Tonnes-U 
Reasonably assured resource, <$130/kg-U Redbook19 3.3e6 
Inferred resources, <$130/kg-U Redbook19 2.1e6 
Prognosticated resources, <$130/kg-U Redbook19 2.8e6 
Speculative resources, <$130/kg-U Redbook19 4.8e6 
Total estimated conventional resources 
Above 4 categories, <$130/kg-U 
Above 4 categories, plus “cost range unassigned” 
Undiscovered + known, <$130/kg-U 
Undiscovered + known, <$130/kg-U 
 
Redbook19 
Redbook19 
Herring20 
Steyn21 
 
1.3e7 
1.6e7 
1.5e7 
1.6e7 
Unconventional resources Reference Tonnes-U 
Uranium in sandstone deposits Herring20 1.8e8 
Uranium in volcanic deposits Herring20 2.0e9 
Uranium from seawater Herring20 4.2e9 
Uranium in phosphate deposits Herring20 8.0e11 
Table 2. World Potential Uranium Resources 
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Nuclear fuel isotopes are either fissile or fertile; fissile isotopes are much more readily 
consumed. The only fissile isotope in nature is U-235, which is 0.7% of uranium ore. The 
only fertile isotopes in nature are U-238 (99.3% of uranium ore) and Th-232 (100% of 
thorium ore). To extend ore utilization substantially above 0.7%, one must convert or 
“breed” fertile to fissile isotopes. Fertile U-238 can be bred to fissile Pu-239, called the 
uranium-plutonium fuel cycle (or plutonium for short). Fertile Th-232 can be converted to 
fissile U-233, called the thorium-uranium fuel cycle (or thorium for short). The ratio of 
producing fissile isotopes (from fertile) to consuming fissile isotopes is called the fissile 
breeding ratio. A ratio greater than 1 means that more fissile isotopes are bred than 
consumed, shifting the limiting resource from fissile isotopes to fertile isotopes. 
All current U.S. reactors have fissile breeding ratio less than 1 and thus use less than 1% of the 
original uranium ore. Recycling in such reactors is not sufficient to break 1% because their 
fissile breeding ratios remain below 1. When the fissile breeding ratio is greater than 1, the 
uranium (or thorium) utilization can exceed 1%. There are exotic concepts in which maximize 
in-situ breeding without recycling used fuel, it advanced materials can be developed, these 
may achieve ~10% uranium utilization. With recycling of used fuel in breeder reactors, 
uranium and thorium utilization can approach 100%, subject to processing losses. 
Accomplishing 50-100x improvement in uranium utilization means near total replacement 
of LWRs (or other thermal reactors) with fast reactors. For example, if 10% of the reactor 
fleet remains LWRs with UOX fuel with 90% of the electricity from fast breeder reactors, the 
maximum uranium utilization improvement is 10x. Such substantial infrastructure change 
from LWRs to FRs is notoriously difficult.22 As most of the U.S. LWR fleet is moving toward 
a 60-year reactor lifetime, such a replacement of LWRs will take at least 6 decades from the 
operation of the last LWR. As an example, if fast breeder reactor deployment requires 2 
decades from first deployment to 100% of new construction (i.e. allowing 2 decades for 
industrial scale-up and market penetration); it will be 2120 before the last LWR retires. 
Predicting uranium resources so far in advance is questionable. 
The above example assumes that the fast breeder reactors can grow faster than nuclear 
power growth during its market penetration from 0 to 100%, followed by continued breeder 
growth at the nuclear power growth rate once it reaches 100% of new construction. The rate 
of breeder deployment is constrained by fuel supply, which we have tended to assume is 
transuranic material recycled from LWRs and fast reactors once operating, rather than high 
enriched uranium (~30% U235). 
We have derived the required TRU conversion ratio, such that LWR are not required to 
supply TRU to a growing fleet of fast reactors: 
 
( )F Rm t tCR e    (7) 
where m is the growth rate; Ft  is the time for cooling, separation, and fuel fabrication; Rt  is 
the time in reactor. Thus, F Rt t  is the total turnaround time. As an example, if 0m  , then 
1CR   and the system is in balance with no LWRs. Or, if one wants 0m  , then 1CR  . 
The higher the desired growth rate, the higher the required CR. 
In addition, because new fast reactors (growing at rate m ) must have 1Rt   additional 
years’ worth of fuel to start up, equation 1 must be multiplied by another term.2 
                                                                 
2A core contains tR years worth of fuel, with 1 year’s worth added each year. At startup, there is 
therefore an extra tR-1 that must be provided. 
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( ) (1 ( 1))F Rm t t RCR e m t
    (8) 
At a nominal growth rate of 1.75%/yr, the time lags in the system are important. If 2Ft   
(example for onsite recycling) and 4Rt  , then 1.17CR   is required. If 11Ft   (example 
for offsite recycling) and 4Rt  , then 1.36CR   is required. 
Fig. 18 shows the required CR as function of desired growth rate and turnaround time. The 
minimum turnaround time is probably ~5 years (1-year cooling, separation, fabrication and 
4 years in reactor). 
 
 
Fig. 18. Required fast reactor TRU conversion ratio at dynamic equilibrium, as a function of 
growth rate and turnaround, ignoring displacement of pre-existing LWRs or TRU 
stockpiles. 
The theoretical maximum CR is ~1.9 because Pu239 dominates fission in a fast reactor and it 
yields 2.9 neutrons/fission. One neutron must induce the next fission, leaving 1.9 to make 
more transuranic material from U238.3 Neutron yields vary slightly by isotope, e.g., 2.4 for 
U235, 2.9 for Pu241, and 3.2 for Am242m, so the exact theoretical maximum could be 
slightly different than 1.9. Of course, as neutron leakage and neutron capture by fuel and 
non-fuel core material is accounted for, the practical maximum conversion ratio will be 
significantly lower than 1.9. For example, if that maximum is considered to be 1.5, then the 
maximum rate of breeder reactor introduction can be 4.7% with 6-year turnaround (onsite 
recycling), but only 2.3% with 15-year turnaround (offsite recycling). The holdup of 
transuranic material in the system impacts system performance so that short time lags, e.g., 
when facilities are co-located instead of at different locations, can lead to faster system 
evolution. 
                                                                 
3 The theoretical maximum is actually smaller than 1.9 because some neutrons absorbed into fuel 
necessarily lead to (n, γ) reactions instead of (n,fission). However, some of the (n, γ) products and their 
successors will fission, so the reduction of the maximum below 1.9 is somewhat complicated and 
beyond the scope of this illustrative calculation. 
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5.4 Proliferation resistance and physical protection  
Barriers to acquisition of a nuclear weapon/explosive are called “proliferation resistance” 
for a host nation of nuclear facilities and “physical protection” for a subnational or terrorist 
group. An evaluation methodology should include the four stages toward a weapon – (1) 
diversion (if host nation) or theft (if subnational), (2) transportation, (3) transformation, and 
(4) weapon fabrication and indicate how the various indicators are to be combined. 
First, observe that although there is significant reduction of TRU relative to once through 
(avoided and consumed), there remains significant TRU material throughout a fuel cycle 
system. Figure 19 illustrates that there is substantial reduction of TRU material relative to 
once-through (via avoidance and consumption) but also that there is substantial TRU in 
many parts of the system. 
 
 
Fig. 19. Location of TRU material in a 1-tier recycle case. 
The second proliferation resistance observation is that the mass flow of material through 
separations can vary significantly both quantitatively and by type of separation, 
independent of separation efficiency. Figure 20 shows the total mass sent through 
separations (the sum of the flow tonnes-TRU/yr times the number of years) as a function of 
fast reactor conversion ratio for a 1-tier simulation; this figure keeps the fast reactor fuel 
constant (metal) with onsite processing. As CR increases, there are fewer LWRs hence less 
processing of used LWR fuel; but there are more fast reactors and more processing of fast 
reactor fuel. These may be of different technologies and the siting strategy could differ, e.g., 
large centrally located aqueous separation of used UOX fuel versus at-reactor 
electrochemical separation of used fast reactor metal fuel. In such cases, the proliferation 
risk posed by different technologies and locations would vary. 
The third proliferation resistance observation is that the recycled material composition will 
change significantly with time. Figure 21 shows evolution of the recycle mix as TRU 
material is repeatedly recycled, in this case as mixed oxide fuel in LWRs.12 This calculation 
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uses heterogeneous inert matrix fuel (IMF)4 to keep the material fissile, i.e., each recycle is a 
mixture of fresh UOX and IMF made with TRU recovered from the previous recycle. The 
figure shows that the Cm and Cf isotopes, which emit high numbers of neutrons, increase 
up to four orders of magnitude between the first recycle and equilibrium. Figure 21 
compares MOX and metal fast reactor fuel (at CR=0.75, comparable to the CR of MOX) at 
the first and equilibrium recycle. Both MOX-TRU and FR-TRU evolve considerably from the 
first to the equilibrium recycle. FR-TRU has higher Pu content but lower amounts of the 
highest TRU isotopes (Cf) that tend to dominate neutron emission. 
 
 
Fig. 20. Total mass of TRU material sent through separations in 1-tier recycle case as a 
function of fast reactor TRU conversion ratio; metal fuel, on-site processing assumed. 
Figure 22 shows that MOX-TRU and FR-TRU vary little after the first recycle (square data 
points), with major differences only in the Cf isotopes. (Composition impacts many areas, 
not just proliferation and physical security.) At equilibrium recycle (circle data points), 
MOX-TRU and FR-TRU differ less than an order of magnitude below Cm244, about an order 
of magnitude from Cm244 to Cm248 and over an order of magnitude for the Cf isotopes. 
High gamma emitting isotopes are found throughout the actinide chain and therefore the 
total gamma comparison between MOX-TRU and FR-TRU is merely an order of magnitude. 
The highest neutron emitters are located at the top of the TRU chain and therefore the 
neutron emission comparison between MOX-TRU and FR-TRU grows over an order of 
magnitude. Still, both MOX and FR at equilibrium have higher gamma and neutron 
emission than either has at the start of recycling. 
The fourth and final proliferation resistance observation is that the quality of Pu does not 
change dramatically throughout the century. The quality of Pu measured as the fraction of 
                                                                 
4 MOX fuel has U and one or more TRU elements mixed in each fuel pellet and fuel pin. A 
homogeneous IMF fuel has only TRU. A heterogeneous IMF fuel is a mix of IMF fuel pins and UOX fuel 
pins. 
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Pu-239 to total Pu in the system only changes from 0.55 (once through) to ~0.50 for the two 
recycle cases. 
 
 
Fig. 21. Isotopic mix for discharged MOX-TRU as a function of how many times transuranic 
material is. Transmutation data from ref. 16. 
 
 
Fig. 22. Isotopic mix for discharged MOX-TRU and FR-metal-TRU for first and equilibrium 
recycle. Transmutation data from ref. 12 and 16. 
5.5 Economics 
In any area of technology, the cheapest situation occurs when raw materials are very low 
cost and one is allowed to just walk away from waste. As raw material cost increases, the 
incentive to recycle materials increase. As waste disposal costs increase, the incentive to 
reduce, re-use, and recycle increases. 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, for nuclear fuel cycles, there are major uncertainties associated 
with the future cost of uranium (or thorium), any waste repository, and any new 
technologies (reactors, fuels, separation, waste forms) that may be involved. Were uranium 
and waste disposal inexpensive, it would be difficult to economically justify new 
technologies. 
The average cost of electricity from current U.S. nuclear power plants is less than 
$0.018/kilowatt-hour or 18 mills/kilowatt-hour (18 mills/kW-hr) because their capital costs 
have mostly been depreciated. Cost projections for new plants in the next decade range from 
47 to 71 mills/kW-hr which include capital recovery. Fuel cycle costs are about 6 mills/kW-
hr. Of this, 1 mill/kW-hr is the fee currently paid by U.S. utilities to the Federal government 
for future geologic disposal, covering projected disposal costs. 
To date, estimates of the cost of relatively traditional alternative fuel cycle options (most 
uranium cost increases, Yucca Mtn repository, and GNEP technology options) suggest 
uncertainties of a few mills/kW-hr, and possible increased cost (relative to once through) 
ranging from zero to a few mills/kW-hr, or 0-10% of total nuclear energy cost. 
The first is that dynamic versus static will impact economic assessments. A static quilibrium 
is appropriate when discount rates, the time value of money, and cash flows are not 
addressed. A dynamic equilibrium comes closer to cash flows if the time value of money is 
accounted for as costs that lead others are given greater weight; cash flows that lag others 
are given less weight. Table III lists key lead and lag items in dynamic equilibria. For 
example, one builds LWRs relatively early in the process of generating electricity; therefore, 
when time value of money is considered, the relative contribution of LWRs to total cost 
increases. Conversely, fast reactors and waste disposal are bought relatively late; therefore, 
their relative contribution to total cost decreases. 
 
 Leading 
Purchase relatively soon 
Lagging 
Purchase relatively late 
Increase or decrease when 
shifting from static to 
dynamic equilibrium 
Increase, hence factor might 
be more important than 
predicted by static 
equilibrium 
Decrease, smaller impact than 
might be predicted by static 
equilibrium 
Material inputs Natural uranium 
Depleted uranium 
Enriched uranium 
Zirconium and steel 
 
Types of reactors Number of thermal reactors 
using uranium oxide fuel 
Number of fast reactors 
Thermal efficiency increases 
Types of facilities Fabrication plants Separation plants 
Material output  Waste disposal 
Table 3. Lead and Lag Items in Dynamic Equilibria 
The fraction of fast reactors in time will be much lower than predicted by simple “static 
equilibrium” calculations due to multiple system constraints that impact the amount of TRU 
available for fueling new reactors at startup. This is illustrated in figure 23.  
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Fig. 23. Fraction of electricity generated by fast reactor at dynamic equilibrium (near 2100) as 
function of fast reactor TRU conversion rate and nuclear electricity power growth rate, 
calculations assumed metal fuel and onsite processing. 
The final observation is that fuel and separation facilities must accommodate variation in 
fuel mixture elemental composition. This composition will vary as reactor type, fuel type, 
burnup, aging of used fuel, number of recycles, separation purity, etc. 
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The Investment Evaluation of  
Third-Generation Nuclear Power -  
From the Perspective of Real Options 
Ying Fan and Lei Zhu 
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy research, Institute of Policy and 
Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing  
China 
1. Introduction 
The continued growth of world’s population and gradual increase of people’s living 
standards in developing countries have sped up the exhaustion of fossil fuels and caused 
large amount of greenhouse gas emissions. Although renewable energy sources (e.g. wind 
energy, solar energy, hydro energy and biomass energy) have developed rapidly in recent 
years, limitations existing in these energy sources (e.g. non-continuous electricity supply of 
wind and solar power generation, resource constraints for hydro power and biomass energy 
etc.) still set barriers to launching application in large scale and fulfilling world’s energy 
demand in near future.  
Currently, great attention has been paid to nuclear technology. It has been widely accepted 
around the world that nuclear power is a clean energy option which causes zero-emissions 
of SO2, NOx, smoke dust and carbon. A safely-operating nuclear power plant with strict 
radiation monitoring and risk management system will have little impacts on its 
surroundings, and the effects of radiation dose on citizens near the plant will be lower than 
1% of underground natural radiation. The development of nuclear energy can broaden the 
energy sources in energy industry, ease the limitations of fossil fuel supply, and reduce the 
environmental pollution caused by fossil fuel combustion. The development of nuclear 
technology will also have significant impacts on greenhouse gas emission reduction.  
Asia has become the largest market for nuclear power after remarkable growth has emerged 
to its economies in the last decade, especially in China and India. The enjoyment of rapid 
economic development in Asian countries also brings the booming of energy consumption. 
On one hand, considering large fluctuation of international fossil energy prices (e.g. oil 
prices) in recent years and lack of effective energy supply, Asian countries have to face more 
serious energy security situations; On the other hand, the consumption of fossil energy has 
caused severe environmental pollutions and large amount of greenhouse gas emissions, in 
the case of renewable energy development barriers, Asian countries need to find other new, 
clean, stable and extensive energy resource to meet their domestic energy demand. Nuclear 
power is regarded as a trustworthy way to enhance Asian countries’ energy security and 
becomes a preferred-choice in their energy options.  
As the world’s largest developing country which is struggling with limited energy 
resources, growing energy demand, increasing dependence on imported oil, deteriorating 
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environment, and enormous greenhouse gas emission, China has taken nuclear power as 
one of main directions in future energy development to cope with serious threats on 
domestic energy security. China’s power generation portfolio aims to gradually reduce the 
proportion of coal-fired power in the total power-generation mix and to promote the 
diversification of electrical energy sources, the power industry’s ‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’ 
(NDRC, 2007) has been proposed to optimize the development of nuclear power. 
Furthermore, the objective of ‘Mid and Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan’ 
(NDRC, 2007) is to achieve a new capacity of 40 GW Nuclear Power in the year 2020, which 
will account for 4% of total generating capacity. At the end of 2009, China has owned the 
largest scale of nuclear power plants under construction over the world, and the plants in 
progress have reached 21.92 GW with a total of 20 units.  
After the development of first two generations of nuclear power, China proposed to pioneer 
the demonstration and deployment of third-generation nuclear power with advanced 
reactors (Generation III nuclear reactor) in order to further enhance the level of self-
developed nuclear power technology. The third-generation reactors have: 1) a standardized, 
simpler and more rugged design for each type to expedite licensing; 2) higher availability 
and longer operating life expectancy; 3) comparatively lower possibility of core melt 
accidents; 4) resistance to serious damages; 5) higher burning temperature to reduce fuel use 
and the amount of waste and burnable absorbers to extend fuel life. In 2007, as one of the 
Generation III nuclear reactor technologies on basis of a comprehensive technology 
transfer, Westinghouse AP1000 has been selected by China National Nuclear Cooperation to 
build four nuclear reactors in two demonstration projects in Zhejiang Sanmen and 
Shandong Haiyang. Currently, nuclear reactors built in Zhejiang Sanmen are the only third-
generation nuclear power units in the world. 
2. Uncertainties of China's third-generation nuclear power technology 
investment 
Some scholars have already studied the third-generation nuclear power from different 
perspectives. Yim (2006) has discussed the relationship between the future expansion of 
nuclear power and the prospect for world nuclear nonproliferation, he concludes that the 
development of nuclear power and expansion of advanced nuclear technology will not 
result in nuclear proliferation. Popa-Simil (2008) has proposed that the micro-bead 
heterogeneous fuel mesh gives the fission products the possibility to acquire stable 
conditions outside the hot zones without spilling and the high temperature fission products 
free fuel with near perfect burning, which is important to the future of nuclear power 
development. Marcus (2008) has studied the characteristics of advanced nuclear reactor in 
order to extensive demands worldwide, including the role of nuclear power in the world 
power generation, introduction of innovative nuclear technologies, nuclear path forward 
and international initiatives of advanced nuclear technologies. Tronea (2011) has discussed 
the European quest for standardisation of nuclear power reactors, including nuclear power 
design, new reactors standard and nuclear safety. Yan et.al (2011) has introduced the 
development of nuclear power and third-generation nuclear power demonstration projects 
in China, and they also have forecasted the future demand of uranium fuel in China.  
In the study of the economics of nuclear power, Kessides (2010) has discussed nuclear 
power investment from the perspective of economic risks and uncertainties. He points out 
that several elements should be considered in nuclear power valuation, including 
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environmental benefits of nuclear power investments (the contribution of greenhouse gas 
emissions), fuel costs, costs of radioactive waste disposal, risks associated with radio activity 
release from all fuel cycle activity, with the capital or nuclear power construction costs with 
the greatest importance. However, as a technology that is currently in the research and 
development stage, China is facing numerous uncertainties in demonstration and 
deployment of third-generation nuclear power, including:  
1. The uncertainty from the technology itself. As a large-scale and capital-intensive 
technology, third-generation nuclear power is still in the development and 
demonstration stage which exhibiting unsolved technology uncertainties. During the 
technology deployment process, uncertainties around the technology mainly come from 
the plant design and construction, reactor installation, and equipment commissioning. 
And this corresponds to the uncertainties of investment cost and construction period 
which are in need for technology deployment.  
2. It is claimed in the design that the operating costs of third-generation nuclear power will 
be equal or even lower than that of second-generation. It should be noted that nuclear fuel 
cost has accounted for a large proportion in nuclear power operating costs. Currently, the 
price of nuclear fuel is relatively stable because uranium resources in each country are 
under government control, as more nuclear power plants will be put into use in the 
coming future, increasing demand of uranium resources worldwide may result in price 
increasing and fluctuation. This will add more price risk to generating cost. 
3. Although the design of third-generation nuclear power is much safer than first two 
generations, because the lack of actual operational experiments, the potential risk of 
radiation can not be completely under control. China’s National Nuclear Security 
Regulations require the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) must be carried out by all 
nuclear power plants. Nuclear accidents are unexpected events with small probability, 
and previous studies in nuclear power valuation have not considered the impacts of 
nuclear accidents and losses (or damage) caused by nuclear plants operation.   
4. The uncertainty in electricity price mechanism. Currently, China’s electricity price of 
nuclear power is set by the government, which is a cost-benefit pricing mechanism and 
each nuclear power plant has its own constant electricity price. So the electricity prices 
vary a lot among different nuclear plants. With the continuous electricity market 
reform, the electricity price will be gradually pushed forward to market-oriented. One 
important feature of electricity price marketization is “price bidding” among different 
kinds of power plants. Liberalized electricity price will be affected by seasonal demand 
for electricity, fuel price changes, and other factors. And thus it is uncertain. Electricity 
price mechanism and price level will directly affect the valuation of third-generation 
nuclear power investment. 
5. Regarding climate policy, nuclear power can be viewed as an emission reduction 
option. Compared to thermal power with identical installed capacity, the operation of 
nuclear power does not produce greenhouse gas emissions, but this part of emission 
reduction can not be verified in current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). So the 
application of nuclear power can not have Certification Emission Reduction (CER) and 
trade in CDM. In fact, the nuclear industry is promoting nuclear power CDM credits. If 
nuclear power can be included in Clean Development Mechanism, the uncertainties in 
climate policy and trading mechanism of CDM (Bilateral or Unilateral) will also affects 
the investment of third-generation nuclear power.  
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As NPV based evaluation method can not fully catch the impacts of these uncertainties on 
nuclear power investment, it is necessary to develop a proper method to handle such kinds 
of uncertainties to evaluate the demonstration and deployment of third-generation nuclear 
power plants in China.  
Real options approach is suitable for evaluation of large-scale investment projects with great 
uncertainties. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) first introduced a real options approach to 
natural-resource investment decisions. After that, real options approach has been applied 
more frequently in the evaluation of energy investment (Paddock et. al, 1988, Smith and 
Nau, 1995, Smith and McCardle, 1998, 1999, Fan and Zhu, 2010). For power investment 
projects, real options approach can consider the uncertainties of the market environment, 
generating fuel prices, environmental factors, electricity demand and supply and so on 
(Venetsanos et.al, 2002, Davis and Owens, 2003, Siddiqui et. al, 2007, Abadie and Chamorro, 
2008a, 2008b, Fuss et.al, 2008, Fleten and Näsäkkälä, 2009). Therefore, the real options 
approach would be useful for evaluation of advanced generating technologies. In the 
valuation of nuclear investment, Gollier et. al (2005) apply real options approach with the 
consideration of electricity price uncertainty to compare the critical value between flexible 
sequence of small nuclear power plants and a nuclear power plant of large capacity. They 
show that the option value of modularity has a sizeable effect on the optimal dynamic 
strategy of the producer, particularly in terms of the optimal timing of the decision to invest 
in the first module.  
This paper applies real options theory with Monte Carlo method to establish a nuclear power 
investment evaluation model, incorporating the world's first third-generation nuclear power 
project-Sanmen nuclear power plant in Zhejiang province, to evaluate the value of third-
generation nuclear power plant from the perspective of power generation enterprises. Several 
technical and economic uncertainty factors (deployment cost, generating cost and nuclear 
accident), and two price mechanisms (electricity price and CDM) have been considered in the 
model and it is solved by Least Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) method. As the model can be used 
as a policy analysis tool, under a given period of nuclear power operation, first we have 
evaluated the value of Sanmen third-generation nuclear power plant in current constant 
electricity price set by the government to see whether it is worth investing or not. Then the 
impacts of different electricity and CDM mechanisms on the valuation of third-generation 
nuclear power have been discussed. And we have also analyzed the acceptable level of 
investment cost for third-generation nuclear power in China.  
3. Model description and parameter settings  
As stated above, Sanmen third-generation nuclear power project has been chosen for 
evaluation object, the model established here is based on real options theory with Monte 
Carlo method and solved by Least Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) simulation. The valuation 
includes nuclear power plant construction period and operation period. As a large-scaled 
investment project, it will take time to complete nuclear power investment. And the power 
generation enterprise has the right to exercise the abandon option to terminate the nuclear 
project in the investment stage. So at each step of the investment stage, the enterprise can re-
evaluate the nuclear project to decide whether to continue or abandon the investment. 
Assuming the total period for nuclear power construction and operation is T  years, for the 
purpose of valuation we divide the T  years into N  periods, each with a length of 
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/t T N  , and define nt n t  , 0,1,...n N . All the units for the parameters described 
below is displayed in table 1.  
3.1 Modeling third-generation nuclear power operation  
At nuclear power plant operation period, first it is in need to calculate the cash flow during 
nuclear power operation. Assuming at any period nt , the generating capacity of third-
generation nuclear power is ( )Elec nQ t , and all the electricity generated by nuclear power can 
be sold to grid. Considering the possibility of nuclear accident, after nuclear power 
investment has been completed, the cash flow ( )iCF t  earned by the power enterprise 
through electricity selling from nuclear power at it  period should be: 
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] ( ) (1 )Nu i Nu i C i Nu i Elec iCF t P t P t C t Rw Q t Tax q          
Where ( )Nu iP t  is the electricity price; ( )C iP t  is the carbon price under CDM, and if nuclear 
power can not be included in CDM, this term will be 0; ( )Nu iC t  is the nuclear generating 
cost; Tax  denotes the income tax for power generation enterprise; Rw  represents the cost 
for nuclear waste disposal; and q  is the impact of nuclear accident.  
At any period it  after accomplishment of nuclear power investment, the value ( )Nu iV t  for 
enterprise operating the nuclear power plant is:  
( )( ) ( )n i
N
r t t
Nu i Nu n
n i
V t e CF t 

   
And r  is the risk free rate.  
During nuclear power plant operation period, we have considered the impact of three 
electricity price mechanism, two CDM price mechanism, generating cost (uranium fuel 
price) uncertainty, and unexpected events with small possibility on the nuclear power plant 
operating cash flow and value.  
First, we can assume nuclear generating cost following a geometric Brownian motion:  
1/2
1( ) ( )exp( ( ) )Nu i Nu i C C CC t C t t t         
Where C  is a normally distributed random variable with mean of 0 and standard deviation 
equivalent to 1; and C  and C  represent the drift and variance parameters of the nuclear 
generating cost, respectively.  
Nuclear accidents are unexpected events with small possibility. Here we apply a Poission 
process to describe the unexpected events (nuclear accidents) during nuclear power plant 
operation period. Let q  be a Poission process, then we have:  
0, Probability: 1
,Probability:
,Probability: , Probability:
,Probability:
S S
M M
L L
t
u
q
u u t
u
                 
 
Where   is the average probability for the unexpected events (nuclear accidents), and at 
any time horizon t , the probability of nuclear accidents happen will be t  and the 
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probability of nuclear accidents do not happen will be 1 t  ; u  represents the damage or 
loss caused by nuclear accidents during nuclear operation, and 1S M L      .  
Considering different level of nuclear accidents will cause different damage or loss, we 
define three levels of nuclear accidents which correspond to different probability:  
1. Minor accident, the probability is S , there is a small loss Su  for nuclear power plant 
and it will not affect plant operation.  
2. Moderate accident, the probability is M , there is a moderate loss Mu  for nuclear 
power plant. And the plant will pause power generation in next two years in order to 
have necessary reactor security maintenance and monitoring nuclear leak, which 
1 2( ) ( ) 0Elec x Elec xQ t Q t   .  
3. Serious accident, the probability is L , there is a severe loss of Lu  for nuclear power 
plant. And the plant will be shut down permanently, which 
1 2( ) ( ) ... ( ) 0Elec x Elec x Elec NQ t Q t Q t     .  
For electricity price, three forms of price mechanism have been taken in to account in this 
paper, which are shown as follows:  
1. The electricity price follows cost-benefit pricing mechanism and is set by the 
government, it is a constant price mechanism in which 1( ) ( )Nu i Nu iP t P t  .  
2. The electricity price is still under government control but has a constant growth rate at 
each period, it is a constant growth price mechanism in which 
1( ) ( )exp( )Nu i Nu i PP t P t t    .  
3. The electricity price is liberalized as electricity marketization. Assuming the liberalized 
electricity price follows a geometric Brownian motion  
1/2
1( ) ( )exp( ( ) )Nu i Nu i P P PP t P t t t         
Where P  is a normally distributed random variable with mean of 0 and standard deviation 
equivalent to 1; and P  and P  represent the drift and variance parameters of the 
electricity price, respectively.  
For CDM, two following forms of CDM have been modelled in this paper: 
1. In bilateral CDM, the carbon price is constant, of which 1( ) ( )C i C iP t P t  .  
2. In unilateral CDM, referring to previous research related carbon price modeling 
(Abadie and Chamorro, 2008, Heydari et.al, 2010), assuming the carbon price in 
unilateral CDM follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
 1/21( ) ( )exp( ( ) )C i C i Pc Pc PcP t P t t t         
Where Pc  is a normally distributed random variable with mean of 0 and standard 
deviation equivalent to 1; and Pc  and Pc  represent the drift and variance parameters of 
the carbon price, respectively.  
3.2 Modeling third-generation nuclear power investment  
At nuclear power plant construction period, we apply a controlled diffusion process to 
describe the uncertainty of third-generation nuclear power investment. NuK  is the expected 
total investment cost for power generation enterprises to deploy third-generation nuclear 
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power technology and the total deployment investment remaining at period it  is ( )Nu iK t . 
Assume that NuK  follows the controlled diffusion process:  
1/2 1/2
1( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )Nu i Nu i Nu i Nu i Nu i xK t K t I t t I t K t t        
Where   is a scale parameter representing the uncertainty around NuK ; x  is a normally 
distributed random variable with mean of 0 and standard deviation equivalent to 1. The 
variance of NuK  is 
2
2
2( ) 2Nu Nu
Var K K
     
, whereby uncertainty of third-generation 
nuclear power technology reduces as NuK  decreases.  
Under the real option analysis framework, the power generation enterprise owns the 
abandon option during nuclear power plant construction period. At any time period it  in 
construction period, the value of the nuclear power investment opportunity owned by the 
enterprise is denoted by ( )Nu iF t . At the time period which nuclear power investment is 
completed (construction finished), the value of abandon option is equal to nuclear power 
project value:  
( ) ( )Nu NuF V    
At the time period it  before investment is completed, the value of the nuclear power 
investment opportunity that the enterprise owns is equal to:  
 1( ) 1( ) max 0, ( ) ( )i ii r t tNu i t Nu i Nu iF t E e F t I t       
Where  *
itE  is the expected value which the enterprise chooses to hold abandon option 
and continue to invest in nuclear power plant at the time period it .  
3.3 LSM Solution to the model  
The abandon option ( )Nu iF t  of third-generation nuclear power investment is computed by the 
Least Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) method. The LSM method was developed for valuing 
American options and is based on Monte Carlo simulation and least squares regression 
(Longstaff and Schwartz, 2001; Schwartz, 2004). The model also computes the related 
greenhouse gas emission reduction which is avoided by applying nuclear power to take place 
of thermal power. Take g  to represent the time that the third-generation nuclear power 
investment is completed in path g . Thus, the greenhouse gas emission reduction from the 
adoption of nuclear power during the given observation period can be computed as: 
( ) ( )Elec gER g e Q T      
Where ( )ER g  is the emission reduction amount during path g ; e  is the emission factor for 
existing thermal power. Taking the average over all the paths, the total emission reduction 
amount through investing in third-generation nuclear power technology can be obtained. 
LSM method described has been implemented in Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB), and all 
solution procedure is vividly described in figure 1. 
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3.4 Model parameters  
Table 1 shows the parameter values of the model. The project data related to Sanmen third-
generation nuclear power plant mainly derive from public reports. Liberalized electricity 
price mechanism refers to European electricity market, and the data of uranium price comes 
from EIA. Some parameter values are estimated in this research due to data lack.  
 
 
Fig. 1. LSM based Model Solution Procedure 
 
Parameter Model 
symbol
Value Notes 
generation capacity ElecQ  
15000*10^6 
kwh 
After Sanmen Nuclear Power project phase I has 
been completed, it will provide the power 
installed capacity of 2.5 million kilowatts, with a 
electricity supply of annual 17.5 billion kwh. It is 
designed to meet new electricity demand in 
Zhejiang province. 
Total investment 
cost of third-
generation nuclear 
power plant 
NuK  
40000*10^6 
yuan 
Sanmen Nuclear Power Project will build 2 units 
with each installed capacity of 1.25 million 
kilowatts, and the total investment cost is 40 billion. 
Initial annual 
investment cost Nu
I  8000*10^6 
yuan 
The time needed for nuclear power construction is 
generally 5 years. Sanmen Nuclear Power Project 
has started construction in 2009, and it is expected 
to be put into in operation in 2014. So the initial 
investment cost can be set as five years annual 
investment cost. 
Nuclear technology 
uncertainty 
  0.5 Here refers to the settings in the research of Schwartz (2003), Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  
Investment complete 
Timeline  
2. 3rd nuclear power 
project investment 
 
3. Compute the net power generation cash 
flow NuCF  at each period 
4. Calculate the value of nuclear plant   NuW  
recursively 
5. Estimate the fitted value 
ˆ
NuW  
For enterprise to decide 
whether to continue or 
abandon the option  
6. Discounting the resulting cash flows to time zero, compute the average option 
value of the 3rd nuclear power investment project  
1. Random paths simulation along timeline ( NuP , CP , NuC ,q  and NuK ) 
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Parameter Model 
symbol
Value Notes 
Nuclear power 
generating cost Nu
C  0.25 
yuan/kwh
The data refers to the estimation of uranium 
generating cost from Zhu and Fan (2010).  
Nuclear power 
generating cost 
drift rate 
C  0.01/year 
Set by this study.  
Nuclear power 
generating cost 
standard deviation 
rate 
C  6.24%/year
The data refers to the estimation of uranium 
generating fuel risk from Zhu and Fan (2010).  
Electricity price NuP  
0.45 
yuan/kwh
The price level refers to the electricity price set for 
Tianwan nuclear power plant which is newly put 
into operation, and this is also the baseline 
electricity price in our model. 
Electricity price 
drift rate P
  0.01/year Set by this study. 
Electricity price 
standard deviation 
rate 
P  5.00%/year
Set by this study. Considering future economic 
development in China, the demand for 
electricity is to some extent rigid, so here we set a 
low level of price volatility. 
Correlation 
between Electricity 
price and 
generating cost 
PCNu 0.3 
Set by this study. 
Carbon price CP  
0.12 
yuan/kwh
The data refers to the estimation of carbon 
emission cost from Zhu and Fan (2010). And this is 
also the baseline carbon price in our model.  
Carbon price drift 
rate Pc
  0.02/year Set by this study. 
Carbon price 
standard deviation 
rate 
Pc  11.50%/year
The data refers to the estimation of carbon price 
risk from Zhu and Fan (2009).  
Probability of 
nuclear accident   0.01%/year
Set by this study. 
Probability of 
minor accident S
  98.90% Here assume most of the nuclear accident are minor accident 
Probability of 
moderate accident M
  1.00% 
Assuming there will be 1.00% the probability to be 
moderate accident after nuclear accident 
happened. 
Probability of 
serious accident L
  0.10% Assuming there will be 0.10% the probability to be serious accident after nuclear accident happened.  
Damage or loss of 
minor accident S
u  50*10^6 
yuan 
The loss for minor accident and it will not affect 
plant operation. 
Damage or loss of 
moderate accident M
u  500*10^6 
yuan 
The loss for moderate accident, And the plant will 
pause power generation in next two years in order 
to have necessary reactor security maintenance 
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Parameter Model 
symbol
Value Notes 
and monitoring nuclear leak.  
Damage or loss of 
serious accident L
u  5000*10^6 
yuan 
The loss for serious accident, And the plant will be 
shut down permanently.  
Nuclear waste 
disposal cost Rw  
0.02 
yuan/kwh
The cost of nuclear waste disposal is generally 
account for 10% of total nuclear generating cost.  
Riskfree rate r  0.05% 
China’s long-term deposit interest rate is used as a 
risk-free rate to represent the discount rate.  
Tax rate Tax  25% Refers to the level of current domestic income tax.  
Observation time T  
30 year, 
year 2010-
2040 
Here we consider the first 30 years of nuclear 
power plant life, this period is main investment 
accounting period for nuclear power investment.  
Time Step Size in 
Simulations t  1 year 
 
Number of 
Simulations G  5000 
In general, the simulation results will start to 
convergence when paths more than 1000, so the 
number of paths simulated in different scenarios 
are set as 5000.  
Emission Factor e  893g CO2/kwh 
Emission factor of coal-fired generation comes 
from IEA (2009). In 2007, CO2 emission per kwh 
from electricity and heat generation using 
coal/peat in China is 893g CO2/kwh.  
Table 1. Parameters used in the model 
Figure 2a and 2b shows the changes of nuclear power generating cost NuC  and remaining 
investment cost of third-generation nuclear power plant NuK  in 250 of 5000 simulation 
paths. Figure 2c-2e shows once nuclear accident happen, the impact of three levels of 
nuclear accident on the nuclear power plant operation and cash flow in a single path. A 
large sample of random routing Monte Carlo simulation can simulate every possible result 
of cost change, and can better quantify the impact of nuclear accident on the value of third-
generation nuclear power plant.  
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a     b 
Fig. 2a. Generating cost simulation  
(Paths:250 of 5000) 
Fig. 2b. Residual investment cost simulation 
(Paths:250 of 5000) 
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Fig. 2c. Single simulated path of minor nuclear accident 
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Fig. 2d. Single simulated path of moderate nuclear accident 
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Fig. 2e. Single simulated path of serious nuclear accident 
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4. Evaluation of third-generation nuclear power investment in China 
Take the value of parameters into the model, and simulate the future changes of uncertainty 
factors according to their initial settings, then we can calculate the nuclear power plant 
value with abandon option by LSM method. Considering the Randomness of Monte Carlo 
simulation and in order to have a more accurate result, we have calculated five seeds for 
each result. And each seed has a result based on 5000 paths simulation with the application 
of LSM solution. Taking the average of the results in five seeds then we can get the value of 
third-generation nuclear power plant with abandon option.  
For comparisons, we have presented two cases. Case 1 is based on current situation in China 
that the electricity price of nuclear power is set by the government and nuclear power can 
not be included in CDM. The constant electricity price set in our model is 0.45yuan/kwh 
which refers to the electricity price set for Tianwan nuclear power plant, and carbon price is 
0. Case 2 sets the electricity price that is liberalized and nuclear power can be included in 
CDM (unilateral CDM with uncertain carbon price). The initial electricity price is set as 
0.45yuan/kwh, and carbon price is 0.12yuan/kwh. See results in table 2.    
It can be seen from table 2 that, in Sanmen third-generation nuclear power investment, if the 
electricity price is set by the government and nuclear power can not join CDM, the value of 
nuclear power plant is 0 and the investment has been abandoned in all paths. This means, 
because of high investment cost and uncertainty, under current level of constant electricity 
price for nuclear power, third-generation nuclear power is not worth investing in China. 
And if we consider the liberalized electricity price and CDM, the value of nuclear power 
plant lies between 17979.49 and 18582.92 million yuan, with a mean of 18322.38 million 
yuan. The percentage of paths abandoned is 0.74%, which is really small. And the CO2 
emission reduction amount is 325.78 million tons CO2e. This means under case 2, the 
investment of third-generation nuclear power is very attractive and with a very small 
investment risk.  
 
Case 1: Electricity Price  
Fixed + Without CDM Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4 Seed 5 Average 
Nuclear Power Plant Value 
(Millions RMB) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Percentage of Paths Abandoned 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Emission Reduction Amount 
(Millions tonnes CO2e) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Case 2: Electricity Price  
Uncertain + Unilateral CDM Seed 1 Seed 2 Seed 3 Seed 4 Seed 5 Average 
Nuclear Power Plant Value 
(Millions RMB) 18297.62 18447.95 18582.92 18303.94 17979.49 18322.38 
Percentage of Paths Abandoned 0.72% 0.74% 0.72% 0.52% 1.00% 0.74% 
Emission Reduction Amount 
(Millions tonnes CO2e) 325.84 325.91 325.81 326.48 324.85 325.78 
 
Table 2. Nuclear Power Plant Values Results for Different Seeds 
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In the next, we will further discuss the impacts of three electricity price mechanism, two 
CDM, and different levels of investment cost on the valuation of third-generation nuclear 
power investment.  
4.1 The impact of three electricity price mechanism  
Nuclear power electricity price level is a significant factor in nuclear investment. Our model 
has introduced three electricity price mechanisms: constant electricity price set by the 
government, electricity price with constant growth rate, and liberalized electricity price as 
market-oriented (the price follows stochastic process). This part aims to investigate, under 
these three electricity price mechanisms, the impact of different level of electricity price on 
the value of third-generation nuclear power. In constant electricity price mechanism, the 
price level will increase from 0.45yuan/kwh gradually up to 0.575yuan/kwh. And in 
constant growth rate and liberalized electricity price mechanism, the initial price level will 
increase from 0.45yuan/kwh gradually up to 0.575yuan/kwh. See results in figure 3a-3c.  
Figure 3a is the trend for the value of third-generation nuclear power changes as electricity 
price changes. In constant electricity price mechanism, the value of third-generation nuclear 
power can exceed 0 only when electricity price is 0.575yuan/kwh, and the value is 88.74 
million yuan. Compares to 40000 million yuan investment cost for third-generation nuclear 
power plant, it has very low investment returns. And the electricity price of 0.575yuan/kwh 
has increased 27.78% than that of Tianwan nuclear power plant, the price level is high. This 
mean if we wish to make the investment value of third-generation nuclear power exceed 0, 
the electricity price need to at least increase 30% than that of current price level in Tianwan 
nuclear power plant.  
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Fig. 3a. Nuclear plant value under 3 electricity price mechanisms 
In constant growth rate and liberalized electricity price mechanisms, the value of third-
generation nuclear power increases as the initial electricity price level increases. And given 
the same initial price level, the value in liberalized electricity price mechanism is always 
higher than that of constant growth rate price mechanism (given the initial electricity price 
as 0.45yuan/kwh and 0.575yuan/kwh, the value in liberalized electricity price mechanism 
are 70.52 million yuan and 14187.34 million yuan, which are all larger than 0 and 12998.13 
million yuan in that of constant growth rate price mechanism). So in liberalized electricity 
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price mechanism, future uncertainty in electricity price can indeed increase the value of 
third-generation nuclear power and make the investment much more attractive.  
Figure 3b is the paths abandoned among three electricity price mechanisms. In constant 
electricity price mechanism, all the paths are abandoned when electricity price level is lower 
than 0.55yuan/kwh, and the percentage of paths abandoned is 98.8% when the electricity 
price is  0.55yuan/kwh, which indicates that the investment risk is very high. In constant 
growth rate and liberalized electricity price mechanisms, the percentage of paths abandoned 
decreases as the initial electricity price level increases. Take the initial electricity price as 
0.45yuan/kwh, the percentage of paths abandoned in constant growth rate and liberalized 
electricity price mechanisms are 100% and 99.05%. And take the initial electricity price as 
0.45yuan/kwh, the percentage of paths abandoned in the two price mechanisms are 0.28% 
and 2.30%, respectively.  
When the initial electricity price is low, the investment risk in constant growth rate 
mechanism is higher than that of liberalized electricity price mechanism (Take the initial 
electricity price as 0.475yuan/kwh, the percentage of paths abandoned in constant growth 
rate price mechanism is 99.93%, which is higher than that of 94.74% in liberalized electricity 
price mechanism). And when the initial electricity price is high, the investment risk in 
constant growth rate mechanism is smaller than that of liberalized electricity price 
mechanism (Take the initial electricity price as 0.55yuan/kwh, the percentage of paths 
abandoned in constant growth rate price mechanism is 6.55%, which is lower than that of 
9.75% in liberalized electricity price mechanism). Though at the same initial price level, the 
value in liberalized electricity price mechanism is always higher than that of constant 
growth rate price mechanism, given a higher initial electricity price, the investment risk can 
be well hedged in constant growth rate price mechanism. This can not happen in liberalized 
electricity price mechanism because a higher initial electricity price can not fully hedge the 
uncertainty in future electricity prices. Therefore, the investment risk always exists in 
liberalized electricity price mechanism.  
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Fig. 3b. Paths abandoned under 3 electricity price mechanisms 
Figure 3c is the CO2 emission reduction amount among three electricity price mechanisms. 
CO2 emission reduction amount is negatively correlated to the percentage of paths 
abandoned. Higher nuclear investment risk will result in lower emission reduction amount. 
In constant electricity price mechanism, when electricity price level is lower than 
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0.55yuan/kwh, all the emission reduction amount are all 0 as all the paths are abandoned. 
When electricity price level is 0.575yuan/kwh, the emission reduction amount is 3.95 
million tons CO2e as percentage of paths abandoned is 98.8%. In constant growth rate and 
liberalized electricity price mechanisms, CO2 emission reduction amount of investing in 
third-generation nuclear power increases as the initial electricity price level increases.  
When the initial electricity price is low, the CO2 emission reduction amount in constant 
growth rate mechanism is smaller than that of liberalized electricity price mechanism (Take 
the initial electricity price as 0.475yuan/kwh, the CO2 emission reduction amount in 
constant growth rate price mechanism is 0.26 million tons CO2e, which is smaller than that 
of 17.26 million tons in liberalized electricity price mechanism). And when the initial 
electricity price is high, the CO2 emission reduction amount in constant growth rate 
mechanism is smaller than that of liberalized electricity price mechanism (Take the initial 
electricity price as 0.55yuan/kwh, the CO2 emission reduction amount in constant growth 
rate price mechanism is 306.60 million tons CO2e, which is larger than that of 296.19 million 
tons in liberalized electricity price mechanism). This is mainly because of the changes of 
investment risks among the two electricity mechanisms.  
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Fig. 3c. Emission reduction amount under 3 electricity price mechanisms 
From the results we know that under current domestic constant electricity price level, 
nuclear power can not be included in CDM, third-generation nuclear power does not worth 
to invest. And the electricity price need to increase at least 30% than that of current price 
level in Tianwan nuclear power plant so as to make the investment value of third-generation 
nuclear power exceed 0. In constant growth rate and liberalized electricity price 
mechanisms, the value of third-generation nuclear power has increased a lot than that in 
constant electricity price mechanism. And in liberalized electricity price mechanism, as 
future uncertainty in electricity price can indeed increase the value of third-generation 
nuclear power, under this mechanism the value of third-generation nuclear power is the 
largest, and the investment is the most attractive.  
4.2 The impact of two Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)  
The nuclear industry is pushing hard to give nuclear power CDM credits. Our model has 
introduced two forms of CDM, bilateral CDM (constant carbon price) and unilateral CDM 
(uncertain carbon price). Here we set the electricity price as 0.45yuan/kwh and keep it 
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constant, the income of nuclear power generation is from two parts, selling electricity plus 
carbon credit. This part aims to investigate, under two forms of CDM, the impact of 
different level of carbon price on the value of third-generation nuclear power. In unilateral 
CDM, the carbon price level will increase from 0 gradually up to 0.125yuan/kwh. And in 
bilateral CDM, the initial carbon price level will increase from 0 gradually up to 
0.125yuan/kwh. See results in figure 4a-4c.  
Figure 4a is the trend for the value of third-generation nuclear power changes as carbon 
price changes. In unilateral CDM, although nuclear power can be included in CDM, the 
value of third-generation nuclear power still can not exceed 0 when carbon prices are lower 
than 0.10yuan/kwh. And at the baseline level of carbon price (0.12yuan/kwh) set in our 
model, the value is only 22.95 million yuan, which is relatively small. In bilateral CDM, at 
the baseline level of initial carbon price (0.12yuan/kwh), the value of third-generation 
nuclear power is 7147.07 million yuan, which makes nuclear power more attractive for 
investment. The value of third-generation nuclear power increases as the initial carbon price 
level increases, which is similar to that in liberalized electricity price mechanism. But given 
the same income level, the value in bilateral CDM is much smaller than that in liberalized 
electricity price mechanism (in bilateral CDM, when the initial income level is 
0.45+0.10=0.55yuan/kwh, the value is 2444.34 million yuan, which is much smaller than that 
of 10809.95 million yuan in liberalized electricity price mechanism with initial electricity 
price is 0.55yuan/kwh).  
 
7141.07
81.450.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.95
8533.05
170.73
0.000.000.00
2444.34
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
0.
00
0
0.
02
5
0.
05
0
0.
07
5
0.
10
0
0.
12
0
0.
12
5
0.
00
0
0.
02
5
0.
05
0
0.
07
5
0.
10
0
0.
12
0
0.
12
5N
uc
le
ar
 P
ro
je
ct
 V
al
ue
 (1
0^
6 
yu
an
)
Bilateral CDM Unilateral CDM
yuan/kwh yuan/kwh
 
Fig. 4a. Nuclear plant value under 2 CDM mechanisms 
Figure 4b presents the paths abandoned among two forms of CDM. In unilateral CDM, the 
investment risk of third-generation nuclear power is very large. In bilateral CDM, the 
percentage of paths abandoned decreases as the initial carbon price level increases, which is 
similar to that in liberalized electricity price mechanism. Howerver, provided in given the 
same income level, the paths abandoned in bilateral CDM is much larger than that in 
liberalized electricity price mechanism (in bilateral CDM, when the initial income levels are 
0.45+0.075=0.525yuan/kwh and 0.45+125=0.575yuan/kwh, the percentage of paths 
abandoned are 97.72% and 16.40%, which are much larger than that of 33.48% and 2.30% in 
liberalized electricity price mechanism with initial electricity prices are 0.525yuan/kwh and 
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0.575yuan/kwh, respectively). This means at the same initial income level, the investment 
risk in bilateral CDM is always larger than that in liberalized electricity price mechanism.  
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Fig. 4b. Paths abandoned under 2 CDM mechanisms 
Figure 4c is the CO2 emission reduction amount among two forms of CDM. In unilateral 
CDM, the emission reduction amounts are 0 or relatively small because most of the paths 
are all abandoned. In bilateral CDM, the emission reduction amount increases as the initial 
carbon price level increases. As given the same initial income level, because the investment 
risk in bilateral CDM is always larger than that in liberalized electricity price mechanism, so 
the emission reduction amount in bilateral CDM is always smaller than that in liberalized 
electricity price mechanism (given the same initial income level as 0.55yuan/kwh, the 
emission reduction amount in bilateral CDM is 98.70 million tons CO2e, which is smaller 
than that of 296.19 million tons CO2e in liberalized electricity price mechanism).  
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Fig. 4c. Emission reduction amount under 2 CDM mechanisms 
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From the results we can see that when the carbon price level is low, neither unilateral CDM 
nor bilateral CDM can increase the attraction of third-generation nuclear power investment. 
At the baseline carbon price level (0.12yuan/kwh), the carbon credit income in both 
unilateral CDM and bilateral CDM can increase the value of nuclear power on the basis of 
constant electricity price (0.45yuan/kwh). And the value will be higher in bilateral CDM. 
Therefore, if the nuclear power can be included in CDM, we would advise the power 
generation enterprise to take more efforts in bilateral CDM, but not conservative follow 
bilateral CDM which is more common for domestic carbon credit sellers. As a result, it can 
obtain more benefits from carbon credits.  
4.3 The impact of different levels of nuclear investment cost 
Based on the data from Sanmen third-generation nuclear power plant, the total investment 
cost is 40000 million yuan with installed capacity of 2500MW (2*1250MW). And the average 
unit investment cost is 16000yuan/kw, which is relatively high. High investment cost of 
third-generation nuclear power will result in great investment risk. This part aims to 
investigate the impact of investment cost reduction on the valuation of third-generation 
nuclear power. Here also set the electricity price as 0.45yuan/kwh and remain constant, and 
nuclear power can not be included in CDM. The investment cost will decrease from 40000 
million yuan (16000yuan/kw) gradually down to 25000 million yuan (10000yuan/kw). And 
10000yuan/kw is equal to the unit investment cost of domestic second-generation nuclear 
power plant. See results in figure 5a-5c. 
Figure 5a is the trend for the value of third-generation nuclear power changes as investment 
cost changes. The impact of marginal investment cost reduction on the value of nuclear 
power shows ‘increased first and then decreased’ (as total investment cost decrease from 
37500 million yuan to 35000 million yuan, the increment of nuclear power value is 2250.96 
million yuan; as total investment cost decrease from 35000 million yuan to 32500 million 
yuan, the increment of nuclear power value is 2700.83 million yuan; as total investment cost 
decrease from 27500 million yuan to 25000 million yuan, the increment of nuclear power 
value is 1928.53 million yuan). Consequently, the contribution to nuclear power value from 
marginal investment cost reduction will decrease when the total investment cost is less than 
32500 million yuan.  
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Fig. 5a. Nuclear plant value under different total investment cost 
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Figure 5b is the trend for the percentage of paths abandoned changes as investment cost 
changes. The percentage of paths abandoned decreases as third-generation nuclear power 
investment cost decreases and total investment cost reduction can reduce the investment 
risk effectively. The percentages of paths abandoned are all less than 5% when total 
investment cost falls below the level of 30000 million yuan. And as the total investment cost 
decreased to 25000 million yuan, the percentages of paths abandoned is only 0.26%, the 
investment risk is very small. The marginal investment risk reduction also shows ‘increased 
first and then decreased’ as investment cost decreases, and the contribution to nuclear 
power investment risk reduction from marginal investment cost reduction decreases when 
total investment cost falls below 32500 million yuan.  
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Fig. 5b. Paths abandoned under different total investment cost 
Figure 5c is the trend for the CO2 emission reduction amount as investment cost changes. 
The emission reduction amount increases and the marginal CO2 emission reduction amount 
also shows ‘increased first and then decreased’ as third-generation nuclear power 
investment cost decreases. When the total investment cost falls below 30000 million yuan, 
the CO2 emission reduction amounts are all larger than 310 million tons CO2e, the changes 
in marginal CO2 emission reduction amounts are very tiny.  
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Fig. 5c. Emission reduction amount under different total investment cost 
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From the results we are informed that under baseline constant electricity price as 
0.45yuan/kwh, changes in investment cost have significant impact on the value of third-
generation nuclear power. If the total investment cost falls below 30000 million yuan which 
investment cost per unit is 12000yuan/kw, the investment risk is lower than 5%, implying 
that the investment is more viable. At this case the investment cost per unit is 1.2 times to 
that of average unit cost of domestic second-generation nuclear power plant. 
5. Conclusions and further work 
This paper applies real options theory with Monte Carlo method to establish a nuclear 
power investment evaluation model, incorporating the world's first third-generation nuclear 
power project-Sanmen nuclear power plant in Zhejiang province to evaluate the value of 
third-generation nuclear power plant in China. With several technical and economic 
uncertainty factors (deployment cost, generating cost and nuclear accident) considered in 
the model, we have investigated the impacts of three electricity price mechanisms, two 
forms of CDM, and investment cost reduction on the value of Sanmen third-generation 
nuclear power plant. Based on the result analysis,a couple of conclusions are drawn as 
follows: 
1. Under constant electricity price mechanism, third-generation nuclear power is worth 
investment if the price refers to the electricity price in Tianwan nuclear power plant. 
And the electricity price need to at least increase 30% than current price level in 
Tianwan nuclear power plant so it can make third-generation nuclear power worth to 
invest. It should be noticed that in liberalized electricity price mechanism, the 
investment of third-generation nuclear power is more attractive than the other two 
price mechanisms among all electricity price levels. So the electricity price 
marketization will be a preferred option to promote the investment in third-generation 
nuclear power under current investment cost level. 
2. Currently nuclear power can not be included in CDM. If the CDM can give nuclear 
power credit, the selling of carbon credit can increase the income of nuclear power 
plant, and this will also promote the investment in third-generation nuclear power. 
Considering the current electricity price is set by the government and remains constant, 
at baseline carbon price level, CDM has provided another option for power generation 
enterprise to compensate for the large investment cost of third-generation nuclear 
power. Based on the comparison between bilateral CDM and unilateral CDM, we 
would advise the power generation enterprise to take more efforts in bilateral CDM to 
obtain more benefits from carbon credits.  
3. As the world's first third-generation nuclear power project, currently the investment 
cost of Sanmen nuclear power plant is relatively high. As the value of nuclear power is 
sensitive to investment cost, under current constant electricity price mechanism, the 
investment in third-generation nuclear power will be more viable if the total investment 
cost can be reduced to 1.2 times to that of domestic second-generation nuclear power 
plant.  
Third-generation nuclear power is an advanced generating technology with large 
uncertainties. Our model still has limitations. Firstly, some data, especially nuclear accidents 
data in the model, are estimated in this research owing to shortage of actual data 
supporting. Secondly, the model does not consider any flexibility during the nuclear power 
operating period and we only consider the abandon option in Sanmen nuclear power plant 
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first phase project. Actually, the power generation enterprises can decide whether to invest 
in second phase project based on the judgment of electricity market of nuclear power 
operation status. As a consequence, taking compound option during nuclear power 
operational period into our model is one of the most important directions for model 
improvements. The forementioned issues require emphasizing in future work.  
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Characteristic Evaluation and Scenario 
Study on Fast Reactor Cycle in Japan 
Hiroki Shiotani, Kiyoshi Ono and Takashi Namba 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) 
Japan 
1. Introduction 
Today, Japanese nuclear energy faces a period of great change. After the start up of 
plutonium recycling in LWR (light water reactor) and groundbreaking of MOX (Mixed 
OXide) fuel fabrication plant (J-MOX), Rokkasho reprocessing plant is preparing its 
operation. Regarding Gen IV nuclear energy system, a joint team of Japan Atomic Energy 
Agency (JAEA) and the Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) and related parties has been 
conducting Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development Project (FaCT Project) since 2006. It 
has been a Japanese political choice to take a step toward Fast Reactor (FR) 
commercialization in the middle of this century. It will be reviewed by the government of 
Japan in response to the recent accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. In 
FaCT project, besides the facility design studies and element technology development, the 
characteristic evaluations and scenario studies have been conducted including the 
methodology development to confirm and give suggestions on basic directions of the 
research and development (R&D). 
2. FaCT project and evaluation tool 
In this section, the outline of FaCT project is described including the background Japanese 
nuclear policies firstly. Then, a new evaluation code developed for FaCT project is described 
as the basic infrastructure for the strategic studies and evaluations in future Japanese 
nuclear fuel cycle. 
2.1 Outline of FaCT project 
FR cycle technology is capable of reprocessing spent fuels and utilizing recovered 
plutonium and uranium as new fuels effectively. It also has the potential to provide Japan 
with long-term stable energy supply and contribute to reducing the potential harmfulness of 
radioactive waste. Therefore, with the aim of putting FR cycle technology into practice at an 
early stage, JAEA, in cooperation with electric utilities, is working on FaCT project which 
mainly targets a combination of the Sodium-cooled FR with oxide fuel, advanced aqueous 
reprocessing, and the simplified pelletizing fuel fabrication since 2006. In 2010, taking the 
transitional period from LWR cycle to FR cycle into consideration, we reviewed and revised 
the procedures of R&D on reprocessing technology deployment from 2011 onward. Outline 
of FaCT project is shown in Figure. 1. 
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Fig. 1. Outline of FaCT project 
The national policy guidelines such as “Energy Basic Plan” articulates that R&D on FR cycle 
technology should be promoted aiming for the start-up of demonstration FR around 2025 
and its introduction on a commercial basis before 2050. Based on these national policies, in 
2015, FaCT project aims to present conceptual designs of both commercial and 
demonstration facilities of FR cycle, which has capability to acquire the feature that next-
generation nuclear energy system must fulfill from the viewpoints of safety, economics, 
environmental impact, resource utilization efficiency and proliferation resistance, and R&D 
plan towards its commercialization. In order to put those commercial and demonstration 
facilities in practice, promoting introduction of innovative technology, FaCT project is 
conducting element technology development and its subsequent design studies which are 
identified with 13 R&D issues (or 10 techniques regrouped for adoption judgment) on 
reactor system and 6 R&D issues on reprocessing system and fuel fabrication system 
respectively. In 2010, the last year of FaCT project phase 1 starting 2006, we carried out the 
adoption judgment of innovative technologies and the performance criteria assessment of 
FR cycle system, which reflect the results of the adoption judgment, toward the performance 
target. These results are being assessed by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, and 
Technology (MEXT) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Although 
the future FaCT plan will be reconsidered due to the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 
power station, we will progress steadily to realize the commercialization of FR and its fuel 
cycle in around 2050 while enhancing the safety and reliability of the FR cycle concept. 
Meanwhile, we are also conducting R&D on metal fuel cycle as secondary concept, and plan 
to carry out from 2011 onward with the international cooperation. 
2.2 Typical Japanese FR deployment scenario 
World’s energy consumption is increasing with economic growth and it is expected for 
nuclear energy to play an important role worldwide to secure the stable energy supply and 
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to prevent global warming (reduction of greenhouse gas emission) aiming at realization of 
sustainable growth. The level 7 accident of International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) 
occurred at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station by the massive earthquake in 
March 11, 2011 in Japan and some countries began to revalidate nuclear plant safety and 
conduct a review of their nuclear policies. However, in the U.S., large number of nuclear 
power plants are planned to be built for the first time in 30 years. In India and China, which 
maintain high rates of economic growth, it is planned to build additional nuclear power 
plants to raise the entire nuclear capacity up to about 290GWe and 250GWe, respectively by 
2050. In Long-term forecasts conducted by major international agencies concerning energy, 
such as WEO 2009, ETP2008 and ETP2010 by OECD and IEA, it is projected that nuclear 
energy will expand in the long-term as a countermeasure against global warming with 
posing scenarios where conventional measure that only focused on controlling global 
warming will be replaced by the measure that promotes nuclear energy utilization while 
limiting greenhouse effect gas emission intensively. 
Meanwhile, in ‘Basic Energy Plan’ decided by the Japanese Cabinet in June, 2010, it is 
planned to build at least 14 additional nuclear power plants by 2030, domestic nuclear 
power plant capacity of about 48.8GWe will rise to about 68GWe. Furthermore, Japan aims 
at introducing FR cycle on a commercial basis before 2050 as stated in ‘Framework for 
Nuclear Energy Policy’ decided by the Cabinet in October, 2005 and in ‘Nuclear Energy 
Nation Plan’ approved by the Atomic Energy Commission in March, 2006. The ‘Basic 
Energy Plan’ will be reviewed in response to the Fukushima Dai-ich accident. An example 
of trial calculation is shown in Figure 2, it demonstrates the transition of the nuclear energy 
composition when FRs (combination of high breeding core with breeding ratio of 1.2 and 
low breeding core with breeding ratio of 1.03) featured in the FaCT project, are introduced 
in 2050. Before FR deployment, plutonium recovered from LWR reprocessing plants will be 
recycled mainly in LWR, and its LWR capacity will be about 10-20GWe. From 2050 onward, 
if the LWRs with life time of 60 years are replaced by FRs one by one, it takes minimum 60 
years for the complete transition from LWR to FR. Or, if the deployment pace of FR becomes 
slow and it makes the coexistence period of LWR and FR longer, FR cycle can be flexible to 
deal with the transition from LWR to FR by adjusting FR breeding performance and/or 
reprocessing plan by itself. 
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Fig. 2. Long term framework for nuclear energy in Japan (FR deployment in 2050) 
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Currently, Japan poses basic nuclear scenario where current LWR cycle transitions 
completely to FR cycle and it is detailed as follows: 1) the period of LWR existence only, 2) 
the transition period from LWR to FR, and 3) the equilibrium period of FR existence only. 
Evaluation of equilibrium cycle is targeted to the third, ‘FR equilibrium period’. As the ‘FR 
equilibrium period’, when only FR cycle and its fuel cycle exist, continues for long period of 
time, plutonium composition in new fuels and spent fuels of FR, high-level radioactive 
waste, and economics will converge to a certain equilibrium value and end up being simple 
phase, that is ‘ the state of multiple equilibrium cycle’. 
2.3 Performance evaluation tool both for equilibrium and transient nuclear fuel cycle 
system 
Regarding the evaluation methodology to seize the comprehensive characteristics of nuclear 
energy (typically LWR cycle to FR cycle), the methodology is aimed at: 1) performing 
comprehensive evaluation of nuclear energy business based on both transient period and 
equilibrium period using the systematically structured data model of nuclear facilities; 2) 
being a fundamental deliberation evaluation tool providing various information on R&D 
and design study of nuclear energy system in the future. Evaluating dynamic nuclear 
energy system in the transient period as well as FR cycle in equilibrium status, we employ 
time-series evaluation method mainly dealing cash-flow or mass- flow regarding atomic 
energy directly to reflect transition of target nuclear energy system. 
From the view point of economic evaluation, a large-scale calculation system is required 
because it is necessary to express cash-flow or mass-flow of every facility, such as nuclear 
power reactor, fuel fabrication facility, reprocessing facility, waste disposal facility, etc. in 
the life cycle consisting of construction, operation and decommissioning and to calculate the 
amount of waste or cash-flow from nuclear system overall through adding up those cash-
flows or mass-flows. 
With the knowledge of management engineering, this method was built based on the 
concept of supply-chain management (SCM) for nuclear fuel cycle with the consideration of 
business risk of nuclear fuel cycle which was carried out at the first stage of FS phase II. 
Using the calculation tool employing time-series multi-dimensional evaluation method 
basically developed in the final evaluation of FS phase II, we started development of the 
system intensively and obtained sufficient functions to coordinate evaluation and review the 
design of FaCT project. Thus the SCM code is at present developed as both performance 
criteria evaluation tool and detailed transition period evaluation tool. 
This method is network-flow type dynamic analysis model to simulate overall nuclear 
energy business by forming nuclear facilities which makes up nuclear energy system. 
Object-oriented design and analysis technique was used to enhance the system flexibility 
and extendibility of the code. It covers almost all the facilities in Japan from the beginning of 
the nuclear energy utilization and FR cycle equilibrium state in future. It can conduct 
burnup calculation of nuclear fuel in nuclear power plants as well as decay calculation of 
nuclear material in fuel cycle facilities including actinides, fission products, and other 
nuclides although it only uses the ORIGEN-2 code with the libraries based on JENDL-3.3. 
Although the evaluation started at the present in the figure, it should be started the 
calculation at the beginning of the use of nuclear energy. With the capability described 
above, it enables to evaluate both the amounts and compositions of materials/wastes. 
Furthermore it can assess cost (economic efficiency) at all facilities in Japanese FR 
deployment scenario (installed capacity) shown as Figure 2.  
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Fig. 3. Nuclear supply chain and SCM code 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the facilities in nuclear fleet. For example, the 
effects from the differences of breeding ratio of FR, reprocessing plant, and Am-Cm 
recycling on characteristics from developmental targets influences the material flow from 
reprocessing plant. With the object oriented design feature and mechanism that conveys 
information and materials via the interface among highly independent facilities, it is easy to 
place improvements on a facility by itself according to needs. Furthermore, the SCM code 
enabled us to simulate nuclear fuel cycle overall in the process of procurement, dispose and 
transportation of material from the upper to lower facilities without any major change with 
facility data that indicates basic characteristics of nuclear facilities according to the provided 
schemes and scenarios as the assumption of analyses by user in timely manners. 
3. Characteristics evaluation of equilibrium FR cycle and scenario evaluation 
In this section, evaluation on Japanese nuclear fleet in FaCT project is described mainly by 
SCM code code. It covers almost all the facilities in Japan from the beginning of the nuclear 
energy utilization and FR cycle equilibrium state in far future. 
3.1 Characteristics evaluation of equilibrium FR cycle 
The characteristics evaluations on FR cycle in equilibrium status related to the development 
target of FaCT project, which are, economics, environment reservation, radioactive waste 
management, uranium resource utilization efficiency, and proliferation resistance. The 
recent results of the design studies of FR cycle reflected in the evaluations. In those 
evaluations, single reactor and related fuel cycle were supposed to be evaluated. 
3.1.1 Evaluation method of equilibrium cycle 
The characteristics of system will be defined more clearly in its equilibrium state because FR 
cycle is closed cycle which has limited mutual actions with outside. That means evaluation 
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of equilibrium cycle is suitable method for conducting comparative evaluations on 
candidate concepts having different characters with common manner. Furthermore, it 
requires few preconditions aside from design result of FR cycle since mutual actions (mass 
balance) with outside of FR cycle are small. Therefore, it will be relatively easy to apply 
strict methods to evaluate and lessen the uncertainty which affect the characteristics of FR 
cycle. In mass balance calculation, more sophisticated methods than those used in time-
series evaluation are applied and its calculation result is stable. The flexibility of SCM code 
enabled us to treat FR cycle in equilibrium state and mixture of LWR cycle and FR cycle 
transient state with unified manner in the same code. We are conducting the evaluations of 
accumulative natural uranium demand, waste generation and economics for ‘the state of 
multiple equilibrium cycle’. 
3.1.2 Accumulative natural uranium demand 
Although the analysis for cumulative natural uranium demand treats a transient 
characteristic of nuclear fleet, natural uranium demand evaluation result is written here 
because it is raised as one of the essential characteristics of FR cycle system. Figure 4 shows 
Japan’s accumulative natural uranium demand of some scenarios, such as ‘LWR once 
through’, ‘Pu recycling in LWR’ and ‘FR deployments’ in 2040, 2050 and 2060. In the cases of 
LWR once through and Pu recycling in LWR, accumulative natural uranium demand in the 
period of 2007 through 2120 will be about 1.5 million tons and 1.15 million tons, 
respectively. In addition, if FRs with breeding ratio of 1.1 or 1.2 are deployed starting in 
2050, all LWRs will be replaced to FRs completely around 2130, enabling accumulative 
uranium demand to be saturated at about 0.8 million tons level which accounts for 5% of 
conventional uranium resources (total about 16.7 million tons). Consequently, there will be 
no need to import natural uranium from other countries. In the case of ‘LWR once through’ 
and ‘Pu recycling in LWR’, it will be required to procure large quantities of uranium even 
after the late 21st century in which fears over depletion of uranium resource will be foreseen 
worldwide. On the other hand, in ‘deployment of FR’ case, it will be unnecessary to import 
uranium and will lead to an enhancing of energy security. 
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3.1.3 Waste generation 
Nuclear energy supply chain is complicated and great deal of radioactive waste is handled 
in it, thus sufficient safety measure and waste management should be established at the 
nuclear facilities to prevent from influencing surrounding environment and residents. In 
particular, we have to address the challenges to treat and dispose HLW generated in 
reprocessing plant safely. Figure 5 indicates the amount of HLW unit of electricity generated 
and usable years of final disposal site. In current LWR cycle, HLW, namely vitrified wastes 
are produced with the amount of 30 canisters during the operation of LWR with 1GWe for a 
year. While, in the future FR cycle case, it reduces the amount of vitrified waste by 20% 
compared with the current LWR cycle because of high thermal efficiency of FR and 
reduction of pyrogenic FP production. By reflecting foundational R&D result concerning FP 
recycle in addition to the minor actinides recycle, it has possibility to achieve drastic 
reduction of HLW and longer-use of disposal site. Figure 6 shows chronological changes of 
potential harmfulness (relative values) of HLW (spent fuel (SF) and vitrified waste) in the 
same amount of electricity generated for each case. After 1000 years later from being 
discharged from nuclear reactor, in the vitrified waste produced from ‘Pu recycling in LWR’ 
case in which most of uranium and plutonium are recycled, potential harmfulness will be 
reduced to 1/8 of that of spent fuel which is disposed directly in ‘LWR once through’ case. 
Moreover, in FR cycle, minor actinides are also recycled in addition to uranium and 
plutonium, enabling the potential harmfulness to be reduced to 1/30. Meanwhile, the 
potential harmfulness of HLWs generated in each case are compared with the potential 
harmfulness of natural uranium required to produce the same amount of electricity 
generated as each case, which is indicated by the red dashed horizontal line in Figure 6. It 
will take 100,000 years for the potential harmfulness of direct disposed spent fuel to reduce 
to the same level with that from natural uranium, 10,000 years for the vitrified waste from 
LWR cycle, and a couple of hundred years for the vitrified waste from FR cycle. Recycling 
minor actinides in FR cycle enables us to reduce the potential harmfulness and 
environmental burdens caused by HLW. 
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Fig. 5. HLW generation and usable years of final disposal site in Japan 
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Fig. 6. Harmfulness of HLW (spent fuel and vitrified waste) 
3.1.4 Economics 
We are aiming at economics improvement due to a reduction of amount of material by 
adoption of innovative technologies toward commercialization before 2050 since FR cycle 
should be competitive in economy to become basic electric source in the future. Figure 7 
shows estimation of the generation costs of current LWR, future LWR and Future FR 
(breeding ratio of 1.1). The generation cost of future LWR will reduce to 60% of that of 
current LWR by improvement of capacity factor and reduction in unit construction cost of 
reactor. If FR (NOAK) provides superior performance as designed, it will be able to compete 
with future LWR economically by the effect of high thermal efficiency and adoption of high 
burn-up fuel, although the unit construction cost of reactor may be little higher. The total 
cost consists of capital cost, operating cost and fuel cost accounting for about a third each. 
As regard to FR, considering the effect of drop down of capacity factor and increase of the 
unit fuel cycle cost posed by adoption of alternate technologies on the power generation 
cost, the power generation cost will be almost the same level as that of current LWR. 
However, it would appear that the FR cycle compete with the future LWR cycle 
economically. 
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3.1.5 Nuclear proliferation resistance 
As nuclear materials are used as fuels in nuclear energy, we must sweep away the concerns 
over nuclear proliferation. Japan has been applied comprehensive safeguards including 
supplementary protocols and becomes an international model country. In addition, toward 
a commercialization of FR cycle, it is making effort to lead the future nuclear non-
proliferation models by concept study for the process in which uranium will be constantly 
accompanied by plutonium and minor actinides while developing state-of-art technologies 
of safeguards and physical protections of nuclear materials. As one of the efforts, we are 
studying for upgrading reactor cores with effective nuclear proliferation resistance and 
identified the advantage to material barrier which is one of indexes for nuclear proliferation 
resistance by evaluating isotope composition of plutonium in its spent blanket fuels. The 
concepts of upgrading reactor cores with effective nuclear proliferation resistance are listed 
as follows: the core without radial blanket fuels, the core with radial blanket fuels added by 
plutonium and that added by minor actinides. Figure 8 shows the three core concepts. 
Regarding the radial blanket fuels added by plutonium, the ratio of 240Pu/Pu total in the 
radial blanket spent fuels is more than 18% and it meets a criterion for reactor-grade 
plutonium (240Pu/Pu total>18％) suggested by Dr. Pellaud. Thus, this design concept alters 
the plutonium composition to the one without capability being nuclear weapon by adding 
plutonium into radial blanket fuels, and become the one of measures to enhance the effect of 
nuclear proliferation resistance. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Three sample core concepts for enhancing the effect of nuclear proliferation resistance 
(Taken from a figure of “JAEA R&D Review 2010”) 
3.2 Japanese scenario evaluations with advanced analysis tool 
In scenario evaluation, we mainly target at ‘the transition period from LWR to FR’, which is 
the second item in the three periods indicated in section 3.1.1. LWRs, FRs and their nuclear 
fuel cycles coexist in this transition period from LWR to FR. For this reason, in the 
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evaluation of ‘the transition period from LWR to FR’, the results are characterized by the 
complicated effects of various events and preconditions such as, the FR deployment pace, 
introduction plan of reprocessing facilities, interim storages of spent fuels, recycle of 
recovered uranium and so on. In the time–series scenario evaluation, we will optimize the 
mass-balance among various types of reactors, cycle facilities and fuels and will focus 
attention on the smooth transition to FR. Since we target at more complex mass-flow 
comparing to the evaluation of equilibrium cycle, higher leveled and more sophisticated 
methods must be applied in mass-balance calculation, waste generation, and cash-flow 
evaluation, etc. In addition, the number of input items and calculation conditions increase 
and this makes possible for the uncertainty about entire evaluation to be higher than that of 
equilibrium cycle evaluation. We conduct the evaluations of the changes in nuclear material 
and radioactive wastes at the same time including plutonium composition, the amount of 
waste generation and economics on the transition state to the FR cycle. 
The scenario analyses were performed to investigate the characteristics of current Japanese 
nuclear fleet with LWR cycle to the future nuclear fleet with FR cycle. Based on the intensive 
development of the SCM code to cover both equilibrium and transient status of nuclear fuel 
cycle, economics, resources, radioactive wastes, and non-proliferation issues and the 
complex of those issues have been surveyed with consideration of the recent technical 
progress and events in Japanese society. The authors should begin with the alternation of 
scenario in recent several years (after the establishment of “Framework for Nuclear Energy 
Policy” in Japan). Although safety and reliability is raised as one of the important 
development targets in FaCT project, the consideration of them is not directly reflected in 
the analyses. Therefore, some important topics in the course of realizing the equilibrium FR 
cycle state which bring uncertainties to Japanese nuclear fleet were discussed. 
3.2.1 Basic Japanese scenario evaluations including recent change 
The current image of Japanese nuclear energy capacity which is expressed in Framework for 
Nuclear Energy Policy by Japan Atomic Energy Commission is shown in Figure 9. 
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Fig. 9. Nuclear power plant capacity image in the current Framework for Nuclear Energy 
Policy (Original figure was AEC’s HP: Revised by the authors) 
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In Figure 9, important points of the nuclear power plant capacity are as follows: 
 In Japan, the nuclear capacity goal was changed from 58GWe, 
 The BR=1.1 was supposed for FR for future deployment, 
 The lifetimes of nuclear power plants were 40 to 60 years, 
 The reprocessing plants for FR spent fuels will be constructed independently from 
those for LWR spent fuels. 
However, more than five years have passed since the announcement of the current 
Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, the circumstances surrounding nuclear fuel cycle 
including FR cycle also have been changed. The authors discuss several factors which will 
affect the FR cycle long-term plan and strategy in this section. 
First of all, the expectation for nuclear energy has been increased (at least before the accident 
of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station) because it is a just suitable energy to achieve 
both to urge sustainable economic development and to reduce greenhouse gas emission in 
the world. In Japan, national energy basic plan published in 2010 insisted that the nuclear 
energy capacities up to 68GWe by 2030 mainly to meet both of sustainable economic growth 
and greenhouse gas emission reduction. The increase of the expected nuclear capacity in 
Japan will urge the breeding needs of FR and related fuel cycle in Japan. Regarding the 
breeding ratio of FR, BR=1.1 is considered as the reference in the current Framework and 
FaCT project, but FR with higher BR (ex.BR=1.2) which was described in former section is 
also important in preparedness for the uncertainties of the fuel cycle operation and the 
possibility of development toward global standard after the governmental evaluation of FS 
Phase II. Besides, Japanese government, electricity utilities, and manufacturers are making 
the concept of the next generation LWRs which has 80 years lifetime with the burnup of 
more than 70GWd/tHM, etc. Additionally, the study on reprocessing facilities subsequent 
to Rokkasho-Reprocessing Plant (RRP) has started. In the study, dual-purpose (LWR-SF and 
FR-SF) reprocessing plants were proposed as well as independent single-purpose (for 
exclusive use) reprocessing plants. Therefore, the authors tried to include those variations in 
the analysis cases listed in Table 1. 
 
Case Capacity 
(GWe) 
Core Fuel Breeding Ratio LWR 
lifetime
Reprocesing  
Plant mode 
Conventional 58 (U, Pu, MA) oxide 1.1 to 1.03 60 Single Use 
Recent (Ref.) 68 (U, Pu, MA) oxide 1.1 to 1.03 80 Dual Use 
BR=1.2 68 (U, Pu, MA) oxide 1.2 to 1.03 80 Dual Use 
60Yrs 68 (U, Pu, MA) oxide 1.1 to 1.03 60 Dual Use 
Single Use 68 (U, Pu, MA) oxide 1,1 to 1.03 80 Singlel Use 
Table 1. Analysis cases reflected basic nuclear energy policy change 
In those analyses listed in Table 1, the influence of lifetime extension was largest on future 
scenarios; change in breeding ratio and future nuclear power plant capacity had some 
influence. The reprocessing plant mode had a relatively smaller influence, on the whole. 
The authors would like to start an analysis treated the meaning of the breeding ratio in the 
recent context of Japan. The result of FS showed that FR with breeder core of BR1.1 will be 
enough to deploy FRs smoothly in 80 years for future Japan. The lifetime extension of next 
generation LWRs to 80years helped reduce the breeding requirement of FRs in future Japan. 
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Figure 10 shows the nuclear capacity in Japan for deployment of FR with BR=1.1 with the 80 
years lifetime of LWR. The “Dual Use” means a reprocessing plant can be used both for 
LWR-SF and FR-SF. On the contrary, “Single Use” means a reprocessing plant can be used 
only for LWR-SF or FR-SF. 
However, if some larger uncertainties are considered in scenario study, FRs with breeder 
core of BR=1.2 contributes to offset the risk in Japanese nuclear energy system. Smaller 
number of FRs with breeder core will be needed for future Japan as is shown in Figure 11. 
Since cash-flow is the basis for all economics evaluation, Figure 12 shows the total cash-
flows of FR deployment scenarios with FR of BR=1.1 and BR=1.2 from Japanese nuclear fleet 
from 2000 to 2200. It can be said that the decrease of total power generation cost was JPs 
from JPY in BR=1.1 case from BR=1.2, the authors considered the economic merit was not 
the critical reason to abandon higher breeding ratio, even if the relative low power 
generation cost for BR=1.1 case acts as an incentive around the deployment stage of FR 
cycle. Therefore, the room for breeding ratio adjustment corresponds to socio-environment 
is an evidence of the inherent flexibility in core fuel with fast neutron. 
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As the readers can see several peaks and bottoms from the area chart in Figure 13, the 
realistic cash-flows are different from simple averaged power generation costs (ex. 
2.8JPY/kWh for BR=1.1 or 2.6 JPY/kWh for BR=1.03) although they became similar in far 
future after 2200. The actual dynamic analysis result for electricity generation cost will not 
usually accord with the simplified or averaged power generation cost of nuclear fleet. In 
other words, the original cash-flow is the basis of the economic evaluation, it should not be 
forgotten that simplified electricity generation cost result is basically studied from the 
ground of cash-flow result in particularly in case of scenario (time-series) evaluation. 
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Fig. 12. Total cash-flow of Japanese nuclear fleet for both (BR=1.1 and BR=1.2) cases 
3.2.2 Radioactive waste management scenario evaluations 
Another scenario study results showed that the effects of MA recycling on radioactive waste 
management in FR cycle (reduction of HLWs generation from FR cycle or reduction of heat 
emission from HLW in FR cycle to cut disposal area). The effect was described in 3.1.3 for 
equilibrium state of FR cycle. It is caused partly by the nuclear materials in precedent LWR 
cycle transferred from LWR cycle to FR cycle. The cases listed in Table 2 were analyzed by 
SCM code on radioactive wastes (mainly HLW) generation.  
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Case Capacity (GWe) Core Fuel Breeding Ratio 
Reprocesing  Plant 
mode 
U-Pu, Single 68 (U, Pu) oxide 1.1 to 1.03 Single Use 
U-Pu, Dual 68 (U, Pu) oxide 1.1 to 1.03 Dual Use 
TRU, Single 68 (U, Pu, MA) oxide 1.1 to 1.03 Single Use 
TRU, Dual 68 (U, Pu, MA) oxide 1.1 to 1.03 Dual Use 
Table 2. Analysis cases with/without MA recycling 
Since there was little difference in the results between the single use reprocessing plant case 
and dual use plant case, the authors did not write the concrete case in the following part. 
Figure 13 shows the radioactive wastes generation from Japanese nuclear fleet in reference 
case based on the waste management evaluation by SCM code. There are several peaks in 
the figure which correspond to the major facilities’ decommissioning such as LWR 
reprocessing plants and nuclear power plants. Although the quantity of HLW is small, it 
requires large scale facility for disposal and usually focused in disposal site finding issue. 
Therefore, the influence on HLW from MA recycling is investigated in this section. 
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Fig. 13. Radioactive wastes generation from Japanese nuclear fleet 
Figure 14 shows the calculated Japanese nuclear power plant capacities according to core 
type in a typical case without MA recycling. FRs are deployed after 2050 just as same as the 
reference case explained in 2.2.1. Since the completion of switchover to FR with (U, Pu) 
oxide cores were delayed several years from the reference case, total transition period is 84 
years from the analyses results. It is explained from the internal conversion ratio difference. 
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Fig. 14. FR deployment with core of BR=1.1 without MA recycling 
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When the total Japanese nuclear fleet is considered, MA recycling has the potential to reduce 
the quantities of HLW from FR cycle system. Because of the difference in fuel cycle and 
other discrepancies, it is difficult to compare directly the scenarios with or without MA 
recycling. Comparing the quantities of HLW generation, Figure 15 was obtained. Though 
there seems to be little difference (the difference is a kind of complex of causes) in HLW 
generation from Figure 15, it is expected that the area needed for HLW disposal will be 
reduced as a result of reduction in decay heat from HLW by MA recovery from raffinate in 
reprocessing plants. Besides that, MA recycling leaves the possibility for further HLW 
reduction combined with the introduction of high density FP packing in vitrified waste 
technology. The reduction of HLW generation will be realistic if the high emission heat 
nuclides are removed from HLW by the recovery of MAs and/or FPs as described in Figure 
16. The difference of HLW generation after 2135 in Figure 17 is the combined effect of MA 
recycling and high density FP packing in vitrified wastes although the fuel cycle schemes 
are different because of the existence or non-existence of MA recycling.  
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Fig. 15. Comparison of HLW generation from nuclear fleets with and without MA recycling 
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Fig. 16. The effect of MA recycling combined with high-density FP packing in HLW 
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3.2.3 Nuclear non-proliferation scenario evaluations 
As for the scenario study related to non-proliferation, the measures to dope MAs in blanket 
fuel to improve the non-proliferation characteristics of spent blanket fuel have some issue to 
be resolved to supply sufficient amounts of MAs to all FRs and its fuel cycle system in 
Japan. On the other hand, although the measure to add Pu in blanket may delay FR 
deployment in future, it is feasible from both of the viewpoints of material supply and of 
improving material barrier of spent blanket fuel. There are many ideas to enhance 
proliferation resistance of FR cycle system. 
 
Case Core Fuel / Axial Blanket / Radial Blanket Reprocesing  Plant 
Depleted Uranium Blanket Fuel (U, Pu, MA) oxide / U Oxide / U oxide Single Use 
Radial Blanket Free Fuel (U, Pu, MA) oxide / U Oxide / - Single/Dual Use 
MOX Radial Blanket Fuel (U, Pu, MA) oxide / U Oxide / (U, Pu) oxide Single/Dual Use 
Radial Blanket Fuel with MA 
Doping 
(Minoa Actinide) 
(U, Pu, MA) oxide / 
U Oxide / (U, MA) oxide Single/Dual Use 
All MOX Blanket Fuel (U, Pu, MA) oxide / (U, Pu) oxide /(U, Pu) oxide Single/Dual Use 
All Blanket Fuels with MA Doping
(Minoa Actinide) 
(U, Pu, MA) oxide / 
(U, MA) oxide / (U, MA) oxide Single/Dual Use 
Table 3. Analysis cases for non-proliferation improvement core 
The analysis cases listed in Table 3 reflect the authors’ concern on the measures to apply to 
the Pu in blanket SF of FR. In Case-1, called the “Radial Blanket Free Core” concept, the 
radial blanket is replaced by a steel reflector, In Case-2, the radial blanket is fabricated with 
Pu in low isotope enrichment so that the plutonium produced in the radial blanket will have 
a low-fissile ratio. In Case-3 the radial blanket fuel is doped MA, which reduces the 
attractiveness because of the heat generation from Pu-238. The maximum MA ratio of new 
core fuel was assumed to be 5wt% which was almost recovered from spent LWR fuels 
although the MA ratio of new core fuel in the equilibrium state FR cycle. In Case-4, the 
radial blanket is fabricated with Pu in low isotope enrichment so that the plutonium 
produced in the radial blanket will have a low-fissile ratio. In Case-5 the radial blanket fuel 
is doped MA, which reduces the attractiveness because of the heat generation from Pu-238. 
The maximum MA ratio of new core fuel was assumed to be 5wt% which was almost 
recovered from spent LWR fuels although the MA ratio of new core fuel of FR in the 
equilibrium state is considered as about one per cent. 
The nuclear power plant capacities of all MOX blanket fuel case and all blanket fuel with 
MA doping case are shown in Figure 17 and figure 18, respectively. No severe influence on 
smooth introduction of FRs was seen from the analyses. The authors tried to confirm the 
effect of Pu addition to blanket fuel through the analyses with SCM code. Dr. Pellaud 
defined the plutonium including more than 18% of Pu-240 as “reactor grade” (RG-Pu) as it 
was explained in 3.1.6. Plutonium in LWR SF meets this RG-Pu condition; it has been used 
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globally in commercial manner under the appropriate nuclear material control and 
management. If the idea that proliferation resistance target of future nuclear energy system 
should fulfil a kind of “Pareto criterion” in material attractiveness is true, FR cycle system 
which uses RG-Pu achieves the target. The transition of Pu240/Pu in blanket SF in “All 
MOX blanket core” case is shown in Figure 19. The Pu240/Pu keeps more or equal than 18% 
in general during the lifetime of the reactor though the option somewhat sacrifices the speed 
of FR deployment. 
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Fig. 17. FR deployment scenario for all MOX blanket case 
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Fig. 18. FR deployment scenario for in all blankets with MA doping case 
Pu isotope content in blanket SF during the transition period from LWR to FR in all MA 
doping blanket fuel case is shown in Figure 20. As for the period when FRs with radial 
blanket are installed (before 2090), it looks difficult to meet Kessler’s criteria because of the 
shortage of MAs supply to dope blanket fuels. Regarding heat emission from radial blanket 
assemblies, it reached around the boundary condition (2.6kW/Assembly) for the design 
study in FaCT project. Meanwhile, FRs without radial blanket increase after 2090; although 
the quantity of MAs are enough for the criteria, it may need additional measure for high 
decay heat emission from radial blanket assemblies because of the recovered MAs with high 
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decay heat in FR cycle. Though only an example scenario is provided here, it can be said 
that the measure to improve proliferation resistance of blanket SF by MA doping should be 
careful for both proliferation resistance requirements and realistic constraints of fuel cycle 
operation at the same time. 
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Fig. 19. Pu 240/Pu in blanket SF of all MOX blanket fuel case 
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Fig. 20. Pu 238/Pu of blanket SF and decay heat emission from assemblies in all blanket 
fuels with MA doping case 
In general, the measure except for “all blanket with MA” case in this scenario study to 
improve proliferation resistance of blanket spent fuel in FR can achieve their purposes 
unless they are reviewed from broader feasibility including R&D difficulties, adverse effect 
on economics, and other logistics issues, etc. Accordingly, it should be paid attention to the 
by-effects described above in case such measures are applied as a practical manner in future. 
3.2.4 Advanced topics and latest situation of Japanese nuclear energy 
The authors will explain the more realistic supposition in the scenario analyses with the Pu 
possession by utility companies. Furthermore, a scenario study for the influence of accident 
in Fukushima Daiichi occurred after a gigantic earthquake hit several prefectures in eastern 
part of Japan in March, 2011. 
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Conventional scenario analyses usually consider the Japanese nuclear power plants as one 
block; therefore, they ignore both the property right of nuclear material and/or constrains 
based on the matter of contracts between companies in general. Regarding the detailed 
analysis dealing Pu recycling in LWR with full MOX core at Ohma by J-Power, the analysis 
tool can reflect plutonium transfer contracts between J-power and 7 electric utilities 
(Tohoku, Tokyo, Chubu, Hokuriku, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu) for the initial loading 
core. If the future Pu balance was considered from worm’s-eye view, such kinds of transfers 
should be counted. An example of rough estimation of Pu transfers during “Pu recycling in 
LWR period” in Japan between electricity utilities by SCM code was shown in Figure 21. 
Besides the Pu demands in Figure 22, other Pu is needed for FR deployment and running 
stock for operation from the discrepancy of recovered Pu and Pu demand for Pu recycling in 
LWR.  J-power may have to gather Pu from other electricity utilities for Pu recycling in 
Ohma plant.  
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Fig. 21. Example of Pu transfer estimation during “plutonium recycling in LWR” period in 
Japan 
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A larger earthquake ever recorded in Japanese history hit northern eastern part of Japan on 
March 11, 2011, the record-breaking tsunami occurred subsequent to the earthquake caused 
severe accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Concerning the influence of 
the accident on Japanese nuclear policies, it is too early to say something definitive because 
the accident has not finalized yet and the governmental argument on future energy policies 
has not started. Presently, the authors can suggest the role and flexibility of FR cycle 
according to the series of analyses by SCM code with the following assumptions:  
The nuclear power plants involved in Fukushima Daiichi accident (Fukushima-1 No.1 
to NO. 4) will not restart, 
Though new nuclear power plants will not be constructed in new locations, the existing 
nuclear power plants other than listed above will be replaced by new nuclear power 
plants. 
The breeding requirement for FR cycle system will be reduced under the assumption of both 
withdrawals from several nuclear power plants and deployment of next generation LWRs 
with longer plant lifetime. The result also indicated that FR cycle will be FR with break-even 
core from the beginning of installation without rapid breeding needs. It will curb fuel cycle 
cost through the reduction of mass-flow by the usage of high burnup fuel. The flexibility of 
breeding capability in FR leads us to adapt both higher nuclear capacity and lower nuclear 
capacity to some extent by giving weight to economics or breeding in the coexistence of 
LWR and FR nuclear fleet in transient state.  
4. Conclusion 
The authors tried to provide overall path to nuclear energy system with FR and related fuel 
cycle facilities firstly. Along with to the R&D effort to improve economic competitiveness,  
safety and reliability, and several ideas for future uncertainties the fissile material breeding 
ability of FR cycle system and the potential of FR core with fast neutron to burn broader 
isotopes, FR is major option for electricity supply for future Japan.  
Secondly, the recent achievement in SCM code as the system dynamic analysis tool in FaCT 
project. Because of the sufficient flexibility of the newly developed analysis code based on 
object-oriented design, it can meet both “single plant characteristic evaluation” and 
“Japanese whole nuclear fleet scenario study until 22nd century”. The code will be used as 
an infrastructure of future nuclear energy system in Japan. 
In addition to the fact that a nuclear energy system development usually needs a long lead-
time for decades, it was important that the development of the current LWR cycle and R&Ds 
may have an influence on successive nuclear energy system including FR cycle through the 
supply chain of nuclear energy system. Nuclear energy utilization and development become 
a matter of argument in reaction to the occurrence of Fukushima Daiichi’s accident, it 
should be keep in mind that today’s decision on the directions of nuclear energy R&D under 
influence of the fresh memory of accident may make a difference in far future as well as that 
in immediate future. 
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Nuclear Proliferation  
Michael Zentner 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
United States of America 
1. Introduction  
Early nuclear energy system designs grew out of programs to develop nuclear weapons, 
and accordingly these systems were optimized to produce weapons usable material. As the 
nuclear industry matured and the use of nuclear power spread, safety, cost, environmental 
impact and waste management considerations shaped nuclear energy system designs that 
were deployed for the purpose of producing electricity. A multi-faceted international 
nonproliferation regime comprised of treaty commitments and obligations, verification 
mechanisms, export controls, and diplomatic strategies intended to dissuade States from 
proliferating has grown (Figure 1). Likewise, measures to prevent theft of nuclear materials 
by subnational groups have been implemented at both the national and international levels. 
There has been continuing interest in developing nuclear technologies that would permit the 
peaceful use of nuclear power without an associated proliferation of nuclear weapons 
capability. The term “proliferation resistant” was coined to describe technologies that are 
not suitable for the production of weapons usable material.  
Despite this interest in “proliferation resistant technologies,” the reality remains that a truly 
proliferation-proof nuclear energy system has yet to be discovered. A fuller understanding 
of the nature of nuclear proliferation would suggest that motivation, underlying political-
military ambitions, in some cases domestic political imperatives, are key drivers for 
proliferation or for decisions not to pursue nuclear weapons development. There is no 
technological “silver bullet” that will solve the proliferation challenge. Even for technologies 
that are said to be more difficult to misuse for proliferation purposes, one must recognize 
that the international transfer of such technology can impart to the recipient technical 
capabilities and know-how that can be put to use in facilities that could be used to support a 
nuclear weapons program.  
A more productive course of action would be to consider how a particular technology or 
facility design might lend itself to more effective and efficient forms of international 
verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Beginning early in the 1950s, 
international safeguards agreements and principles were put in place to make certain that as 
the use of nuclear power spread it would be used for peaceful purposes only, and if a State 
were to misuse these technologies it would be detectable so that the international 
community could take timely action. The more difficult and detectable it was to use a 
system to make nuclear weapons usable material, the better.  
As discussed below, the notion of “proliferation resistance” in this context is more relative, 
that is, how one system might compare to another. Results of proliferation resistance studies 
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should not be construed as implying that a particular system is proliferation-proof, nor that 
features claimed to make a system more proliferation resistant provide a rationale for 
relaxing: 1) international safeguards for such systems; 2) controls on the export of such 
systems and related technologies; or 3) the nonproliferation credentials and commitments of 
the recipient of such technology transfers.  
 
 
Fig. 1. International safeguards agreements  
Nuclear energy system designers and engineers must understand not only how to design 
and build their systems to make them safe and secure, but also easy to safeguard. In this 
chapter, we will show how proliferation resistance has been studied, what can be learned 
from these studies, and how the results can used in the international community. As already 
stated, the problem of nuclear proliferation is multi-faceted, with a long and complicated 
history, and for purposes of this chapter we will focus only on the concept of proliferation 
resistance.  
2. Proliferation resistance 
The generally accepted definition for proliferation resistance is: 
“… that characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared 
production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by States in order to acquire nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. The degree of proliferation resistance results from a combination of, 
inter alia; technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements and 
safeguards measures. Intrinsic proliferation resistance features are those features that result from the 
technical design of nuclear energy systems, including those that facilitate the implementation of 
extrinsic measures. Extrinsic proliferation resistance measures are those measures that result from 
States’ decisions and undertakings related to nuclear energy systems.” (IAEA-STR-332, 2002)  
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This definition makes clear that proliferation resistance should be considered a function of 
the intrinsic technical features (facility design and operation) and extrinsic properties 
(implementation of international agreements and safeguards) of a nuclear energy system. 
The degree of effectiveness of these properties is used to determine a nuclear energy 
system’s proliferation resistance.  
Studies of nuclear proliferation can be broadly separated into two distinct categories, as 
follows:   
 State-level proliferation studies (e.g., Meyer 1984; Singh & Way 2004; Li et al. 2009, etc.) 
examine the implications and consequences of State motivations, resources (technical, 
human, and financial), geostrategic or regional rivalries, and international agreements. 
Using this information, analysts assess the likelihood that a State will proliferate or 
attempt to do so.  
 Technical proliferation studies address elements of Nuclear Energy Systems (NES), 
focusing on their possible contributions to a nuclear weapons program. Technical 
studies can range from evaluating an individual facility or unit to examining all 
elements of a fuel cycle.  
This chapter focuses on technical proliferation resistance studies, which can be used to:  
 evaluate characteristics of proposed nuclear energy systems that are intended to 
impede the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or the misuse of 
technology,  
 evaluate the vulnerability of proposed NES design and operational features from a 
proliferation resistance point of view, 
 evaluate the applicability and effectiveness of international safeguards measures, 
 provide a basis for improving both facility intrinsic features (design options) and 
extrinsic measures (safeguards) to achieve an appropriate balance, and 
 communicate proliferation resistance strengths and weaknesses of the NES to decision 
makers in a transparent, understandable and meaningful way. (Zentner, et al., 2009) 
3. Proliferation risk 
Although the terms “proliferation resistance” and “proliferation risk” are sometimes used 
interchangeably, they are not synonymous. Technically, risk can be defined (Kaplan & 
Garrick, 1981) in terms of a risk “triplet”:  1) What can go wrong? 2) How likely is it? 3) What 
are the consequences?  For proliferation risk, technical proliferation resistance studies answer 
the first and the third questions, but answering the second—the likelihood of the deliberate 
act of proliferation—is a difficult calculation most suited to State level proliferation studies 
as described above.  
Accordingly, proliferation resistance should be considered a component of proliferation 
risk, and proliferation resistance studies may be useful to identify means of addressing 
elements of that risk. The concept of proliferation risk includes much broader political 
considerations than proliferation resistance, and will not be further addressed here. 
4. Physical protection 
It is important to understand the difference between the concepts of Proliferation Resistance 
and Physical Protection. Physical protection is defined as “that characteristic of an NES that 
impedes the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices 
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(RDDs) and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by sub-national entities and other 
non-Host State adversaries. 
The objective of a physical protection system is to minimize the susceptibility to and 
opportunity for unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use, storage or transport and of 
sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The effectiveness of the system is 
demonstrated by its capability to prevent the successful execution of a malicious act and to 
prevent and/or mitigate radiological consequences thereof.  
Physical protection concerns are not unique to the nuclear industry. Although what is to be 
protected; consequences of a successful attack; and approaches for detecting, delaying, and 
responding to an attack may differ, the same basic principles are applied to protect any 
important facility against sabotage or theft, whether it is an NES, an oil refinery, a 
communications center, or a military site (Bari, 2009). Accordingly Physical Protection will 
not be further addressed in this chapter. 
5. Studying proliferation resistance  
A number of distinct procedures for the study of proliferation resistance exist. Four 
representative methodologies (TOPS1, INPRO2, SAPRA3, and GEN IV PR&PP WG4) are 
described below. All use the standard definition of proliferation resistance, “… that 
characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of 
nuclear material or misuse of technology by States in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive device…”, but take distinctly different approaches.  
They can be broadly separated into two classes:  multi-attribute utility analyses (MAUA) 
and pathway analyses. In the first class (TOPS, INPRO, and SAPRA) a set of attributes (i.e., 
material and technical barriers to proliferation) are identified and relevant values are 
established for measuring the relevant importance or effectiveness of each barrier against a 
particular proliferation threat. In the second class (GEN IV PR&PP WG) possible 
proliferation pathways are postulated involving the diversion of weapons usable material or 
misuse of technology to produce such material. For each pathway, acquisition scenarios are 
identified and analyzed, and the resulting outcomes are compared using specified sets of 
proliferation resistance measures.  
5.1 Technological Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global 
Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) 
The TOPS Task Force 5 was established in 1999 to “identify near and long-term technical 
opportunities to increase the proliferation resistance of global civilian nuclear power 
systems and to recommend specific areas of research that should be pursued to further these 
goals” (TOPS, 2001). After reviewing several proposed approaches, a MAUA methodology 
was developed that identifies a set of material and technical attributes considered barriers to 
proliferation, with relevant importance values. Material barriers are properties that affect the 
                                                                 
1 TOPS: Technological Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power 
Systems 
2 INPRO: International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA) 
3  SAPRA: Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of Nuclear Systems 
4 GEN IV PR&PP WG:  Generation IV Proliferation  Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group 
5 Created by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology 
and DOE’s Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC)  
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desirability or attractiveness of the material as an explosive. Technical barriers are those 
aspects that make it difficult to gain access to materials and/or to use or misuse facilities to 
obtain weapons-usable materials (Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of TOPS and SAPRA barriers (Greneche et al., 2007) 
Diversion Transport Transform
Weapon 
fabricate
Critical Mass 1
Isotopic Enrichment 2
Spontaneous Neutron 
Generation
Heat Generation Rate
Radiation
3
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Facility unattractiveness
SAPRA
TOPS Note
Isotopic
Dangerousness (other than 
irradiation)
Chemical
Barrier  Descriptions
Time 
Technical difficulty
Radiological (other than the 
material)
Mass and bulk
Physical form
Detectability
Collusion level
Construction detectability
Signature of installation
Te
ch
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l
Safeguards
Access/control/security
Facility accessibility
Available mass
Diversion detectability
Skill, expertise, knowledge
3 - In SAPRA, this barrier is implicitly included in other technical barriers linked to the 
diversion phase, in particular the "technical difficulty" and accessibility" barriers
Notes:
Barriers Considered in each method
Location/distance (for transport 
phase)
Ex
tr
in
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c
1 - in SAPRA, this barrier is implicitly included in "Mass and Bulk" barrier
2- Isotopic barrier plays a role only when enrichment is inescapable to obtained direct 
weapons usable material
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Examples of material barriers used in the original TOPS procedure included material 
isotopic, radiological, and chemical properties, in addition to mass or bulk. Technical 
barriers included attractiveness of the facility to a potential weapons program, difficulty of 
facility access, detectability of proliferator actions, and necessary skills and time needed for 
the proliferator’s actions.  
As the use of the TOPS methodology has matured, a variety of approaches has been 
developed to determine barrier values. For example, in one proliferation resistance study 
using the TOPS approach (Skutnik et al., 2009), barrier values were developed using a 
“fuzzy logic” based attributed analysis approach. This technique was intended to overcome 
the challenges of subjectivity inherent in development of the barrier values. The resulting 
model was tested by evaluating several reprocessing technologies, and the results were 
found to generally agree with more structured PR studies.  
The TOPS approach forms the basis for a number of advanced assessment methodologies, 
two of which (INPRO and SAPRA) are described in more detail below.  
5.2 Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of Nuclear Systems 
(SAPRA) 
In 2002, a French nuclear industry working group was formed to select and develop a 
methodology for assessing the proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems. The result 
was a methodology called the Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of 
Nuclear Systems (SAPRA). SAPRA (Greneche et al., 2007) is an evolutionary approach based 
on the TOPS methodology, with a number of modifications, additions, and improvements. 
Table 1 compares the two approaches. 
SAPRA separates proliferation into four phases:  diversion, transport, transformation, and 
nuclear weapon fabrication. At each phase, intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation 
are identified and scored based on the perceived robustness of the barrier. SAPRA 
addressed the complete fuel cycle. A panel of experts was assembled to determine the 
values to be assigned to each of the barriers. The values were then added together to give an 
aggregate “Proliferation Resistance Index.” Using these results the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various nuclear energy systems studied were identified. SAPRA is unique 
among most proliferation resistance assessment approaches in that it explicitly includes 
theft by a State as a possible proliferation threat.  
5.3 Guidance for the Application of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative 
Nuclear Energy Systems – Proliferation Resistance (INPRO)  
Beginning in 2002, the IAEA’s International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel 
Cycles (INPRO) developed a proliferation resistance assessment methodology that is 
primarily based on a multi-attribute utility analysis approach. The INPRO proliferation 
resistance approach identifies one Basic Principle of Proliferation Resistance with five User 
Requirements for meeting this Principle, along with seventeen indicators with specific criteria 
and acceptance limits (IAEA, 2007). 
The Proliferation Resistance Basic Principle is: “Proliferation resistance intrinsic features and 
extrinsic measures shall be implemented throughout the full life cycle for an INS to help ensure that 
INSs will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapons 
program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and neither shall be considered 
sufficient by itself.”  
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The five Proliferation Resistance User Requirements are:   
1. States' commitments, obligations and policies regarding nonproliferation and its 
implementation should be adequate to fulfil international non-proliferation standards.  
2. The attractiveness of nuclear material and nuclear technology in an INS for a nuclear 
weapons program should be low.  
3. Any diversion of nuclear material should be reasonably difficult and detectable. 
4. Innovative nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation resistance 
features and measures.  
5. The combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, compatible with other 
design considerations, should be optimized in the design/engineering phase to provide 
cost-efficient proliferation resistance.  
Table 2 (IAEA, 2007) shows User Requirement 3 including the description of the User 
Requirement, related criteria, indicators, and acceptance limits. 
Several studies have been performed to demonstrate the use of the INPRO methodology. An 
important example is the “INPRO Collaborative Project PRADA: Proliferation Resistance: 
Acquisition/Diversion Pathway Analysis” (Chang & Ko, 2010). In this study of the proposed 
South Korean DUPIC6 fuel cycle User Requirements 3 and 4 were evaluated using a 
modification of the PR&PP pathway analysis methodology (section 5.4). The PRADA study 
concludes that a multiplicity of barriers is not sufficient to ensure robust proliferation 
resistance; rather robustness is not a result of the number of barriers or of their individual 
characteristics but is an integrated function of the whole system. 
5.4 Generation IV International Forum Proliferation Resistance and Physical 
Protection Evaluation Methodology (GEN IV PR&PP WG) 
The Generation IV International Forum7 (GIF) formed a working group in December 2002 to 
develop a method for studying proliferation resistance and physical protection of advanced 
NES to support the proliferation related technology goal of Generation IV (GIF002-00, 2002; 
PR&PP, 2006) Nuclear Energy Systems (NES):   “Generation IV NESs will increase the assurance 
that they are a very unattractive and the least desirable route for diversion or theft of weapons-usable 
materials, and provide increased physical protection against acts of terrorism.” 
After exploring several options, the working group developed a methodology using a 
pathway analysis approach. The methodology separates pathways into three stages:  
acquisition, processing, and weaponization. Weaponization is normally not further evaluated 
in these GIF studies. For a proposed NES design, proliferation challenges (or threats) are 
identified, the NES response to these challenges is analyzed, and outcomes are assessed as a 
set of proliferation resistance measures for each pathway (Figure 2). 
The measures determine: 1) the difficulty of the approach; 2) how long it will take to 
accomplish the goal; 3) how much it will cost to achieve; 4) how much the safeguards 
system for the NES will cost; 5) how likely it is that actions in the pathway will be detected; 
and 6) the material of concern  
While developing the methodology, members of the working group performed a number of 
studies to demonstrate and improve the approach. A PR evaluation of a proposed nuclear 
energy system consisting of four liquid metal reactors and co-located reprocessing and fuel 
                                                                 
6 DUPIC (Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU reactors) 
7 The Generation IV International Forum is “a cooperative international endeavor organized to carry out the 
research and development (R&D) needed to establish the feasibility and performance capabilities of the next 
generation nuclear energy systems. “ (GIF, 2000) 
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production facilities (PR&PP, 2009), showed that a study performed early in the conceptual 
design phase of an NES can provide information useful for ensuring an optimal safeguards 
system concept and provide a basis for detailed systems design. A PR evaluation (Whitlock, 
2010) of an advanced CANDU reactor design (ACR-1000) provided useful information to the 
facility design team and resulted in changes that improved facility safeguards without 
impacting other design requirements. In another study (Zentner, et al. 2010) a suite of four 
reactors was evaluated against a common set of proliferation threats, and areas where 
safeguards approaches and technology can be improved through the use of safeguards-by-
design studies were identified. 
 
Basic Principle BP: Proliferation resistance intrinsic features and extrinsic measures shall 
be implemented throughout the full life cycle for innovative nuclear energy systems to help 
ensure that INSs will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a 
nuclear weapons program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and 
neither shall be considered sufficient by itself. 
User Requirements (UR) Criteria (CR) 
Indicator(IN) Acceptance Limits (AL) 
UR3 Difficulty and 
detectability of diversion:  
The diversion of nuclear 
material (NM) should be 
reasonably difficult and 
detectable. Diversion 
includes the use of an INS 
facility for the production or 
processing of undeclared 
material. 
CR3.1 quality of measurement
IN3.1: Accountability. AL3.1: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
designs, meeting international 
state of practice. 
CR3.2 C/S measures and monitoring
IN3.2: Amenability for 
C/S measures and 
monitoring. 
AL3.2: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
designs, meeting international 
best practice.
CR3.3 detectability of NM
IN3.3: Detectability of 
NM. 
AL3.3: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
facilities. 
CR3.4 facility process
IN3.4: Difficulty to modify 
process. 
AL3.4: Based on expert judgment 
equal or better than existing 
designs, meeting international 
best practice. 
CR3.5 facility design
IN3.5: Difficulty to modify 
facility design. 
AL3.5 = AL3.4 
CR3.6 facility misuse 
IN3.6: detectability to 
misuse technology or 
facilities.
AL3.6 = AL3.4 
Table 2. INPRO User Requirement 3, Difficulty and detectability of diversion 
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The results of these studies establish that the methodology can usefully frame the evaluation 
of the proliferation resistance of a variety of nuclear fuel cycles. It can also provide insight 
into the effectiveness of integrated safeguards, and support the development of improved 
safeguards to support new NES designs.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Framework for the PR&PP Evaluation Methodology 
6. Usefulness of proliferation resistance studies 
The results of proliferation resistance studies can be used by decision-makers at all levels: 
 Government officials, including Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
legislative officials responsible for program approvals and funding appropriations  
 National licensing and regulatory authorities; export control authorities for State 
exports, imports and indigenous development  
 IAEA safeguards authorities and other safeguards inspectorates  
 Industrial designers/producers/vendors  
 Utility owners and operators (Pomeroy, et al., 2008)  
Decisions made by these authorities (Table 3) will set priorities for the activities of the 
nuclear energy system designers and can help determine the types of technologies and 
designs to pursue when investing in or building new civil nuclear facilities. Information 
provided by proliferation resistance assessments, properly used, can: 1) identify potential 
safeguards issues early in the design process; 2) provide a framework for the selection of 
design approaches that could  make safeguards at the facility more efficient and effective; 3) 
identify design innovations that could either raise new safeguards issues or lessen cost 
impacts on the IAEA or the facility operator; and 4) enable the designer to focus on whether 
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to address new safeguards issues with design modifications that eliminate the issue or with 
enhanced safeguards measures (Wonder & Hockert, 2011).  
 
Potential Users of a Proliferation 
Resistance Assessment and Evaluation 
Methodology 
Illustrative Uses of Proliferation Resistance 
Information 
 
Government officials, including Energy 
Ministry officials, Foreign Ministry 
Officials and Legislative officials 
responsible for program approvals and 
funding appropriations  
1. Ensuring provision of sustainable 
energy supply from safe, secure, 
economic and proliferation resistant 
sources.  
2. Basing nuclear export control decisions 
on well-understood and assessed 
proliferation threats  
National licensing and regulatory 
authorities, and export control 
authorities, for State exports, State 
imports and indigenous development  
1. Developing guidance on and validation 
of effective and efficient implementation 
of proliferation resistance/safeguards 
requirements in design and operation  
2. Providing basis for cooperation with 
regional and international safeguards 
authorities  
IAEA safeguards authorities and other 
safeguards inspectorates  
1. Providing understanding of the role of 
safeguards measures in proliferation 
resistance  
2. Ensuring that facility design and 
operation facilitate the implementation 
of safeguards  
Industrial designers/producers/vendors 1. Employing usable guidance for effective 
and efficient implementation of 
proliferation resistance/safeguards 
requirements in design and operation  
2. Ensuring that there are transparent 
acceptance procedures with assessable 
cost impacts  
Utility owners and operators  1. Enhancing public acceptance of nuclear 
energy production  
2. Providing transparent means for 
demonstrating that perceived threats are 
adequately controlled  
3. Optimizing extrinsic and intrinsic 
proliferation resistance measures with 
facility safety, operations, and cost  
Table 3. Users and Uses of Proliferation Resistance Information (Pomeroy, et al., 2008)  
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The following section describes how the results of proliferation resistance studies can be 
used, including discussions concerning nuclear material evaluation, facility safeguardability, 
and the implementation of safeguards by design. 
6.1 Nuclear material evaluations 
As more work in this area is performed, a number of lessons have been learned and some 
potential misconceptions have been identified. Experts generally agree that the 
attractiveness of the nuclear material and nuclear technology in an innovative nuclear 
system for use in a nuclear weapons program should be low. An important issue under 
current investigation is the concept of a “proliferation proof” material. Some have proposed 
that a material could be identified or developed that would be difficult—if not impossible—
to use as a weapon or nuclear explosive device because of the material’s isotopic content, its 
intrinsic radiation field, heat load, or other features. Such material would have minimal 
safeguards requirements.  
A team of specialists from the United States focused on material attractiveness issues from 
the standpoint of potential usability in a nuclear explosive device. Their studies reviewed a 
variety of materials associated with existing and proposed reprocessing schemes and 
nuclear fuel cycles. The research concluded that there are no “silver bullets” in conventional 
or advanced fuel cycle reprocessing schemes (e.g.; PUREX, UREX, COEX, and pyro-
processing). All products from such schemes are potentially attractive for use in a nuclear 
weapon or nuclear explosive device (Bathke, et al., 2009). 
The results of these studies support the assertion that relying on intrinsic features in a 
nuclear fuel cycle will not be sufficient to ensure that proliferation resistance goals will be 
met. Effective safeguards are of primary importance to the proliferation resistance of a 
nuclear energy system, and care must be taken not to construe proliferation resistance as 
being largely a function of intrinsic measures or as an absolute characteristic in the sense of 
a nuclear energy system being proliferation proof. Consequently, extrinsic features such as 
international safeguards and other institutional measures such as controls on the export of 
sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies remain essential and cannot be lessened. 
Rather, it is important to make these measures more effective and cost efficient by 
improving the “safeguardability” of an NES.  
6.2 Safeguardability 
The fundamental objective of international safeguards is to detect in a timely manner: 1) the 
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful to non-peaceful uses, 
and/or 2) possible misuse of nuclear facilities for undeclared purposes. How well and how 
efficiently an NES meets this objective is defined as its safeguardability. Safeguardability can 
be understood as the extent to which the facility design readily accommodates and 
facilitates effective and cost-efficient safeguards, that is, effectively integrating a nuclear 
facility design’s technical features with required safeguards measures.  
An important use of the results of proliferation resistance studies is to evaluate and if 
necessary improve the safeguardability (Bjornard et al., 2009) of an NES by: 1) identifying, 
evaluating, and optimizing intrinsic barriers in the system design; 2) reviewing and 
evaluating safeguards measures for cost and effectiveness; and 3) ensuring that safeguards 
goals can be met. Figure 3 outlines this process. 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 124 
 
Fig. 3. Elements of safeguardability 
Updating and strengthening a structured approach for accomplishing “Safeguards-by-
Design” (IAEA, 2009) to help improve the safeguardability of NES facilities is receiving 
substantial international attention, elements of this activity are discussed further below. 
6.3 Safeguards-by-Design 
The IAEA has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 
“international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear 
facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and 
decommissioning” (IAEA, 2009). SBD has taken on a new importance in light of the 
expected “Nuclear Renaissance” and the requisite expansion of the global reactor fleet with 
an increased number and variety of reactors and fuel cycles under safeguards. As these new 
nuclear energy systems are being planned and constructed, it is clear that the IAEA must 
find ways to optimize its verification activities amidst continuing constraints on the financial 
and human resources available to it for safeguards. Consequently, the nuclear industry is 
beginning to address the problem of how it can facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards 
in a manner that provides benefits to both the IAEA and the facility operator. SBD is 
intended to help solve this issue by developing a structured approach for designing and 
incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the 
design process, and designing the facility in such a way that it more readily lends itself to 
being safeguarded. 
Broadly speaking, this effort would involve using safeguardability assessment tools:  1) to 
aid designers in identifying potential safeguards issues early in the design process; 2) to 
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provide them with a framework for the selection of facility-specific SBD best practices and 
lessons learned; and 3) to help them anticipate where innovations in their designs might 
pose new safeguards issues that might be addressed through changes in the design, or 
enhancements of accepted safeguards approaches in a manner likely to meet IAEA 
safeguards requirements while mitigating cost impacts on both IAEA and the facility 
operator (Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This approach, as laid out in Figure 4, parallels the 
PR&PP assessment methodology.  
Stakeholders responsible for developing and incorporating SBD in the design and 
construction of new nuclear facilities include those responsible for the design, approval, 
construction, oversight, operation, and safeguarding of a nuclear facility. These stakeholders 
include: 
 The IAEA 
 Owners/operators 
 Designers/builders 
 Regional or State Systems of Accounting and Control (R/SSAC), and 
 Equipment providers. 
The future application and development of the concept of SBD is ongoing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Safeguards by Design Process (Wonder & Hockert, 2011) 
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7. Conclusion 
New approaches for studying proliferation resistance continue to be developed and 
improved. Their goal is to help ensure that innovative nuclear energy systems are 
“unattractive and [the] least desirable routes for diversion or development of weapons-usable 
material.”  The “Safeguards-By-Design” approach has become the subject of intense research 
because it makes use of safeguardability assessment tools such as proliferation resistance 
studies to improve the design and construction of new facilities in such a way that they will 
be easier and more cost efficient to safeguard. Stakeholders and decision makers in the 
nuclear energy field will need to understand, apply, and advance the concepts discussed 
here to effectively participate in the development of proliferation resistant nuclear facilities 
in the future.  
Inquiry into the nature of proliferation resistance, the utility of different methodologies to 
study it, and the extent to which proliferation resistance studies offer useful and meaningful 
answers and insights for decision-makers continues. A growing body of literature is 
emerging on these subjects, and will continue to grow over the next several years. A new 
independent evaluation of proliferation resistance and proliferation resistance 
methodologies by the United States National Academy of Sciences will begin in the summer 
of 2011. The result will be a report to the U.S. Department of Energy in 2013 that should be 
particularly valuable in identifying the strengths and limitations of the concept of 
proliferation resistance and associated methodologies. Recommendations for whether and 
what types of additional methodology development activities should follow will be an 
important result of this work.  
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Ethics of Nuclear Power: How to Understand 
Sustainability in the Nuclear Debate  
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Delft University of Technology  
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1. Introduction 
With the nuclear accidents in Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, the global public and political 
debate on nuclear power is rapidly reaching boiling point. On the one hand, it seems that 
nuclear power is losing public support. Japan intends to review its nuclear policy – one in 
every eight nuclear reactors is currently in that country – and China have planned one-year 
moratoriums on new nuclear power constructions. China’s position is relevant since the 
country is set to become a world leader in the next decades: China currently has 13 
operational nuclear power reactors, 27 reactors under construction, 50 planned and 110 that 
are proposed (WNA, 2011). More concretely, pro nuclear stances have led to a loss of 
political power in Angela Merkel’s party in different regions in the recent German elections; 
Merkel’s administration recently decided to phase out all German nuclear reactors 
(Dempsey & Ewing, 2011). Furthermore, the Swiss government abandoned plans to build 
new reactors and Italians rejected nuclear energy in a referendum. On the other hand, the 
extent of our dependency on nuclear power makes one wonder whether we are witnessing 
the end of the nuclear era; approximately 16% of the world’s electricity is currently being 
produced in nuclear power plants. Perhaps it is more likely that a certain pragmatism with 
regard to securing domestic energy supplies and curbing carbon dioxide emissions will 
eventually dominate the debate; see in this connection president Barak Obama’s recent plan 
to cut American oil import and diversify, indeed, in the direction of renewable energy, but 
to also include nuclear power (Wynn & Doyle, 2011). 
Now, more than ever before, there is a need to reflect on the desirability of nuclear power. In 
such analysis proponents stress the abundant availability of nuclear resources, the ability to 
produce large amounts of energy with small amounts of fuel and the very low greenhouse 
gas production levels. It can also make industrialized countries less dependent on 
conventional energy sources that mainly have to be imported from other parts of the world. 
The detractors, on the other hand, would emphasize the accident risks of reactors – the 
unfolding disaster in Japan speaks for itself – the waste transport risks, the proliferation 
concerns or worries about the possibility that such technology can always be deployed for 
destructive purposes and, indeed, the matter of what to do with the long-lived radiotoxic 
waste.  
In this paper, I do not intend to get involved in the general desirability debate. I assert that 
when carefully reflecting on the desirable energy mix for the future one needs to consider 
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nuclear energy in relation to other energy sources. In so doing, we should first be aware of 
the distinctive aspects of nuclear technology such as the effects that long-lived waste could 
have upon future generations. We should furthermore include different technological 
methods or fuel cycles in the production process as these methods deal differently with the 
distinctive aspects. This paper presents this comparison by focusing on the notion of 
sustainability and its philosophical origins in justice between generations, alternatively 
known as intergenerational justice. 
Some people might object that sustainable nuclear power is a contradictio interminis. Their 
objections probably arise from the fact that nuclear power leaves behind highly dangerous 
toxic waste with tremendous long life-times. This correctly relates to one interpretation of 
sustainability, but in a comprehensive analysis we need to include all the relevant 
interpretations. Sustainability could, for instance, also be seen as the endurance of energy 
resources for future generations. New technology in nuclear power production (i.e. nuclear 
breeders and multiple recycling of the waste) could facilitate the latter for a very long time. 
So, nuclear might be unsustainable in one interpretation and sustainable in another; 
precisely which one should be given priority might emerge after thorough moral analysis. 
Rather than using sustainability as an adjective, this paper sets out to clarify the notion by 
focusing on how nuclear power production affects the distribution of burdens and benefits 
over the different generations. Such an analysis can help decision-makers in the making of 
technically and ethically informed choices, when opting for a certain nuclear fuel cycle. It 
could also help when comparing nuclear power or, more to the point, a certain nuclear fuel 
cycle with other energy systems on the basis of the notion of how they affect the interests of 
people living now and in the future.  
The paper consists of seven sections. In Section 2, I will elaborate on the ethical aspects of 
the notion of sustainable development, arguing that sustainability and intergenerational 
justice are closely intertwined. This section further elaborates on the question of what we 
should sustain for posterity. Section 3 focuses on a set of moral values which, together, 
encompass the value of sustainable development. These moral values will then be 
operationalized and connected to different steps of nuclear fuel cycles in Section 4. The latter 
Section further elaborates on the intergenerational conflicts between the values. The role of 
new technologies will be addressed in Section 5 and Section 6 reviews three challenges 
when assessing the social and political desirability of nuclear power. The final section 
concludes the paper with the findings in brief.  
2. Sustainability and ethics 
In the second half of the last century there was growing public awareness of the fact that the 
earth is a living space that we not only share with our ancestors but also with our children 
and grandchildren and with their offspring. The natural resources upon which our 
economies heavily depend seem to be running out as a result of the ever-rising world 
population and industrialization. In addition, the accompanying pollution presents a serious 
problem; we have been urged by the Club of Rome to consider ‘The Limits to Growth’ 
(Meadows et al., 1972). So, the technological progress that had once brought wealth and 
prosperity has come to create concerns for people living now and in the future. These 
genuine concerns eventually culminated in an Environment and Development report 
published by a United Nations’ commission with the very telling title ‘Our Common 
Future’. The first systematic definition of sustainable development emerged as an attempt to 
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balance economic growth and industrialization on the one hand with environmental 
damage on the other. Sustainable development as a kind of development that “meets the 
need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (WCED, 1987, 43) was named after the commission’s chairwoman, the then 
Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland.  
Many of the analyses regarding the desirability of nuclear power seem to revolve around 
this notion of sustainable development and the specific interpretations made by different 
scholars and organizations (Elliott, 2007; IAEA, 2006; Turkenburg, 2004). The implicit 
assumption seems to be that sustainability is synonymous with social and political 
desirability. Proponents find nuclear energy sustainable as it can produce clean, secure and 
reliable electricity that does not put the earth’s climate in jeopardy (Bonser, 2002); other 
enthusiasts have more reservations but maintain that nuclear power can contribute to 
sustainable development in a “transitional role towards establishing sustainable [renewable] 
energy systems”(Bruggink & Van der Zwaan, 2002, p.151). The latter endorse the popular 
opinion that we are facing an “energy gap” in the coming decades which can only be filled 
with nuclear power (Connor, 2005; Pagnamenta, 2009). The detractors, on the other hand, 
are utterly resolute in their view that nuclear power is inherently “unsustainable, 
uneconomic, dirty and dangerous” (GreenPeace, 2006). 
Even though Brundtland’s definition has been very influential in the academic and public 
domain, it requires further clarification, particularly from an ethical point of view. In other 
words, sustainability is not only a descriptive notion, merely stating the facts about the 
subject of a matter, but also one that should express normative opinions about what it is that 
we should sustain, why and how we should sustain it and for whom and how long we should 
sustain it (Raffaelle et al., 2010). In this paper I will focus on these normative aspects in the 
case of nuclear power deployment. In the next section, sustainability will be presented as an 
overarching moral value encompassing certain other values.  
Before getting into detailed discussion about what exactly sustainability should protect, let 
us pause for a moment to elaborate on the philosophical roots of the notion of sustainability. 
Brundtland’s sustainability is founded on principles of social justice viewed from two main 
angles: 1) the distribution of wealth among contemporaries or the spatial dimension and 2) 
the distribution of burdens and benefits between generations or the temporal dimension. 
Sustainability also has a third main theme, namely that of the relationship that human 
beings have with their natural environment which, again, has both a spatial and a temporal 
dimension. The question of how to value the environment in a moral discussion will be 
addressed in Section 3.  
The two social justice notions that underlie sustainability are referred to as intragenerational 
and intergenerational justice. Obviously, in nuclear energy discussions intragenerational 
justice is relevant, for instance when addressing the question of where to build a nuclear 
reactor or in connection with issues concerning the distribution of the burdens and benefits 
between contemporaries; see for instance (Kasperson, 1983; Kasperson & Dow, 2005; 
Kasperson & Rubin, 1983). In this paper I will mainly focus on the long-term consequences 
of nuclear power and on the complex questions of intergenerational justice to which that 
gives rise; in Section 6 I will briefly discuss the issues of intragenerational justice. 
2.1 Intergenerational justice and nuclear power production  
Let me present and briefly discuss the central claim that underlies my analysis, namely that 
the production of nuclear power creates a problem of intergenerational justice. There are 
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two intergenerational aspects in nuclear power production that support this claim. Firstly, 
nuclear energy is produced from a non-renewable resource (uranium) that will eventually 
be less available to future generations. Stephen Gardiner (2003, 5) refers to this problem as 
“The Pure Intergenerational Problem” (PIP), which is in fact an exacerbated form of the 
Tragedy of the Commons, extended over generations. The Tragedy of the Commons is a 
situation in which various rational agents might be inclined to deplete limited resources on 
the basis of their own self-interest, while the same action will negatively affects the 
collective interest. The dilemma was first illustrated in an article compiled by Garrett 
Hardin, in which he pictured a pasture open to many herdsmen (Hardin, 1968). It is in 
individual interest of each herder to keep as much cattle as possible on the common ground 
while in collective terms such a strategy would culminate in the fast depletion of the 
common. Gardiner extends this argument to include different generations. He imagines a 
world that consists of temporally distinct groups that can asymmetrically influence each 
other; “earlier groups have nothing to gain from the activities or attitudes of later groups”. 
Each generation has access to a diversity of temporally diffuse commodities. It is in the 
individual interest of each generation to use as many as possible of these commodities, but it 
is in the collective interest of all temporally diffused generations if earlier generations would 
avoid depletion. Hence, engaging in activity with these goods poses the problem of justice 
between generations.  
A second intergenerational aspect is the long-term consequences (e.g. pollution) that could 
be created for future generations, while benefits mainly accrue to the current (and 
immediately following) generations (Gardiner, 2003). A typical example of this 
intergenerational problem is the fossil fuel energy consumption situation, which is 
characterized by predominantly good immediate effects but deferred bad effects in terms of 
the anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. Intergenerational 
justice and climate change have received increasing attention in the literature in recent years 
(Athanasiou & Baer, 2002; Gardiner, 2001; Meyer & Roser, 2006; Page, 1999; Shue, 2003). The 
main rationale behind these discussions is that a change in a climate system that threatens 
the interests of future generations raises questions concerning justice and posterity. 
Alongside the first (depletion) analogy that nuclear power production has with non-
replaceable fossil fuel resources, both energy generation methods have potential long-term 
negative consequences in common. In the case of fossil fuel combustion, it is the emitting of 
greenhouse gases that can trigger long-term climatic change for posterity, while with 
nuclear power deployment, it is the creation of long-lived radiotoxic waste that could 
potentially pose safety and security problems to future generations. What exacerbates this 
problem is the fact that we – the present generation – are in a beneficial temporal position 
with regard to not yet existing generations and it is, therefore, quite convenient for us to 
visit costs on posterity, all of which makes us susceptible to “moral corruption” (Gardiner, 
2006).  
Intergenerational justice has already been an influential notion in discussions related to 
nuclear energy, particularly in relation to nuclear waste issues. The International Atomic 
and Energy Agency (IAEA) has laid down several principles on Radioactive Waste 
Management, in which concerns about the future were expressed in terms of the 
“achievement of intergenerational equity”1 (IAEA, 1995). It was asserted that nuclear waste 
                                                 
1 It should be mentioned that equity entails a narrower notion than justice. However in this paper I do 
not make a distinction betweeh the two notions. 
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should be managed in such a way that it “will not impose undue burdens on future 
generations” (IAEA, 1995, Pr. 5). Many nations agree that this undue burdens clause must 
be taken to mean that nuclear waste should be disposed of in geological repositories which, 
it is believed, will guarantee the long-term safety of future generations (NEA-OECD, 1995). I 
will defer further discussion on this issue to Section 6.  
2.2 What is it that we should sustain?  
The notion of sustainable development implies that there is a certain good that we need to 
sustain for future generations. I will follow here Brian Barry (1999) in his discussions on the 
normative aspects of the notion of sustainable development and how that relates to the 
principle of intergenerational justice. Barry argues that there is an entity X which, as we 
enjoy it, should be sustained into the future so that future generations do not fall below our 
level of X. He then presents principles for the theorems of fundamental equality, two of which 
are the principle of responsibility – “[a] bad outcome for which somebody is not responsible 
provides a prima-facie case for compensation” – and the principle of vital interests: 
“locations in space and time do not in themselves affect legitimate claims … [therefore] the 
vital interests of people in the future have the same priority as the vital interests of people in 
the present” (Barry, 1999, p 97-99).  
The ensuing question is what this valuable entity of X should be. Barry proposes opportunity 
as a metric of justice: one requirement of justice is that above all else “the overall range of 
opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed” (Barry, 1978, p 243). 
So, whilst adhering to the guiding principle that we should not narrow the total range of 
opportunities, I will develop two other sustainability principles that will lead to the matter 
of how this main principle relates to nuclear power generation, the main rationale being that 
whenever we find ourselves in a position to negatively influence the opportunities open to future 
generations we should be careful not to narrow these opportunities.  
We should recall the two intergenerational aspects of nuclear power production and how 
they could affect posterity’s equal opportunity. Firstly, we leave behind radiotoxic waste 
with tremendously long life-time spans. If not properly disposed of, this waste can influence 
the vital interests of future generations and thus also, their equality of opportunity. Hence, 
the first moral principle I am defending urges us to sustain posterity’s vital interests. 
Secondly, we are depleting a non-renewable resource, to which posterity has less access. If 
we assume that well-being significantly relies on the availability of energy resources then 
we are in a position to influence future opportunity for well-being. From the latter I derive 
the moral principle that we should sustain future generations’ opportunity for well-being 
insofar as that can be achieved through the availability of such energy resources. In the 
following section I will discuss these principles in detail.   
3. The moral values at stake 
So far I have argued that the notion of sustainable development needs further ethical 
clarification which has been provided in terms of the two moral principles that we have 
with regard to posterity, namely 1) to sustain future generation’s vital interest and 2) to 
sustain human well-being in the future. In this section I will elaborate on how to understand 
these principles in terms of the moral values at stake. But let me first say something about 
the meaning of value and why I intend to approach sustainability from the angle of moral 
values.  
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Questions about rightness and wrongness are generally subsumed under the heading of 
values. In everyday life, there are many things we uphold such as honesty and integrity; 
those things are referred to as values and they inspire social norms in human interaction. 
Outside this common sense meaning of the term, values are also relevant to many of the 
choices that we make, also with regard to technology; they reflect our understanding of the 
rightness and wrongness of those choices. The term value indeed has definitions that extend 
beyond philosophy and ethics. We find many things such as art and music valuable without 
making any reference to their moral goodness or rightness; these are indeed non-moral 
values. The focus of this paper is confined to the moral values that deal with how we want 
the world to be. In other words, moral values are things worth striving for in order to 
achieve a good life (Scanlon, 1998, p 78-79). However, we should not confuse values with 
the personal interests of individuals; values are the general convictions and beliefs that 
people should hold paramount if society is to be good. Those values in relation to the notion 
of sustainable development will be reviewed here; what are the things that we find valuable 
when we refer to sustainability and why do we find them valuable? More importantly, 
which value should be given priority if different values contradict or cannot be complied 
with simultaneously?  
3.1 Sustaining human safety and security and the environment 
Let us remind ourselves that one interpretation of sustainable development is that we 
should sustain the vital interests of future generations. Let us then explore for a moment 
what exactly is meant by Barry’s principle of vital interest and how that relates to the 
principle that I am defending here. Barry (1999, 105) argues that taking equal opportunity 
seriously means that “the condition must be such as to sustain a range of possible 
conceptions of the good life”; such a good life will, in any case, include “adequate nutrition, 
clean drinking-water, clothing and housing, health care and education”. Here my 
understanding of vital interest is applied to a very specific sense. I argued earlier in this 
paper that whenever we are in a position to negatively influence future opportunities we 
should be careful not to narrow those opportunities. One clear way in which we can 
negatively affect future interest is by inappropriately disposing of nuclear waste. My 
account of future generation’s vital interest relates to the status of the environment and to 
the safety and security of future generations in so far as they depend on the actions of 
present generations and how we dispose of our nuclear waste.  
Something first has to be said about how to approach issues relating to the environment in a 
moral discussion. One important issue when addressing ‘values’ is to determine whether a 
thing is worth striving for for its own sake or because it serves a greater good. To put this in 
philosophical terms, we must establish whether something has an intrinsic value or whether 
it has an instrumental value, thus requiring reference to an intrinsic value. This discussion is 
particularly relevant to the way in which we value nature and address human beings’ 
relationships with the natural world. Generally, we can distinguish between two schools of 
thought: 1) anthropocentrism that situates human beings in the center of ethics; this is 
alternatively known as human supremacy or human-based ethics and 2) non-
anthropocentrism that ascribes an intrinsic value to nature. These discussions relate to one 
of the central questions in the field of environmental philosophy and it is not my intention 
to get involved in that debate here. But let me just make one remark.  
When it comes to the relationship between humans and non-humans, it is probably 
uncontroversial to ascribe designations such as moral wrongness; torturing animals is, for 
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instance, morally wrong. However, our focus in this paper is upon justice to future 
generations and I follow Barry (1999, p 95) in his suggestion that “justice and injustice can be 
predicated only of relations among creatures who are regarded as moral equals in the sense 
that they weigh equally in the moral scales“. Hence, in addressing intergenerational justice 
in this paper, we refer to the environment with regard to what it means in conjunction with 
safeguarding the vital interests of human beings. Such considerations would emanate from 
radiation hazards resulting from possible seepage of radiotoxic material into the 
environment, which in turn could affect human health and safety. Thus, in the 
anthropocentric approach adopted in this paper, the moral value of environmental friendliness 
basically relates to the issues that the value of public health and safety will raise and so it will 
be subsumed under the latter value. Indeed, one could defend a non-anthropocentric 
account of intergenerational justice and separate these two values. However, in discussing 
the sustainability issues of nuclear power deployment, these environmental concerns relate 
to exactly the same radiation levels that are relevant when assessing public health and safety 
issues. The only difference would thus be that an intrinsic value has been ascribed to the 
environment. In other words, the consequences of radiation in the environment should then 
be addressed without making reference to what these means for human beings.  
Public health & safety (environmental friendliness) 
Sustainability could be taken to relate to human health and safety and to the status of the 
environment. In its Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA (2006, p 5) takes safety to “mean 
the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks“; this definition implies 
that the IAEA is defending a non-anthropocentric viewpoint. The latter is reiterated in 
IAEA’s Principles of Radioactive Waste Management, in which one of the key principles 
relates exclusively to the environment: “[r]radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way 
as to provide an acceptable level of protection of the environment“ (IAEA, 1995, p 5). 
However, in a temporal sense and when it comes to protecting the future, the principles 5 
(the protecting of future generations) and 6 (the burdens on future generations) in the latter 
IAEA document leave no room for misunderstanding, making it clear that the IAEA’s 
approach is anthropocentric and solely refers to future generations of human  beings who 
should be protected (IAEA, 1995). The environment thus has here an instrumental value. 
Safety issues in nuclear power technology include “the safety of nuclear installations, 
radiation safety, the safety of radioactive waste management and safety in the transport of 
radioactive material”(IAEA et al., 2006, p 5). The value we link to these concerns is public 
health & safety, which pertains to the exposure of the human body to radiation and the 
subsequent health effects of radiation. 
Security  
Security is the next value that will be addressed in this analysis. In the IAEA’s Safety 
Glossary, nuclear security is defined as “any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility 
or nuclear material in use, storage or transport which could endanger the health and safety 
of the public or the environment” (IAEA, 2007, p.133). One can argue that ‘security’ as 
defined here also refers to the safety considerations discussed above.  We shall, however, 
keep the value of ‘security’ separate in this analysis so as to be able to distinguish between 
unintentional and intentional harm. Security also refers to extremely relevant proliferation 
considerations such as the using and dispersing of nuclear technology for destructive 
purposes. We define ‘security’ as the protecting of people from the intentional harmful 
effects of ionizing radiation resulting from sabotage or proliferation. 
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3.2 Sustaining future well-being  
So far we have presented three values for sustaining the environment and humankind’s 
safety and security. Another aspect of sustainability links up with the sustaining of human 
well-being, insofar as it relates to the resources. I will discuss the two values of resource 
durability and economic viability.  
Resource durability 
Sustainability could be thought to refer to the availability of natural resources and their 
continuation. Obviously, in discussions on energy production and consumption, the value 
of resource durability plays an important role. Brian Barry presents the theory of 
intergenerational justice as the appropriate consumption of non-renewable natural resources 
across time; “later generations should be left no worse off […] than they would have been 
without depletion” (Barry, 1989a, p.519) Since it would be irrational to expect the present 
generation to leave all non-renewable resources to its successors and since replicating such 
resources is not an option either, Barry (1989a, 519) argues that we need to offer 
compensation or recompense for depleted resources “in the sense that later generations 
should be no worse off […] than they would have been without depletion”. We should 
remember that this reasoning has been presented by Barry in order to keep the range of 
opportunities open to posterity; “[t]he minimal claim of equal opportunity is an equal claim 
on the earth’s natural resources” (Barry, 1989b, 490). I narrowed down this argument to 
include only those resources that we might have depleted in the process of nuclear power 
production. If we now look back on the period of industrial revolution up until the present 
it would be fairly straightforward to conclude that the availability of energy resources has 
played a key role in achieving well-being. So I argue that that we should compensate for a 
reduction in the opportunities for well-being as that can be brought about by energy 
resources. The value of resource durability is therefore defined as the availability of natural 
resources for the future or the providing of an equivalent alternative for the same function.  
Economic viability  
Some economists claim that “a development is sustainable if total welfare does not decline 
along the path” (Hamilton, 2003, p.419) and that “achieving sustainable development 
necessarily entails creating and maintaining wealth”(Hamilton, 2003, p 419-420). 2 The next 
value that I shall discuss in relation to sustainability is that of economic viability. One might 
wonder whether economic issues have an inherent moral relevance and whether it is 
justified to present economic durability as a moral value. On the one hand, one could argue 
that the safeguarding of the general well-being of society (also, for instance, including issues 
of health care) has undeniable moral relevance. On the other hand, our understanding of 
economic viability in this chapter solely relates to the issues that we have presented in 
relation to nuclear energy production and consumption. With this approach economic 
aspects do not therefore have any inherent moral relevance; it is what can be achieved with 
this economic potential that makes it morally relevant. This is why I present the value of 
economic durability in conjunction with other value. First and foremost, economic viability 
should be considered in conjunction with resource durability. In that way it relates to the 
economic potential for the initiation and continuation of an activity that helps in the 
providing of an alternative for the depleted resources. We will see in the next section that 
                                                 
2 In this paper I do not make a distinction between welfare, well-being and wealth.  
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economic viability also becomes a relevant notion when we aim to safeguard posterity’s 
safety and security by introducing new technology. In general, economic viability is defined 
here as the economic potential to embark on a new technology and to safeguard its 
continuation for the maintaining of the other discussed values.  
4. Operationalizing moral values: Assessing existing fuel cycles  
Let us first recapitulate the moral values discussed in the preceding section. I argued that 
above all else, we should sustain equal opportunity for future generations. More to the point, 
we should safeguard posterity’s vital interests and the well-being of posterity. To that end, 
five different interpretations of sustainable development have been presented in terms of 
five different moral values; the definitions of these values have been summarized in Table 1. 
In other words, in order to address the sustainability aspects of a certain technology (in our 
case the sustainability aspects of a certain nuclear fuel cycle), we need to first assess to what 
extent these values are safeguarded or compromised. To that end, the values should first be 
operationalized, meaning that we should assess the impacts of different stages in the 
production of nuclear power according to how these values are affected. In this 
operationalization process, we should take into consideration the fact that the values could 
relate to the interests of different groups of people belonging to different generations. In the 
remainder of this section I will first discuss different fuel cycles before going on to elaborate 
on how to assess the impacts of the fuel cycles according to such values.  
 
Value Explanation 
Environmental 
friendliness 
Preserving the status of nature to safeguard human health and 
safety 
Public health & safety Protecting people from the accidental and unintentional harmful effectsof ionizing radiation 
Security Protecting people from the intentional harmful effects of ionizing radiationarising from sabotage or proliferation 
Resource durability The availability of natural resources for the future or the providing of suitable alternatives 
Economic viability Embarking on a new technology and continuing that activity to safeguard one of the above values 
Table 1. Five moral values that together constitute the overarching value of sustainability  
4.1 Existing nuclear fuel cycles: open and closed  
Generally, there are two main methods, or nuclear fuel cycles, used for the production of 
nuclear power; namely open and closed fuel cycles. Both fuel cycles have a front-end phase, 
involving the mining and milling of uranium, enrichment and fuel fabrication, and a back-
end phase involving the steps taken after irradiation in the reactor. Both cycles are more or 
less the same until the moment of initial irradiation in the reactor. I shall start by discussing 
these fuel cycles from the cutting point of the front-end and the back–end of the cycles, 
namely form the moment of irradiation in the reactor. What comes out of the nuclear reactor 
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is not necessarily waste; it would be better to refer to it as spent fuel. This is because precisely 
how we deal with this spent fuel determines the type of fuel cycle required. In the open fuel 
cycle, spent fuel is considered as waste. After irradiation the fuel in the reactor, the spent 
fuel, will be kept in interim storage on the surface for a couple of decades (basically to let it 
cool down) and it will then be disposed of in deep underground repositories. Since the fuel 
will be irradiated only once, this cycle is referred to as a once-through or an open fuel cycle. 
The disposed of waste should be isolated from the biosphere for the period that it 
constitutes a radiation risk; for an open fuel cycle this is about 200,000 years. This kind of 
fuel cycle is sometimes known as the American method, but it is also employed in certain 
other countries as well, like Sweden. The (black) solid arrows in Fig. 1 represent the open 
fuel cycle.  
In the second method, spent fuel will be reprocessed. Reprocessing is a chemical process in 
which spent fuel can be recycled for two main purposes. Firstly, the still deployable 
materials in spent fuel (namely uranium and plutonium) will be separated in order to be 
reinserted into the cycle. That is why this method is called the closed fuel cycle; see in this 
connection the (red) dotted lines in Fig. 1. Separated uranium can be added at different 
front-end phases in the open fuel cycle; plutonium can be used to manufacture MOX (Mixed 
Oxide Fuel), which is a fuel based on a mixture of plutonium and uranium. The second 
reason for reprocessing is to substantially reduce the volume of the most long-lived type of 
waste; i.e. the most long-lived materials (again uranium and plutonium) will have been 
removed. The waste life-time in the closed fuel cycle amounts to about 10,000 years. The 
closed fuel cycle is more commonly known as the European method, but is also applied in 
some other countries like Japan. Both fuel cycle types are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of open and closed fuel cycles, together with the forecast 
waste life-times. The black solid lines represent the open fuel cycle and the red dotted lines 
illustrate the additional steps taken in the closed fuel cycle.  
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4.2 Operationalization of values: Intergenerational assessment of fuel cycles 
It would extend beyond the scope of this work to discuss in detail how the fuel cycles 
should be assessed according to the values presented, but I will briefly discuss the steps that 
we need to take in order to operationalize these values. First, we must link the impact of 
different steps in the fuel cycle to the values presented and evaluate to what extent those 
impacts are for present and future generations. Let me illustrate this with an example in 
which we shall operationalize the value ‘public health & safety’. 
First, when assessing safety issues in an open fuel cycle, we should at least address the 
following steps that relate in one way or another to the safety issues: 1) mining, milling, 
enrichment and fuel fabrication, 2) transport of (unused) fuel and spent fuel, 3) reactor 
operation and decommissioning period, 4) interim storage of spent fuel and 5) final disposal 
of spent fuel in geological repositories. These impacts have been mapped in Fig. 2.3 In this 
figure, it has been assumed that nuclear power production will last for one generation, this 
is referred to as the Period for which the Activity Lasts (PAL). The first four steps 
particularly create risks in the short-term, which is slightly longer than the PAL. Especially 
the decommissioning period and the interim storage of spent fuel will last several decades 
longer. From the perspective of long-term safety concerns (issue number 5 above), there will 
be potential burdens after spent fuel has been situated in the geological repositories; these 
concerns will potentially last for the life-time of the spent fuel, or approximately 200,000 
years. So the horizontal black arrow represents these long-term concerns extending into 
‘Generation n’ in the future. Please note that here the value of ‘environmental friendliness’ is 
discussed in conjunction with the value of ‘public health & safety’.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Relating moral values to concrete fuel cycle steps. PAL stands for the Period for 
which the Activity Lasts and SF stands for spent fuel. This is a partial representation and a 
slightly modified version of Figure 3 in (Taebi & Kadak, 2010).  
                                                 
3 This is a partial representation of a detailed analysis I have made elsewhere together with Andrew 
Kadak.  Readers who are interested could consult this publication for a detailed operationalization of 
these values in relation to the two existing and the two future nuclear fuel cycles; see (Taebi & Kadak, 
2010). 
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4.3 Intergenerational conflicts  
Like in the example above, we can operationalize all the values and relate them to the 
concrete steps in the two fuel cycle. If we now draw a comparable burden-benefit chart for 
the closed fuel cycle, it should show that the safety concerns for remote future generations 
will substantially decrease; this is because the waste life-time of the closed cycle will be a 
factor of 20 less (approximately 10,000 year). From the perspective of future generations, the 
closed fuel cycle will thus score better on the issue of safety. However, in the short-term and 
from the perspective of Generation 1, more safety risks will be created since reprocessing is 
a chemical process that creates different types of nuclear waste that subsequently has to be 
disposed of (these are mainly different types of waste with shorter lifetimes). Reprocessing 
plants are furthermore situated in only a few countries, which means that countries that 
endorse the closed fuel cycle but have no reprocessing plants will be forced to go back and 
forth with their waste to the country that can do the reprocessing; this creates additional 
safety risks in relation to transportation. In Europe, the two commercial reprocessing plants 
are situated in the UK and France. Other European countries that endorse the closed fuel 
cycle have their waste reprocessed in one of these countries. Another short-term safety 
concern has to do with the using of plutonium as MOX in fuel. Plutonium is a very 
dangerous substance when inhaled. See in this connection the concerns that reactor 3 has 
been raising in the Fukushima Daiichi accident where MOX is being used as fuel in that 
reactor.   
A similar analysis could be presented for the security concerns. Security relates to both 
sabotage and proliferation and it could be linked to the following steps in any open fuel cycle: 
1) uranium enrichment, 2) reactor operation and the decommissioning period, 3) spent fuel 
storage and 4) the final disposal of spent fuel. All four issues have to do with the risk of 
sabotage. Issue number 1 has, in addition, a proliferation aspect as well. The naturally 
occurring uranium contains different isotopes. Since the isotope that is deployable in the 
conventional reactors (235U) is present in less than 1%, that uranium is enriched in order to 
make sure that more of that isotope will be present in the fuel. Enriched uranium to 3 (up to 
10) percent is usually used for civil energy production purposes. However, the further 
enriching of uranium (up to 70% and higher) makes it a suitable material for weapon 
production. The Hiroshima bomb contained about 65 kilogram of 80% enriched uranium.  
If we now assess the security concerns of the closed fuel cycle, one important issue will 
appear in relation to proliferation, namely the issue of the separation of plutonium during 
reprocessing. In addition to highly enriched uranium, plutonium is also deployable in 
nuclear weapons; the Nagasaki bomb contained 8 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium. 
Plutonium, which usually emanates from civil reactors, is usually of a much lower quality 
for weapon production, but it does carry serious proliferation risks.4  
Let us continue with the value of resource durability in our two fuel cycles. If the 2008 
uranium consumption rate were continued, there would be enough reasonably priced uranium 
available for approximately 100 years (IAEA-NEA, 2010). Obviously, if many more 
countries join the nuclear club in the next couple of decades this availability will 
substantially decrease. It is, however, important to note that this uranium availability 
constitutes a reference to geological certainty and production costs. If we include 
estimations of all the available resources (in seawater and in phosphates), this will rise 
                                                 
4 For a more technical discussion on the different isotopes of plutionium and the risk of proliferation, 
please consult  (Taebi, Forthcoming). 
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significantly (IAEA-NEA, 2010). Yet, the open fuel cycle depletes the resources of reasonably 
priced uranium much faster. The closed fuel cycle, on the other hand, extends the period of 
availability of uranium, since reprocessed uranium and plutonium is reused. The conclusion 
thus seems straightforward. Closed fuel cycles should be preferred from the perspective of 
resource durability for future generations.  
The last issue is the one of economic viability. As stated earlier, reprocessing plants are 
situated in a very limited number of countries. That is partly because of security concerns in 
conjunction with proliferation, but what is at least of equal importance, is the fact that 
reprocessing plants are very expensive. So, for countries with a small number of nuclear 
reactors, it is not worth while building their own reprocessing plant. Purely from the 
economic perspective, the open fuel cycle would then be preferred.  
Let us now make an overall comparison between the two fuel cycles from the justice angle. 
From the perspective of the present generation, the open fuel cycle would be preferred, 
since it creates less safety and security risks and is less costly. The closed fuel cycle is, on the 
hand, more beneficial from the point of view of future generations, because it reduces the 
long-term safety concerns of waste disposal and because it helps extend non-renewable 
resources farther into the future. At the same time, the closed cycle creates more short-term 
safety and security concerns and economic burdens. This cuts right to the heart of the 
central issue of this paper, namely that of intergenerational justice. The questions that need 
to be answered are the following. Does intergenerational justice require that we reduce the 
waste life-time and enhance the resource availability into the future? If so, are the additional 
current burdens of the closed fuel cycle sufficiently justified?5  
5. Sustainability as an ethical field of tension: The progress of technology  
When opting for a certain fuel cycle, we first need to express opinions with regard to the 
moral relevance of the values presented for different generations. After the accidents in 
Japan, we could for instance conclude that if we want to continue on the nuclear path, we 
will have to reduce the safety burdens for the present generations as much as possible. So, in 
terms of our values, we rank the moral relevance of the value of ‘public health & safety’ in 
the short-term higher than all of the other values. In such an example, the open fuel cycle 
with its fewer nuclear activities must be favored. On the other hand, if we now conclude 
that as producers of nuclear power we are the main ones responsible for reducing its future 
burdens, we give the same value of ‘public health & safety’ for future generations higher 
moral priority; the closed fuel cycle would then become an attractive option.  
Then discussion concerning the prioritizing of moral values will gain particular relevance 
when we come to address technological advancement. Even though technology has no 
inherent moral value as such, it does enable us to comply better with other moral values. 
Also in questions regarding the development of new technologies for the future, it is 
important to be clear on the purpose of this technology, or to put it in philosophical terms, 
to be clear about which values this technology should improve for which group of people or 
which generation. Before moving on to discuss new technologies and how they could affect 
values, let me first say something about the interdependency of these values. Rather than 
contemplating them in isolation, it is actually the combination of these values which goes 
towards forming the overarching value of sustainability. We could liken our set of values to 
                                                 
5 See for a detailed discussion of this issue (Taebi & Kloosterman, 2008). 
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several American football balls held tightly together with springs; see in this connection Fig. 
3.6 Hitting any one of these balls will inevitably affect the others in the construction. In other 
words, by presenting new technology, we might be able to comply better with any one of 
these values, but we should at the same time evaluate how that would affect the remaining 
values. This is why I am presenting our set of values as an ethical field of tension. Let me 
explain this by giving an example.  
 
 
Fig. 3.Schematic representation of sustainability in an ethical field of tension  
Due to its radiotoxic nature and extremely long lifetime, nuclear waste is perceived to be the 
Achilles heel of nuclear energy production. Serious attempts have been made to further 
reduce its lifetime. A new technology for the latter purpose is that of Partitioning and 
Transmutation (P&T). This is a complementary method to the closed fuel cycle that involves 
separating and dividing (partitioning) the materials remaining after reprocessing so that 
they can afterwards be eliminated (transmuted) in Fast Reactors; these reactors can irradiate 
the radionuclides that the currently operational thermal reactors cannot irradiate. If 
completely successful P&T will, it is expected, make the waste lifetime five to ten times 
shorter when compared to closed fuel cycle waste. After P&T, waste radiotoxicity can decay 
to a non-hazardous level within the space of hundreds of years, i.e. 500 to 1000 years 
(KASAM, 2005, Ch 8).  
However, P&T is merely a technology that has been scientifically proven at lab level. It still 
requires decades of development which, in turn, will necessitate serious investments in this 
technology (NEA-OECD, 2002). Furthermore, the industrialization of P&T requires the 
building of many more facilities, both nuclear reactors and new reprocessing facilities. All 
these additional safety, security and economic burdens will have to be borne by 
contemporaries or at least by those nations that are capable of developing the technology; 
due to the inherent technological implications and complexity, not all countries will be 
capable of developing or deploying this technology (IAEA, 2004). To conclude, while P&T is 
capable of improving the value of ‘public health & safety’ in the long run, it is 
                                                 
6 Please note that the value of ‘environmental friendliness‘ has been subsumed under the value of 
‘public health and safety‘.  
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compromising short-term ‘public health & safety’ and ‘security’. In addition, the economic 
burdens will mainly be borne by the present and the immediately following generation. In 
other words, P&T (as an extension to reprocessing) presents an exacerbated form of the 
intergenerational dilemmas of the closed fuel cycle.7  
Similarly, we could present fast reactors in the configuration of nuclear breeders in order to 
breed (make) more fuel than they consume. Breeders are capable of consuming the major 
isotope of uranium (238U) that is present for more than 99% in natural uranium. From the 
point of view of ‘resource durability’ such a breeder fuel cycle (with multiple recycling) 
could be very beneficial; we would then use the same natural uranium far more efficiently, 
all of which would extend the period of its durability. However, from the perspective of 
short-term concerns such a fuel cycle will bring comparable safety, security and economic 
burdens to P&T. It is particularly in conjunction with the abundant presence of plutonium 
and the ensuing proliferation concerns that this cycle method has never attracted serious 
attention. The term ‘plutonium economy’ usually refers to the using of plutonium as MOX 
in a closed fuel cycle and also to a fuel cycle with nuclear breeders.  
In short, new technology can contribute to an improvement in moral values. It is therefore 
important that we include the progress of technology in our moral analysis. For one thing, 
in a discussion focused on what we ought to do for future generations, it is important to first 
be aware of what we can do, technologically speaking. This is the added value of this type of 
applied ethics in which solutions can be proposed within the realm of technological realities 
and in the light of the progress of technology. For another thing, we should then bring this 
solution back in the ethical field of tension proposed earlier in this chapter. How would the 
other values be affected by the introduction of this technology? Again, the question of how 
these values should be ranked in terms of their moral relevance should be determined 
during public and political discourse.  
6. Challenges of assessing social and political desirability of nuclear power 
In the preceding sections I approached the notion of sustainability as a moral value 
consisting of several other values. Different nuclear fuel cycles can now be assessed in terms 
of how well they safeguard or jeopardize these moral values for present and future 
generations; this gives rise to issues of intergenerational justice. What is now the 
relationship between these moral discussions and policies? How influential could and 
should these justice principles be when policy-makers need to deal with serious choices and 
trade-offs?  
I shall elaborate on this issue by giving an example of where tangible nuclear waste 
management policy and fundamental philosophical discussions on justice to posterity are 
closely intertwined. The IAEA’s principle of avoiding “undue burdens” on future 
generations is one that has been endorsed by all members of IAEA and it forms part of the 
current national policies on nuclear waste management. However, what this “undue 
burdens” clause precisely entails remains a moot point. Indeed, we cannot completely 
prevent harm to future generations and as the principle implies, there must then be a certain 
degree of due burdens that we are allowed to impose on posterity. It has been argued that 
                                                 
7 The intergenerational distribution of the burdens and benefits of different fuel cycles is more precisely and 
extensively discussed in a joint paper written with Andrew Kadak (Taebi & Kadak, 2010). The breeder fuel 
cycle was also assessed in thsi paper.  
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this principle is best complied with when we dispose of nuclear waste in geological 
repositories that are situated a couple of hundred meters underground (NEA-OECD, 1995); 
the possible harmful consequences of a geological repository in the long run is then tacitly 
taken to mean due harm.  
It is the combination of the engineered barrier (i.e. canisters stored in concrete containers) 
and the natural barrier (i.e. geologic formations) that makes repositories favorable from the 
point of view of long-term safety (Chapman & McCombie, 2003, 27-31). However, the 
tremendous long-term uncertainties that repositories bring (Macfarlane & Ewing, 2006) 
make it difficult to guarantee equal safety for distant future generations (Shrader-Frechette, 
1993, 1994; Taebi, Forthcoming). In the case of the Yucca Mountains repositories, once the 
location had been designated for the permanent disposal of American spent fuel for a 
million years, an interesting distinction was made between different future people: “a 
repository must provide reasonable protection and security for the very far future, but this 
may not necessarily be at levels deemed protective (and controllable) for the current or 
succeeding generations” (EPA, 2005, 49036). People living in the next 10,000 years deserve a 
level of protection equal to the current level and the generations belonging to the period 
extending beyond 10,000 years could conceivably be exposed to a much higher radiation 
limit. The underlying argument for this distinction is sought in the low degree of 
predictability for the remote future and the fact that any positive influence on such societies 
is meaningless, all of which is believed to diminish our responsibility towards future 
generations. 
As a matter of fact, this issue relates to another intergenerational aspect of the notion of 
sustainability that I was merely hinting at in Section 2, namely that of for whom (and for 
how long) we should sustain the valuable entity of X? If we now agree that through the 
inappropriate disposal of nuclear waste, we can affect the vital interests of future 
generations, and if we again agree that location in time and space does not provide 
sufficient moral ground for treating people differently (in accordance with Barry’s (1999) 
principles of fundamental equality), we can now argue that this distinction between 
different people of the future is ethically problematic. The arguments provided for 
proposing this distinction are more pragmatic reasons for why we cannot act otherwise than 
solid moral justifications. The discussions on tangible policies should, therefore, be preceded 
by the more fundamental discussions on what our relationship with posterity should be. 8 
When addressing the desirability of a certain fuel cycle for the future we should incorporate 
the social and economic context within which policies are articulated. One possible 
conclusion to a moral analysis could be that if we decide to continue on the nuclear path, the 
P&T method as an addition to the closed fuel cycle should be favored, since it has many 
advantages in terms of substantially reducing the waste lifetime and the potential future 
burdens.9 However, as argued in Section 5, the further developing of this method as well as 
its industrialization will create substantial safety and security burdens for present 
generations; how can the policy-maker justify these additional burdens? Last but certainly 
not least, in policy-making there is the question of the legitimacy of the financial efforts that 
                                                 
8 For a detailed discussion on Yucca Mountains Radiation Standards, please see (Vandenbosch & 
Vandenbosch, 2007). Elsewhere I argue that the proposed distinction must urge us to reconsider other 
waste management possibilities that could be used to help reduce waste lifetime and potential future 
burdens (Taebi, Forthcoming).  
9 This argument is extensively defended elsewhere (Taebi, 2011).  
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are required to make all of this happen. Indeed, these considerations have always been 
crucial to policy-making and will most probably always remain so. However, what we tend 
to forget is that our choices today have serious consequences for the interests of the people 
who happen to come after us. I am therefore endeavoring to shift the focus of the analysis on 
nuclear energy production and nuclear waste management policies. In other words, since 
we, the present generation, are enjoying the lion’s share of the benefits of nuclear power; 
justice requires us to remain responsible for its burdens. The challenges mentioned should 
not, however, be taken too lightly. One important aspect would, for instance, be that of the 
distribution of these additional burdens among the currently living generations.  
A highly relevant question in policy-making is that of whether nuclear power should be 
considered to be a viable option in the future of energy provision. I started this paper by 
circumventing this general desirability discussion surrounding nuclear energy. It is, 
however, worthwhile considering what this analysis can contribute to that public and 
political discourse. As stated earlier, we should not consider nuclear power in isolation but 
address its desirability in the broader perspective of the desirable energy mix; the moral 
insights offered here could help one distinguish between different fuel cycles, all of which 
can facilitate a comparison between a certain nuclear fuel cycle and another specific energy 
system. We can, for instance, compare the P&T cycle with the waste that remains radiotoxic 
for a couple of hundred years with a certain fossil fuel system that contributes to a change in 
the climate system. Such comparisons could be made based on considerations of 
intergenerational justice, or on how they affect the interests of both the present and future 
generations.  
When one compares two non-renewable energy systems, focusing on the intergenerational 
aspects of sustainability would help us to facilitate a comparison based on moral grounds. We 
should then distinguish between the nature and longevity of those long-term effects; the latter 
is, for instance, different for oil and nuclear power both in terms of the type of the 
consequences and the period for which those consequences will be present. These 
intergenerational arguments lose, however, relevance when we assess a renewable energy 
system; there is no depletion of a non-replaceable resource and there are often far fewer, or 
virtually no more, long-term consequences. Even though renewability is an important aspect 
of sustainability and – we want to eventually move towards these renewable systems – we 
should also be aware of the societal and ethical consequences of such energy systems. When 
addressing the desirability of renewable energy resources, we should instead focus on the 
spatial aspects of sustainability and on the questions of intragenerational justice that are raised 
for the generations currently alive. For instance, when assessing the desirability of biofuel 
there are the issues of land use, water consumption and the possible effects of producing 
biofuel from food crops that could potentially exacerbate the problem of hunger.10  
When it comes to comparing different energy systems, we encounter at least two types of 
implications, namely 1) how to compare different types of burdens and benefits and 2) how 
to value future burdens and benefits in relation to present burdens and benefits. In 
economic studies and investment decisions with potential benefits for the future, these 
issues have been dealt with in cost-benefit analyses (CBA) that can be used to identify and 
quantify different costs and benefits over the course of time. CBA is grounded in the ethical 
                                                 
10 The British Royal Society has repesented a comprehesive analysis of how to assess the sustainability 
of biofuel; see (Pickett et al., 2008). 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 
 
146 
theory of utilitarianism which asserts that the moral worth of any action should be assessed 
in terms of how it maximizes overall utility (alternatively referred to as well-being or 
happiness). For the sake of calculation, economists argue that we could express all the costs 
and benefits in terms of their monetary value. Since the value of different commodities 
declines over the course of time, the future value of these benefits will be determined on the 
basis of their present value discounted for time.  
While CBA and discounting are undisputed11 and sometimes desirable for certain short-term 
decisions in policy-making, the whole matter becomes complicated and even controversial 
when there is more at stake than just monetary costs and benefits, or when we need to account 
for the detrimental effects and benefits of the distant future. The first issue is the problem of 
incommensurability. How should we incorporate human lives, environmental damage and 
long-term radiation risks into a CBA? Although there are ways of expressing such concerns in 
terms of monetary units, all the approaches face the problem of comparing matters that are 
essentially incomparable. The second issue, accounting for harm and benefit in the distant 
future, raises questions about the moral legitimacy of discounting (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). 
Discounting is particularly controversial in the case of non-economic decisions, for example 
when decisions are made from an intergenerational point of view in the way advocated in this 
paper (see for an overview (Portney & Weyant, 1999)).  
There are many philosophical objections to the applications of a CBA (see for an overview 
(Hansson, 2007)), but at least two of these objections are worth mentioning here. Firstly, 
CBAs fail to address the distribution issue between generations and, secondly, if we are to 
discount risks in the remote future, the policies for mitigating climate change and disposing 
of nuclear waste will be seriously undermined. The following example may serve to 
illustrate this: at a discount rate of 5 percent, one death next year becomes equivalent to more 
than a billion deaths in 500 years. It would be outrageous to include such conclusions in the 
assessment of future risks. In light of the fact that we are considering tremendously long 
periods of time, discounting – even at a very small rate – will make future catastrophes 
morally trivial (Parfit, 1983).  
To conclude, policy-making on nuclear power production and nuclear waste management 
needs to include fundamental discussions on our relationship with posterity and to address 
issues surrounding the distribution of burdens and benefits between generations and also 
among the present generation. Since economic instruments such as CBA offer no solace, 
policy-making in nuclear technology should go hand in hand with more fundamental moral 
discussions.   
7. Conclusion 
Nuclear power production and consumption gives rise to the problem of intergenerational 
justice as we are using uranium, which is a non-replaceable resource, and as the remaining 
radiotoxic waste creates potential burdens extending into the very distant future. Since 
future interest is subject to present action, we have every reason to include posterity’s 
interests in our decision-making in the area of nuclear power production. In my arguments, 
                                                 
11 There are at least two issues that can make short-term CBA problematic. Firstly, the question of how 
to express the value of goods in terms of money; e.g. what is the economic value of rainforests? 
Secondly, there is disagreement on the interest rate of discounting when considering future effects; the 
rate can seriously influence the outcome. 
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I presented the notion of sustainable development as a moral value and elaborated on its 
relationship with intergenerational justice. Following Barry, I argued that we should sustain 
future generation’s opportunity for well-being insofar as that can be accomplished with the 
available energy resources and their vital interests. I then introduced a set of moral values 
which, in combination with each other, comprise the overarching value of sustainability. 
The values ‘environmental friendliness’, ‘public health & safety’ and ‘security’ together 
safeguard the vital interests of future generation; the values ‘resource durability’ and 
‘economic viability’ help to sustain future well-being.  
The impacts of different nuclear fuel cycles were then assessed according to how they affect 
the values presented. In this operationalization process, we took into consideration the fact 
that the values could relate to the interests of different groups of people belonging to different 
generations. The two existing fuel cycles were then compared according to their values; the 
open fuel cycle could best be associated with short-term benefits and the closed fuel cycle with 
long-term benefits and the accompanying short-term costs. All of this gives rise to an 
intergenerational conflict of interests between those alive today and future generations.  
The ranking of these values with regard to their moral relevance requires thorough public 
and political discourse. This is particularly relevant when assessing the desirability of new 
technology. Even though technology has no inherent moral relevance, it does help improve 
other values. In a moral discussion on what we ought to do for future generations, it is 
important to first be aware of what we can do, technologically speaking. This is the added 
value of this type of applied ethics in which solutions can be proposed within the realm of 
technological realities and in the light of technological progress. Indeed, the impacts of these 
new technologies should then be assessed in the ethical field of tension of sustainability, as 
has been proposed here. It is then worthwhile considering how other values will be affected 
by the introduction of this technology?  
When it comes to policy-making for nuclear power deployment, we need to address several 
ethical issues regarding our relationship with posterity and the intergenerational distribution 
of benefits and burdens. Therefore, policies on nuclear power should be accompanied by 
thorough moral analysis. One possible conclusion arising from such analysis could be that we, 
the present generations who are enjoying the lion’s share of the benefits of nuclear power, 
should remain responsible for dealing with its waste. This supports the application of P&T 
that reduces the waste lifetime and therefore also the potential future burdens. Before P&T can 
be introduced, decades of research and development still need to take place. Several 
technological challenges, both in the development of reprocessing technologies and in the 
development of fast reactors still have to be surmounted and the development and ultimate 
deployment of P&T will create considerable burdens (including certain economic burdens) for 
contemporaries. So, if the result of the moral discussion is that we want to be able to apply 
P&T, then this technology should be high on the research agenda so that it can become a 
serious alternative in the near future; one that is both technically feasible and economically 
affordable. The decision-maker should be aware of the technological state-of-the-art and of the 
cost that the development of a certain technology, desirable or not, creates for the present 
generation. This paper aims to contribute to that awareness.  
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Long-Term Operation of VVER Power Plants 
Tamás János Katona 
Nuclear Power Plant Paks Ltd. 
Hungary 
1. Introduction 
The VVER reactors are light-water-moderated and water-cooled i.e. pressurized water 
reactors (PWRs). The name comes from Russian “водо-водяной энергетический 
реактор” which transliterates as Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reaktor (Water-Water 
Energetic Reactor WWER but the Russian type acronym VVER is more often used). The 
VVERs were developed in the 1960s. There are 52 Russian designed VVER-type pressurized 
water nuclear power plants operating in the world today under of 437 nuclear power plants 
(for the latest operational statistics VVER plants see IAEA PRIS database www.iaea.org). 
The cumulative time of safe operation of VVER reactors currently exceeds 1200 reactor-
years. The first three VVERs were built in Russia and in Eastern-Germany in 1964-1970 and 
they were operated up to 1990. The first standard series of VVER have a nominal electrical 
capacity of 440 MW and the second standard series have the capacity of 1000 MW. There are 
two basic types of VVER-440 reactors, which are based on different safety philosophies. The 
VVER-440/230 type is a Generation I design while the VVER-440/213 is representing 
already the Generation II reactor design with reduced pressure containment. Outside Russia 
all VVER-440/230 type plants of the standard design are already shut down. There are two 
specific VVER-440 designs in operation the Loviisa NPP with reduced pressure western 
type containment and the Armenian Medzamor NPP. In the VVER 1000 MW series, there is 
a gradual design development through the five oldest plants (small series) while the rest of 
the operating plants represent the standardised VVER-1000/320 model. The VVER-1000 
units commissioned recently and those currently being under construction are improved 
versions of the VVER-1000/320; for example the Tianwan (China) plant with AES-91 type 
units and the Kudankulam (India) plant with AES-92 type units. New VVER models e.g. the 
AES-2006 design is being considered for future bids. The older types of VVER-1000 are of 
Generation II while the new evolutionary models of large VVER already exhibit Generation 
III features. 
The design operational lifetime of the VVER plants is generally 30 years. Exceptions are only 
the newly designed and operating VVER-1000 units with 50 or 60 years of designed 
operational lifetime. A great majority of VVER plants are aged nearing the end of the 
design-lifetime. Except Russia the VVER operating countries are dependent on nuclear 
power production for example the Nuclear Power Plant Paks in Hungary provided 40 % of 
domestic production in 2010. The nuclear power capacities in these countries ensure the 
necessary diversity of power generation and contribute to the security of supply. Therefore, 
the VVER owners in Central and Eastern Europe intend to keep their plants in operation via 
implementing plant lifetime management (PLiM) programmes with the intention of 
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ensuring safe and financially viable operation in the long term. The PLiM activity and 
strategy of VVER operators is presented in (Katona, 2010).  
The possibility of extension of operational lifetime of VVER-440/213 plants was recognised 
already in 1992 based on assessment of robustness of the design good technical condition of 
the plants and synergy between safety upgrading measures and overall condition of the 
plants (Katona&Bajsz, 1992).  
In all VVER operating countries, the lifetime management had the explicit goal of ensuring 
prolongation of operational lifetime see e.g. (Roesenergoatom, 2003).  
The operational license of the four VVER-440/213 units at Paks NPP Hungary is nominally 
limited to the design lifetime of 30 years. Prolongation by additional 20 years of the 
operational lifetime is however feasible. The first formal step of licence renewal of Paks NPP 
has been made in 2008 and the relicensing process is going on. 
In Ukraine, the nuclear shear in the domestic production of electricity is approximately 48 % 
while the nuclear power plant comprises 26.6 % of total installed capacity. There is a strong 
interest to extend the operational lifetime of all Ukrainian NPPs. The operational license of 
the VVER-440/213 type Units 1 and 2 at Rivne NPP Ukraine has been renewed by 
additional 20 years under condition of performing safety assessment after ten years of 
prolonged operation. The extension of operational lifetime is a generic strategy of operators 
of VVER-440/213 plants in Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
The Loviisa NPP in Finland (a non standard VVER-440 design) prolonged the operation up 
to the next Periodic Safety Review (10 years).  
The operational lifetime of the VVER plants in Russia will be extended by 15 to 25 years; the 
four oldest VVER-440/230 units (Novovoronesh NPP Unit 3 4 Kola NPP Unit 1 and 2) have 
already received a 15 licence for extended operation. The VVER-440/213 type units (Kola 
NPP Unit 3 and 4) also prepared to 15 years prolongation of operational licence. Among 
VVER-1000 plants, the Novovoronesh Unit 5 is prepared to 25 years prolongation of 
operation after an excessive safety upgrading and modernisation programme.  
Increasing the competitiveness by power up-rate is also a general element of industry 
strategies in all VVER-operating countries. The VVER-440 type units at Loviisa NPP are 
operated at ~510 MWe power level. At Paks NPP enhancement of the reactor thermal power 
by 8% increased the power output up-to 500 MW and the commercial competitiveness of the 
plant. Slovenské Elektrárne also implemented a programme of progressive power up-rate of 
Bochunice V2 NPP and the net capacity of 472 MW is already achieved. Similar projects are 
in place at Dukovany NPP in Czech Republic. An 4÷5 % power uprates is planned or under 
implementation practically at all VVER plants in Russia except the oldest plants which 
provide approximately 300 MWe extra generating capacity.  
VVER operators implemented extensive safety upgrading and modernisation programmes 
during last decades and achieved an internationally accepted level of safety. Generally, 
safety deficiencies do not inhibit the long-term operation of the VVER plants.  
Considerable progress has been achieved at VVER plants with respect to the improvement 
of the performance and plant reliability too. The load factor of majority of VVER plants is 
over 80% at some plants e.g. at Paks and Dukovany NPP it is around 90 %. 
In this chapter – after an overview of basic technical features of VVER plants – the 
development and implementation of PLiM programmes for VVER plants will be presented. 
The methods for ensuring long-term operation are focused on the type and lifetime limiting 
ageing/degradation mechanisms of the most important systems structures and components. 
The integration of the plant activities/programmes into coherent PLiM programme will be 
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demonstrated taking into account the frame of regulatory requirements regarding long-term 
operation. The role of the international research and co-operation environment affecting the 
lifetime management of VVER plants will also be presented. The presentation of the PLiM 
and long-term operation will focus on the older VVER-440/213 and VVER-1000 type plants. 
Especially the long-term operation of the VVER-440/213 plants requires specific engineering 
effort.  
The VVER-440/230 plants (Kozloduy NPP Bulgaria and Bochunice V1 NPP Slovakia) being 
already on permanent shutdown will not be considered. In contrast to this the Kola 1 and 2 
and Novovoronesh 3 and 4 units in Russia have already received licences to operate for a 
further fifteen years after implementation of modernisation and safety enhancement 
programmes (Rosenergoatom, 2003) to cope with the safety issues relevant for this design 
(IAEA, 1992). The long-term operation and plant lifetime management of VVER-440/230 
plant type is not a generic practice and will be discussed below only to a limited extent.  
From the point of view of long-term operation, the newly designed and constructed VVER 
plants are also of less interest. Obviously, they have been designed and manufactured 
taking into account the aging lessons learned from the operational experience. The question 
of longer than designed operation of these plants will be and can be considered after 
decades of operations. 
2. Basic idea of long-term operation 
The safety of nuclear power plants are determined by the functionality and performance of 
following systems, structures and components (SSCs): 
1. Systems structures and components important to safety that perform the basic safety 
functions i.e.: 
a. To ensure integrity of reactor coolant pressure boundary 
b. To ensure the capability to shut down the reactor cool-down and maintain it in a 
safe shutdown condition and 
c. To ensure offsite radioactive exposures less than or comparable to limits specified 
in the national regulations. 
2. Structures and components not important to safety but whose failure impacts safety 
function: The function of a system structure or component may be compromised by 
failure of a structure or component not important to safety due to different type of 
interactions.  
The SSCs above are classified into safety classes in accordance with national regulation. The 
classification of SSCs is usually documented in the Final Safety Analysis Report. 
During the total operational lifetime, the performance of the SSCs important to safety has to 
be assured with prescribed margins. The margins are needed for covering the different type 
of uncertainties of the design, manufacturing and operation and for the assurance that the 
SSCs will perform their intended safety function even if an accident happen in the last 
minute of the operation.  
The SSCs can be grouped into three main groups according to the possibility of restoration 
of the function/performance for the compensation of effect of ageing: long-lived passive 
non-replaceable or not-to-replace structures and components replaceable SSCs and 
renewable SSCs.  
The functionality/performance of all SSCs will be unambiguously decreasing in time due to 
ageing all of these components.  
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The function/performance of the replaceable or renewable SSCs can be restored in proper 
time, while in case of non-replaceable SSCs the rate of degradation can be influenced via 
careful operation creation better environmental conditions as that assumed in the design. In 
some cases, the rate of the degradation can be re-assessed based on new scientific evidences 
and operational experience. Consequently, the possibility of operation extended over the 
design lifetime is determined by the ageing and aged condition of long-lived non-
replaceable or not-to-replace structures and components (SCs) relevant for safety like reactor 
pressure vessel containment etc. The functionality and performance of these SCs limit the 
operational lifetime.  
The assurance of intended safety function of replaceable systems, structures and 
components is also very important and might be critical. However, the assurance of function 
and performance of that structures systems and components is mainly question of effort and 
financing and does not limit the operational lifetime.  
Off-course the extension of operational lifetime is a business decision of the owners of the 
plant. From this point of view, the performance and functionality of SSCs important for 
production also pose limit in time for the extension of operation. The Fig. 1 illustrates the 
concept outlined above. 
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Fig. 1. Why the operational lifetime can be extended?  
3. Basic features of the VVER design 
In the sections below, the basic design characteristics of VVER plants are presented. The 
design and manufacturing features are also discussed, which are relevant from the point of 
view of long-term operation (LTO). Safety and compliance with current licensing basis and 
international requirements are the preconditions for LTO. 
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3.1 The VVER-440 models 
3.1.1 Basic design features of the VVER-440 
The VVER-440 V-179, V-230 and V-213 plants are equipped with a six-loop VVER-440 
reactor. In each loop there are main isolating valves (MIV) on the cold and hot legs, one 
main circulation pump (MCP) per loop and the horizontal steam generators (SG). The 
pressurizer with safety valves is connected to the primary loop. The two generations of 
VVER-440 type reactors have very similar layouts of their primary systems; see Fig. 2. 
Typical operating parameters are Thot=297C Tcold =266C p=12.3 MPa as it shown in Fig. 3. 
The design bases of the two VVER-440 types (i.e. the 230 and the 213) are essentially 
different. This has consequences in the design of safety systems and confinement. 
There are 16 nuclear power plant units of type VVER-440/213 namely: four in Hungary, 
four in the Czech Republic and four in Slovakia two in Russia and two in Ukraine. The 
owners of these plants are preparing for long-term operational life of these units.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Layout of the primary system of VVER-440/213 design 
The design bases for the VVER-440/213 safety systems are similar to those used in Western 
PWRs, including the postulating the a double-end guillotine break of the main circulation 
line in the reactor coolant system. The safety systems exhibit triple redundancy and the 
reactors have bubbler condenser-type pressure suppression containments capable of 
withstanding the imposed loads and maintaining containment functionality even following 
large break LOCA. The VVER-440/213 plants design considered internal and external 
hazards to some extent. In addition, protection against single failures in the auxiliary and 
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safety systems has generally been provided by the design. The safety concerns with VVER-
440/213 plants are discussed in detail in an IAEA report (IAEA 1996a).  
 
 
Fig. 3. The technology of VVER-440/213 (Legend: PR-pressurizer, MV-main valve, MCP- 
main circulation pump, HPP, LPP-high and low pressure preheater and HPC LPC – high 
and low pressure parts of the turbine respectively)  
The VVER-440/213 has essentially inherent safety characteristics e.g. robustness of the 
design, low heat flux in the core large water inventory in the primary system and a large 
containment volume, which compensates other deficiencies in the containment concept to a 
large extent. At all plants, most of the safety deficiencies have been addressed by back-
fitting and plant modifications. Due to the robust original design it was feasible to upgrade 
the safety of the original VVER-440/213 design to a level comparable with the PWR plants 
of the same vintage. At the latest constructed units of VVER-440/213, like the Mochovce 
NPP units 1 and 2, several improvements and modifications were already made during the 
design and construction phase. 
There are specific modifications of the VVER-440 design: The Finish nuclear power plant at 
Loviisa represents a combination of the VVER-440/230 basic design and nuclear island 
equipment with a Westinghouse-type reduced pressure ice-condenser containment and 
several other western-designed and manufactured systems like the complete 
instrumentation and control systems (I&C). These units have very successful operational 
history and excellent safety features. A comprehensive lifetime management programme 
was launched in the very early phase of operation, which has allowed long-term operation 
of the Loviisa units. The Armenian reactor also represents a modification of VVER-440 with 
an enhanced seismic capacity. It has to be mentioned that the shutdown units 3 and 4 at 
Kozloduy NPP Bulgaria represent an intermediate type between 230 and 213 series.  
It should be noted that the VVER-440s have certain inherent safety characteristics that are 
superior to most modern PWR plants e.g. robust design large water inventory in the 
primary system relative to the reactor power large volume of the confinement etc.  
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3.1.2 The VVER-440 features relevant for LTO 
In case of VVER-440 plant designs, the operational lifetime-limiting structures and 
components are the containment building, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the steam 
generator (SG). Contrary to the VVER-1000 and PWRs the steam generators are practically 
not replaceable in case of VVER-440/213 design. 
The ferritic-steel reactor pressure vessel is clad internally with austenitic stainless steel. The 
reactor pressure vessels are made from low alloy steel (15Cr2MVA; Loviisa 12Cr2MFA) the 
circumferential submerged arc welding was made using Sv-10CrMoVTi wire. The RPV 
covered internally by welded clad of two stainless steel layers. The inner layer is a non-
stabilised stainless steel (Sv-07Cr25Ni13 similar to AISI 309) and that in contact with the 
coolant is a niobium stabilised stainless steel (Sv-08Cr19Ni10Mn2Nb (Loviisa Sv-
07Cr19Ni10Nb) both equivalent to AISI 347).  
From the point of view of longer-term operation, the main deficiency of VVER-440/230 was 
the high irradiation exposure of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) wall by fast neutrons and 
the relatively quick embrittlement of the RPV material. The issue had been aggravated by 
the lack of a proper RPV surveillance programme at these plants. Several attempts have 
been made to assess the embrittlement of the base and weld material of those RPVs. For the 
first generation RPVs essential data for RPV materials, e.g. transition temperature, 
concentration of copper and phosphorus were absent; archive metal of RPVs was not 
available. The phosphorus and copper contents in the welds of WWER-440/230 are between 
0.030–0.048% and 0.10–0.18% respectively. In the case of VVER-440/213 the same 
concentrations are in the range of 0.010–0.028 % for P and 0.03–0.18% for Cu 
(Vasiliev&Kopiev, 2007).  
Several measures were implemented for the resolution of the RPV embrittlement issue:  
- reduction of the neutron flux on the RPV via low leakage core design dummy shielding 
assemblies and annealing i.e. affecting the change of material properties 
- heating up the water in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to lessen thermal 
shock in a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) situation, steam-line isolation system 
solutions interlocks, i.e. decreasing the stressors 
- introduction of volumetric non-destructive testing for in-service inspection.  
Annealing of RPV has been implemented at Loviisa NPP and Kola NPP (also at the shut 
down plant Buchunice V1). Assessment of annealing effectiveness (level of properties 
recovering after annealing), determination of re-irradiation re-embrittlement rates after 
annealing and the behaviour of WWER-440 weld materials showed the real possibilities for 
recovering RPV toughness properties of irradiated WWER-440 RPV materials. Measures 
were also taken to improve the knowledge of the vessel material by vessel sampling. Also 
reducing of neutron irradiation loading of the RPV wall via dummy assemblies around the 
core was implemented. More detailed description of the RPV neutron irradiation 
embrittlement issue is provided e.g. in (Erak et al, 2007).  
'Extended Surveillance Specimen Programme' was prepared with the aim to validate the 
results of the standard programme (Kupca, 2006). It was prepared for increasing the 
accuracy of the neutron fluence measurement, improvement of the determination of the 
actual temperature of irradiation, fixing the orientation of RPV samples to the centre of the 
reactor core, minimizing the differences of neutron doses at the Charpy-V notch and crack-
opening-displacement specimens and to evaluate any dose rate effects.  
For the Mochovce NPP units 1 and 2, a completely new surveillance programme was 
prepared based on the philosophy that the results of the programme must be available 
during the whole service life of the NPP. The new advanced surveillance programme deals 
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with the irradiation embrittlement of the RPV weld area heat affected zone and the RPV 
austenitic stainless steel cladding, which were not evaluated until this time in the 
surveillance programmes. 
Reactor pressure vessel surveillance programmes became obligatory in all VVER plants that 
had been commissioned after Units 1 and 2 at Loviisa.  
Proper RPV surveillance programmes have been implemented at VVER-440/213 plants 
outside of former Soviet Union. Since the PTS (pressure-temperature-loading limits) is the 
lifetime limiting process for the RPV of VVERs, the methodology of PTS evaluation has to be 
established in the national regulations, which takes into account the applicable best 
practices, the features of the RPV and the thermal-hydraulic peculiarities of the VVERs. The 
assumptions of renewed PTS analyses have been confirmed with mixing tests. The 
embrittlement of the RPV has been controlled via low-leakage core design. Considering the 
VVER-440/213 plants, annealing of RPV has been implemented at Rivne NPP. 
Components of the primary circuit in contact with the primary coolant other than RPV are 
also made of austenitic stainless steel, i.e. the piping of the primary loop the main circulating 
pumps gate valves and the emergency and auxiliary systems pipework. 
The steam generators in VVER are horizontal (see Fig.4).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Steam-generator of VVER-440/213 design 
The heat exchanging tubes and the steam generator tube headers (collectors) are 
manufactured from austenitic stainless steel (18% Cr 10 % Ni stabilized with titanium) in 
VVERs, instead of the nickel-based alloys (Alloy 600 and 690) and higher chromium-
containing alloys (Alloy 800) used in PWR. The material of the SG heat exchanging tubes in 
VVER-440 is equivalent to AISI 321. The advantages of the VVER horizontal steam generator 
design are the high reliability absence of vibrations, no accumulation of sludge at the tube 
sheet and easy to access for the maintenance.  
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The SG design has positive impact on safety as well, e.g. the design allow reliable natural 
circulation, effective gas removal, large water inventory and essential thickness of the heat 
exchanging tubes.  
The oldest VVER-440 type steam generators at Novovoronesh NPP unit 3 and 4 are 
operating already 40 years. Condition of the oldest VVER-440 steam generators at Kola and 
Novovoronesh plant allows 15 years extension of operation of these plants. According to the 
operational experience, the feed-water distributor inside the SG shows accelerated ageing 
due to erosion. These elements were replaced practically at all VVER-440 plants (see the red 
coloured new distributor in Fig.4).  
The experience regarding ageing of VVER steam generators is summarised in the report of 
the International Atomic Energy (IAEA, 2007). At WWER-440 plants, the lifetime limiting 
ageing mechanism of the SGs is “Outer Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking (ODSCC)” of 
the austenitic stainless steel heat-exchanger tubes. The ODSCC indications appear typically 
(80%) at the grid structure supporting the tube bundle where the secondary circuit corrosion 
products with concentrated corrosive agents are deposited. An eddy-current inspection 
programme is implemented for monitoring the tubes. Samples have been removed from 
plugged tubes to facilitate investigations of the phenomena. The rate of ODSCC was 
essentially slowed down by a series of modifications and actions implemented at different 
plant to different extent.  
The measures implemented are as follows:  
- Replacement of the condensers: the new condensers have austenitic stainless steel tubes 
- Removal of copper and copper-bearing alloys from the secondary circuit 
- Replacement of the feed-water distributor (the old one was manufactured from carbon 
steel) 
- Cleaning the heat exchanging surface of the SGs 
- Introducing high pH secondary water chemistry 
- Replacement of the high-pressure pre-heaters (with erosion-corrosion resistant tubes). 
All these measures have been implemented at Paks NPP, which completely changes the 
conditions and the rate of ODSCC in the SGs. Consequently, a better (i.e. decreasing) 
plugging trend is experienced, which can also be expected in the long-term. The gaps 
between the tubes and support grid are still the critical places since remaining corrosion 
products accumulate there. It is therefore difficult to forecast the ODSCC rate in the gaps 
and the ageing process has to be well monitored in the future. Under the new conditions, 
sludge may be accumulated at the bottom area of the SG. An effective method for draining 
the sludge has to be found. The reserve in heat exchanger surfaces of the SG is relative large 
(more than 15%). Considering past experience and the recent plugging trend of the heat 
exchange tubes, none of the SGs would exceed 10% of plugged tubes by the end of 50 years 
operation due to implemented measures (Katona et al, 2003); see also (Trunov et al, 2006). 
The number of allowable plugged tubes became more important at the plant where the 
primary energy output is increased for the power up-rate. Therefore, establishing adequate 
performance criteria for the steam generators is very important.  
The reduced pressure containment of VVER-440/213 is made of reinforced concrete, and 
steel liner ensures the leak tightness. Therefore, the basic concern regarding containment 
ageing is the affect of ageing on the containment leak-tightness. The leak rates of VVER-
440/213 containment allowed by the design and justified by the regular integral tests equals 
to 14.7%/day at the post large-break loss-of-coolant accident when the design internal 
containment pressure equals 2.4 MPa. It is clearly higher at some plants than is allowed for 
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Western NPP containments. Therefore, the goal of the VVER operators is to improve the 
leak-tightness. (It should be noted that comparison with Western NPP containments could 
not be straightforward. In case of design basis accidents the pressure suppression system 
tends to cause an under-atmospheric pressure rather than overpressure at the time period 
when the atmosphere of the containment has its highest contents of radioactive aerosols and 
when the potential for radioactive releases would thus be the highest.) Containment leakage 
has a complex origin. Investigations carried out at Paks and Buchunice NPP practically from 
the time of start-up tests shows that the poor sealing of doors and hatches mainly cause the 
containment leakage. It means that the leakage itself is a maintenance problem rather than 
an ageing issue.  
Some VVER plants are built on relatively soft soil. Geodetic control of the settlement of main 
building of these plants was started during the construction and it is periodically performed. 
The phenomena might be a concern when the uneven settlement, i.e. the differential 
movement causes unaccepted additional deformation of the structures. Experience shows that 
the differential movement may cause cracks in non-structural masonry walls. Other concern 
might be, if the non-uniform settlement results in non-allowed tilting of the RPV vertical axis, 
which would cause problems for control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs). The operating 
experience and analysis of settlement with extrapolation to extended operational lifetime is 
discussed for Paks NPP in (Katona et al, 2009a). 
As per operational experience, ageing of both reinforced concrete load bearing structure and 
liner do not limit the long-term operation of the VVER-440/213 plants.   
3.2 VVER-1000 model 
3.2.1 Basic design features of the VVER-1000 
The VVER-1000 model exists in several versions. The “small series” plants could be 
considered as pioneers of this model. The VVER-1000/320 is the large series version of the 
design. The VVER-1000/320 type plants are operated in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Russia, 
Ukraine and China: they were developed after 1975. Modernised versions of VVER-1000 
plants are under construction in five countries (Bulgaria, China, India, Iran and Russia).  
Regarding lifetime management, the VVER-1000/320 plants have practical importance. The 
“small series” plants show some specific design features however the lifetime management 
practice of these plants does not differ essentially from those in the case of the VVER-
1000/320 version.  
The VVER-1000 is a four loop PWR with horizontal steam generators. Each loop consists of a 
hot leg, a horizontal steam generator, a main circulating pump and a cold leg. Main isolating 
valves on the hot and cold legs of each loop equip the non-standard VVER-1000 primary 
loops. The standard V-320 design and the new clones of the VVER-1000 do not have 
isolating valves on the primary loops. A pressuriser is connected to the hot leg of one of the 
loops and the spray line to the cold leg. Operating conditions are Thot=322 °C Tcold=290 °C 
p=15.7 MPa.  
The reactor, the primary and safety systems are all placed within a full pressure, dry, pre-
stressed concrete containment. 
The design bases and the technical solutions applied are very similar to the PWRs operated 
in Western countries. The safety concerns about the VVER-1000 plants are discussed in 
detail in IAEA reports; see (IAEA, 1996b) and (IAEA, 2000). The main safety concern 
regarding the VVER-1000 plants lies in the quality and reliability of the individual 
equipment especially the instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment. The plant layout 
 
Long-Term Operation of VVER Power Plants 
 
163 
has weaknesses that make the redundant system parts vulnerable to hazardous systems 
interactions and common cause failures caused by fires internal floods or external hazards. 
At all plants, many of these deficiencies have been addressed by plant modifications and an 
acceptable safety level has thus been achieved. 
There are several advanced VVER-1000 plants presently under construction and more than 
20 new projects of advanced VVER design are under preparation or consideration and 
several are in the bidding phase. The most advanced versions of VVER design showing 
features of Generation III reactors are considered for future bids for large generating 
capacity reactors. 
3.2.2 Features of VVER-1000 model relevant for LTO 
In case of VVER-1000, the proven design solutions of VVER-440 are implemented like the 
horizontal steam generator also the concept of the material selection. In the VVER-1000 
models, all primary circuit surfaces either are made from or are clad in stainless steel. The 
08X18H10T type stainless steel (08Cr18Ni10Ti AISI 321) is used for the core structures, main 
circulating pumps and steam generator tubing, whilst the main loop pipework and steam 
generator collectors are manufactured from 10GN2MFA type carbon steel and the cladding 
is made from 08Cr18Ni10T stainless steel. The pressuriser is also made from 10GN2MFA 
carbon steel covered by cladding with an inner layer of Sv-07Cr25Ni13 (similar to AISI 309) 
stainless steel and two layers of Sv-08Cr19Ni10Mn2Nb niobium stabilised stainless steel 
(similar to AISI 347). The reactor pressure vessel and head are made from the low alloy steel 
15Cr2MNFA. The cladding of the reactor head has an inner layer of Sv-07Cr25Ni13 stainless 
steel and two layers of the niobium stabilised stainless steel Sv-04Cr20Ni10Mn2Nb (again 
similar to AISI 347). The phosphorus and copper contents in the welds of WWER-1000 are 
0.005–0.014% and 0.03–0.08% respectively. The quality of manufacturing and alloy 
composition ensure the possibility of LTO for VVER-1000 reactors (Vasiliev&Kopiev, 2007]. 
For newly commissioned WWER-1000 plants and plants in construction, essential 
modifications of the surveillance programme have been implemented. Specimen containers 
are located in positions representative for vessel wall conditions at Temelin NPP. Based on 
the fracture mechanics analysis, it was recommended to heat up the accumulator water to 
55°C and to prevent injection of ECCS water with temperatures below 20°C for all the 
plants. The use of low neutron leakage core loading patterns in WWER-1000 reactors  
reduces the RPV wall fluences by approximately 30%. It was planned to introduce partial 
low leakage loading patterns at some plants during 1994 (i.e. fuel assemblies with high 
burn-up to be placed at the core periphery). 
The steam generators for VVER-1000 have been designed on the same principles as in case 
of VVER-440 plants. However, the SGs at VVER-1000 plants are replaceable.  
At some Units throughout the design service life of SG there were problems resulting in 
necessity of SG replacement.  
At the same time, the SGs at some plants can be operated above design service life. As the 
operating experience shows, the water chemistry of the secondary circuit is the main factor 
influencing operability of the SG tubing like in the case of VVER-440 plants.  
Tube integrity is inspected by eddy current method. The results of eddy current test can be 
used to determine the plugging criterion for defected tubes. Proper definition of the 
plugging criterion was an important problem.  
The ageing problems of the SGs at VVER-1000 plants are as follows; see (Trunov et al, 2006): 
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- cracking at headers of the cold collectors of the heat-exchanging tubes 
- degradation of the welded zone at hot collector headers 
- corrosion of the heat-exchanging tubes 
- formation of deposits 
- difficulties in measuring and regulating the SG water level. 
A study performed in the frame of the International Atomic Energy Agency summarises the 
status of knowledge on the steam generator ageing (IAEA, 2007). 
In VVER-1000 plants, ageing may affect the pre-stressing of the containment. Important 
ageing mechanisms of the pre-stressed containment and its structural elements, e.g. the 
tendons anchorages are the relaxation shrinkage creep of steel resulting in loss of pre-stress.  
Requirements on testing of containment pre-stressing system are defined both by the 
designer and regulation (Orgenergostroy, 1989a) and (Orgenergostroy, 1989a). The scope of 
inspection shall be extended if defects are observed and/or average loss of tension force is 
more than 15%. If additional control verifies obtained results, it is necessary to test 100% of 
tendons. Tendons with force losses more 15% shall be once again controlled after straining. 
In the case if a force loss at 24 hours is more than 10% the tendon shall be replaced. In order 
to enable monitoring of the level of the containment pre-stressing measurement systems are 
installed permanently on the structure and these systems measure structure deformations 
and pre-stressing force in the cables.  
At VVER-1000 plants, detailed field investigations and analyses have been carried out for 
the assessment and evaluation of the condition of pre-stressing tendons. There are design 
solutions for the replacement of tendons. Thus, all existing defects leading to loss of 
stressing force and rupture of tendons have been avoided.  
At some plants, new pre-stressing system and an additional system for automatic control of 
stressing forces is installed in the bundles. 
4. Feasibility of long-term operation 
4.1 Preconditions and motivations for long-tem operation 
Pioneers of the extension of operational lifetime were the VVER-440/213 operators. It was 
already recognised in 1992 that the favourable characteristics of the VVER-440/213 plants, 
the comprehensive safety enhancing programme launched and partially already 
implemented by the operating companies, the operational and maintenance practice of the 
operator give an opportunity to extend the operation lifetime (Katona&Bajsz, 1992).  
Decision on the preparation of feasibility studies for LTO had been based on the recognition 
of the following VVER features and experiences: 
- robust design of VVER-440/213 design 
- good plant condition due to well-developed maintenance in-service inspections, careful 
operation and extensive modernisation and reconstructions 
- successful implementation of safety upgrading measures resulting in acceptable level of 
safety. 
Safety of the plants and compliance with international standards have been generally 
considered as decisive preconditions for long-term operation.  
The comprehensive modernisation and safety upgrading programmes implemented by the 
VVER operators during last two decades resulted in gradual decreasing of the core damage 
frequency (CDF) of these plants. For example, the level 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) 
study establishes the resulting CDF for all units at Dukovany NPP between 1.47÷1.67*10-5/a 
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(Czech Report, 2010). The same achievements are published for other VVER plants in the 
national reports compiled under Safety Convention; see (Slovak Report, 2010). The CDF for 
Bochunice V-2 NPP is shown in Fig. 5.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Decreasing the CDF for Bochunice V-2 NPP due to the implementation of safety 
upgrading measures (Slovak Report, 2010)  
Similar to Slovak and Czech plants results have been achieved at Paks NPP in Hungary too. 
Extensive modernisation and safety upgrading programme has been implemented in 
Ukraine (Ukraine, 2011) and Russia (Rosenergoatom, 2003) and Bulgaria (Popov, 2007) too. 
One of the issues related to the justification of the compliance with current licensing basis at 
VVERs operated outside of Russia is the lack of the knowledge of design basis, especially 
the assumptions made by the designer with respect to the ageing mechanisms, stressors and 
time limits of the safe operation of the components.  
The availability of design base information is a current licensing basis requirement.  
In the same time knowledge of design base is unavoidable for the preparation of long-term 
operation and licence renewal especially for the review of time-limited ageing analyses. 
Operators of WWER-440/213 units have to perform specific project for the design base 
reconstitution. The design base reconstitution covers the identification of design base 
functions values and bounding conditions according to the licensing basis.  
Two basic tasks have to be performed while reconstituting the design base: 
- collection and review the original design information  
- consideration of the changes of the licensing basis since the design and issuance of the 
operational licence. 
The design of VVER-440/213 and the older VVER-1000 plants was generally based on the 
former USSR regulations of early the seventies: 
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- General Requirements on Safety of NPP Design, Construction and Operation (OPB- 73) 
and 
- General Safety Rules for Atomic Power Plants (PBYa –74). 
OPB-73 marked the beginning of a transition to the generally accepted international practice 
in nuclear safety (e.g. defence in depth, single failure criterion).  
Additional work was needed for the proper definition of design base values and conditions. 
Design input loads and conditions had to be newly defined for the most important SSC. 
Information sources for this work were: 
- the existing design information 
- results of the periodic safety reviews 
- current licensing basis compliance check 
- transient analyses newly performed for the final safety analysis reports (FSAR) 
- operation history.  
The design base has to be newly created taking into account all essential changes in the 
licensing basis. For example, in case of Paks NPP seismic loads were not considered in the 
design. Current design/licencing base includes safe shutdown earthquake with 0.25 g 
horizontal acceleration.  
The good plant condition and appropriate plant programmes are also preconditions for 
long-term operations. Especially the surveillance of the RPV embrittlement and monitoring 
of the condition of long-lived passive structures and components are of interest. The most 
important ageing management (AM) activities are performed at the VVER plants from the 
very beginning of the operation. The early AM activity was focused on the known 
degradation of main SSCs like reactor pressure vessel (RPV) embrittlement or on issue cases, 
e.g. leaking of the confinement due to the liner degradation outer surface corrosion of the 
steam generator heat-exchange tubes. Most of early AM programmes were state-of-the-art 
as for example the RPV surveillance programme. In the course of the first periodic safety 
reviews, the scope of most critical for operational lifetime SSCs and the dominating ageing 
mechanisms were defined.  
Adequate assessment of the aged condition and forecast of safe lifetime of SCs can only be 
performed if the ageing process is monitored properly from the very beginning of the 
operation. The operational history of SCs has to be documented in sufficient details for 
performing the trending. 
Availability of a state-of-the-art FSAR and its regular updating is required for the control of 
compliance with CLB and configuration management.  
The national regulation allowing the approval of the prolongation of the operation beyond 
designed operational lifetime is also and unambiguous condition of the long-term operation. 
The legislative framework of regulatory approval of long-term operation in the VVER 
operating countries is based either on the periodic safety review or on the formal licence 
renewal.  
There are several non-technical conditions, which affected the strategy of VVER operators 
and motivated the decision on LTO. The positive international tendencies with regard to 
long-term operation of existing nuclear power generation capacities stimulate the LTO of 
VVERs too. (This tendency might be changed by the nuclear accident following the Great 
Tohuku earthquake in Japan March 2011.) Accumulation of the experiences and scientific 
evidences for justification of longer than designed operation of NPPs provides good basis 
also for LTO of the VVER. Good market positions of NPPs overall in the VVER operating 
countries and high level of public acceptance and positive public attitude towards operation 
of NPPs in these countries. 
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The intention to prolong the operational lifetime of existing NPPs was also motivated by 
very low probability for the extension of nuclear power capacity in late nineties since all 
trials for launching new nuclear projects failed and several projects have been stopped and 
frozen already for long time. 
4.2 The feasibility study 
The main goal of the feasibility studies was the preparation of the final owners decision 
regarding LTO and licence renewal. Simultaneously, the authorities in the VVER operating 
countries started the preparation of regulations on long-term operation and licencing.  
According to (Katona et al, 2001) the feasibility was checked from technical and safety point 
of view via:  
- assessment of plant safety and overall technical condition  
- forecast for the lifetime expectations of non-replaceable structures and components  
- assessment of the effectiveness of the plant operational and maintenance practice 
- evaluation of the safety level of the plant and forecast for the extent of future safety 
upgrading measures based on the international tendencies in the R&D and 
development of regulations  
- effort needed for ensuring the safety and operational performance scheduled 
replacements reconstructions 
Logic followed in the feasibility study is shown in Fig.6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Logic followed in the feasibility study 
It has been found that there is no technical or safety limitation to the 50 years of operation of 
the Paks NPP. In case of most systems and equipment, the monitoring maintenance and 
regular renewal practice of the plant allows for the lifetime extension without outstanding 
costs. There is a well defined number of SSCs only, which require extensive reconstruction 
and investment as the possibility of compensating for the effects of ageing is limited or a 
significant moral ageing can be expected. In case of some SSCs, capacity expansion might be 
needed (e.g. radioactive waste storage tanks). 
Findings related to the reactor vessels and steam generators had been dealt with specific 
attention since these are in case of VVER-440/213 the real lifetime limiting components. As 
for the reactor vessels of VVER-440/213 at Paks NPP, the embrittlement due to fast neutron 
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irradiation of the reactor pressure vessels material was found the dominant ageing process. 
The condition of the RPV was different at different plants. While performing the feasibility 
study, the condition of RPV at Paks NPP was found that the RPVs of Unit 3 and 4 could be 
operated without extra measures even at 50 years. It was found that the water in the 
emergency core cooling (ECC) tanks should be heated up in order to decrease stress levels 
caused by pressurized thermal shock (PTS) transients. For this purpose, cost-effective 
technical solutions were already available. At Unit 1 in case of the 50-year lifetime in 
addition to the ECC heating-up the annealing of the welded joint No. 5/6 close to the core 
had been considered with 50% probability. It has to be mentioned that these conclusions 
were revised later on the basis of more sophisticated analyses. 
In case of VVER-440/213, the steam generators are not replaceable in a practically 
reasonable way. Therefore, the steam generators are as critical as the reactor pressure vessels 
from the point of view of lifetime limits of the safe operation of the plant. A forecast of the 
expected change of the steam generator performance has to be made based on the plugging 
rate.  
In case of VVER-1000, the reactor pressure vessel and the containment are the real lifetime 
limiting SCs since the steam-generator is replaceable. 
Simultaneously with the assessment of the plant condition and lifetime expectations of the 
most important non-replaceable structures and components,  the evaluation of the effort of 
the scheduled replacements, safety upgrading measures and reconstructions the costs for 
maintaining the required plant condition and sustaining the capability of operating 
company had to be assessed. These data had been used for input of business evaluation of 
the LTO. Simplified presentation of the business model is shown in Fig.7. Several options 
might be been investigated: 0, 10, 20 and 30 years of prolongation of operation beyond the 
licenced 30 years. The results of the study determined the objective of the PLiM. 
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Fig. 7. The business model 
Similar to the study presented above has been made for Dukovany NPP in the Czech 
Republic (Kadecka, 2007) and (Kadecka, 2009).  
4.3 Synergy between long-term operation and safety upgrading and modernisations 
There is a synergy between the long-term operation and different plant actions and 
measures implemented for safety upgrading, power up-rate, improving reliability and plant 
programmes. This will be shown below based on (Katona, 2006).  
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Implementation of the safety-upgrading programme for ensuring the compliance with 
national and international requirements is a precondition for LTO. In the same time, the 
safety is the most important aspect of public acceptance. The operator commitment in 
relation of safety is and will be the decisive point of judgement of the public.  
Most of the safety upgrading measures results in positive technical effect too. Due to these 
modifications, the safety systems or their essential parts had been practically renewed, 
reconstructed. Consequently, large part of safety systems is not aged. In some cases, safety-
upgrading measures have direct influence on the lifetime limiting processes. For example, 
the new relief valves installed on the pressurizer for the cold over-pressurisation protection 
eliminate the danger of brittle fracture of the reactor vessel.  
Some of the VVER plants implemented extensive seismic upgrading programme involving 
addition of large number of new seismic fixes and other strengthening measures; see papers 
in (IAEA, 1993). Fixing the building structures, the anchorages equipment, cabinets and 
racks, also the structural support of cable trays can be considered as reconstruction of these 
SCs.  
The most important economical condition for long-term operation is the preserving of the 
present cost advantage of nuclear electricity generation within the market conditions. 
Exploiting reserves and advantageous features of the VVER-440/213 reactors the electrical 
output of the plants can be safely increased up-to approximately 500 MWe by improvement 
of the efficiency of the secondary circuit/turbine and increasing reactor thermal power via 
implementation of modernised fuel assemblies. Obviously, the power up-rate should not 
result in a decrease of the plant safety level and should not cause stressors of ageing which 
affect the lifetime extension perspectives and the plant availability.  
The frequently criticised obsolete I&C systems were replaced at VVER plants. The new I&C 
systems have proper environmental qualification. Beside of the obsolescence, the lack of 
environmental qualification was the basic issue in case of the old systems practically at all 
plants.  
The major causes of the steam generator heat exchange tube local corrosion is the high 
concentration level of corrosion activators (chloride ions, sulphates, copper oxides etc.) in 
the secondary circuit and in the hidden surfaces at the secondary side of the SGs. This is 
critical in case of VVER-440 hence the steam generators are practically not replaceable. For 
limitation of the local corrosion, the high level of deposition on the tube surfaces should be 
eliminated. Most important measure implemented was the replacement the main turbine 
condenser for example at Paks NPP (Katona et al, 2005). Contrary to the old condensers with 
copper alloy tube bundle, the new condensers with stainless steel tubing allowed the 
introduction of the high pH water regime in the secondary circuit providing better 
operational condition for components of the feed water system and for the generators as 
well.  
5. System for ensuring long-term operation 
5.1 Concept for ensuring longer term operation 
Safe and economically reasonable prolongation of operation of VVER type plants (and any 
other old vintage plant) should be not limited to the formal regulatory or re-licensing 
aspects; it has to be considered in broader context (Katona&Rátkai, 2008) and (Katona et al, 
2009). It requires a comprehensive engineering practice, which integrates  
- up-to date knowledge on aging phenomena 
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- vigilance through condition monitoring /aging management 
- ability to recognize the unexpected phenomenon when it arises 
- a consequent application of best practices 
- feedback of experiences 
- proper consideration of VVER-440/V213 features 
- graded approach in accordance with safety relevance and plant lifetime limiting 
character of the given structure/component and ageing process; 
A comprehensive plant approach to LTO means: 
- All systems, structures and components have to be covered by certain plant programme 
(ageing management preventive maintenance scheduled replacement etc.). In case of 
safety classified SSCs, plant programmes and practice should comply with regulation; 
in case of non safety classified one, the complexity of programme depend on the 
importance of SSCs regarding power production, e.g. preventive maintenance and in 
some cases even run to failure concept might be applied.  
- All ageing processes have to be considered. 
- All plant activities have to be considered i.e. the routine activities should be integrated 
with those specific to LTO utilizing the synergy between them. 
The concept is illustrated in Fig.8. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Concept for preparation of the LTO and LR 
5.2 Scope of systems structures and components to be considered in LTO 
Plant Lifetime Management (PLiM) is complex programme for ensuring safe and long-term 
production of electrical energy. The scope of LTO should cover the SSCs relevant to safety 
SSCs important for production and conditions for functioning of operational organisation. 
PLiM is focusing on ageing on the economically optimal way of ensuring required condition 
of the plant while ensuring the safety. Practically all SSCs of the plants are within the scope 
of the PLiM. However, these components can be divided into two categories: 
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Category 1 – long-lived non-replaceable components as well as those which replacement 
will makes the LTO economically not reasonable. These components are the RPV, SG, Main 
Coolant Pump, main circulation pipeline containment cables and most of the buildings etc. 
The required condition of these SCs is ensured via ageing management or justified by time 
limited ageing analyses and environmental qualification validated for the extended time of 
operation. The method for scoping and screening for ageing management is presented in 
Section 7.1. 
Category 2 – includes all SSCs except for those of Category 1. The required condition of 
these SSCs is ensured via plant maintenance and scheduled replacement programmes. 
The scope of PLiM for LTO is broader than the scope for justification of the safety of the 
long-term operation developed for obtaining the regulators approval. The regulatory review 
and approval is focusing on the safety related SSCs and on the plant programmes for 
ensuring their functioning and performance over the extended operational lifetime. The 
scope of regulatory approval is presented in the sections below.  
5.3 Methods for ensuring required functionality/performance 
5.3.1 The system for ensuring required plant condition 
The control of performance and safety functions shall be ensured by certain plant 
programme or justified by analysis. The system is illustrated in Fig.9 based on Hungarian 
Regulatory Guide 4.12; see (Katona, 2010). 
 
Ageing management 
 Preventive programs, 
 Mitigation programs, 
 Surveillance 
Maintenance
Effectiveness 
Monitoring 
MAINTENANCE
ISI, 
TRP, 
MAINTENANCE 
Individual ageing management programs 
TLAAs EQ
ACTIVE
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE
SAFETY ANALYSES
Justification of functionality of the 
equipment by means of operation of the 
existing programs (ISI, Technical Review 
Program, maintenance) as coordinated by 
the ageing management organization. 
ACTIVE and PASSIVE
To prove by analyses, that the 
given equipment (material, 
structure) under given conditions 
(environmental parameters, loads) 
for the given time-period is 
capable to fulfill the anticipated 
function. 
To prove, that by means of 
effective maintenance the SSC are 
capable to fulfill their intended 
functions and to operate with the 
set forth parameters. 
DESIGN BASIS 
 
Fig. 9. System for ensuring required safety function and performance of the plant 
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The possible plant programmes are the ageing management programmes, routine plant 
surveillance, in-service inspection, testing and monitoring programmes, the maintenance 
programmes and the scheduled replacement and reconstruction programmes.  
Routine plant programmes can be credited after review and justification of effectiveness.  
The criteria of adequacy of existing plant programmes with regard to LTO are presented in 
Section 7.  
The adequacy of TLAAs has to be reviewed and demonstrated while entering into LTO; see 
section 8.  
Usually, ageing management programmes ensure the performance and function of passive 
long-lived SCs. Some VVER operators, such as Hungary, ageing management deals with 
passive components and structures only, since the active components and systems are 
addressed by the maintenance rule. There are VVER operating countries where the ageing 
management deals with both active and passive components and structures.  
Plant may select and optimise the methods applied for particular SSCs while the plant 
practice should be gapless, i.e. all SSCs and degradation mechanisms affecting the safety 
functions should be covered by the system. However, in case of structures and components 
of high safety relevance, regulation requires performance of dedicated ageing management 
programmes. In case of systems working in harsh environment, dedicated programme for 
maintaining of environmental qualification is required.  
5.3.2 Environmental qualification 
Performance and functioning of active systems can be tested during the operation and can 
be ensured via maintenance under maintenance rule (MR), i.e. evaluation and assessment of 
the effectiveness of the maintenance along safety criteria and/or via implementation of the 
programme for maintaining the environmental qualification (EQ).  
Environmental qualification should be implemented especially for I&C equipment, which 
shall operate in harsh environment.  
When the older VVER-440 and VVER-1000 NPPs were built, large part of the originally 
installed electrical and I&C equipment did not have initial qualification or the qualification 
was not certified properly. The issue was recognised already in the first reviews for safety; 
see (IAEA, 1992) (IAEA, 1996a) (IAEA, 1996b) and (IAEA, 2000).  
The resolution of the issue can be made in two steps:  
- restoring the initial qualification  
- maintaining the qualified condition of the equipment.  
The maintenance of the qualification means: 
1. Control of the capability of equipment to fulfil its safety function through: 
a. periodic testing of systems and components 
b. testing of the equipment following maintenance 
c. results of service routes by maintenance personnel 
d. diagnostics measurements; 
2. Development and implementation of scheduled replacement programme taking into 
account the requirements for environmental qualification while purchasing the new 
equipment; 
3. Preventive maintenance of the equipment; 
The environmental qualification should be reviewed and validated for the extended 
operational lifetime. There are different possible outcomes of the review: 
- The qualification remains valid for the period of long-term operation. 
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- The qualification has been projected to the end of the period of long-term operation. 
- The effects of ageing on the intended function(s) have to be adequately managed for the 
period of long-term operation via introducing new ageing management programme. 
- There is a need for replacement of the equipment. 
The plant activity regarding the environmental qualification is a specific TLAA review and 
revalidation task. 
5.3.3 Maintenance 
According to the logic outlined above, the required condition and functioning of (mainly) 
active systems and components can be ensured via maintenance or programme for 
maintaining environmental qualification and/or condition-dependent scheduled 
replacements.  
The plant maintenance programme can be credited as adequate tool for ensuring long-term 
operation after reviewing and justification of its effectiveness.  
Proper procedure has to be in place for monitoring the effectiveness of the maintenance. The 
monitoring shall demonstrate that the performed maintenance activity ensures the meeting 
of maintenance objectives set for the SSCs in scope of the maintenance programme and shall 
provide the necessary information for the improvement of the programme if deviations are 
detected.  
The procedure for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance should be applied using 
graded approach depending on the risk-relevance of the SSCs. The risk significance has been 
defined quantitatively by probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) or qualitatively by expert 
judgement.  
Beyond identification and repair of actual and possible failures, the maintenance process 
includes other support activities such as in-service inspection and testing, evaluation of 
maintenance results and monitoring of meeting the maintenance criteria.  
These criteria or objectives of the maintenance can be the following: 
- Availability 
- Success of starting tests  
- Failure frequency experienced during tests  
- Opening-closing time closing compactness  
- Quantity of delivered medium delivery head deviation from the recorded characteristic 
- Failure frequency 
- Measurement and operation accuracy 
- Success of overloading tests  
- Repetitive failures that can be prevented by maintenance  
- Violation of the Technical Limits and Specifications or being under its effect. 
In some countries, e.g. in Hungary the maintenance effectiveness monitoring (MEM) is an 
adaptation of 10CFR50.65 for the WWER-440/213 design features and Hungarian regulatory 
environment and plant practice (Katona&Rátkai 2010). There are two basic methods applied 
in the monitoring:  
- deterministic method, i.e. control of maintenance via testing/measuring performance 
parameters of component  
- probabilistic method, i.e. assessing the effectiveness of maintenance via comparison of 
reliability/availability parameters on the level of component/system or plant.  
Performance parameters are defined in accordance with safety class and risk significance.  
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The deterministic method is based on ASME OM Code. For example, in case of pumps the 
performance criteria to be checked are the head flow-rate and vibration level. Plant level 
deterministic performance parameters are for example the capacity factor thermal efficiency 
of the unit leakage of the containment (%/day).  
Risk significance and the probabilistic performance criteria are set based on PSA. Those 
SSCs are high risk significant, which are in 90% cut set having high contribution to core 
damage frequency (CDF) or high Fussel-Vessely rank. Performance criteria are based on the 
reliability/unavailability of performing safety function. System level performance 
parameters are for example failure rates per demand (failure/start) or run failure rate 
(failure/time) during operation. Plant level performance parameters are the CDF or some 
selected contributors to the CDF and other safety factors (unplanned reactor scrams or 
safety system actuations per year).  
The MEM is under implementation at Paks NPP. For the implementation of ASME OM 
Code, the existing in-service and post-maintenance testing programmes of the Paks NPP 
have to be modified and amended. Probabilistic performance criteria are under 
development now. It is expected that the MEM will improve the safety factors and capacity 
factors for the plant while the maintenance effort will be optimal. MEM is a prerequisite for 
license renewal in Hungary since it provides the assurance for the functioning of active 
components.  
5.4 Regulatory requirements regarding justification and approval of LTO 
Generally, PLiM is not regulated in VVER operated countries. However, the effectiveness of 
ensuring the safety functions and plant performance is subject of periodical safety reviews.  
Contrary to PliM, the long-term operation beyond the originally licensed or designed term 
needs well-defined justification and regulatory approval; see e.g. (Svab, 2007).  
According to (OECD NEA, 2006) and (IAEA, 2006) there are two principal regulatory 
approaches to LTO depending on the legislation regarding the operational licence.  
The operational licence in VVER operating countries is either limited or unlimited in time.  
In those countries where the operational licence has a limited validity in time formal 
renewal of the operational licence is needed. These are Russia and Hungary where the 
operational licence is limited to the design lifetime namely 30 years. In these countries, the 
regulation prescribes the conditions for licence renewal.  
In Hungary, the national rules for licence renewal have been developed based on the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission licence renewal rule. In Russia, the rules defined within 
the context with national regulation.  
The control of the compliance with current licensing basis can be maintained via  
- Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and its annual update 
- Periodic Safety Review (PSR) every ten years 
- other regulatory tools including Maintenance Rule (MR) inspections etc. 
Within the frames of the Periodic Safety Report: 
a. It shall be certified that the technical conditions of the buildings and equipment of the 
unit as well as the standard and conditions of operation fulfil the safety requirements 
and the contents of the regulatory licence; 
b. The current condition of the plant shall be assessed considering the ageing of the SSCs 
as well as all internal and external factors that influence the safe operation of the facility 
in the future; 
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c. The current characteristics of the plant shall be compared with the regulations 
considered as up-to-date in international practice and the deviations limiting the safe 
operability shall be defined according to the regulations considered as up-to-date; 
d. The risk factors revealed based on Items b) and c) shall be ranked and a corrective 
action program shall be created in order to increase the level of safety. 
If the PSR is the basis of the approval for LTO it has to have an extended scope compared to 
the previous PSR.  
The PSR for approving LTO has to include the following tasks: 
- comprehensive assessment of the condition of the plant  
- review of the plant programmes especially the ageing management activity and  
- revalidation of time-limiting ageing analyses for safety relevant long-lived and passive 
SCs.  
The LR is focusing on the ageing of the long-lived passive SCs and revalidation of TLAAs 
while the performance of active systems and components is controlled in accordance to the 
maintenance rule and via programmes for maintaining the environmental qualification.  
The logic of the justification of the application is shown in Fig.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Logic of the justification of licence renewal application 
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In the VVER operating countries, licensing of extended operation is rather complex it 
requires obtaining the environmental licence for extended term of operation and other 
permissions. This system of licensing is shown in Fig.11. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Flowchart for licensing of extended operational lifetime 
6. Review of the plant condition 
Independent from the regulatory framework for approval of LTO, plant actual condition has 
to be reviewed and assessed. In the framework of licence renewal, the review of plant 
condition is part of the integrated plant assessment. In case of periodic safety review, the 
review of the plant condition is the review area of the safety factor 2 in accordance with 
IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-2.10 (IAEA, 2003).  
The goal of the review is to evaluate and demonstrate the good health and their function 
and performance in line with requirements.  
The scope of the review covers the following SSCs: 
1. SCs with highest safety importance – safety class 1 2 and 3; 
2. those non-safety SCs which can jeopardize the safety functions; 
3. non-safety related SSCs which can jeopardize the environment (non-nuclear pipelines 
and tanks for storing different chemical substances); 
4. SSCs important for production (turbine cooling water distribution panels etc.). 
The review of plant condition is based on the information related to the health of 
components from the following sources:  
- results of operational information records of the operational events; 
- failure data root-cause analysis failure statistics; 
- outage and maintenance records. 
The evaluation can result in: 
- modification of the maintenance procedures; 
- modification of the periods of the maintenance; 
- introducing new diagnostic measures in order to determine the necessary additional 
actions; 
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- performing additional evaluation of the situation; 
- modifications e.g. implementation new sealing;  
- replacement of the component for a different type. 
The inspection program for safety class 1 SCs is the most rigorous one. It includes the 
following: 
- data of the non-destructive testing of the SCs; 
- evaluation of the results of the in-service inspections; 
- evaluation of the results/findings of the maintenances; 
- evaluation of the results of the ageing management programs; 
- evaluation of failure data and other lifetime information; 
- evaluation of operational information. 
The non-destructive testing is a regular activity at the power plants.  However, in the frame 
of the plant review for the justification of LTO some additional tests might be necessary. 
Individual programs can be useful and developed for the Class 1 SCs, i.e. for the reactor 
main isolation valves (if exist), main pipelines of primary loops, steam generators and 
pressurizer. 
In case of groups (2)-(4) of SCs listed above, the methodology of the inspection for reviewing 
the plant condition is based practically on the information sources as in case of the group 
(1). However, the review method is the visual on-site inspection. Application of the graded 
approach is useful, i.e. in case of higher importance or safety relevance the inspection has to 
be performed for each particular item while the review can be limited to the inspection of a 
representative sample of the commodity. The selection of the representative sample has to 
be made taking into account the type material dominating degradation mechanism 
environmental stressors etc.  
There are very trivial questions or aspects to be checked during the inspections for example:  
- symptoms of leakages 
- condition of the insulation; 
- condition of painting; 
- condition of surfaces without painting; 
- condition of welding; 
- condition of component at junction point of different materials; 
- condition of bolted joints etc. 
After performing all of the on-site inspections, the findings have to be evaluated and the 
corrective measures have to be identified. The information obtained has to be taken into 
account while reviewing the ageing management programmes and TLAAs. 
7. Ageing management 
Ageing management programmes (AMPs) might be preventive, mitigating of consequences 
of ageing or slowing down the process like the chemistry programmes.  
There are programmes for monitoring of the condition and/or performance of SCs 
assuming that effective measures might be implemented for compensating the ageing effect 
and ensuring the required function.  
The attributes of ageing management programmes are defined by the national regulations 
and the IAEA Safety Guide NS-S-G.12 (IAEA, 2009). All these definitions are similar to each 
other and to the definition given by the NUREG-1801 (US NRC, 2010).  
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According to the flowchart in Fig.10, the plant has to define the scope of its ageing 
management and has to review the adequacy of the existing programmes.  
Plant routine programmes e.g. the in-service inspection programme might be credited as 
adequate for ensuring the safety of the LTO if they can be qualified by the review. 
7.1 Scope of the ageing management 
7.1.1 Generic approach 
Scope of ageing management programmes covers all safety-classified passive, long-lived 
structures and components, which have to perform intended safety function during 
operational lifetime. These are the safety and seismic classified SCs. Those non-safety 
structures and components have to be included into the scope failure of which may 
inhibit/affect the safety functions.  
Depending on the national regulation, the definition of the scope, of ageing management 
may vary. The scope of AMPs can be extended to the components and equipment having 
high operational value too. 
The starting point of the process is the definition of the safety and seismic classified SSCs. 
From that scope the SSCs have to be screened those, which are active and short-lived, i.e. in the 
scope of maintenance and scheduled replacement. The long-lived SCs requiring 
environmental qualification fall also out. The logic of the definition of the final scope of ageing 
management after scoping and screening is shown in Fig.12. Furthermore, and it is not 
indicated in the Fig.12 those SCs have to be also excluded, long-term operation of which will 
be justified via revalidation of TLAAs only. A very similar flowchart is given in (IAEA, 2007).  
 
 
Fig. 12. Flowchart for scoping and screening for ageing management and AM review 
Typical set of SCs within the scope of ageing management are as shown in the Table 1; see 
(Katona et al, 2005) and (Katona et al, 2009b): 
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SCs within the scope of AM 
Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) Pressurizer 
Reactor vessel internals Hydro-accumulators and other SSCs of ECCS 
Reactor vessel supports Pumps valves and piping of safety classes 2 and 3 
Control Rod Driving Mechanisms Emergency diesel-generator 
Reactor cooling system (RCS) Containment isolation valves 
Piping connected to RCS Feed-water piping pumps valves 
Steam generator Safety related heat exchangers 
Main circulating pump  Piping and component supports 
Main gate valves Containment ventilation system 
Table 1. SCs within the scope of ageing management 
The IAEA Safety Guide on ageing management interpret the scope of AM including all 
systems structures and components relevant to safety (IAEA, 2009). Some VVER operating 
countries ageing management deals with both active and passive components and structures. 
7.1.2 Specific features of the VVER-440/213 plants 
First essential peculiarity of VVER-440/213 design is related to the extreme large number of 
safety-classified systems structures and components. In case of Paks NPP, the number of 
SSCs within Safety Classes 1-3 is over hundred thousand because of design features and 
methodology of safety classification.  
The number of passive long-lived of SCs is also very large. After screening out the active 
and short-lived systems from the total safety classified SSCs approximately 38000 
mechanical 6500 electrical and 2000 structural SCs have been identified to be in scope.  
This magnitude of the scope multiplies all the ageing management effort of the plant. 
Methods should be applied for reasonable management of this large scope, e.g. careful 
structuring is required for effective organisation of ageing management and proper IT tools 
have to be developed for support of organisation of ageing management and dealing with 
information related to condition of the SCs (Katona et al, 2008).  
7.2 Structuring of ageing management programmes 
The VVER plants developed different types and system of ageing management programmes 
e.g.: 
1. Plant overall AMP. 
2. AMPs addressing a degradation mechanism. 
3. Structure or component oriented AMP. 
7.2.1 Plant overall AMP 
Plant overall AMP can be developed and implemented for definition of the goals of the 
operating company distribution of the responsibilities and organizational performance and 
policy level activities definition of the structure of the system for ensuring the required plant 
condition, i.e. the implementation of the concept shown in Fig.9. Several VVER operating 
countries have utility or even industry level or umbrella type ageing management 
programmes like Ukraine. The plant level programme has to be deduced from the overall 
one furthermore the unit level programme from the plant level one. The plant overall AMP 
also includes the categorisation of the SCs in accordance to the safety relevance importance 
and complexity. Considering the structuring and organisation of AMPs, graded approach 
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should be applied according to the safety relevance of the given structure or component and 
plant lifetime limiting character of the given ageing mechanisms. 
7.2.2 AMPs addressing a degradation mechanism 
AMPs addressing a particular degradation mechanism are listed in the Table2. 
7.2.3 Structure or component oriented AMP 
Applying the graded approach the SCs can be separated into two categories:  
1. Highly important from safety point of view items with complex features and ageing 
mechanisms;  
2. Items, e.g. pipelines pipe elements valves heat exchangers which have the same type 
safety class identical design features materials operating circumstances dominating 
ageing mechanism could be grouped into commodity groups and for each commodity 
group a designated AMPs should be implemented.  
The highly important SCs like reactor pressure vessel together with internals components of 
main circulating loop (SCs of Safety Class 1 and some SCs of Class 2) can have dedicated 
individual AMPs, which are composed from several programmes, each of them is 
addressing one of the degradation mechanism critical location.  
A structure or component oriented AMP is effective for determining the actual condition of 
specific structure or component or part of a complex SCs (control rod drives) for example: 
a. Reactor pressure vessels 
b. Steam generators 
c. Reactor pressure vessel internals  
d. Pressurizers  
e. Main circulation pipeline 
f. Main coolant pumps  
g. Main gate valves  
There are items, e.g. pipelines pipe elements (elbows T-pieces) valves heat exchangers, 
which can be grouped into commodity groups according to type material working 
environment. The SSC within a group have the same degradation mechanism and about the 
same operational and maintenance history. It is very reasonable to develop specific ageing 
management programmes addressing ageing of commodity groups. The definition of the 
commodity groups is performed applying the attributes given in the Table 3 in all 
reasonable combinations. 
 
AMPs addressing a particular degradation mechanism 
Low-cycle fatigue Thermal ageing 
Irradiation damage Stress corrosion 
Boric acid corrosion  Wear 
Local corrosion General corrosion 
Irradiation assisted stress corrosion  Loosening 
Swelling High-cycle fatigue 
Thermal stratification fatigue Erosion 
Erosion-corrosion Microbiological corrosion 
Water hammer Groundwater corrosion 
Deposition  
Table 2. AMPs addressing a particular degradation mechanism 
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Safety classification Type of SSC Medium Material 
Safety Class 1  
Safety Class 2 
Safety Class 3 
Non-safety class failure of which may 
inhibit intended safety function 
Valve body 
Pump body 
Pipe and pipe 
elements 
Heat exchanger 
Tank 
Borated water 
Prepared water 
River/see water 
Steam gas-steam 
mixture 
Acid or alkali 
Oil other 
Stainless 
steel 
Cast 
stainless 
steel 
Carbon steel 
Table 3. Attributes for the definition of commodity groups 
7.2.4 VVER-440/213 example – AM for civil structures 
The VVER-440/213 design is very much differing from the usual architecture of PWRs. In 
case of Paks NPP practically all building structures at the plant are within the scope. Most of 
these building structures are complex and heterogeneous from the point of view of 
structural design, layout, manufacturing and construction of members, material 
composition and contact with environment (Katona et al, 2009a). In case of Paks NPP it 
would be difficult to adopt the AMPs described in GALL Report (US NRC, 2010) where nine 
groups of building structures seven groups of structural components are defined, and ten 
ageing management programmes cover the whole scope. At Paks NPP, the large number 
and variety of building structures and structural components requires establishment of a 
hierarchical structure of ageing management programmes. The type A programmes have 
been developed for the SCs shown in Table 4. 
 
SCs addressed by A-type AMP 
foundations  reactor support structure  
reinforced concrete structural members  equipment foundations  
steel and reinforced concrete water 
structures  
carbon and stainless steel liners  
prefabricated panels  masonry walls  
earth structures  doors and hatches steel-structures  
cable and pipe supports  paintings and coatings  
penetrations  fire protection structures  
main building settlement  support structures of cabinets  
sealing's and isolation  corrosion in boric acid environment.  
Table 4. SCs addressed by A-type AMP 
These programmes are related to specific structures, i.e. structural commodities or specific 
ageing mechanisms (e.g. building settlement due to soft soil conditions). The control of leak-
tightness of the containment is also an A type programme which is related to the 
containment only. 
The buildings having identified safety functions are composed from structural commodities. 
Using the type A programmes for specific structures (commodities) 30 programmes of type 
B have been composed which covers all plant building structures. These AMPs contain the 
identification of ageing effects and mechanisms to be managed the lists and details of the 
proper application of AMPs of type “A” to be applied while managing the ageing of the 
given building. The “B” type AMP also contains logistical type information since the 
accessibility of certain buildings is limited. 
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7.3 Steps of the development of AMP 
Practically the first step of the procedure of the development of the ageing management 
programme is the scoping-screening presented in Section 7.1 above. In strict sense the AMP 
can be developed in following sequence: 
1. Identification of degradation mechanisms and locations susceptible to ageing 
2. Identification of the mitigation and preventive measures  
3. Identification of the parameters to be controlled 
4. Definition of the method for the detection of ageing effects 
5. Definition of the monitoring trending condition evaluation 
6. Definition of the acceptance criteria 
7. Identification of the corrective actions 
8. Organising the administrative control 
9. Organising the operational experience feedback 
In the reality, the development is some kind of iterative process and steps are overlapping, 
as it will be shown below.  
7.3.1 Identification of ageing mechanisms 
The development of AMPs has to be started with the identification of the ageing 
mechanisms critical locations and effect of the ageing on the intended safety function. In 
case of AMP to be developed for a complex structure or component like reactor or steam 
generator, several mechanisms and critical locations can be identified. The material 
conditions and stressors are considered at this step of the AMP development. Examples for 
the mechanisms are listed in the Table 2.  
In fact, the structuring of the ageing management programmes and the identification of the 
commodities depend form the identification of ageing mechanisms.  
For example, a commodity group can be defined as follows, see Table 3: “Safety Class 3” + 
”Piping and pipe elements” + working in “prepared water” (e.g. feed-water line) + “carbon 
steel”. As per experience, the dominating ageing mechanism of this group is the flow-
accelerated corrosion (FAC), which is a degradation process resulting in wall thinning of 
piping vessels heat exchanger and further equipment made of carbon and low alloy steel. 
This degradation mechanism of the identified commodity group should be addressed by 
proper AMP which can be developed, e.g. via application of COMSY system (Zander, 
Nopper, Roessner, 2007) used by several VVER operators. 
7.3.2 Preventing measures 
The second step of the development of the AMPs is the identification of the means of 
preventing or controlling of the ageing. For example, the corrosion phenomena on the 
internal surfaces can be slowed down via adequate water chemistry parameters. General 
corrosion and soil corrosion may be reduced by coatings and ensuring the undamaged state 
of the coatings. The most effective way of avoiding boric acid corrosion is the timely 
detection and effective termination of leakages onto carbon steel elements, which are the 
subject of walk down inspections.  
7.3.3 Parameters to be controlled 
Identification of the parameters allowing the control of the degradation process is essential 
part of AMP development. Some parameters are indicating the evolution of degradation 
 
Long-Term Operation of VVER Power Plants 
 
183 
directly e.g. the wall thickness of piping. The water chemistry parameters can be used as 
indirect controlling parameters of all internal surface corrosion mechanisms.  
7.3.4 Definition of the method for the detection of ageing effects 
Most of the postulated ageing effects and their occurrence can be detected during the 
execution of the current programs of the plant as follows: 
- Non-destructive testing performed in the frame of in-service inspection programs; 
- Visual inspections performed in the frame of maintenance programs; 
- Visual structural inspections; 
- Walk-down inspections. 
7.3.5 Monitoring trending condition evaluation 
Definition of the methods for monitoring, trending and condition evaluation is the fifth step 
in the development of the AMPs. For example, the monitoring of the trend of fast neutron 
fluence absorption in the critical components of the reactor pressure vessel is one of the 
most important indirect ageing management elements. The monitoring of load cycles 
defined during design and of their parameters belongs to the ageing management of fatigue 
degradation mechanism. The monitoring of the number and growth of crack-indications 
found during material inspections and visual inspections in the frame of in-service 
inspection can be assigned to each local degradation phenomenon. The monitoring and 
trending of the value of wall thickness reduction could be taken into account in the case of 
degradation forms with general material loss. In the case of heat exchangers, the monitoring 
of the number of plugged tubes can be considered also as an ageing management program 
element. 
7.3.6 Acceptance criteria 
The acceptance criteria are expressed as a limit value for the controlled parameter of the 
ageing. The limit value corresponds to the performance or functioning with required 
margin, see Fig.1. Acceptance criteria have to be defined for each component or commodity 
for each degradation mechanism in relation with fulfilment of intended safety function. The 
acceptance criteria can be derived from stress calculations in case of allowable wall thickness 
of piping or fatigue calculation regarding allowable load cycles. The acceptance criteria for 
degradation phenomena entailing decrease of the brittle toughness are determined by the 
relevant TLAA analysis results. The compliance criteria for water chemistry parameters are 
defined in the relevant chemistry instructions. 
7.3.7 Corrective actions 
The damages not complying with the acceptance criterion should be repaired if it is 
possible. In case of fatigue CUF>1.0 appropriate fatigue monitoring focused in-service 
inspection programme can be implemented.  
7.3.8 Administrative control  
The administrative and organisation arrangements have to be defined for the performance 
of ageing management programmes. Appropriate plant procedures have to ensure the 
planning staffing performing documenting and management control of the AMPs. Proper 
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system for documentation and reporting has to be established. Proper quality assurance 
plan has to be also developed for AMPs. 
7.3.9 Operational experience feedback 
A system for the verification of the effectiveness of AMPs and feedback of experience has to 
be in place at plants. In the case of the found damages, the degradation mechanism should 
be identified and then it should be evaluated whether the given degradation mechanism is 
properly managed by the AMPs. 
7.3.10 Crediting the existing plant programmes 
Review of the existing plant programmes can qualify these programmes for adequate for 
ageing management. For example, the following programmes can be classified as AMPs or 
part of AMPs: 
- Preventive and predictive maintenance programme can be considered to be part of 
AMP because it is one of the solutions of ageing mitigation and it is also necessary for 
AM to obtain information on carried out preventive maintenance of SCs 
- In-service inspection programme 
- Functional Testing Programme – for active components if they are in the scope of AM. 
7.4 Review of the AMPs  
The nine generic attributes of an effective ageing management programme against which 
each ageing management programme should be evaluated are see (IAEA, 2009): 
1. Scope of the ageing management programme based on understanding of the ageing 
2. Preventive actions to minimize and control the ageing degradation 
3. Detection of the ageing effects 
4. Monitoring and trending of the ageing effects 
5. Mitigating the ageing effects 
6. Acceptance criteria 
7. Corrective actions 
8. Operating experience feedback and feedback of R&D results 
9. Quality management 
The attributes above are for checking whether all steps for development of AMPs discussed 
above have been done properly and the practical effectiveness of AMPs ensure the intended 
safety functions and LTO goals. 
8. Analyses of ageing processes 
8.1 TLAAs and their role of the in justification for LTO 
Although the wording is sometimes different, the term “time-limited ageing analyses” is 
understood by the VVER operators in a very similar way as it is defined in US NRC Code of 
Federal Regulation 10CFR Part 54 Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for 
Nuclear Power Plants. The role of the review and revalidation of the TLAAs in the 
justification of LTO is also the same as in the international practice.  
The TLAAs are those calculations and analyses that: 
1. Involve systems structures and components within the scope of LTO; 
2. Consider the effects of aging; 
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3. Involve time-limited assumptions defined by the current operating term for example in 
case of VVERs considered 30 years; 
4. Were determined to be relevant by the licensee in making a safety determination; 
5. Involve conclusions or provide the basis for conclusions related to the capability of the 
system structure and component to perform its intended functions; and 
6. Are contained or incorporated by reference in the CLB…” 
Existing TLAAs should be reviewed and revalidated with assumed extended time of plant 
operation. The evaluation of each identified TLAA should justify that the safety function of 
the SC will remain within design safety margins during the period of LTO.  
The plants have to demonstrate either in the frame of the PSR or in the licence renewal 
application that: 
- The analysis remains valid for the period of long-term operation; 
- The analysis has been projected to the end of the period of long-term operation; or 
- The effects of ageing on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the 
period of long-term operation. 
There are three possibilities for validation of the TLAAs: 
- It is possible to extend the validity the TLAAs; 
- It is possible to remove the conservatism used in the TLAA analysis by less 
conservative assumptions and methods for analysis. It practically means to perform a 
new analysis.  
- It is possible to demonstrate that measures will be introduced during the extended 
service life which will control the ageing processes and ensure the intended safety 
function.  
8.2 The scope of the required analyses 
The identified TLAAs cover the usual areas as fatigue calculations assessment of 
embrittlement changes of material properties etc. However, the scope of TLAAs in case of 
some VVERs is differing from the usual one either because of the peculiarities of the design 
or because of national regulation. For example, in case of Paks NPP, the scope of fatigue 
calculations is extended to the Safety Class 1 and 2 piping and components, and the analysis 
of thermal stratification is included. Regarding RPV, besides of PTS analysis, the limits and 
conditions of safe operation, i.e. the p-T curve has to be re-analysed in the frame of 
revalidation of TLAAs.  
8.3 The issue of the TLAAs 
Review and validation of TLAAs is a rather complex task for majority of VVER plants. The 
issue is related to the availability of design base information and incompleteness of the 
delivered design documentation. Often the results of the analyses are known only; in some 
cases, the analyses are presumably obsolete.  
The TLAAs have to be reviewed and verified for most important structures and components 
by control calculations using state-of-the-art methods. In many cases, the analyses have to 
be newly performed in accordance with the recent requirements.  
Development of methodology of TLAA reconstitution and definition of the way of 
adaptation of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section III (ASME BPVC) for a Soviet 
designed plant has been reported in (Katona, Rátkai, Pammer, 2007) and (Katona, Rátkai, 
Pammer, 2011). Hungarian regulations require application of state-of-the-art methods codes 
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and standards while performing the time-limiting ageing analyses. ASME BPVC edition 
2001 had been selected for the reconstitution of TLAAs and associated strength verification. 
The code selection requires understanding of both the Russian (Soviet) design standards 
and the ASME BPVC code. Different studies were performed for ensuring the adequacy of 
ASME BPVC implementation for VVER-440/213.  
Calculations were performed for 50 years extended operational lifetime with additional 
margin of 10 years.  
Comparing the practice of different VVER operating countries probably the most complex 
cases are the Eastern-European VVER-440/213 plants since these plants have to solve the 
issue indicated. The case of Paks NPP Hungary will be discussed below based on the 
(Katona et al, 2010). 
8.3.1 Mechanical components 
For justification of safety of long-term operation, the scope of TLAAs to be reconstructed or 
newly performed covers the Class 1 and 2 mechanical components. Examples of the 
calculations/analyses are as follows: 
Low cycle fatigue analysis for Safety Class 1 and 2 piping and mechanical components: 
ASME BPVC was adapted for the calculations; see (Katona, Rátkai, Pammer, 2011). This task 
also includes identification of needs for fatigue monitoring. Part of the analyses has already 
been performed. This justified the operability of the Class 1 and 2 piping and components 
for 50+10 years.  
There are only a few non-compliances found.  
Most critical ones are the high stresses in the body and sealing block of the main circulating 
pumps. These however could be managed via focused non-destructive examination 
programs.  
Analysis for thermal ageing of Class 1 and 2 components: 
This task focuses on components manufactured from 15Ch2MFA 22K 08Ch18N9TL casted 
stainless steel materials and on welds (Sv04Ch19H11M3 EA400/10T Sv10ChMFT IONI 
13/55), which are sensitive to thermal embrittlement.  
Change of crack propagation resistance due to thermal embrittlement has been evaluated. 
Significant changes of material properties due to thermal embrittlement are expected in case 
of ferrit-pearlit materials or casted stainless steel above 220oC operational temperature.  
Only a few components comply with these conditions at Paks NPP.  
According to fatigue analyses, there are no cases where crack propagation due to fatigue 
might be expected. The analysis performed for the main gate valve casted stainless steel 
body shows that crack propagation should not be expected even if the J-R curve for C8 steel 
is changing due to embrittlement and a crack is postulated.  
Analysis of thermal stratification for Class 1 and 2 pipelines: 
A measuring system was operated at Paks NPP Unit 1 pressurizer surge line in 2000-2001. 
Assessment of measured data shows significant thermal stratification (110oC), which moved 
periodically from the pressurizer to the hot leg. This temperature swing was kept by the 
swing of water level control in the pressurizer during the heat-up and cool-down. During 
normal operation, the temperature differences were decreased to a negligible level.  
A similar temperature monitoring system is operating on both legs of surge line at Unit 3 
since 2007. Evaluation of the measured data and the subsequent fatigue analysis justify the 
long-term operation for the pressurizer surge lines.  
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Other pipelines have also been identified where thermal stratification might be the case, e.g. 
the pipelines connecting the coolant cleaning system No 1 to the primary system the 
pipeline of passive emergency core cooling system the feed water system pipeline and also 
the auxiliary emergency feed water pipelines. Experience gained at other VVER-440/213 
plants (Mochovce and Dukovany NPP) has been taken into account while the pipelines of 
interest have been identified. Implementation of monitoring programs is going on at these 
pipelines with temperature and displacement measurements.  
High cycle fatigue analysis of flow-induced vibration of internal structures of the steam generator 
tubes: 
This analysis shows that the flow-induced vibration of the heat-exchanging tubes does not 
cause significant stresses compared to those due to operational loads. Taking into account 60 
years of operation and 108% of reactor thermal power the CUF is equal to 0.027 due to 
vibration even if a pipe wall thinning of 50% is assumed. 
Analysis of the corrosion of piping wall: 
The question is whether the erosion-corrosion allowance applied in the design provides 
sufficient margin for 50+10 years of operation. The analyses are supported by the data 
obtained from the erosion-corrosion program, which was implemented practically from the 
start of operation of the plant. The measured/observed rate of wall thinning is compared to 
those postulated in the design.  
Few cases are expected only where the existing corrosion-erosion monitoring program using 
COMSY software has to be extended.  
Analysis for material property change of the steam generator tubes: 
The main finding of the study is that the thermal ageing of 08H18N10T material of heat 
exchanging tubes is negligible at operating temperatures ~290oC. Similar results were 
obtained from the destructive testing of piping of RBMK reactors made from the same 
material and working at the same operational temperatures. The material properties 
provided by the manufacturer can be used while selecting the standardized fatigue curves 
for the heat exchanging tubes. Results of laboratory tests show that there is no change in the 
fatigue crack propagation rate due to long-term operation at 288oC; see (NPO Hidropress, 
2007).  
An operational time of 60 years is justified with this respect. 
Crack propagation analysis of detected defects in Class 1 and 2 components: 
The results of the analyses show that the detected defects are not critical from crack 
propagation point of view. The retrospective sampling performed for the RPV analysis does 
not lead to fracture mechanical consequences. The qualification defect sizes of non-
destructive testing are also found adequate. The size of acceptable defects should also be 
reduced in the cases of cracks through cladding and of the longitudinal welds of steam 
generators. In the frame of this task, the embedded cracks in the heat affected zone below 
the RPV cladding, which are caused by inter-granular segregation will be analysed.  
8.3.2 Reactor pressure vessel and internals 
For the justification of operability of RPV and RPV internals for extended operational 
lifetime, the following analyses have to be performed: 
PTS analyses for RPV 
The structural integrity against brittle fracture of the RPV is ensured if the factual ductile-
brittle transition temperature (DBTT) of its critical components is less than the maximum 
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allowable component-specific DBTT. The analysis is based on the comparison of the static 
fracture toughness of the material and stress intensity factor calculated from the given 
loading situation (Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics or LEFM concept).  
Steps of the analysis are as follows: 
- Identification of the critical components of the RPV: These are the parts of RPV belt line 
region (base metal circumferential weld No. 5/6 heat affected zone of the weld 
cladding) as well as the other circumferential welds of the RPV including the nozzle 
region. 
- Selection of the PTS initiating events: Beyond the PTS initiating events selected on the 
basis of engineering judgment (LOCAs, stuck open pressurizer safety or relief valve, 
primary to secondary leakage accidents, etc.) additional transients are also considered if 
the frequency of occurrence is higher than 10-5/a.  
- Thermal-hydraulic calculations: These calculations provide the temperature fields in the 
down-comer distribution of heat transfer coefficient and pressure of reactor coolant as a 
function of time. 
- Calculations of neutron fluences: Based on core configurations implemented so far and 
planned to be implemented in the future calculations using KARATE core design code 
(Kereszturi et al, 2010) and MCNP code (Breismeister, 2000) were performed. End-of-
life fluences (for 50 and 60 operating years) are calculated for the RPV wall as well as 
for the surveillance position. Neutron dosimetry results have been used to verify the 
calculations. 
- Temperature and stress field calculations: Temperature distribution in the RPV wall is 
determined for the analysed transient as a function of the coolant temperature and heat 
transfer coefficient between coolant and wall. Deformation and stress fields occurring 
because of the temperature transient and pressure inside the vessel are determined by 
solving the system of equations of elasticity (and/or plasticity). 
- Fracture mechanics calculations.  
Temperature deformation and stress fields are determined using axial-symmetric and/or 
simplified 3D models with global meshing and without crack; deformation and stress fields 
are determined based on linear deformation theory using linear-elastic material model.  
A full-scope 3D FEM calculation should be used for those cases where the calculation 
outlined above would show that any transient could challenge the RPV integrity. In this case 
the FEM mesh contains a crack model with local meshing; determination of deformation 
and stress fields is based on theory of large deformations using elastic-plastic material 
models and von Mises theory; the stress intensity factor is determined from J-integral based 
on the theory of virtual crack increment.  
Transients with annual frequency ≥10-5/a have been analysed using the LEFM approach. 
For the two most significant transients further analyses have been conducted applying the 
Nonlinear Fracture Mechanics theory (Elastic Plastic Fracture Mechanics) to verify the 
results coming from the LEFM approach. This double check justified the appropriate 
conservatism of the LEFM approach. 
The conclusion of the analyses is that the RPVs at Paks NPP can be safely operated for at 
least 60 years. For the sake of completeness of the studies, some additional analyses are still 
going on regarding for PTS sequences initiated by internal fires flooding and earthquakes 
under shutdown conditions.  
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The neutron fluences also have to be modified taking into account the new fuel design 
introduced after power up-rate. These additional studies are not expected to change the 
conclusion.  
Definition of pressure-temperature (p-T) limit curves of RPV 
The Hungarian Authority issued recently a new guideline to replace the old and quite 
conservative procedure for performing the RPV p-T calculation. The old procedure 
considered the residual stresses with very high safety margin similarly to PTS calculations 
while the new guideline reduces this conservatism according to the present international 
practice. This new guideline will be the basis of calculations performed for the Unit 1 RPV. 
This task is interrelated to the tasks for review and justification of operational limits and 
conditions of the VVER-440/213 units at Paks NPP. 
Analysis of fracture toughness of structures within the reactor pressure vessel 
According to the preliminary results, the irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking and 
void swelling may be of interest. The stud joints fixing the polygon mantle to the core basket 
are the critical structures in case of both ageing mechanisms. The stress corrosion cracks 
might be initiated at the flange between the cap and threaded part of the bolt. The position 
of the cap may indicate the swelling.  
Considering the radiation and temperature the segment No. 18 of the core basket is the most 
demanded. Measures can be identified after visual inspection of the core basket and review 
of inspection procedure.  
The possibility of implementation of non-destructive volumetric test method for the bolts is 
also considered. With respect to the void swelling possibility of implementation of 
ultrasonic measurements as well as gamma heating and a replacement program are being 
investigated.  
8.3.3 Analyses related to operational limits and conditions 
Review of Final Safety Analyses Report and reconstruction of design bases, which has been 
performed at Paks NPP, resulted into recognition of need for justification of operational 
limits and conditions related to certain ageing phenomena via adequate thermo-hydraulic 
stress and fracture mechanics analyses. These analyses have been included into the scope of 
TLAAs required for the justification of long-term operation of Paks NPP. The task also 
includes the justification for modification of the limits and conditions in accordance with 
operational needs allowing rapid temperature changes in certain cases. The temperature 
measurements and the temperature rate control methodology have also been reviewed and 
amended.  
Following analyses have been performed: 
- confirmation of permissible cooling down heating up rates for the primary and 
secondary circuits 
- analyses for confirmation of operational limits and conditions for the operational 
transients. 
Analysis has been performed for the following components: 
- RPV, RPV-head and RPV-flange; 
- Primary side steam generator elements;  
- Secondary side steam generator elements;  
- Main isolating valve; 
- Main circulating pump; 
- Pressurizer tank; 
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- Hydro-accumulators and their valves; 
- Main steam system; 
- Heat removal system. 
The cases analysed are: 
- The Normal Start-up Cycle 
- The Normal Shutdown Cycle 
- The Cycle Start-up from Operational Mode D 
- The Rapid Cool-down Cycle 
- Pressurizer Flow at Start-up  
- The Pressurizer Flow at High Temperature Difference 
- Injection at High Temperature Difference. 
The main findings can be summarized as follows:  
- The calculations performed for the given temperatures temperature rates and processes 
justify the adequacy of the limits and conditions defined by the designer.  
- In case of injection into the pressurizer in accordance with existing limitation on 
temperature, the margin to allowable stress (3Sm) is minimal and the number of 
allowable cycles is rather small (6500) therefore monitoring of cycles shall be 
established.  
- In case of rapid cool-down process a leakage of the inner sealing ring may occur, which 
can be controlled by leakage detection. Since the flanges of MIV are welded together, 
this will not result in leakage to the hermetic compartment.  
- During the rapid cool-down process (70°C/h cooling rate to reach the 150°C state) 
leakage may appear in the collector assemblies of the steam generators. However, the 
rapid cool-down may cause only the loosening of the inner sealing ring of the collector 
assemblies. Therefore, no primary coolant will get over to the secondary side. 
According to existing prescriptions for the control of the heat-up and cool-down rates, the 
temperature has to be measured every minute and averaged over subsequent time-intervals 
of 19 minutes. The rate for the control has to be defined by taking the difference of the actual 
and the previous average temperature values. Compliance with hourly rate limit is ensured 
if the temperature change is less than 6.3°C for heat-up and 9.5°C for cool-down per every 
19 minute interval. The performed analyses show that for certain components it is necessary 
to introduce ten minute averaging intervals with limitations of 33°C and 5°C per ten 
minutes corresponding to the rates of 20°C/hour and 30°C/hour respectively. The 
occasional applicability of the processes in primary system with rates 40°C/h for heat-up 
and 60°C/h for cool-down and for the rate of temperature change in the pressurizer is 
80°C/h have been justified as an amendment to the existing procedures. In these cases, the 
sudden temperature change should be avoided by appropriate temperature control.  
The methodology of calculations was based on the adaptation of ASME BPVC. For the 
calculation of temperature transients in the primary system the RELAP5/mod3.3 code was 
used. Specific thermo-hydraulic model was developed for accident analyses. This model 
consists of detailed model of the primary system the heat removal system and the automatic 
control system and it takes into account the operator’s actions during the heat-up and cool-
down processes. The thermo-hydraulic model and the calculation method have been 
verified via comparison of the calculated transient time histories with the measured ones. 
8.3.4 Containment civil structures and structural components 
Taking into account the specific features of the VVER-440/213 design of civil structures and 
the lack/missing of analyses performed by the designer eight analysis tasks were identified 
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as necessary for the justification of long-term operation of Paks NPP. Necessity of the 
performance of the stress calculations for the validation of the rather sparse information 
available for containment and other safety-classified structures were also recognized. 
Considering their content these calculations are not typical TLAAs. However, without 
sufficient information on the design of civil structures, the newly performed TLAAs would 
not have the design basis.  
The scope includes the following tasks: 
- Analysis of buildings classified into safety category for the verification of the design.  
- Fatigue analysis for the containment penetrations; 
- Fatigue analysis for the hermetic liner of the containment (welding transition welding 
area of anchors);  
- Fatigue analysis for the liner of the spent fuel pool (welding transition welding area of 
anchors);  
- Stress and fatigue analysis for the safety classified crane in the reactor hall with capacity 
of 250/32/2 tons; 
In case of Paks NPP, there are several design-specific TLAAs of the main reactor building 
for example: 
- Fatigue analysis of the containment for increased pressure level during integral leak-
tightness tests; 
- Analysis of main reactor building settlement. 
The allowable leakage value of the VVER-440/213 containment is 14.7 per cent per day at 
the design pressure of 2.5 bars. Each of the containments was tested at this design 
pressure in the start-up phase. The pressure of the yearly leakage tests is 1.2 bar and tests 
at a pressure of 1.7 bars are carried out during the outages. The leakage value for the 
nominal pressure of 2.5 bars is calculated via extrapolation from the leak-rate results of 
tests. This practice has been criticised regarding correctness of the leak-rate extrapolated 
from the measured ones. Therefore, investigations of enhancement of the test pressure 
level has been proposed. Nevertheless, the recent reduced pressure test procedure has 
obvious advantages compared to the tests at enhanced pressure level: the time needed for 
the low-pressure test is short and the load on containment structures is moderate. In the 
on-going analyses the test procedure covers all aspects of interest: Correctness of the leak-
rate defined via testing, the time consumption and the costs of the tests, and the fatigue 
due to cyclic loads are being considered and evaluated. According to the results of leak-
tests, the correct leakage values at the nominal pressure of 2.5 bars can be determined 
from the results of test out at considerably lower pressure values. This statement is based 
on analyses of numerous tests including the results of test carried out at the design 
pressure of 2.5 bars at Unit 2 in 2008.  
Regarding Paks NPP, the analysis of settlement of the main building complex has been 
identified as a TLAA since an excessive inclination of the main building complex due to 
differential settlement may result in non-allowed tilting of the RPV vertical axis, which may 
cause problems with the control rods. Additionally, an excessive inclination can cause 
extreme local loading as well, resulting in degradations of the building. It has to be 
mentioned that the VVER-440/213 type units at Paks NPP have twin-unit-design, i.e. two 
main reactor buildings separated by a dilatation gap are built-up on a common base-mat.  
Detailed settlement control was started during the construction period of Paks NPP. The 
measured results are to be evaluated and reported annually. A prolonged in time 
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consolidation process was observed in case of the main reactor buildings the settlement of 
which is continuing. The phenomenon is related to the seasonal variation of the water level 
of the river Danube, which may reach a value of 9 meters. This variation of the river water 
level influences the ground-water level. According to the data measured in the wells at and 
around the plant site, the ground-water level follows the variation of the water level in the 
Danube with a certain time delay. The water-table fluctuations influence the stress-
deformation conditions in the subsoil. This can explain the successive settlement of the raft 
foundation as measured during the past years. The settlement at Unit 4 is somewhat larger 
than at Units 1-3, which is due to the slight inhomogeneity of the subsoil and the highest 
alteration of the level of the water table occurring near Unit 4.  
Detailed analyses have been performed for the subsidence and differential settlements of the 
main reactor buildings for the end-of-life situation taking into account the static loading 
(immediate settlement) ground-water fluctuation seismic settlement dynamic settlement 
due to machinery and tectonic subsidence. The calculation model and procedure has been 
calibrated to the measured time-history of subsidence. An adequate constitutive model has 
to be defined for the soil, which includes the development of a non-linear hardening model 
and proper definition of the decay curve for cyclic loading due to ground-water fluctuation 
based on soil tests results.  
Regarding the long-term operation, the analyses show that a value of differential settlement 
that may cause non-allowed tilting of the RPV axis due to the inclination of the building 
should not be expected. The structural integrity of the foundation and the containment part 
of the main building structures is not affected by the settlement and it is not expected 
because of further subsidence.  
8.3.5 Basic findings of the revalidation/reconstitution of the TLAAs 
Dedicated ageing management programs already control some of the processes addressed 
by the presented above time-limited ageing analyses, e.g. process of settlement of the main 
building erosion-corrosion of piping wall.  
The results of the above analyses show that only a few non-compliances or lifetime-limiting 
cases have been found and all of them can be managed by the extension/amendment of the 
existing ageing management programs and/or other plant programs.  
For example, regarding RPV and internals the stud joints fixing the polygon mantle to the 
core basket are the critical structures from the point of view of irradiation-assisted stress 
corrosion cracking and void swelling. In order to manage these mechanisms, review and 
extension of the present programs are going on.  
Regarding operational limits and conditions in case of injection into the pressurizer, the 
margin to allowable stresses is minimal and the number of allowable cycles is rather small. 
Consequently, the number of cycles should be monitored. It was also found that during 
certain heat-up and cool-down processes the averaging intervals of the temperature 
measurements have to be modified at certain components.  
With respect to the containment civil structures, the existing ageing management program 
should be extended for managing the change of material properties of heavy concrete 
structures and to the corrosion of steel liner on heavy concrete surface.  
Regarding electrical and I&C components, cases were found where new ageing 
management programs are to be introduced or replacement of the equipment is needed. 
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9. Conclusions 
A complex picture of ensuring and justification of long-term operation of VVER plants is 
given in the Chapter; especially the VVER-440/213 model is discussed in details.  
In VVER operating countries, proper regulatory framework and comprehensive plant 
lifetime management system have been developed for ensuring the safety of long-term 
operation of VVER-440 and VVER-1000 type plants. Detailed studies and already approved 
cases of prolongation of the plant operational lifetime are demonstrating the feasibility of 
long-term operation of VVER plants. 
Generally accepted principles for safety have been followed while developing plant systems 
which ensure that any SSCs will be covered by some of the plant programmes and within 
the frame of LTO Programme all conditions of safe operation will be ensured. Significant for 
safe long-term operation structures systems and components are identified. Proper level of 
understanding of the ageing phenomena is reached and adequate ageing management 
programmes were developed for ensuring the required status and intended function for 
long-term. Revalidation of time-limited ageing analyses also justify the safety of long-term 
operation, which is completed by the monitoring of maintenance on performance criteria 
combined with the maintenance of environmental qualification and 
replacement/reconstruction programmes.  
Best international practice and state-of-the-art methodologies have been applied while 
performing the particular tasks for preparation and justification of long-term operation and 
license renewal. However, as it has been demonstrated any good examples and experiences 
should be adapted in creative way taking into account the design features national 
regulations and existing plant practice.  
This way the strategy of VVER operators to operate safely as long as possible and 
economically reasonable at higher power level will be ensured.  
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A Novel Approach to Spent 
Fuel Pool Decommissioning 
R. L. Demmer  
Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho 
USA  
1. Introduction 
A novel underwater strategy was developed at the INL as an interim action to reduce the 
hazards associated with maintaining excess SFPs containing water, sludge and other debris. 
It is estimated that hundreds of these facilities exist around the world. They present a 
hazard to the environment in that they often leak and may spread contamination. In some 
cases the pools were maintained to prevent airborne contamination risks if the sides become 
dry, or to shield a “bathtub ring＂ (or other debris on the bottom of the pool) of highly 
radioactive material just below the water’s surface. The INL strategy was to vacuum the 
pool, scrub the sides, filter the water and coat the entire pool to reduce the risks associated 
with these hazards. Extending this strategy to the more challenging decommissioning of the 
INTEC-603 pool, with extensive underwater scanning and grouting was a natural 
progression of the hazard reduction actions. 
The underwater coating and cleaning strategy was subsequently found to be of interest in 
the commercial NPP arena for a deactivation project at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station 
Unit 1. This project became a cooperative effort between Exelon and Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL), with shared project planning, equipment, and documentation. The 
approach was to apply the underwater coating process pioneered at INL. It was successfully 
modified and deployed by the Dresden Unit 1 SFP team. 
The Dresden Station Unit 1 is one of the first commercial nuclear reactors commissioned in 
the United States. Unit 1 was placed into commercial operation on August 1, 1960, and 
became the first commercial nuclear power plant built by private industry. It is situated 
approximately 50 miles southwest of Chicago near the confluence of the Des Plaines and 
Kankakee Rivers. It shares this site with two other NPPs, Dresden Units 2 and 3. 
Unit 1 is a General Electric-designed Boiling Water Reactor. It was originally engineered for 
a power output of 630 MWt, and this was later increased to 700 MWt, which generated 210 
MW of electricity. Unit 1 had a history of minor steam leaks and erosion in steam piping. It 
operated until 1978, when it was shut down for retrofitting. Following the Three Mile Island 
incident in 1979, additional regulations were issued, and a decision was made not to restart 
Unit 1. The plant was subsequently licensed to possess radioactive material but not to 
operate and its designation was changed to a SAFSTOR configuration, a Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) interim decommissioning designation. Chemical decontamination of the 
primary system was completed in 1984. According to an NRC report, the remainder of the 
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decommissioning work has been delayed until the other operating units reach the end of 
their lifetime (US NRC, 2005). 
In 2004, a decision was made by Exelon management to reduce the risk of fuel pool leakage 
by cleaning, draining, and coating the SFP. The Unit 1 tritium groundwater monitoring 
program indicated that there may have been leakage from the Unit 1 pools. Since that initial 
indication there has been no further signs of any significant leakage, and the tritium 
monitoring will continue to be used to provide indication of any possible leakage until all 
the water is drained from the pools. Recent incidents of SFP leakage, particularly at the 
Indian Point and Connecticut Yankee NPPs, underscore the necessity of this concern. In the 
spring of 2004, a conceptual plan was developed to remove the water, process it in the water 
treatment facility for Units 2 and 3, seal the basin, and thus reduce the SFP leakage risk and 
maintenance requirements. 
Exelon contacted INL because of their newly developed method of successful SFP 
decommissioning. INL is a Department of Energy (DOE)-owned, contractor-operated 
nuclear energy development laboratory located 45 miles west of Idaho Falls, Idaho. During 
50 years of nuclear research, INL built several SFPs, four of which were scheduled for 
decommissioning by 2004. These included the Test Area North (TAN) 607 Pool, the 
Materials Test Reactor (MTR) 603 Canal, the Power Burst Facility (PBF) 620 Canal, and the 
Idaho Nuclear Technology Engineering Center (INTEC) 603 Overflow Pit. Decommissioning 
the large TAN-607 SFP was completed ahead of schedule and for less cost than using 
traditional practices. The size and condition of the INL pools are shown in Table 1 
(Whitmill, 2003). 
 
Pool 
Designation 
Volume Dimensions Average Water 
Contamination 
TAN 607 2,948,400 l 14.6 x 21.3 x 7.3 m deep 1E-3 uCi/L 
MTR 603 446,040 l 33.5 x 2.4 x 5.5 m deep 4E-2 uCi/L 
PBF 620 94,500 l 2.4 x 4.9 x 6.1 m deep 1E-3 uCi/L 
INTEC 603 
(Overflow Pit) 
43,470 l 1.8 x 2.4 x 5.2 m deep 4E-2 uCi/L 
Table 1. INL Spent Fuel Pools Completing Underwater Clean and Coat Processes. 
2. The INL approach 
Cleaning and coating an SFP using the underwater coating process requires extensive 
environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) documentation and engineering efforts. The set of 
procedures, permits, and safety analyses for the TAN-607 SFP fills four large binders. 
Members of INL management reviewed these preparations and procedures during an 
assessment prior to commencing the fieldwork. An underwater team with nuclear reactor 
experience, Underwater Engineering Services (UES), was contracted to perform the cleaning 
and coating work, as shown in Figure 1. Emergency procedures were well-documented and 
reviewed in a pre-job briefing each workday, and work was coordinated through the facility 
management. During each shift of underwater diving, an INL senior management 
representative supervised the contractor’s conformance with the safety procedures. 
 One major component of INL’s preparation was to develop an “As-Low-As-Reasonably-
Achievable” (ALARA) package. Due to the highly-radioactive nature of certain portions of 
the TAN-607 pool, the work processes and procedures were scrutinized to meet the tightest 
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level of radiological control. Essentially no portion of the work was left to chance in terms of 
potential skin contamination or overt radiation exposure. This was integrated with the 
training and experience of the underwater diver’s program. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Diver at INL completing entry into basin for underwater cleaning and coating. 
The INL tested 14 different epoxy-based coatings to determine their conformance to SFP 
requirements (Tripp, 2004). The following criteria were used to evaluate the coatings: 
 Ease of application 
 Strong adhesion to carbon steel, brick, concrete block, and stainless steel 
 No negative effect on water quality 
 No hazardous residues left behind 
 Proven in other underwater applications 
 High cross-link density and pigment to withstand radiation and contamination 
penetration. 
The ease of application was addressed in terms of moderate, but not excessive, viscosity, 
application thickness, and pot life (pot life is the amount of time a catalyzed coating may be 
used prior to solidifying). These types of coatings are used in naval applications for 
recoating ship hulls underwater. UES had previously made applications of one particular 
underwater epoxy coating in which they had high confidence. A test of that type of coating, 
UT-15 Underwater Epoxy, manufactured by Picco Coatings Co., determined that it was 
within the acceptable range of requirements for this work. 
Fieldwork commenced in the TAN-607 SFP in the spring of 2003. This pool was the largest 
at INL to be decommissioned in this series. A larger pool, the INTEC-603 main pool (north 
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middle and south basins) has also been deactivated with a modified underwater approach 
discussed later in this report. The TAN-607 SFP was viewed as a significant but manageable 
challenge with application to future larger projects. The TAN-607 SFP had been used for 
storage of a number of different nuclear fuels, the most notable being the damaged Three 
Mile Island fuel and core debris, which, consequently, led to increased contamination levels 
in the pool. 
The radiological contamination and exposure controls were managed on a real-time basis. 
While each section of the SFP had been extensively surveyed using remotely-reporting, 
submersible, extended-reach AMP-100 radiation probes manufactured by Arrow-Tech Inc., 
each shift of divers also visually surveyed their work area prior to beginning work. Each 
diver was outfitted with five redundant, remotely-reporting dosimeters multiplexed to the 
DMC 2000S, manufactured by Merlin Gerin Co. These instruments were integrated into the 
“dive station” laptop computer that monitored divers’ dive times. If two of the dosimeter 
units failed, or if dose readings exceeded the 500 mR/hr alarm set point, the diver was 
required to move to a lower dose area. Industrial guidelines of three-hour dives were 
maintained; work below 12.2 m could not exceed 1.5 hours. A team of assistants dressed in 
anti-contamination clothing and a partially-suited substitute diver were maintained at the 
entrance to the dive at all times. 
The divers averaged 5-8 mR radiation dose per dive and completed 255 dives prior to the 
only incidence of skin contamination (out of a total of 411 dives for 1673 dive hours on all 
four basins). In preparation for the dives, foreign objects and as much of the sludge as 
possible were removed from the pool. This action, along with the shielding properties of the 
water and the heavy rubber dive suit, resulted in lower radiation doses. Debris removal was 
first attempted using long-reach extension poles, buckets on tethers, and/or placing highly-
radioactive objects in shielded casks. During a pre-job survey of one section in the TAN-607 
basin, a highly-radioactive nut reading 90 R/hr, probably debris from the Three-Mile Island 
accident, was discovered in the area. Work was stopped until a plan could be formulated to 
remove the item. It was retrieved using 2  m long tongs and placed in a stainless-steel 
bucket. Work continued after this incident with a renewed emphasis on the pre-job surveys. 
The process of cleaning and coating the TAN-607 SFP began with treating and cleaning the 
water. UES provided a multi-purpose underwater filter/pump system, manufactured by 
Prosser, Co., 9-50134-03X. The water was then treated with a calcium hypochlorite to 
precipitate soluble contaminants. This was not particularly successful because the water 
turned an opaque brown and required several days of filtration prior to diver reentry. After 
cleaning the water, a hydraulic hull-scrubber device, like those used to clean boat hulls, was 
used to clean the pool walls. A large number of paint blisters were found as the wall 
scrubbing progressed. Every blister required additional scrubbing with a hard-bristle steel-
wire brush, thus slowing the cleaning and coating process significantly. The next step was to 
vacuum the floor of the pool. The multi-purpose filtration system was used for this as well. 
A special type of paint roller system was used for underwater application of the epoxy 
coating, which is shown being applied underwater in Figure 2. The system had two separate 
pumps for the epoxy resin and hardener, which were pumped through separate hoses to a 
mixing manifold about 1.5 m from the roller. The roller/extruder system was flexible up to 
that point, and like a solid wand from there to the roller head.  
The first half-hour dive provided several important indications that a successful project was 
underway. A splash curtain was installed along the area where the diver entered and exited 
the water, and the wipe down and doffing took place within this area. The diver was rinsed 
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off as he exited the pool, and then dried off completely with disposable wipes prior to 
doffing. 
Unexpectedly high dose rates were encountered in two work evolutions. One occurred 
when a particle became lodged in the ridges of the vacuuming hose that the diver used to 
clean the bottom. A smooth hose was then substituted so that it would be less likely that 
particles would become lodged in the hose. On a second occasion, the knee areas of the 
diver became highly contaminated from kneeling in debris on the pool floor. To facilitate 
removal of this contamination in subsequent dives, the knees and shoes of the diver were 
covered with duct tape in such a manner that the tape could be easily removed prior to the 
divers leaving the basin. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Special two hose roller system used for wall coating at the MTR pool. 
Another unexpected problem was instrumentation malfunction in the wet and high-
vibration conditions typical during this project. Condensation occurred within some of the 
radiation detection equipment, particularly the multiplexers. Opening the covers of the 
dosimeters and letting them dry overnight solved this condensation problem. Some of the 
wires on the electronic dosimeters were fragile and did not stand up well to the vibration 
and manipulation of the divers. To address this failure potential, the connection points for 
the dosimeters were reinforced with electrical tape at the clamp areas, and all the connectors 
were tightened regularly. 
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Overall, the TAN-607 SFP project was highly successful and reduced personnel exposure, 
project length, and cost from the baseline case. It was projected that the radiation exposure 
to divers cleaning the pool would be 1056 mR; the actual exposure was only 744 mR. The 
highest dose to any diver was 196 mR, which was well below that anticipated for even a 
conventional, non-diver baseline approach. Exposure for the support personnel was 
projected at 200 mR, and was actually only 80 mR. Campbell has shown that the integrated 
basin deactivation project’s scheduled duration (6 months for all four basins, about 5200 
worker hours) was reduced by 1.5 months (1200 hours) and the cost by $200,000 from the 
$1.9M baseline estimate (Campbell, 2004). 
3. In-situ deactivation of spent fuel pools 
Following the INL SFP coating, cleaning and water removal projects, the basins were 
stabilized with backfill (soil, gravel or grout). This strategy was performed within the 
hazardous waste laws of Idaho as an interim action protective of health and the 
environment. The low strength grout used at the INL provides the capability of future 
removal if that were required. Similar strategies performed at other DOE sites are described 
as In-situ Deactivation (or decommissioning) or ISD. For those other nuclear facilities this 
strategy is considered a permanent end state (Langton, 2010, Brown, 1992), like entombment 
of a facility. While the INTEC-603 43,470 l Overflow Pit was briefly described in the 
previous section of this report as a clean and coat action, the larger INTEC-603 (north, 
middle and south basins, 4,900,000 l) provides an example of the whole basin stabilization 
process using grout rather than epoxy coating. 
There were three phases in deactivating the INTEC-603 SFP.  These phases are: 1) Residual 
cleanout, 2) Validation and 3) Stabilization of remaining contamination. Each of these 
phases can be very difficult, time consuming and take several years to complete. In the 
residual cleanout phase, all the spent fuel is removed, equipment is removed and the sludge 
is removed. The second phase, the validation phase, involves the thorough investigation of 
the basin to determine that no nuclear fuel remains.  This phase also may include extensive 
sampling and characterization of residual materials for waste disposal. The last phase, 
stabilization, involves the addition of grout (or another structural material) that prevents 
intrusion and subsidence.  These phases are not rigid and may be revisited over the course 
of the project. 
Residual cleanout can be a very lengthy and difficult stage of the project.  Ideally this stage 
would be part of the operational or (timely) post-operational function of the pool.  If 
consistency with the operation of the pool can be established, it is more likely that trained 
operators, somewhat knowledgeable about the types of materials that have been used, will 
be available to identify and remove the items.  It is important to stress the continuity of 
using operators that were trained during the productive life of the pool.  They are a ready 
source of information and skills that will serve the cleanout and deactivation project.  This 
aids the residual cleanout, especially the removal of all spent nuclear fuel or other highly 
radioactive materials; certainly a priority step in deactivating the pool. 
The INTEC-603 pool required an extensive and challenging residual cleanout phase 
performed well after the post-operational cleanout. At the other INL SFPs the cleanout 
performed during deactivation was essentially framed within the coating effort.  For the 
INTEC-603 pool the residual cleanout phase was quite extensive and was a project in itself.  
This pool had a larger accumulation of sludge (some 50,000 kg) and debris that was several 
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inches deep. Because the waste was known to contain hazardous constituents (cadmium 
and lead) a treatability study was performed to determine methods to treat the waste within 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations; the treatment required an 
engineered grout to encapsulate and stabilize the sludge for disposal. As at other DOE sites, 
the presence of small bits of residual spent fuel must be taken into account.  Thus, a difficult 
problem of underwater removal and RCRA treatment of highly radioactive sludge becomes 
even more challenging because of the concern for nuclear criticality. 
A system was engineered to remove and treat the sludge in an efficient method that 
satisfied all the regulatory and safety concerns.  A similar sludge cleanout campaign was 
performed some 20 years prior and a great deal of the technical basis from that previous 
work was employed during the engineering phase. Essentially the cleanout system was 
composed of a high-integrity container (HIC) where the sludge was pumped, a integral 
sacrificial stirring system used to mix the grout in the HIC, and a filtration system in the 
HIC that separated and returned the water to the basin without the sludge (Croson, 2007). A 
similar system was used on the Dresden project and is detailed in a following section. Other 
basin cleanout campaigns had removed and repackaged the spent fuel and removed the fuel 
storage racks and other in-pool facility equipment at INTEC-603.   
The validation phase during the INTEC-603 pool project occurred in parallel with some 
portions of the cleanout phase.  After the racks and equipment were removed, an extensive 
examination using very sophisticated gamma scanning equipment was employed to map 
the location and character of the sludge at INTEC-603.  In previous INL pools the diver  
simply surveyed the work area using a remotely reporting instrument prior to starting work 
each shift. At the Dresden project, the small Remote Underwater Characterization System 
(RUCS) assisted in the validation role prior to diver entry and cleanup. At the INTEC pool 
the Multi Detector Basin Scanning Array (Figure 3) was employed as the survey tool. This 
scanning array is composed of three sections containing gamma detection instruments and 
is specifically designed to be used with the INTEC-603 crane system and to traverse 
channels in the pool floor.  Since the overall residual cleanout is not complete until the 
sludge is removed, the validation phase was performed after equipment removal but prior 
to sludge removal. 
In the stabilization phase the  grout development, delivery and pool water removal aspects of 
the INTEC-603 project were revealed. A special grout was formulated with admixtures to have 
high flowability, cure underwater, be self-leveling and maintain a (low) 1724 kPa strength. 
After extensive laboratory testing, the grout was prepared on-site in a batch plant and pumped 
into the basin using 10 cm hoses. Grout was directed into the center of the basin and allowed 
to flow to the outside.  As the grout was injected into the basin, the displaced water was 
filtered and pumped to the Idaho CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF), a large waste water 
evaporation pond maintained at the INTEC facility. Grout lifts were generally about 60 cm 
thick, with different sections of the pool (north middle and south) receiving lifts on different 
days allowing curing of the different sections for at least one day. 
4. Deactivating the Dresden Unit 1 SFP 
The decommissioning of Unit 1 actually began more than 25 years prior to the SFP 
campaign. In 1978, reactor operations were suspended and defueling took place. In 2002, the 
fuel and fuel pool equipment, such as the racks and accessories, were removed. Some 
cleaning had been performed in the SFP, but no campaign had been waged to completely 
gut the pool. When the racks were removed, they were cut off at floor level leaving 
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protrusions as high as 10 cm. The water quality had deteriorated significantly, and there 
was no longer any appreciable visibility below the water line. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Multi Detector Basin Scanning Array for INTEC-603. 
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The Unit 1 team was planning a cleanup of the SFP using long-handle tools and coating the 
pool as the water was lowered. This is a conventional method of SFP cleanup, but poses 
some concerns. The primary concern was the potential for high airborne contamination by 
allowing contaminated poolsides to be exposed during the draindown. Another concern 
was the length of time involved in slowly removing water and treating the walls. The 
disposal of water had to be scheduled with the operating unit’s 2/3 treatment system. 
Theavailability of the 2/3 system could not be assured over wide periods of time, but could 
be used on an available space and time campaign basis. 
The INL underwater coating process was attractive to the Unit 1 team for a number of 
reasons. First, INL had no airborne contamination problems during the SFP coating projects. 
Second, with the underwater coating process, there is little concern about scheduling for 
draining away the pool water; the water can be taken away at any time after the cleaning 
and coating are completed without impacting the operating unit or the decommissioning 
schedule. No strain injuries occurred during the INL decommissioning projects while the 
extensive use of long-handled, underwater tools to clean and paint the pool had a high risk 
of these injuries. Using divers allows more successful cleaning of the pool bottom and closer 
cutting of pool equipment. Previously, cutting was accomplished using long-handled 
cutting tools that left 10 cm rack stubs. Naturally, the reduced schedule, cost, and radiation 
dose shown in the TAN-607 SFP project was an advantage. 
The Dresden Unit 1 SFP was designed with distinct portions that have different depths, 
functions, and kinds of equipment. The SFP is “L” shaped with the main body composed of 
two separate pools—the storage pool and the transfer area. The storage pool is 6.1 x 7.6 x 7.9 
m deep and the transfer area is 6.1 x 7.6 x 13.6 m deep. The storage pool had contained 
spent-fuel racks that had been bolted to the floor, but were previously removed. In the 
transfer area, fuel could be examined and packaged, and maintenance could be performed 
on reactor components. These two pools were connected with a gateway that could be 
closed between them. The transfer area was connected to the reactor compartment by a 2.1 x 
4.6 x 18 m transfer channel. 
Preparations for the underwater coating process began after Exelon management had 
reviewed decommissioning options. The underwater coating process is not intuitively safer 
industrially and radiologically, but is proven by INL to be safer statistically. An 
independent dive contractor, Underwater Construction Company (UCC), was contracted as 
a preferred provider in the Exelon nuclear system and was tasked with underwater coating 
process. UCC had performed similar types of nuclear jobs involving coatings at reactors. 
An underwater survey of the SFP was also a key initial activity. The pool condition and 
remaining items in the pool were documented from previous cleaning efforts, but a current 
survey and up-to-date pictures or video were not available. INL provided an operator and 
the RUCS which is essentially a small, tethered submersible tool to provide video and 
radiation dose measurements. Although the RUCS system was not a calibrated Exelon unit, 
its dose measurements were adequate for development of the ALARA plan. The RUCS 
showed that the floor had general dose readings of 2-3 Rem/hr, with hot spots up to 11 
Rem/hr, but that the general pool dose was less than 10 mR/hr. The in-depth survey also 
identified additional items in the pool not previously visible from above. 
The Dresden Unit 1 SFP project proceeded in a series of tasks that took more than a year to 
complete. Table II shows the tasks and associated schedule required to perform this work. 
Each task is not discussed in detail, but some of the more interesting activities are examined. 
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The overall project took considerably longer than expected, primarily because of the 
resource drain caused by scheduled work on other Exelon reactors. Work on operating 
reactors always took precedence over decommissioning work. This was principally 
manifested in the non-availability of Radiation and Contamination Technicians (RCTs). 
Thus, decontamination tasks that were expected to take a few months lasted an entire year. 
The most extensive activity involved in the underwater coating process was the water 
cleanup task. The water in the SFP required treatment for two main reasons: first, there was 
a considerable amount of algae on the surface, and second, the general water condition was 
moderately contaminated. The bottom was not visible, and the sides of the pool were 
essentially invisible below the algae layer. Since visual contact with the diver was required 
at all times, no diver work could start until the water was treated and visibility was 
adequately restored. There were other reasons to maintain as much cleanliness in the water 
as possible as well. Beyond the need for visual contact, higher cleanliness contributed to 
lower radiation doses and contamination on the diver’s suit. This made the job of avoiding 
skin contamination much easier. Cleaning the water also permitted the water to meet the 
2/3 system requirements without further remedial treatment. 
The process of cleaning the water required a considerable amount of technology. A 
specialist in the field, Duratek Inc., was contracted to achieve and maintain water quality. 
The first step was to “shock” the water with the addition of 10 to15 parts-per-million (ppm) 
hydrogen peroxide. The hydrogen peroxide primarily served to kill the algae and bacteria. 
After the initial injection of the peroxide, the water turned dark brown and remained this 
color for several weeks. The peroxide injection system allowed the use of ultraviolet light 
and ion-exchange after a few days, once the algae were destroyed. 
A system known as the UFV-100 “Tri-Nuc” Filter System, manufactured by Tri-Nuclear 
Corporation, was placed in the pool to maintain long-term water quality. The Tri-Nuc is a 
canister-type, shielded filter about 0.8 m. long and 18 cm in diameter. It is an easily-
maintained, self-contained system with a submersible pump. After the peroxide injection 
and three weeks of Tri-Nuc filter operation, the pool water became clear and maintained 
clarity throughout the project. Over the course of the project, 50 of the Tri-Nuc filters were 
used. A skimmer system was added to the Tri-Nuc to clear floating algae debris. The 
underwater diving contractor provided a separate vacuum/filtering system consisting of a 
pump and eight-38 cm filters on a manifold (see Figure 3). Though this system helped to 
maintain water clarity, its primary purpose was to contain the paint chips and floor debris. 
A “rock catcher” screen was used on the UCC system to prevent larger particles from going 
through the pump. 
Following the filtration and water treatment tasks, the wall and floor surfaces were cleaned 
and prepared. At the start of each work shift, the work area was surveyed using an 
underwater dosimeter. The floor surface was thoroughly vacuumed using the UCC 
vacuuming system. The stubs left from previous fuel rack removal were cut with a plasma 
torch. These were removed along with other small debris so that the floor area was basically 
clean and free of obstruction. While the walls of the INL SFPs were cleaned using the hull 
scrubber, the Unit 1 walls were cleaned using hydrolasing. Hydrolasing uses high-pressure 
water recycled into the pool to blast off grime and loose paint. If the paint came off or 
blistered paint was present, the areas were cleaned with a 3M Scotch-Brite® pad prior to 
recoating. 
Several devices were used to afford easier pool access, greater visibility, and reliable diver 
communication. A portable scaffolding device, much like a window cleaner’s or painter’s 
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work platform, was used in the wall-cleaning and coating. It was easily raised or lowered to 
different work levels. Underwater lights were used to provide the divers with better 
visibility, and inexpensive underwater cameras were employed by the engineers to 
supervise progress. Voice communication devices were installed in the divers’ helmets. 
Additionally, each suit was pressure-tested for leaks and thoroughly surveyed for 
contamination prior to each dive. 
 
 
Fig. 4. UCC vacuuming filtration system underwater manifold.  
The pool and cleanup equipment required some on-site modification during the course of 
the project. A large water heater was used to raise the water temperature from about 15 to 
21°C. This enabled more comfortable diving and ensured that the pool walls were at an 
appropriate temperature for proper coating adhesion. The paint flow through the system 
was initially slow and somewhat inefficient, so a heated “trace” line was added to the single 
delivery hose lines and the paint was reformulated to achieve a lower viscosity. The most 
serious problem was that the mixing lines were too far from the paint roller head. The paint 
began solidifying before it reached the roller because of the long mixing time while the resin 
and hardener traveled through the hose, so the mix point was moved to within 1.2 m of the 
paint roller head. Heavy, stainless-steel buckets were used to transport floor debris, like 
nuts, bolts, and pieces of basin equipment. A long-reach pickup device was fabricated from 
a pair of Vice-Grips. This tool, like the long-handled tongs used at INL, was invaluable for 
moving radioactive items. 
During previous cleanout activities, two large fuel transfer fixtures had not been removed 
from the lower level of the transfer channel. These fixtures, called “elephant’s feet,” 
resembled large, inverted flower pots about 1 m in diameter and 2.1 m tall. The project 
engineers were uncertain whether to cut the elephant feet up and remove them, or to 
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decommission them in place and simply paint them. The final decision was to cut and 
remove them, thereby completely cleaning the SFP and leaving fewer future liabilities. 
Normal dive duration was about three hours with two divers in the water at any one time. 
Two dive shifts were typically performed during a workday. Divers first cleaned and coated 
the top 3 m of the entire fuel pool, and then the pool was drained down to that level. This 
allowed the areas below 12.2 m to be cleaned with the regular three-hour dive limitation 
instead of a reduced 1.5 hour limit for dives below 12.2 m. While highly-contaminated items 
were found in the SFP (1 to 50 Rem/hr), the working dose for the divers was 1 to 50 mr/hr 
due to the shielding properties of the water. 
Several different types of waste were generated during the SFP project. Two types of filter 
wastes were generated: Class A waste (Tri-Nuc filters) and Class C waste (underwater 
vacuuming filters). All filters were removed from their respective systems, allowed to drain 
above the pool, and air-dried. The 50 Tri-Nuc filters were placed in on-site storage. Eighty 
vacuuming filters were shipped off-site and compacted. Two buckets of miscellaneous parts 
and equipment were collected from the floor. Special radiological instructions were 
prepared to facilitate removing those items from the pool. One highly radioactive item was 
an in-core fission chamber detector reading about 70 Rad/hr. This item contained a small 
amount of special nuclear material and had to be handled and accounted for separately. A 
200 l barrel of general dirt, corrosion products, and paint chips was also collected from the 
vacuuming screens. All of the solid debris was air-dried, packaged as Class A waste, and 
held for future disposal. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Task schedule for the Dresden Unit 1 SFP Underwater Coating Process. 
The project was successful, with less overall worker time and exposure. No significant safety 
incidents were encountered. The project was estimated to require 14,065 hours to complete, 
with a 22 Rem dose total. The actual number of hours needed was 10,186, with only a 3.59 
Rem dose total. There were 281 dives completed with no skin contamination incidents. The 
water treatment systems were successful at cleaning the SFP water from out-of-specification 
levels of contaminants, algae, and bacteria to within processing requirements for the Unit’s 
2/3 systems. 
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5. Lessons learned 
During the SFP deactivation projects (INL and Dresden Unit 1), a number of lessons were 
learned, the most significant of which are listed below: 
 Nuclear trained divers must be used for these projects. There is no substitute for trained 
and experienced divers. They know the proper contamination control processes for this 
kind of project and are most effective for difficult operations. These trained individuals 
will be the key operating personnel when the work goes forward. 
 High-quality water treatment systems are required to attain and maintain water clarity 
and low contamination. This is essential to diver productivity and contamination-free 
operations. 
 In both the TAN and Dresden pools the water turned brown after initial treatment, 
probably from high mineral and algae content. High concentrations of minerals and 
algae are common with old spent fuel basins, especially if they have not been under 
water treatment regimes pending decommissioning. Preparations should be made early 
to filter the residual mineral/algae that may come from initial water treatment (like 
chemical “shock” treatments).  
 Unusual and unexpected objects (probably highly contaminated) are likely to be found 
in SFPs. Work areas should be surveyed periodically using the waterproof dosimeters. 
Some flexibility with special procedures and extended reach tools should be planned 
into the work. Simple tools like inexpensive underwater cameras and Vice-Grips can be 
effectively employed. 
 Maximizing the use of “off-the shelf” items (such as scaffolding, waterproof lights and 
cameras and even the marine hull scrubber) reduced the cost of special design and 
fabrication for some equipment  
 Coating areas with loose or blistered paint will significantly slow the project and 
consume much more of the coating resources. During the INL SFP decommissioning 
project, the delays were significant, and as much as 50% more paint was required due to 
blistered paint. 
 The RCTs and support personnel should remain consistent over the project. The most 
capable personnel should be chosen to monitor, clean, and check equipment, and then 
should be left in place as a dedicated team. 
 Epoxy coatings may have complicated application requirements. Ensure that the 
manufacturer has optimized viscosity for roller application and that temperature 
requirements are met. Use a two-hose application system if possible. 
 After about two years of service, the coating at Dresden became loose in some wall 
areas. This may point to a lack of “profile” in preparing the wall using a hydrolaser. 
This did not happen using the hull scrubber at INL. It is recommended that an abrasive 
technique, like the hull scrubber, be employed in surface cleaning. 
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Coolant in EBR-II Using Carbonation 
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1. Introduction 
The Experimental Breeder Reactor Two (EBR-II) was an unmoderated, heterogeneous, 
sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor operated by Argonne National Laboratory – West, now 
part of the Idaho National Laboratory in southeastern Idaho, USA. It was a pool-type 
reactor. The reactor core, sodium fluid pumps, and intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) were 
submerged in a tank of molten sodium, and the exchange of heat from the core was 
accomplished by pumping molten sodium from the pool through the reactor core, IHX, then 
back into the pool. Thermal energy from the pool was transmitted in the IHX to a secondary 
sodium loop, which in turn was used to heat high-pressure steam for electricity production. 
When it operated, the nominal power output of the reactor was 62.5 MW thermal and 
approximately 20 MW electrical. The reactor began operation in 1964 and operated until 
final reactor shutdown in 1994. During its lifetime, the reactor served as a test facility for 
fuels development, hardware validation, materials irradiation, and system and control 
theory testing.  
From 1994 through 2002, the reactor was de-fueled, systems not essential to reactor or 
facility safety were deactivated or removed, and the primary and secondary sodium systems 
were drained of sodium metal. During operation, the sodium pool contained approximately 
3.4 x 105 liters of molten sodium, and the secondary sodium system contained 4.9 x 104 liters. 
After draining these systems, some sodium metal remained behind in hydraulic low spots 
and as a coating on exposed surfaces. It is estimated that the EBR-II primary tank contained 
approximately 1100 liters, and the EBR-II secondary sodium system retained approximately 
400 liters of sodium metal after being drained. The sodium metal remaining in these systems 
after the coolant was drained is referred to as residual sodium.  
At the end of 2002, the EBR-II facility became a U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) permitted site, and the RCRA permit1 compelled further treatment of the 
residual sodium in order to convert it into a less reactive chemical form and remove the by-
products from the facility, so that a state of RCRA "closure" for the facility may be achieved 
(42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k, 2002).  
                                                 
1 Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA)/RCRA Partial Permit, EBR-II, EPA ID No. ID489000892, 
effective December 10, 2002 (Part B). 
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In response to this regulatory driver, and in recognition of project budgetary and safety 
constraints, it was decided to treat the residual sodium in the EBR-II primary and secondary 
sodium systems using a process known as "carbonation." In early EBR-II post-operation 
documentation, this process is also called "passivation." In the carbonation process 
(Sherman and Henslee, 2005), the system containing residual sodium is flushed with 
humidified carbon dioxide (CO2). The water vapor in the flush gas reacts with residual 
sodium to form sodium hydroxide (NaOH), and the CO2 in the flush gas reacts with the 
newly formed NaOH to make sodium bicarbonate (NaHCO3). Hydrogen gas (H2) is 
produced as a by-product. The chemical reactions occur at the exposed surface of the 
residual sodium. The NaHCO3 layer that forms is porous, and humidified carbon dioxide 
can penetrate the NaHCO3 layer to continue reacting residual sodium underneath. The rate 
of reaction is controlled by the thickness of the NaHCO3 surface layer, the moisture input 
rate, and the residual sodium exposed surface area.  
At the end of carbonation, approximately 780 liters of residual sodium in the EBR-II primary 
tank (~70% of original inventory), and just under 190 liters of residual sodium in the EBR-II 
secondary sodium system (~50% of original inventory), were converted into NaHCO3. No 
bare surfaces of residual sodium remained after treatment, and all remaining residual 
sodium deposits are covered by a layer of NaHCO3. From a safety standpoint, the inventory 
of residual sodium in these systems was greatly reduced by using the carbonation process. 
From a regulatory standpoint, the process was not able to achieve deactivation of all 
residual sodium, and other more aggressive measures will be needed if the remaining 
residual sodium must also be deactivated to meet the requirements of the existing 
environmental permit.  
This chapter provides a project history and technical summary of the carbonation of EBR-II 
residual sodium. Options for future treatment are also discussed.  
The information collected during the EBR-II post-treatment operation provides guideposts for 
engineers who must design future sodium-cooled reactors, or who are tasked with cleaning up 
shutdown sodium-cooled reactor systems. The single, most important lesson to be imparted to 
the designers of new sodium-cooled reactor systems is this: design systems so that they can be 
drained effectively at all points, and avoid the creation of hydraulic low spots and "dead ends" 
that are inaccessible. Observation of this lesson in future designs will minimize the number 
and size of residual sodium pockets upon drainage of the sodium coolant and increase the 
effectiveness of any clean-up method, including carbonation. In addition, post-operation clean-
up of new sodium-cooled reactor systems will be safer, faster, and less costly.  
Lessons may also be drawn from this work for those who wish to react or remove residual 
sodium from non-nuclear systems such as coolant pipelines, tanks, and drums. The 
carbonation method is generally applicable to such systems, and is not specific to nuclear 
reactors.  
2. Residual sodium inventory determination 
The EBR-II Primary Sodium System consisted of components in the EBR-II Primary Tank 
and supporting systems that came in contact with the primary sodium coolant (i.e., argon 
cover gas clean-up system, sodium vapor traps). Figure 1 shows a schematic of the EBR-II 
Primary Tank, which includes the reactor core. The black arrows in Figure 1 show the flow 
path for sodium coolant from the pool through the reactor core and back to the pool. A 
detailed description of EBR-II systems and components may be found in Koch, 2008.  
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Fig. 1. Schematic of EBR-II Primary Tank and internal systems. 
The EBR-II Secondary Sodium System consisted of a network of pipes, steam evaporators, 
and steam superheaters. In the Secondary Sodium System, molten sodium metal circulated 
through the IHX in the Primary Tank in order to remove thermal energy from the sodium 
pool, and then returned to the Secondary Sodium System, where it provided heat to make 
superheated steam. The system was a closed loop, and sodium metal exiting the Secondary 
Sodium System was recycled to the IHX.  
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After shutdown and drainage of the bulk sodium coolant, the Secondary Sodium System 
delivery/return pipeline was severed from the IHX, and the Secondary Sodium System piping 
network was re-routed to provide common input and output locations for residual sodium 
treatment gases. Schematics showing the EBR-II Secondary Sodium System configuration 
during regular operation and after reactor shutdown are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
  
Fig. 2. Schematic and photo of EBR-II Secondary Sodium System as it was configured during 
regular operations 
Determination of the sodium metal inventory during regular operation was relatively easy 
and straightforward. Operational records were available that provided the amount of 
sodium metal added to each system before initial reactor start-up. Measurements of the 
liquid level in the EBR-II Primary Tank and other systems could be tied to these operational 
records, and the losses of any sodium metal due to the removal of sodium-wetted or 
sodium-filled components, evaporation of sodium vapor from the pool, and other events, 
could be correlated to changes in the measured sodium liquid level. All system components 
were immersed in sodium, and the geometry and configuration of the submerged 
components had no effect on the determination of the bulk sodium inventory.  
After the bulk sodium was drained from these systems, direct observation and measurement 
of the residual sodium inventory was no longer possible. Residual sodium is not a single 
entity, and is a collection of localized sodium deposits of heterogeneous depth and physical 
configuration. The amount of residual sodium at any particular location is highly dependent 
upon the geometry, elevation, orientation, and configuration of that location. Only a limited 
number of suspected locations of residual sodium could be visually inspected due to physical 
access limitations or the presence of radioactive contamination or high radiation fields, and 
direct measurement of the residual sodium inventory could not be performed. 
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Fig. 3. Schematic of the EBR-II Secondary Sodium System as it was configured during post-
operation residual sodium treatment.  
An initial estimate of the total residual sodium inventory in these systems was calculated by 
taking the difference between the known volume of sodium coolant that was present during 
regular operation, and the amount of sodium collected upon draining the systems. The 
amount drained from each system, however, was very nearly equal to the known amount of 
sodium in each system, and only an imprecise determination of residual sodium amounts 
could be made due to rounding error. By this method, the amount of residual sodium in the 
Primary Tank and Secondary Sodium System was estimated to be greater than zero and less 
than 4000 liters and 1000 liters, respectively.  
Since fulfillment of the RCRA environmental permit requires that all residual sodium be 
deactivated or removed, a more precise determination of the starting amount of residual 
sodium was needed. Assuming a residual treatment process of any kind is monitored and 
controlled, it should be possible to assess how much sodium has been deactivated or 
removed at any point in time during the treatment process. This does not, however, provide 
any measure of how long a treatment process must be performed to reach an end point. For 
example, if it is known that 500 liters of residual sodium has been deactivated at a certain 
point in time, what fraction of the total inventory of residual sodium does this represent? Is 
this 20% of the inventory, or is it 80% of the inventory? Without a more precise point 
estimate of the initial residual sodium inventory, progress towards an end point can't be 
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assessed, and the treatment process must be carried out indefinitely until some measured 
output of the treatment process indicates that a physical end point has been reached. 
At worst case, it could have been assumed that the inventory of residual sodium in each 
system is equal to the upper bound (4000 liters of residual sodium in the Primary Tank and 
1000 liters in the Secondary Sodium System), but this likely would have established a 
treatment target that could never be reached. For example, if the actual residual sodium 
inventory in the Primary Tank were 2000 liters, and a residual sodium treatment process 
were applied to it, then the treatment process could potentially be carried out until all 2000 
liters of residual sodium were consumed. This would be an excellent result, but the 
treatment target was established at 4000 liters, and the treatment process would therefore be 
assessed as being only 50% complete. One could then try to argue with the regulator that the 
wrong target was chosen and system treatment is complete, but it would be difficult to 
verify whether this was indeed the case without direct inspection, or whether the treatment 
method had stopped working for some other reason, and more residual sodium lies within 
awaiting further treatment.  
There is less project risk if the chosen treatment target is less than the actual residual sodium 
inventory. In this case, achieving less than 100% deactivation of residual sodium is sufficient 
to achieve project "success", but success would be illusory. Physical evidence from the 
treatment process would likely indicate that more residual sodium remained in the system 
being treated after achievement of the project target, and the treatment process would need 
to be continued anyway until a true endpoint was reached. Extension of the treatment 
process past the treatment target might then result in increased project costs and schedule 
delays if the additional treatment work was not planned. Continuing the treatment process 
past a previously agreed upon target value, however, is more easily acceptable to a 
regulator, because it would show that the project team was willing to go "above and 
beyond" the original work scope to achieve environmental goals, and that would reflect 
more favorably on the clean-up project.  
So, there is incentive to choose treatment targets that are less than the upper bounds 
discussed above, but selection of these targets cannot be done arbitrarily. Project sponsors 
do not like cost overruns and schedule delays, and will demand a residual sodium 
inventory estimate that is based on observable data, or that is supported by well-reasoned 
arguments.  
For the EBR-II systems, a mathematical approach was developed for calculating probable 
residual sodium quantities. The engineering drawings for each system and subsystem were 
examined, and hydraulic low points were identified. The volume of residual sodium that 
could be contained in each hydraulic low points was calculated based on the geometry of 
the location and the presence or absence of drainage points, and the individual volumes 
were added to calculate the total residual sodium inventory in each system. As a result of 
this method, the Primary Tank was calculated to contain approximately 1120 liters of 
residual sodium, and the Secondary Sodium System was determined to contain 
approximately 400 liters. The detailed calculations are described below.  
2.1 EBR-II primary tank residual sodium volume determination 
Twenty-four locations were judged likely to contain residual sodium within the Primary 
Tank. These locations are hydraulic low points, or places where sodium metal may have 
collected during regular operations but would have failed to drain when the Primary Tank 
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was emptied. The physical dimensions of each location were then determined from the 
engineering drawings, and the amount of residual sodium that could have been retained at 
each location was calculated. The calculated amounts of residual sodium at these locations 
are shown in Table 1. 
For horizontal locations facing upward against gravity, the residual sodium at each location 
was assumed to have drained to the lowest possible point of drainage, and no blocked 
drainage points were assumed.  
 
Location Name Deposit Volume 
(L) 
Access 
Limitations? 
1 Low pressure plenum 27 No 
2 High pressure plenum 125 Yes 
3 Inlet pipes to high pressure plenum 117 Yes 
4 High pressure plenum inside flow distributing ring 42 No 
5 Between blanket lower adapter, sleeve between grid plates 0 Yes 
6 Control rod position dummy assembly 0 Yes 
7 Inner shield area between inner and outer walls and outlet 11 No 
8 Inner shield region between thermal baffle and outer wall 11 Yes 
9 Top flange of reactor vessel 15 Yes 
10 Reactor cover thermal baffles 11 Yes 
11 Sleeves & bellows for gripper, aux. gripper and hold down 11 Yes 
12 Sleeves and bellows for control rod drives 8 Yes 
13 Guide funnels for control rod drives 38 Yes 
14 Outside flow baffle around gripper/hold down 11 Yes 
15 Inside flow baffle around gripper/hold down 0 No 
16 Recessed area around lifting columns 8 No 
17 Safety rod drive lift tubes 1 Yes 
18 Transfer arm pedestal 4 Yes 
19 Pressure transmitting piping 8 Yes 
20 Heater guide funnels 2 Yes 
21 Auxiliary pump bellows 2 No 
22 Pipe supports 0 No 
23 Primary tank bottom 473 No 
24 Bottom of Primary Tank cover 189 No 
Sub-total, access limitations 364  
Sub-total, no access limitations 752 
Total 1116 
Table 1. Residual sodium locations in the EBR-II Primary Tank. 
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For vertical surfaces such as the side walls of the Primary Tank, no significant deposits of 
residual sodium were assumed. This assumption was verified by a video examination of the 
Primary Tank interior which showed no adhering residual sodium on the side walls of the 
Primary Tank after the bulk sodium had been drained.  
Downward facing horizontal surfaces were generally assumed to be residual sodium-free 
with the exception of the Primary Tank Cover. The bottom surface of the Primary Tank 
Cover has a complex geometry, and there were many places for residual sodium to be 
retained. Also, it was known from regular operating experience that the penetrations in the 
Primary Tank Cover were slightly cooler than the Primary Tank side walls and submerged 
components, and residual sodium tended to accumulate at certain locations under the cover 
due to condensation of sodium vapor and the capture of sodium aerosol.  
The largest deposit of residual sodium was on the bottom of the Primary Tank. The depth of 
residual sodium at this location was determined by calculating the gap space (0.95 cm) 
between the tank bottom and the bottom of the pump suction that was used to withdraw 
bulk sodium from the tank. Assuming the Primary Tank bottom is perfectly flat, the volume 
of residual sodium was calculated by assuming a circular area with a diameter equal to the 
inner diameter of the Primary Tank minus the projected areas of structures attached to the 
Primary Tank floor. The Primary Tank had no drain hole, so no further sodium could be 
drained beyond the lower reach of the pump.  
The second largest location for residual sodium is on the bottom of the Primary Tank Cover. 
No accurate mathematical estimate of residual sodium in this location could be determined, 
so a guess of 50 gallons (189 liters) was assumed.  
The other residual sodium deposits are located in areas that are hydraulic low spots and that 
have no known drainage points. These areas also include the narrow gap spaces in 
architectural features that wouldn't have drained well due to surface tension effects, such as 
the Reactor Cover Thermal Baffles. A detailed examination of engineering drawings of these 
areas provided the physical dimensions of prospective residual sodium deposits, and the 
volume of each residual sodium location could be calculated once the dimensions of the 
locations were known. 
After identifying and quantifying residual sodium locations, the locations were also 
characterized according to their accessibility to the gas space of the Primary Tank. Locations 
open to the Primary Tank were judged to be completely accessible to any treatment method, 
while locations with narrow or limited access to the Primary Tank gas space were judged to 
be only partially accessible, or inaccessible to all but the most severe treatment methods (i.e., 
filling the Primary Tank with liquid water).  
2.2 EBR-II secondary sodium system residual sodium volume determination 
An examination of the engineering drawings of the heat exchanger equipment, and a 
physical examination of the piping network to identify elbows, dead legs, and hydraulic low 
spots revealed that residual sodium was located throughout the Secondary Sodium System 
in varying amounts. The largest deposits for residual sodium were identified to reside in the 
bottom of the steam evaporators and superheaters, and each evaporator and superheater 
was estimated to contain at least 10 liters of residual sodium. A precise amount of residual 
sodium could not be determined, but it was estimated that the Secondary Sodium System 
contained approximately 400 liters of residual sodium based upon these examinations.  
Less emphasis was placed on calculating precise residual sodium volumes because the 
components of the Secondary Sodium System were physically accessible. The progress of 
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any residual sodium treatment operation or verification of its completion could be checked 
by cutting open the component or system being treated and examining the contents. Also, if 
a component or system could not be treated completely using an in-situ method, the 
component or system could be cut out and dismantled for further treatment at INL's 
Sodium Component Maintenance Shop (SCMS), a facility used to clean and repair sodium-
coated components.  
3. Selection of residual sodium treatment method 
The selection of a residual sodium treatment method was motivated by the requirements of 
the EBR-II RCRA permit, and the need to maintain a safe work environment while 
performing residual sodium treatment processes. A RCRA closure permit is a goal-driven 
document that requires that the permit holder achieve "closure" of the affected system or 
systems within a defined period of time, usually within 10-20 years of permit issue. The 
RCRA laws define the closure process as direct removal of RCRA-listed hazardous 
components, or deactivation (i.e., chemical transformation of a hazardous component into a 
non-hazardous component) of RCRA-listed components followed by removal of the 
deactivation products. Once the affected system(s) have been cleaned of hazardous 
components or deactivation products, an examination of the system by a professional 
engineer is required to verify the end state. After the inspection step, the affected system(s) 
is classified as RCRA-closed, and the environmental permit is closed out. Partial closure of a 
complex system may be performed if a larger system can be divided into smaller, isolated 
sections that can be treated individually. In cases where complete deactivation or removal 
cannot be achieved, then the law provides a risk-based closure process that allows some 
amount of hazardous components or deactivation products to remain in place if the 
remaining inventory does not pose a risk to human health or the environment. The EBR-II 
RCRA permit was issued and is administered by the State of Idaho Department of 
Environmental Quality (Idaho DEQ) on behalf of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(U.S. EPA).  
 In the case of the EBR-II Secondary Sodium System, a RCRA-closed state could be achieved 
by mechanically extracting the components containing residual sodium (e.g., pipes, tanks, 
vessels), and treating the pieces one-at-a-time in the on-site Sodium Component 
Maintenance Shop (SCMS). This approach constitutes a "closure by removal" strategy. 
Although definitive, it was decided that cutting apart the Secondary Sodium System, 
packaging and shipping the pieces to the on-site treatment facility, and treating the pieces 
individually would be too costly in regard to available funding. Also, the dismantling work 
posed an unacceptably high risk of worker exposure to hazardous chemicals and risk of fire. 
In addition, the residual sodium in the Secondary Sodium System contains a small amount 
of tritium, and workers would incur a measurable radiation dose during any dismantling 
operation.  
For the EBR-II Primary Tank, a dismantling operation was out of the question due to the 
presence of a high radiation field and radioactive contamination in the tank. A radiation 
monitor inserted into the Primary Tank measured a radiation field strength of 50 R/hour 
just beneath the Primary Tank cover, and higher radiation levels are likely present nearer to 
the core. Significant sources of radiation in the Primary Tank are Co-60, which is present as 
fixed contamination in the reactor structural materials, and Na-22, and Cs-137, which are 
present in the residual sodium.  
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In-situ treatment methods were then considered. The application of an in-situ treatment 
method is a "treat, then remove" strategy. The residual sodium in the affected system(s) is 
reacted in order to transform it into a non-hazardous material, or a less hazardous material, 
and then the reaction product(s) are removed from the system. Removal of the reaction 
product(s) is then performed by draining the system if the reaction product is a liquid, or, if 
the reaction product is a solid, by flushing the system with a solvent in order to dissolve and 
remove the solid reaction product.  
Three in-situ treatment methods were examined in detail, all of which involve the injection 
of a reacting gas into the system being treated. These methods are the Steam-Nitrogen 
Process, the Water Vapor Nitrogen (WVN) Process, and the Carbonation Process. The 
methods were compared on the basis of safety, cost, and schedule. After considerable study 
and discussion among treatment project engineers, and between treatment project engineers 
and a sub-set of the engineers who originally designed and built EBR-II, it was decided to 
pursue carbonation as an in-situ treatment method. A detailed description of these in-situ 
treatment method, and the selection process, is found in the sub-sections below.  
3.1 Steam-Nitrogen Process 
In the Steam-Nitrogen Process, steam or superheated steam mixed with nitrogen is injected 
into the system for the purpose of converting residual sodium into sodium hydroxide 
(NaOH). Hydrogen is also produced. Nitrogen at a concentration of 20-80 vol% is added as 
a diluent to suppress the potential for a hydrogen fire or explosion. The stoichiometry of this 
treatment process is shown in Equations 1 and 2.  
        2 2Na s   H O g NaOH s   ½ H gà   (1) 
        2 2       NaOH s  H O l,  g NaOH H O s,l  1,  2nn à n   (2) 
In Equation 1, sodium metal reacts with steam to form NaOH and hydrogen. Sodium 
hydroxide is hygroscopic, and absorbs water to form NaOH hydrates, as shown in Equation 
2. Pure NaOH melts at 318°C, but sodium hydroxide hydrates for n>2 are liquid at room 
temperature. Equation 1 occurs at the exposed residual sodium surface, or at the 
sodium/NaOH interface after a NaOH surface layer has been established. The treatment 
rate is generally controlled by the steam feed rate, and rapid treatment of systems (i.e., 
within hours to days) is possible. Equations 1 and 2 are exothermic, and Equation 1 in 
particular liberates -184 kJ/mol at standard temperature and pressure. The treatment 
process is carried out continuously until no hydrogen is generated from the system for a 
defined period of time (generally greater than 1 hour).  
The reaction products, NaOH and NaOH hydrates, are water-soluble, and may be removed 
from the treated system after the treatment process is complete by flushing the system with 
liquid water. The water effluent is highly basic and requires neutralization before further 
treatment and disposal.  
The application of this method to residual sodium is characterized by steady periods of 
smooth operation, interspersed by erratic and spasmodic reaction behavior, as indicated by 
spikes in system temperature. An example of a temperature spike is shown in Figure 4, 
which shows the behavior of a steam treatment experiment performed at Argonne National 
Laboratory (Sherman et al, 2002). In the figure, somewhat steady reaction behavior is 
experienced between 75 and 250 minutes, and then a spike in hydrogen concentration 
(bottom curve) and temperature (top curve) occurs in the reaction chamber at 250 minutes. 
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Fig. 4. Measured temperature, guage pressure, and hydrogen concentration in off-gas 
produced by exposure of sodium metal sample exposed to saturated steam.  
Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that erratic reaction behavior occurs when liquid 
NaOH hydrates begin to accumulate. The difference in the melting points of pure NaOH 
and its hydrates, and the strong chemical affinity of sodium metal for water, may lead to the 
formation of a strong water concentration gradient between the residual sodium surface and 
the free liquid surface. Once a concentration gradient is established, then circulation of 
hydrogen bubbles through the liquid layer or other physical disruptions may cause 
convection within the liquid layer, bringing water-enriched NaOH hydrates in contact with 
residual sodium, thus causing a sudden acceleration in reaction rate. If the residual sodium 
temperature is above the melting point of sodium, 97°C, then droplets of liquid sodium, 
which are less dense, may rise and contact water-enriched NaOH hydrates, which also 
produces a sudden acceleration in reaction rate.  
The frequency of temperature spikes may be reduced by removing liquid reaction products 
as they form, or by stopping the treatment process periodically to remove liquid pools. 
Removal of liquid by-products during the reaction process has an added benefit in exposing 
fresh residual sodium surfaces, and allows for reaction of residual sodium deposits to 
arbitrary depth. Care must be taken when removing liquid pools, since liquid removal may 
cause mixing, and this could lead to the uncontrolled reaction behavior that the draining 
step was intended to prevent.  
In spite of these operational instabilities, the Steam-Nitrogen Process is rapid and has been 
used successfully for many years to deactivate residual sodium in industrial and nuclear 
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systems. For example, E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., routinely uses the technique to clean 
residual sodium from sodium transport rail cars and tanker trucks. The Hallam Nuclear 
Power Facility, a sodium-cooled breeder reactor that operated from 1962 to 1964 in 
Lancaster County, Nebraska, U.S.A, used superheated steam and nitrogen to deactivate its 
residual sodium content when the Hallam Reactor was decommissioned (Atomics 
International, 1970). Superheated steam is being used at the shutdown Fermi 1 Reactor 
Facility in Frenchtown Charter Township, Michigan, U.S.A. for in-situ cleaning of systems 
and piping networks containing residual sodium and NaK, and for treatment of sodium-
coated components (Goodman, 2009).  
3.2 Water Vapor Nitrogen (WVN) process 
In the Water Vapor Nitrogen (WVN) Process, nitrogen saturated water vapor or nitrogen at 
less than 100% humidity is injected into the system, and the water vapor in the injection gas 
reacts with residual sodium to form NaOH, NaOH hydrates, and hydrogen gas. Unlike the 
Steam-Nitrogen Process, the treatment process is carried out below the boiling point of 
water and below the melting point of sodium, generally in the temperature range 20-90°C. 
The treatment rate is influenced by the amount of water vapor in the system, the inventory 
of water dissolved in the NaOH hydrate layer, and by the thickness of the NaOH and NaOH 
hydrate layers.  
The reaction products, NaOH and NaOH hydrates, are water-soluble, and may be removed 
from the treated system after the treatment process is complete by flushing the system with 
liquid water. Effluent from a water flushing step is highly basic due to dissolved NaOH, and 
generally requires acid neutralization before further treatment and disposal.  
Process conditions are selected to minimize the frequency and magnitude of temperature 
spikes. Water is delivered at a lower concentration to reduce the reaction rate and to allow 
more heat of reaction to dissipate per unit time. The residual sodium deposits are 
maintained below the melting point of sodium to minimize intermixing of sodium and 
water-rich liquids. Though pressure and temperature instabilities may still occur, pools of 
NaOH hydrates are removed when they accumulate to help prevent reaction instabilities. 
Like the Steam-Nitrogen Process, the WVN Process is capable of reacting residual sodium 
deposits to an arbitrary depth. 
The chief practitioner of the WVN Process in the nuclear area is the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority, UKAEA, who is using the technique to clean systems containing residual 
sodium at its site in Dounreay (Gunn et al., 2009). 
3.3 Carbonation process 
The Carbonation Process is similar in execution to the WVN Process, except nitrogen is 
replaced with CO2, and this replacement greatly changes the process chemistry and 
characteristics of the treatment process. Like the WVN Process, hydrogen is produced as a 
by-product of the water-sodium reaction, as shown in Equation 1. Unlike the WVN Process, 
the CO2 carrier gas also participates as a reactant. In the presence of CO2 and at 
temperatures below 60°C, NaOH produced by the water-sodium reaction is converted  
into sodium bicarbonate, NaHCO3, when it reacts with the CO2 carrier gas, as shown in 
Equation 3.  
    2( 3NaOH s   CO g) NaHCO s    T 60 C      (3) 
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NaHCO3 does not form liquid hydrates. Above 60°C, NaHCO3 is unstable and 
disproportionates into sodium carbonate (Na2CO3), CO2, and water, as shown in Equation 4. 
        3 2 3 2 22 NaHCO s Na CO s   CO g   H O g    T 60 C      (4) 
Na2CO3 forms hydrates more readily than NaHCO3, but none of those hydrates are liquids. 
To avoid the formation of Na2CO3, the process is carried out at a temperature below 60°C. 
The water content of the CO2 carrier gas is maintained at less than 100% humidity to avoid 
the condensation of liquid water in the system being treated. The treatment rate is 
influenced by the amount of water vapor in the system being treated, and the thickness of 
the NaHCO3 layer. Since the surface layer is solid, the mass transfer resistance for the 
diffusion of water vapor to the residual sodium surface is higher than for a liquid surface 
layer, and the reaction rate quickly becomes surface resistance limited once a NaHCO3 
surface layer becomes established. Reaction of residual sodium to depths beyond 3-4 cm is 
possible but is very slow unless the thickness of the intervening NaHCO3 layer can be 
reduced or eliminated. 
The reaction products, NaHCO3, is water-soluble, and may be removed from the treated 
system after the treatment process is complete by flushing the system with liquid water or 
another suitable solvent. The liquid effluent is only mildly basic, and may not require any 
further treatment before disposal. In the case that some amount residual sodium remains in 
the treated system after the Carbonation Process is stopped, the flush liquid would react 
with residual sodium to form NaOH, but this NaOH will be buffered to some extent by the 
presence of dissolved NaHCO3.  
NaHCO3 accumulates as a porous, solid layer on residual sodium surfaces. According to 
laboratory observations (Sherman et al, 2002), the thickness of the NaHCO3 layer is 
approximately 5 times the thickness of the sodium layer consumed. The volumetric 
expansion of the surface layer in relation to the volume of residual sodium can cause 
problems in areas where there is insufficient void space to accommodate growth, such as in 
small diameter piping. In such places, the void space can become filled with NaHCO3, thus 
blocking the flow path for humidified CO2 at that location. Examples of sodium samples 
treated with humidified carbon dioxide are shown in Figure 5. 
 
  
Fig. 5. Sodium samples before (left) and after (right) exposure to humidified CO2. In the 
figure on the right, the NaHCO3 layer is visible as a white layer above darker gray sodium 
metal. 
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Unlike the Steam-Nitrogen and WVN Processes, the Carbonation Process is less subject to 
uncontrolled fluctuations in reaction rate. Under normal operating conditions, moisture 
does not accumulate in the NaHCO3 surface layer, so there is little opportunity for contact 
between residual sodium and accumulated aqueous solutions. Fluctuations in reaction rate 
and temperature are still possible if moisture condenses in the system being treated, but this 
may be avoided by using a sub-saturated treatment gas, or by heating the system that 
contains residual sodium, so that the atmospheric temperature within the system is higher 
than the treatment gas.  
3.4 EBR-II treatment process selection 
The process of selecting a treatment method for residual sodium within EBR-II was 
contentious. One group, composed of the EBR-II reactor designers and former operators, 
favored the use of the Steam-Nitrogen Process or the WVN Process because these methods 
promised faster treatment rates and the ability to react residual sodium to greater depths. In 
addition, the nitrogen-based processes were familiar and backed by experience. They also 
feared that application of the relatively untested Carbonation Process to EBR-II would place 
the EBR-II systems into a state in which it would be more difficult and costly to clean up 
during facility decommissioning than would occur if a nitrogen-based process were used 
instead. As a back-up strategy, they favored doing nothing as being preferable to 
application of the Carbonation Process. After all, the empty EBR-II systems were stable and 
could be maintained indefinitely in this "safe storage" condition as long as required before 
full funding was available for facility decommissioning.  
The other group, composed the engineers and project personnel who were assigned to 
perform the residual sodium clean-up task, recognized the weight of the first group's 
recommendations, but were compelled by project requirements and constraints to look for 
other treatment options. The option of waiting until sufficient funding was available for 
facility decommissioning was not possible because the RCRA permit compelled treatment. 
Treatment project funding was insufficient to decommission the facility, and sufficient 
funding to decommission the facility would not be available for the foreseeable future. The 
option of using a nitrogen-based process to clean EBR-II systems was studied, but the 
nitrogen-based methods are subject to fluctuations in temperature and pressure, and the 
project sponsor, the U.S. Department of Energy, was very risk-averse and had little tolerance 
for any potential event that might cause harm to personnel or equipment, or lead to an 
unintentional release of radioactive material to the environment.  
A particular project concern with the nitrogen-based processes had to do with the 
operational characteristics of the method, and the project funding frequency. The project's 
mandate was to perform residual sodium clean-up as funding became available. Full funding 
was not available at the start of the project, and funding would be provided on a yearly 
basis across the time span of the project. This meant that there would be periods of 
activity, followed by periods where the project was waiting for funding and work on the 
EBR-II systems would cease. The nitrogen-based processes, however, demand a full 
commitment to the system being treated, and must be carried out to completion once the 
treatment process is started if system safety is to be maintained. Before a system is treated, 
it contains only residual sodium, and the configuration is safe and stable. After treatment 
is completed, the system (presumably) would contain no residual sodium, and the 
configuration would be safe and stable. During treatment, and in between active 
treatment periods, the system would be unstable due to the simultaneous presence of 
residual sodium and liquid NaOH hydrates, and an uncontrolled reaction event could 
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occur at any time. Although stopping the flow of steam or water vapor to the system stops 
the active treatment process, a stable configuration is not achieved again until all of the 
residual sodium inventory is consumed.  
The project really needed a residual sodium clean-up method that was capable, stable, and 
that could be started and stopped at will without creating additional hazards during periods 
of inactivity. Although untested on a large scale, the Carbonation Process met these criteria. 
Laboratory work indicated that the method was capable of reacting sodium to depths 
beyond 3 cm, which is sufficient for a majority of the residual sodium locations in EBR-II. 
The method was very stable, and did not undergo process variations in temperature and 
pressure. The NaHCO3 layer generated by the treatment process did not accumulate liquid 
moisture, so that partially treated systems were nearly as safe as untreated systems due to 
the depletion of residual sodium inventories and the blanketing of residual sodium deposits 
with a layer of NaHCO3. Also, the concern that application of the Carbonation Process 
would block access to deeper residual sodium deposits was alleviated by tests that showed 
that the NaHCO3 layer is water-soluble.  
In the end, the treatment project team selected the Carbonation Process for these reasons. 
However, without budget constraints and with greater ability to weather uncontrolled 
reaction events, the project team might have selected a nitrogen-based process instead. The 
higher treatment rates and better penetration ability of those methods were recognized, but 
other project constraints prevented their selection. The Carbonation Process, while slower 
and less capable of reacting residual sodium to great depths, had many other favorable 
characteristics, and was compatible with the needs of the treatment project.  
4. EBR-II system preparation 
Preparation of the Primary Tank and Secondary Sodium Systems for residual sodium 
treatment involved installation of a large CO2 source tank, piping changes to the Secondary 
Sodium System, installation of treatment-related equipment and instrumentation, and 
changeover of the systems' atmospheres from argon to CO2. These preparations are 
described below.  
4.1 CO2 source tank 
A liquefied CO2 tank was installed in between the EBR-II Containment Dome and the Sodium 
Boiler Building, the building in which the Secondary Sodium System equipment was located 
(see Figure 2). The tank had a 6400-kg capacity, and was bolted to a concrete pad. The tank 
was sized to supply pure CO2 at a 135 slm (5 standard ft3/min) for 2 weeks without refill. 
4.2 EBR-II primary tank piping changes 
The EBR-II Primary Tank cover has 58 penetrations or ports through which various 
instruments, tools, and equipment assemblies were inserted during regular operation of the 
reactor. One port contained a device called the Failed Fuel Removal System, which had 
never been used or irradiated. This device was removed from the Primary Tank cover, and a 
vent pipe was installed in its place. An in-line HEPA filter was also installed to contain any 
radioactive particulate generated during the treatment process. A schematic of the EBR-II 
Primary Tank rupture disk and floating head tank remained operational during treatment in 
order to protect the system against larger overpressure events. 
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4.3 Secondary sodium system piping changes 
After the bulk sodium was drained from the Secondary Sodium System, the piping network 
was altered to allow for the creation of 12 distinct linear flow paths through the system. 
Without distinct flow paths, sufficient flow of treatment gases through certain pathways 
could not be guaranteed due to the highly parallel nature of the pipe network. The flow 
paths were not exclusive, however, and there was some overlap between flow paths. A gas 
entry manifold was installed that allowed for seven different flow configurations for 
treatment gas. A vent manifold was also installed. Additional valves and tubing were also 
installed. The distinct flow paths were created by opening and closing valves in the inlet 
manifold, the vent manifold, and within the Secondary Sodium System. The exhaust end of 
the vent manifold was attached to a HEPA filter before exiting to a facility stack. The 
modified network of valves and pipes is shown in Figure 3.  
4.4 Additional equipment and instrumentation 
4.4.1 Humidification cart 
A mobile CO2 humidification system, the Humidification Cart, was built to facilitate 
application of humidified CO2 at multiple locations. The Humidification Cart consists of a 170 
liter clear acrylic water tank, four stainless steel frit bubblers, and a collection of Swagelok™ 
valves and tubing that allow a pressurized supply of CO2 to be humidified between 0 and 
100%. The tank and other equipment are placed on a wheeled platform, which gives it 
mobility, and the inlet and outlet gas connections are made using flexible tubing. The water 
tank is equipped with a bayonet heater with thermostatic control. The humidity of the 
treatment gas is measured using a GE Panametrics Moisture Meter with Remote Moisture 
Probe, Model #MCHTR-1, which is installed in the CO2 exit flow path, and the flow rate of 
CO2 is measured using a simple glass bead rotometer. A schematic of the Humidification Cart 
is shown in Figure 6 and images of the Humidification Cart are shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Schematic of Humidification Cart. 
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Fig. 7. Photos of the Humidification Cart's acrylic tank and instrumentation/valve panel.  
4.4.2 Instrumentation and controls 
Instrumentation and controls were installed on the Primary Tank vent line. A 5.08 cm (2") 
Jordon Mark 518 low pressure spring-loaded mechanical back pressure regulator was installed 
in order to prevent the back-flow of air from the vent into the EBR-II Primary Tank. The back 
pressure regulator was normally closed, and opened only when the pressure inside Primary 
Tank exceeds ~125 Pa-gage. A Teledyne Analytical Instruments #326RB oxygen probe was 
also installed in order to detect air leakage into the Primary Tank, and the monitor was 
calibrated to read accurately in the range between 0-1 vol%. A Fluid Components International 
5.08 cm (2") Model GF92 thermal dispersion mass flow meter with flow transmitter was 
installed to measure the mass flow rate of the exhaust gas and the exhaust gas temperature. A 
Teledyne Analytical Instruments #235B thermal conductivity meter was installed to measure 
the hydrogen concentration in the exhaust gas, and was calibrated to read accurately in the 
range between 0-4 vol%. A GE Panametrics Moisture Monitor with remote moisture probe, 
Model #MCHTR-1, was also installed to measure relative humidity of the exhaust gas. The 
signal outputs from the mass flow meter, oxygen monitor, hydrogen monitor, and humidity 
monitor were recorded by a facility digital data acquisition system.  
The Secondary Sodium System was not as thoroughly instrumented. Oxygen and hydrogen 
monitors of the same make and model as used on the EBR-II Primary Tank vent line were 
installed on the Secondary Sodium System vent, and no other instruments or pressure 
control devices were installed.  
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Fig. 8. Vent line for EBR-II Primary Tank with installed instrumentation and HEPA filter.  
4.5 Changeover of system cover gas from argon to CO2  
During regular operation, the EBR-II systems were blanketed with argon to protect the 
sodium coolant against exposure to oxygen. The Carbonation Process requires an internal 
atmosphere rich in CO2, and so the argon cover gas was changed to CO2 prior to beginning 
treatment. The cover gas changeover was accomplished by actively purging the argon 
blanket with a flow of dry, pure CO2. The Primary Tank was purged for 11 days, and the 
Secondary Sodium System was purged for 4 days with all valves open, at a CO2 flow rate of 
135 standard liters/minute. These purge times were calculated to be sufficient to replace 
99% of the argon atmosphere with CO2 with perfect mixing.  
5. Carbonation of residual sodium 
The Carbonation Process had never been used before to treat residual sodium within a 
nuclear reactor's cooling system, and there was no prior operating experience on which to 
draw. So, the project team decided to pilot the treatment method in the Secondary Sodium 
System before applying it to the Primary Tank. Although less instrumented, the Secondary 
Sodium System was accessible, and could be examined to learn more about the in-situ 
behavior of the treatment method. Also, if the treatment method created some unexpected 
condition that prevented further in-situ treatment, then the system could be disassembled 
and treated piecewise at SCMS.  
This section describes the application of the Carbonation Process first to the Secondary 
Sodium System, and then to the Primary Tank. 
5.1 Treatment of secondary sodium system 
The treatment of the Secondary Sodium System was performed in two phases. The first 
phase involved the flow of treatment gas through various paths for time periods ranging 
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between 1 and 19 days. The second phase involved a longer treatment period for the flow 
path containing Superheater 712. The flow path containing Superheater 712 was relatively 
simple with few sections of narrow pipe, and a deep pool (depth > 29 cm) of residual 
sodium sat in the bottom of Superheater 712, which would allow for a more severe test of 
the treatment method than would be possible in other parts of the system.  
Progress of the treatment process was determined by converting the measured hydrogen 
concentration data into a molar flow rate, integrating the hydrogen molar flow rate data 
with respect to time to provide the total amount of hydrogen generated, and then 
converting this number into the amount of residual sodium consumed using Equation 1. In 
this calculation, the exhaust gas flow rate was assumed to be equal to the input gas flow 
rate, and the exhaust gas was assumed to have ideal gas properties. Based on this 
calculation method, approximately 182 kg (~190 liters) of residual sodium were consumed 
during treatment of the Secondary Sodium System. This amount is approximately 50% of 
the starting inventory of residual sodium.  
The water level in the humidification cart was also monitored, and the volume of water 
evaporated was used to calculate an upper bound on the amount of sodium that could be 
reacted if 100% of the water evaporated from the Humidification Cart were consumed by 
the water-sodium reaction. This number is only an upper bound, however, since 100% 
consumption of water vapor becomes unlikely once a NaHCO3 surface layer becomes 
established. Based on this second calculation method, a maximum of approximately 300 kg 
(~310 liters) of residual sodium could have been consumed during treatment of the 
Secondary Sodium System. The discrepancy between the hydrogen-based residual sodium 
estimate and the upper bound estimate would occur if ~1/3 of the water evaporated from 
the Humidification Cart passed through the Secondary Sodium System without reacting.  
5.1.1 Secondary sodium system treatment phase one 
Phase One treatment of the Secondary Sodium System occurred over 64 days. Treatment 
occurred by flowing room temperature humidified CO2 into the system at a rate of 
approximately 135 standard liters/minute. A trace of the measured hydrogen concentration 
in the exhaust gas is shown in Figure 9.  
The response of the system during treatment was very stable, and no uncontrolled or 
runaway reactions occurred due to the build-up of liquid water within the system. The 
graph shows spikes in hydrogen concentration, but these spikes were aberrations and 
correspond to time periods when the system valves were changed to alter the flow path of 
treatment gases. The dip in hydrogen concentration on Day 8 corresponds to a time period 
when the treatment gas was temporarily changed to dry CO2 to put more water in the tank 
on the humidification cart, and treatment was easily resumed without hysteresis in the 
system response. The concentration of hydrogen gas remained below 1 vol% during the 
length of the treatment period, which is below the lower flammability limit of hydrogen in 
air, 4 vol%. At Day 64, the gas flow was switched back to dry CO2 while maintaining a 
constant flow rate, and the hydrogen concentration in the exhaust gas decayed to 0 vol% as 
hydrogen was purged from the system.  
Table 2 shows the treatment duration per path, and the amount of residual sodium reacted 
in each pathway based on an integration of the measured hydrogen concentration data. 
Taking into account the measured hydrogen concentration, approximately 92 kg of residual 
sodium, or about 95 liters, were consumed during the treatment period. In converting the 
measured hydrogen concentration into the amount of residual sodium consumed, the 
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following conditions were applied: constant flow rate of 135 standard liters/minute, ideal 
gas conditions, and the assumption that 0.5 moles of H2 are produced for every 1.0 mole of 
residual sodium consumed. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Measured hydrogen concentration in exhaust gas during treatment of Secondary 
Sodium System. 
 
Path Name Treatment 
Time 
(days) 
Sodium Reacted, 
kg 
(H2 basis) 
Surge Tank to Yard Lines 19.0 32 
Superheater 712 12.1 21 
Secondary Flow Path to Yard Lines 6.9 10 
Line Na2-34-557 2.2 2 
Major Purge – Superheaters and Evaporators 1.9 2 
Superheater 710 Purge 4.1 6 
Surge Tank 1.0 1 
North Evaporators (4 units) 4.7 7 
South Evaporators (3 units) 1.3 1 
Line Na2-31-534 1.0 1 
Line Na2-31-536 1.0 1 
Final Treatment of Surge Tank to Yard Lines 3.8 4 
Final Treatment Evaporators, Superheaters, Line Na2-
34-520 2.2 3 
Final Purge with Dry CO2 2.8 1 
Total 64.0 92 
Table 2. Summary of treatment times and inventory of reacted residual sodium for 
Treatment Phase One.  
 
Post-Operational Treatment of Residual Na Coolant in EBR-II Using Carbonation 
 
231 
According to the experimental records, approximately 115 liters of water were evaporated 
during this treatment period, which is enough water to react approximately 145 kg, or about 
155 liters, of residual sodium if all of that water came into contact with residual sodium. 
Since the hydrogen-based residual sodium estimate is less than this number, some amount 
of water vapor must have passed through the system unreacted. Evidence that water vapor 
passed through the system unreacted was provided by observing the hydrogen monitoring 
system. The installed hydrogen monitor required a dry gas feed, and a refrigerated 
dehumidifier or gas conditioner was used to achieve this. As the treatment operation 
proceeded, liquid condensate began to accumulate in the gas conditioner's collection bottle, 
and at an increasing rate, as the treatment process continued. Since the only moisture input 
stream into the gas conditioner was exhaust gas from the Secondary Sodium System, 
collection of liquid condensate indicated that the exhaust gas water vapor 
5.1.2 Secondary sodium system treatment phase two 
Phase Two treatment was performed for 72 days, and involved the flow path that included 
Superheater 712. This flow path had previously been treated for a period of 12 days. The 
measured hydrogen concentration during this treatment period are shown in Figures 10 and 
11. The treatment period is split into two parts, one spanning 8 days, and the other spanning 
64 days. This division of the treatment period into two parts was not by design, but was 
caused by the formation of a blockage in a narrow section of pipe in an elbow at the top of 
Superheater 712. Physical examination of the blocked location revealed that the narrow pipe 
section had filled with white powder, which was later revealed by chemical tests to be 
NaHCO3. After formation of the blockage, a dry CO2 flow was initiated through other system 
pathways to flush hydrogen from the system, and then flexible plastic tubing was installed 
around the blocked section. Treatment of the Superheater 712 pathway was then resumed. 
  
 
Fig. 10. Measured hydrogen concentration during Phase Two treatment of the Secondary 
Sodium System, first 8 days. 
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The treatment process proceeded steadily with no uncontrolled reaction behavior. In Figure 
11, there is a large spike in hydrogen concentration on Day 5, but this spike was attributed 
to a power surge during a lightning storm which tripped the hydrogen monitor, and is not 
believed to be a true measurement at that point.  
According to an integration of the measured hydrogen concentration, approximately 90 kg 
(< 95 liters) of residual sodium were consumed during Phase Two. Another 115 liters of 
water were evaporated during the treatment period also, and the excess water vapor was 
presumed to have been vented in the exhaust gas.  
At the end of this treatment phase, the measured hydrogen concentration was still above 0.2 
vol%. A treatment endpoint was not reached at the end of Phase Two, and more residual 
sodium remains in this system that is accessible by the Carbonation Process.  
5.1.3 Post treatment examination of the secondary sodium system 
A physical examination of Superheater 712 and sections of piping along the Superheater 712 
flow path were performed in order to verify the effects of the treatment process. For 
Superheater 712, the level of residual sodium metal in the bottom of the superheater before 
and after treatment was determined by hitting the side of the superheater with a hammer 
and listening for a change in the sound of the hammer blows. According to this test, the 
residual sodium within the superheater had been reacted to a depth of approximately 2.5 
cm. After treatment, a 1.3 cm diameter hole was drilled approximately 25 cm above the 
measured residual sodium level, and a boroscope was inserted into the superheater to look 
at the top of the surface layer and other superheater internals. The visual inspection 
revealed that the surface layer had grown upward in the open space above the residual 
sodium deposit. A metal support framework affected the growth of the layer, and the layer 
had expanded upward through the support framework to form white stalagmites. The 
stalagmites were solid but brittle, and had little mechanical strength when pushed by the 
boroscope.  
In another section of the system, a pipe "T" containing a known amount of residual sodium 
was drilled and examined using the boroscope. The visual inspection showed a similar 
looking white layer of material on top of the residual sodium deposit. Residual sodium at 
this location had also been reacted to a depth of 2.5 cm. Samples of white material obtained 
at this location were tested chemically by titration and x-ray diffraction, and it was 
identified as pure NaHCO3.  
5.1.4 Lessons learned from treatment of secondary sodium system 
The Carbonation Process proved to be a safe and effective means of reacting residual 
sodium in areas where the residual sodium deposits were shallow, and where there was 
sufficient void space to accommodate growth of the NaHCO3 layer. The behavior of the 
treatment process in the Secondary Sodium System was similar to what was experienced 
earlier in the laboratory when test samples were exposed. According to the visual 
inspections, the method appeared capable of reacting residual sodium to similar depths at 
widely separated locations, even in complex piping systems. Measurement of hydrogen 
concentration in the exhaust is the best means available to track treatment progress in 
systems that cannot be inspected visually during the treatment process. Further treatment of 
the Secondary Sodium System is needed before RCRA clean closure status may be achieved. 
Since the treatment process was slow and could be monitored electronically, the process 
could be operated with minimal supervision and maintenance.  
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Fig. 11. Measured hydrogen concentration during Phase Two treatment of the Secondary 
Sodium System, last 64 days. 
5.2 Treatment of EBR-II primary tank 
Treatment of the EBR-II Primary Tank occurred over a cumulative period of approximately 
660 days. This treatment period was not continuous, and was interrupted by occasional 
maintenance periods lasting from days to weeks where the flow of humid carbon dioxide was 
stopped. During these maintenance periods, the Primary Tank was placed in a no-flow static 
condition under a dry CO2 atmosphere. It is estimated that approximately 760 kg, or 780 liters, 
of residual sodium was converted into NaHCO3 by the Carbonation Process, as determined by 
an integration of the hydrogen concentration data in the exhaust gas. This amount is 
approximately 70% of the starting inventory of residual sodium in the EBR-II Primary Tank. 
Although the amount of residual sodium consumed could not be verified by visual 
inspection, integration of the hydrogen concentration data over time provided an indirect 
method of assessing this number. This calculation was made more accurate by also taking 
into account the measured exhaust gas mass flow rate, exhaust gas temperature, and the 
measured concentrations of oxygen and water vapor in the exhaust gas. As was done with 
the Secondary Sodium System, the exhaust gas was assumed to have ideal gas properties.  
The measured reaction rates appear to correspond to treatment rates that would be expected 
if the following conditions were met: uniform internal distribution of the treatment gas, 
surface control of the water-sodium reaction rate, and accurate representation of the 
residual sodium deposit physical geometry and configuration, as described in Section 2.1. A 
model of the reaction process was prepared to predict treatment rates, and a comparison of 
the measured and modeled treatment rates showed good agreement, especially after the 
NaHCO3 surface layer becomes established.  
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5.2.1 Initial system treatment 
Initially, the EBR-II Primary Tank was treated over a period of 55 days in order build 
confidence that the treatment process could be used safely and effectively on the EBR-II 
Primary Tank. Treatment occurred by flowing either room temperature or heated 
humidified CO2 into the system at a rate of approximately 135 standard liters/minute. The 
treatment gas was introduced to the Primary Tank through a pipe that was inserted through 
a nozzle in the Primary Tank cover and extending downward to within 0.95 cm from the 
bottom of the tank. Placement of the pipe exit at the bottom of the tank was believed to 
enhance gas mixing, since the vent for the tank was installed at the top of the vessel. Figure 
12 shows the measured hydrogen concentration and relative humidity in the Primary Tank 
exhaust gas during the first 55 days of treatment. Initially, the temperature of the water tank 
was allowed to drift with the temperature of the room. During the last 20 days in the Figure, 
the water tank was heated to approximately 35-40°C in order to increase the moisture 
content of the treatment gas. Increasing the water tank temperature resulted in an increase 
in the measured hydrogen concentration, and also in the relative humidity of the exhaust 
gas. The drop in hydrogen concentration on Days 20-24 occurred when treatment was 
temporarily stopped in order to refill the CO2 supply tank. The treatment gas flow was 
changed again from humidified CO2 to dry CO2 at Day 54, and this change is reflected by 
the sharp decline in the measured relative humidity and hydrogen concentration on Day 55. 
  
 
Fig. 12. Measured hydrogen concentration and relative humidity during first 55 days of 
treatment. 
During this initial treatment period, it is estimated that approximately 150 kg of residual 
sodium was reacted based on the amount of water evaporated from the Humidification 
Cart. Although using the water tank level to determine the amount of residual sodium 
reacted generally produces treatment numbers that are too high, an integration of the 
hydrogen data for the last 30 days of this treatment period gave an even higher number than 
would have been possible based on a water mass balance. This discrepancy was 
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investigated, and two potential causes were identified: either the record of the amount of 
evaporated was incorrect, or the calibration on the hydrogen monitor was incorrect, and it 
was reading too high. No proof was found to confirm either suspicion, so it was decided to 
err on the side of caution and use the lower residual sodium estimate for this treatment 
period.  
5.2.2 Extended system treatment 
After the initial treatment period, treatment of the Primary Tank was stopped for almost 
two years while awaiting further funding. During this waiting period, the Primary Tank 
was placed in a static condition under a dry CO2 blanket.  
Treatment was eventually resumed using the same treatment operating conditions as used 
previously, and was carried out for another 600 days. The hydrogen concentration and 
exhaust gas mass flow rate measured during this treatment period are shown in Figure 13. 
  
 
 
Fig. 13. Measured hydrogen concentration and exhaust gas mass flow rates during last 600 
days of treatment. 
In the figure, the hydrogen concentration peaked at about 2 vol% on Day 80, and then declined 
over the remaining treatment period to less than 0.25 vol%. The measured mass flow rate was 
never steady, and the variability in the measured exhaust mass flow rate is believed to arise 
from fluctuations in the opening of the mechanical back-pressure regulator. During this 
treatment period, another 630 kg of residual sodium were estimated to have been consumed.  
Treatment of the Primary Tank was stopped after 600 days due to declining treatment rates, 
and no natural process endpoint had been reached. The decline in treatment rate was 
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accompanied by an increase in the humidity in the exhaust gas, and humidity levels 
measured greater than 70% in the exhaust gas by the end of the treatment period.  
5.2.3 Treatment rate model and correlation to measured data 
The reaction rate model was developed during the initial testing stages (Sherman et al., 
2002) of the treatment method. The model is defined by a list of rules. The rules are as 
follows. 
1. Due to uniform mixing, moisture is evenly distributed to all exposed residual sodium 
surfaces. Treatment of residual sodium at multiple locations occurs in parallel.  
2. When the surface layer is less than 0.5 cm thick, the residual sodium reaction rate 
equals the moisture injection rate.  
3. When the surface layer thickness is greater than or equal to 0.5 cm, the reaction rate 
becomes surface-limited. The flux of water vapor to the residual sodium surface is 
inversely proportional to the surface layer thickness, and is directly proportional to the 
moisture input rate. The overall residual sodium reaction rate is equal to the moisture 
flux times the available residual sodium surface area.  
4. There is no discontinuity in the reaction rate when the surface layer thickness equals 0.5 
cm, and surface-limited reaction rate equals the moisture input rate.  
5. For every unit volume of residual sodium reacted, approximately 5 unit volumes of 
NaHCO3 are created.  
6. A residual sodium deposit becomes unavailable for further reaction when it is fully 
consumed or the void space above a deposit becomes completely filled with the 
NaHCO3 (i.e., access to the residual sodium deposit by treatment gas is blocked).  
Application of the model to the EBR-II Primary Tank required further definition of the 
physical configuration of the residual sodium deposits. The residual sodium at each 
location varies in depth, mass, and exposed surface area. Some deposits are relatively 
shallow and spread over a wide area, while other deposits are deep and have only a small 
area of exposed surface. Other deposits are located deep within equipment and have no 
exposed surface area. Table 3 provides information about the accessible residual sodium 
locations, and the locations are arranged in decreasing order in regard to the ability of the 
treatment method to react residual sodium at each location. In Table 3, the Location # 
corresponds to the subset of locations that are considered accessible by the Carbonation 
Process (see Table 1). The "Vol" column lists the residual sodium volume at each location. 
The "Deposit Mass" column lists the mass of residual sodium found at each location. The 
"Avail Area" column lists the exposed surface area of the residual sodium deposit at each 
location before treatment.. The "Depth 1" through "Depth 6" columns provide the masses 
of residual sodium residing within the defined treatment depths for each location. The 
"Done?" column provides a logical descriptor to show whether complete treatment of a 
location might be achieved in a finite amount of time. The number marked "Start" shows 
the beginning mass of residual sodium residing at the subset of locations selected for 
Table 3, and the "End" number shows the total amount of residual sodium that remains 
after residual sodium has been reacted to a depth of 3.8 cm (Depth 6). The available 
surface area shows the exposed surface area at each treatment depth range, assuming that 
the exposed residual sodium surface area at each location remains constant until all 
residual sodium at a particular location is consumed or becomes blocked due to the build-
up of NaHCO3.  
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Location 
# 
 
 
Vol, 
(L) 
Deposit 
Mass, 
(kg) 
Avail. 
Area, 
(m3) 
Depth 1 
<0.1 
cm 
(kg) 
Depth 2 
0.1-0.38 
cm 
(kg) 
Depth 3 
0.38-
0.95 cm 
(kg) 
Depth 4 
0.95-3.18 
cm 
(kg) 
Depth 5 
3.18-
3.65 cm 
(kg) 
Depth 6 
3.65-3.8 
cm 
(kg) 
 
 
Done? 
24 189 183 50.0 49 130 --- --- --- --- Yes 
23 473 456 50.0 49 130 270 --- --- --- Yes 
1 27 26 0.9 0.82 2.3 4.7 18.2 --- --- Yes 
2 125 121 1.5 1.4 3.9 8.0 31.2 6.7 blocked No 
14 11 11 0.1 0.08 0.2 0.5 1.9 0.4 0.13 No 
3 117 113 1.2 1.2 3.5 7.0 27.3 5.8 1.9 No 
4 42 41 0.9 0.83 2.3 4.7 18.4 3.9 1.3 No 
7 11 11 0.2 0.24 0.7 1.4 5.4 1.2 0.38 No 
8 11 11 0.1 0.15 0.4 0.8 3.2 0.7 0.23 No 
16 8 8 0.1 0.12 0.3 0.5 2.65 0.56 0.19 No 
21 2 2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.65 0.14 0.05 No 
Subtotal, (kg)
Start 
982  
 
103 
 
282 
 
301 
 
109 
 
19 
 
4 
End 
164 
Available Surface Area, (m3) 105.0 105.0 55.0 5.0 4.1 2.6  
Table 3. Masses and available surface areas for residual sodium deposits arranged according 
to treatment depth. 
The depth ranges are interpreted sequentially. At the start of treatment, there is no NaHCO3 
surface layer, and treatment proceeds as quickly as moisture can be introduced. Once the 
treatment process has penetrate to a depth of 0.1 cm (Depth 1), the surface layer thickness 
reaches 0.5 cm (see Rule 5 above), and the water-sodium reaction rate becomes surface-
controlled. At a treatment depth of 0.38 cm (Depth 2), all of the residual sodium on the 
bottom of the Primary Tank cover has been reacted, and the total residual sodium surface 
area is reduced accordingly. At a treatment depth of 0.95 cm (Depth 3), the residual sodium 
on the bottom of the Primary Tank has been reacted, and that surface no longer serves a 
moisture sink. At a treatment depth of 3.18 cm (Depth 4), the residual sodium located in the 
Low Pressure Plenum has been reacted, and the available residual sodium surface area is 
reduced again. At a depth of 3.65 cm (Depth 5), access to the residual sodium in the High 
Pressure Plenum becomes blocked, and that location becomes inactive. At a depth of 3.8 cm 
(Depth 6), the residual sodium located outside the flow baffle around the gripper/hold 
down becomes blocked by the build-up of NaHCO3, and that location becomes inactive. 
Reaction of additional amounts of residual sodium at Locations 3, 4, 7, 8, 16, and 21 are still 
possible if treatment is pursued to greater depths, and the piece-wise analysis of reaction 
depths would need to be continued if the reaction rate model were extended to deeper 
reaction depths.  
Interpreting the information provided in Table 3, it is clear that complete consumption of 
residual sodium in the Primary Tank just isn't possible using the Carbonation Process. Only 
about 982 kg out of the total residual sodium inventory (~1100 kg) are accessible. In 
addition, the treatment rate would be exceedingly slow at greater treatment depths due to 
loss of available surface area. At a treatment depth of 3.81 cm, for example, 97.5% of the 
original residual sodium surface area has been eliminated, and the overall treatment rate is 
reduced proportionately if a constant moisture input rate is assumed. 
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Average daily residual sodium treatment rates were calculated using the data shown in 
Figures 12 and 13, and these average treatment rates were plotted in Figure 14 as a function 
 
 of the total amount of residual sodium treated. A model curve was also plotted based on the 
specific information provided in Table 3 and a fixed moisture input rate. During the initial 
treatment period, the measured data fall far below the model curve when the water tank in 
the Humidification Cart was unheated (first 20 days in Figure 12), but align more closely 
when the tank was heated (next 40 days, Figure 12). When treatment of the Primary Tank 
was resumed after the long hiatus, the measured points fluctuate around the model curve 
until approximately 400 kg of residual sodium had been consumed, and then the measured 
points align quite closely with the model curve. In the flat portion of the model curve (upper 
left), the rate is controlled by the moisture input rate, and the wide discrepancy between the 
measured data and the model curve is due to selection of the wrong moisture input rate for 
the model during the initial treatment period. Once the surface layer becomes rate-
controlling, the moisture input rate becomes less critical, and the measured data follow the 
model curve more closely. The growth in surface layer thickness and loss of available 
surface area, leads to large reductions in the treatment rate at higher treatment totals, and 
this effect is evidenced in the plot.  
 
 
Fig. 14. Comparison of observed reaction rates versus modeled reaction rates as a function 
of the cumulative mass of residual sodium consumed.  
5.2.4 Lessons learned from treatment of EBR-II primary tank 
The Carbonation Process may be stopped and started arbitrarily without causing changes in 
treatment performance if the system is placed in a dry, static condition in between treatment 
periods. The process performed smoothly over the extended treatment period without 
spikes in temperature or hydrogen concentration. Although complete treatment of residual 
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sodium within the Primary Tank was not possible, application of the treatment method did 
result in a great reduction in the chemical reactivity of the remaining residual sodium by 
elimination of the easily accessible deposits, and burial of the deeper deposits beneath a 
thick layer of relatively inert NaHCO3. The treatment of residual sodium within the EBR-II 
Primary Tank using humidified CO2 might have been continued still further with the 
Carbonation Process, but the treatment process had reached the point of diminishing 
returns, and little further progress towards the treatment goal was anticipated if the 
treatment process were continued beyond the chosen stopping point.  
6. Conclusions and future work 
In one sense, application of the Carbonation Process to EBR-II in order to deactivate residual 
sodium was very successful. Approximately 70% of residual sodium within the EBR-II 
Primary Tank and 50% of residual sodium within the EBR-II Secondary Sodium System 
were converted into relatively benign NaHCO3 with no safety problems. The treatment 
method was easy to use and could be started and stopped at will with no hysteresis effects. 
The residual sodium that remains within EBR-II is much less chemically reactive, and the 
systems are much better protected against uncontrolled air and water leaks. In addition, the 
behavior of the treatment process appears to be well understood and can be explained and 
predicted using a relatively simple rule-based model.  
In another sense, however, using the Carbonation Process in order to achieve a clearly 
defined RCRA-closed state in the EBR-II systems was not a good strategy. Complete 
deactivation of all residual sodium within these could never be achieved, even with very 
long treatment times, and an additional treatment step is still required to remove the 
reaction by-product.  
Considering the complex geometry of the residual sodium deposits in the EBR-II Primary 
Tank, it is not clear that using the Steam-Nitrogen Process or the WVN Process would have 
been much more successful. Though these methods may have been able to achieve greater 
depth penetration and faster reaction rates, eventually these methods too would become 
surface limited due to the build-up of liquid surface layers and consumption of the easier-to-
reach locations, and treatment rates would also have declined over time. In addition, 
achievement of a clearly defined RCRA-closed state would still have required a follow-on 
treatment step to remove the reaction by-products, and the desired endpoint could not be 
reached in a single treatment step.  
At this point in time, it is still possible to meet the strict definition of RCRA closure in the 
Primary Tank if the tank were filled and flushed with liquid water. Filling the tank with liquid 
water would consume the remaining residual sodium and dissolve the reaction by-products.  
Though the thought of adding liquid water to sodium metal may sound alarming, the safety 
aspects of the operation would be aided by the placement of the remaining residual sodium 
deposits. The locations still containing residual sodium reside at different heights in the 
Primary Tank, and the instantaneous reaction of all residual sodium would not occur if the 
Primary Tank were slowly filled with water. While residual sodium above the water level 
may react weakly in response to water vapor in the gas space above the liquid level, a strong 
sodium-water reaction would not occur until the liquid height reaches the height of a 
residual sodium deposit, or the liquid level becomes high enough to overcome a hydraulic 
barrier, causing water to overflow into a residual sodium location at a lower elevation. 
While it is certain that there would be some uncontrolled and episodic reaction behavior 
when liquid initially comes into contact with residual sodium, the rate of energy released 
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would be limited by the available surface area of the residual sodium deposit, and not all of 
the residual sodium at a particular location would react instantaneously due to the reduced 
surface area of the deposit. Also, the mass of water in the tank would serve as a heat sink 
and would absorb the heat of reaction as water-sodium reactions occur.  
Adding water to the Primary tank would generate a large volume of waste that would need 
to be handled, and the costs and safety aspects of handling this waste material must be 
balanced against the larger need to protect the environment, which is the original intent of 
the RCRA permit.  
If process safety is the ultimate arbiter, then the best option to pursue at this point would be to 
seek a risk-based closure with no further treatment of residual sodium. The relative safety and 
environmental risks associated with the Primary Tank were much improved by application of 
the Carbonation Process, and there would be little risk of any uncontrolled sodium-water 
reactions occurring in the Primary Tank even if moist air leaked into the Primary Tank. As an 
added precaution, the Primary Tank may be also filled with grout to seal and immobilize the 
remaining residual sodium deposits, and block all further access to them.  
It is this last option that the Idaho Clean-up Project (ICP), administered by CH2M*WG 
Idaho, the current organization overseeing stewardship of the EBR-II facility, has selected to 
pursue. By 2015, the company plans to fill the Primary Tank with grout, to further isolate the 
remaining reactor internals, and leave it in place. Although the Carbonation Process was not 
successful in reacting all of the residual sodium within the EBR-II Primary Tank, it worked 
well enough to allow for a risk-based closure without requiring further treatment of residual 
sodium.  
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1. Introduction  
Carbon leakage is the increase in emissions outside a region as a direct result of the policy to 
cap emissions in this region. 
Nuclear energy is a low carbon technology but it is not emission free. Lifecycle analyses of 
nuclear energy find an average carbon intensity of 66g CO2/kWh of which the largest part 
(38%) is generated in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle (uranium mining and milling). 
Besides the CO2 emission there are also other environmental and health impacts that are 
associated with the uranium milling and mining activities. 
In Germany nuclear energy use is a controversially discussed topic. In 2002 the out-phasing 
of nuclear energy by 2022 was decided. In 2010 a new government passed a life time 
extension of the 17 power plants by on average 12 years, seeing nuclear energy as an 
important bridging technology to reach Germany’s ambitious climate goals. This chapter 
calculates the carbon leakage that is expected to result from the 2010 life time extension. Due 
to the nuclear incident in Japan in March 2011 the debate about the time plane for the out-
phasing for nuclear energy started again in Germany. At the time of writing, it is unclear 
when and how the out-phasing process in Germany will take place. This work is therefore to 
be seen as an exemplary study on the issue. Uranium is not mined in Germany and it is not 
easy to trace the origin of the imported uranium. But it can be said that close to 100% 
originate from outside of Europe. 
This work calculates the expected amount of carbon leakage from German nuclear energy 
use until 2036. The calculations are based on an energy scenario of the German government, 
the lifetime extension of nuclear power plants and carbon emission resolved by region for 
each production step from life cycle analyses. 
It is important to incorporate the aspect of carbon leakage in the international discussion 
about climate friendly energy solutions. This assures fairness and transparency and avoids 
that countries with emission limits gloat over mitigation achievements whose burden has to 
be carried by other regions. 
2. Carbon leakage - definition and importance 
Carbon leakage is the increase in emissions outside a region as a direct result of the policy to 
cap emissions in this region. 
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International climate agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord apply 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” taking into account a country's 
economic capability and past accumulated emissions. The Kyoto Protocol sets binding 
targets for 37 industrialized countries for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by on average 
5% against 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008-2012 (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2010). Germany is one of the 37 countries listed 
in Appendix B of the Protocol which have capped emissions. In the following, countries 
with emission reduction targets or capped emissions are referred to as constrained 
countries, while the others are referred to as unconstrained countries. To reach their targets 
some countries have implemented or are going to implement climate policies and 
incentives. Carbon leakage provides a loophole in unilateral climate policies and leads to a 
loss of their effectiveness if viewed from a global level.  
The IPCC defines carbon leakage as follows: 
“Carbon leakage is the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries with emission 
constraints divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries, as a result of 
climate policy in constrained countries.” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[IPCC], 2010)  
Viewed mathematically, carbon leakage i.e. the leakage rate L is simply a ratio which is 
usually given as a percentage. 
 
L = emission increase in unconstrained country/ 
emission reduction in constrained country (1)
 
L>100% indicates an increase in total emission due to the climate policy. Here the reduction 
in constrained countries is less than the increase in unconstrained ones. This may be the case 
because energy and carbon efficiency in unconstrained countries are usually lower than in 
constrained countries hence more emissions are offset to produce the same amounts of 
goods (Babiker, 2005). This clearly counteracts the aim of the climate policy. 
0%<L<100% represents a loss in effectiveness of the climate policy. Some of the emissions 
reduced in the constrained countries cannot be counted as eliminated because they caused 
an increase in emissions in unconstrained countries (Demailly & Quirion, 2008; Gielen & 
Moriguchi, 2002). 
L<0% implies negative carbon leakage, which means that constrained as well as 
unconstrained countries attained emission reductions. This is found to be possible due to 
the effect of induced technology transfer (DiMaria & van der Werf, 2008; Golombek & Hoel, 
2004; Gerlagh & Kuik, 2007). 
L does not give information about the total change in emissions but only about the relative 
changes in the two countries. To make quantitative statements one still needs to know the 
emissions in total numbers. 
Most studies about carbon leakage consider energy-intensive products as the commodity 
that causes the leakage. The production of those products is relocated to unconstrained 
countries and imports to constrained countries increase.  
Theoretical studies on the topic come to a wide range of results depending on the model and 
assumptions. Everything from over 100% to negative carbon leakage has been found 
possible. 
Empirical studies on carbon leakage usually investigate the effect of the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) on internationally traded, energy-intensive products 
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like aluminum, steel, cement and paper. The conclusion is often that there is not much 
empirical evidence of carbon leakage yet. Different reasons for that can be named. The 
probably most important one is that the EU-ETS is still a young incentive that has not yet 
fully developed its impacts on trade flows and production patterns in the concerned 
countries (Reinaud, 2008; European Comission et. al, 2006). 
In this work a new commodity regarding the carbon leakage discussion is studied – the 
nuclear energy lifecycle. 
3. The German energy strategy with focus on the role of nuclear energy 
Germany has high ambitions regarding German emission mitigations. But as an industrial 
country energy supply security and economic energy prices are two very important factors 
in the discussion about Germany’s energy mix. Nuclear energy is a controversially 
discussed topic in German politics as well as in the population.  In 2002 the out phasing of 
nuclear energy by 2022 was decided (Atomgesetz Novelle, 2002). In 2010 this decision was 
revised and the life times of nuclear reactors were extended by on average 12 years 
(Atomgesetz Novelle, 2010). The reason for that is the current government’s stance that sees 
nuclear energy as a necessary bridging technology to reach Germany’s ambitious climate 
goals while securing energy supply and economic energy prices. The lifetime extension can 
thus be seen as a climate policy. Due to the nuclear incident in Japan in March 2011 the 
debate about the time plane for the out-phasing for nuclear energy started again in 
Germany. At the time of writing, it is unclear when and how the out-phasing process in 
Germany will take place. All data used in this work is from before March 2011. 
3.1 The German nuclear law 
The German nuclear law (Das deutsche Atomgesetz (AtG)) is the legal basis for nuclear 
energy use in Germany. It first came into power in 1960. Since then several revisions (AtG 
Novells) of this law where passed. The 2002 AtG Novell introduced by the SPD/”Bündnis 
90 die Grünen” government concluded the phase-out of German nuclear energy. The 
construction of new nuclear power plants was hereby prohibited and the lifetimes of the 
existing plants were limited to on average 32 years after commissioning. From this lifetime 
restriction and the capacity of the different power plants the rest amount of energy that each 
power plant can produce was calculated. These rest amounts sum up to 2620 TWh of 
electricity that can be produced by German reactors after 1 January 2000. It is possible to  
transfer parts of these rest amounts from one reactor to another if favourable. Because of this 
flexibility it is not possible to state exact date for the out phasing. But the estimated end of 
lifetime after the 2002 AtG Novell can be seen in Table 1. 
In September 2010 the CDU/FDP government introduced a new energy concept for Germany; 
part of this energy concept is the extension of the life times of the 17 remaining nuclear power 
plants by on average 12 years. The lifetime extension is established in the 2010 AtG Novell. 
The life times of power plants which came into operation by 1980 will be extended by 8 years, 
all younger power plants will operate for an additional 14 years beyond 2022. 
Table 1 shows a list of all German nuclear power plants, their annual capacity, the year they 
were expected to be shut down after the 2002 AtG Novell, the year they are expected to 
terminate operations after the 2010 AtG Novell. Further the table shows the life time 
extension and the additional amount of electricity is expected to be produced during this 
additional life time.  
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Powerplant 
Capacity*
[TWh/ 
year]
Year of 
operation
start
End of 
lifetime 2002 
AtG Novell**
End of 
lifetime 2010 
AtG Novell
LT 
extension 
[years] 
Capacity 
extansion 
[TWh] 
Neckarwestheim 1 7.36 1976 2010 2018 8 58.88 
Biblis B 11.39 1977 2010 2018 8 91.12 
Isar 1 7.99 1979 2011 2019 8 63.92 
Biblis A 10.73 1975 2010 2018 8 85.84 
Brunsbüttel 7.06 1977 2012 2020 8 56.48 
Philippsburg 1 8.11 1980 2012 2020 8 64.88 
Unterweser 12.35 1979 2012 2020 8 98.80 
Grafenrheinfeld 11.78 1982 2014 2028 14 164.92 
Gundremmingen B 11.77 1984 2016 2030 14 164.78 
Gundremmingen C 11.77 1985 2016 2030 14 164.78 
Philippsburg 2 12.77 1985 2018 2032 14 178.78 
Krümmel 12.28 1984 2019 2033 14 171.92 
Grohnde 12.53 1985 2018 2032 14 175.42 
Brokdorf 12.61 1986 2019 2033 14 176.54 
Isar 2 12.92 1988 2020 2034 14 180.88 
Emsland 12.26 1988 2020 2034 14 171.64 
Neckarwestheim 2 12.22 1989 2022 2036 14 171.08 
Total 2240.66 
* Source: German Atomforum 
** Source: Bundesumweltministerium, 2009 
Table 1. Life time extension and yearly capacity of German nuclear power plants 
4. Carbon emission of nuclear energy - a life cycle analysis 
Nuclear energy is a low carbon technology but it is not emission free. Nuclear power does 
not directly emit greenhouse gas emissions, but lifecycle emissions occur through plant 
construction, operation, uranium mining and milling, and plant decommissioning. Life cycle 
analysis (LCA) is a method to account for the emissions offset during each life phase of a 
products lifecycle, including the production of the product and its raw material, its use and 
disposal.  
Many life cycle analyses of nuclear energy have been conducted and they come to a wide 
range of emission intensities. The emission intensities used in this work are based on an 
analysis of Svacool (2008), who screened 103 life cycle studies of GHG emission for nuclear 
power plants. As a result 66g CO2/kWh is the average emission intensity. The lifecycle 
analysis resolves the emission intensity by steps of the life cycle. The study concludes that 
on average 38% of the emissions are generated in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle 
(uranium mining and milling). This means that the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle which 
takes almost completely place outside of Europe has an emission intensity of 25.1 CO2/kWh. 
In the discussion about carbon leakage these front end emissions are the focus. These 
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emissions occur outside of Germany and outside of Europe and are due to the life time 
extension of German nuclear power plants. 
4.1 Other environmental impacts and risks in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle 
To have a more comprehensive view on the problem, sections 4.1. will elaborate further 
environmental impacts and life-threatening risks connected with  the front end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. These factors do not fall under the issue of carbon leakage but they pose a 
severe disadvantage to the countries in which the uranium for German power plants is 
mined and milled.  
Uranium mining causes a lot of different disadvantages to employees and the local 
population as well as to the environment besides the carbon emission from the mining, 
transportation, power use and building of the facilities. The mineworkers are affected by 
radiation contamination. The alpha radiators radium-226 and its daughter radon as well as 
thorium-232 can cause diseases like lung cancer. A more indirect contamination to the 
human population occurs form the tailings. After the milling process the wet tailings are 
typically stored somewhere above ground without any further protection. The drying 
process leads to radiating dust, which is easily spread by wind. Rainfalls sweep the 
radiation into the soil and groundwater. Even if there is some kind of protection it is often 
just an earthy coating and not really effective against heavy rainfall. A problem that could 
occur after the mine is abandoned is the formation of stagnate water pools from rainwater. 
Those could especially in Africa become hatcheries for mosquitoes that spread water-borne 
diseases like malaria (South Virginia Against Uranium Mining, 2008). These environmental 
impacts and life-threatening risks are not in the attentions of official institutions. In many 
countries safety guidelines for the mining companies exist on a voluntary basis. No controls 
or sanctions for non compliance are executed. Very little data is available on the actual 
impact of the problem. There are no new statistics published by governmental 
organisations. Most data are collected by the industries themselves and do not represent an 
independent assessment of the issue (Kalinowski, 2010). 
5. Regional resolution of the German uranium imports 
Germany has terminated its domestic uranium exploration. All uranium required for 
German nuclear power plants is imported. To trace the origin of the material is very difficult 
due to intransparent accounting methods and data confidentiality of certain countries in the 
trading chain. However, this is required to understand to which country CO2 emissions are 
exported. More precisely, the exact carbon leakage depends on the methods applied for 
uranium mining and milling and these vary significantly by country. 
A study conducted by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War [IPPNW], 2010) attempted to 
resolve the German uranium imports by country of origin. 
The largest part of the imported uranium is natural uranium (4.662 t in 2009). Only 897 t of 
enriched uranium were imported in 2009 (Statistisches Amt der europäischen Union / 
Statistisches Bundesamt, as cited in IPPNW, 2010). 
The uranium demand of German nuclear power plants was 3.398 t natural uranium in 2009. 
(World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements, Website of the World Nuclear 
Association, as cited in IPPNW, 2010). The amount of fuel that can be produced from that is 
between 297 t (5% enriched) and 517 t (3% enriched). Germany is exporter of enriched 
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uranium. Eurostat statistics show that Germany exported 671 t enriched uranium in 2009 to 
mainly Belgium, France, Sweden and the USA, as well as small quantities to Brazil and 
South Korea. (Statistisches Amt der europäischen Union / Statistisches Bundesamt, as cited 
in IPPNW, 2010)  
The enriched uranium Germany imported in 2009 came from: France (575t, 64%), Russia 
(160t, 18%), Netherlands (94t, 10%), USA (41t, 5%), UK (18t, 2%), Belgium (9t, 1%). The 
enriched uranium from Russia comes from dismantled nuclear weapons. 
The countries Germany imports  natural uranium from in 2009 are France (2109t, 45%), UK 
(1914t, 41%), USA (491t, 11%), Canada (134t, 3%) and Netherlands (13t, 0%) (Statistisches 
Amt der europäischen Union / Statistisches Bundesamt, as cited in IPPNW, 2010). 
France and the UK like Germany no longer exploit own uranium resources that means they 
only function as trader and consumer. Information about the import countries of uranium to 
France are known, this information is not available for import to the UK. It is not known 
whether those countries are the original producers of all the uranium or if they also function 
as traders. Assuming France supplied the uranium in the same shares as it received, the 
origin of natural uranium used in German power plants in the year 2009 would look the 
following: Unknown (1914t, 41%), USA (597t, 13%), Australia (569t, 12%), Canada (514t, 
11%), Niger (485t, 10%), Kazakhstan (190t, 4%), Uzbekistan (148t, 3%), Russia (84t, 2%), 
Others (148t, 3%). Since the larges fraction of uranium imports by Germany are from France 
and given the in-transparency of material flows the best estimate for the distribution of 
countries of origin is the one presented in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Assumed origin of natural uranium used in German power plants in the year 2009 
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With the available data the countries from which the uranium is imported for use in 
Germany cannot be fully identified. It is however possible to identify the most important 
mining countries for uranium imports to the EU. These countries are Australia, Russia, 
Canada, Niger, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Namibia, Uzbekistan and USA. It can be assumed 
that those countries are also the countries of origin for the German imports but the shares of 
uranium purchased from the single countries are different between the EU and Germany. 
The EURATOM Supply Agency (ESA) 2009 report identified Australia, Canada and Russia 
as most important suppliers for Europe. Because of the large amounts of trading the ESA 
has to admit that the origin of all Russian uranium cannot be definitely determined. 
Whether the origin of Canadian and Australian uranium can be definitely determined is 
unclear. 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the IPPNW investigations.  
The available data are highly inconsistent and intransparent and incomplete. This makes it 
very hard to answer the question of where does the uranium used in German nuclear power 
plant originate from. IPPNW contacted the German government to provide information and 
the conclusion drawn from the answers of the requests was that it seems as if the 
government tries deliberately to obscure the origin of the uranium. 
The second conclusion is that the supply security of uranium from OECD states is not 
provided. The USA, Australia and Canada are uranium mining countries but those 
countries were in the last years only responsible for less than 50% of the German uranium 
imports. The production in these three countries is declining (World Nuclear Association, as 
cited in IPPNW, 2010). If the global uranium demand rises it is probable that countries like 
Kazakhstan and Namibia increase their mining activities. A consequence of this is that the 
German supply with uranium is as unsecure and as dependent of partners outside the 
OECD as the supply with conventional, fossil energy sources. 
The third conclusion is that Germany does not comply with its own pledge not to purchase 
uranium from countries like Niger in which severe human rights violations and 
environmental damage occur (Greenpeace “Left in the dust”; Der Spiegel “Der gelbe Fluch”, 
29.03.2010, as cited in IPPNW, 2010). Also in the past German companies were not able to 
meet its demand by import from „politically stable” countries. One example is the import of 
uranium from Namibia in time of apartheid, which is not only morally unacceptable but 
also violated the UN-resolution Decree No. I on the Natural Resources of Namibia, which 
forbids the prospecting, mining, processing, selling, exporting, etc., of natural resources 
within the territorial limits of Namibia without permission of the Council (Dumberry, 2007).  
This historical evidence leads to the belief that German nuclear power plants will also in the 
future depend on uranium from “politically unstable” countries. Whoever runs nuclear 
power plants in Europe is responsible for environmental damage and health impacts in the 
uranium mining countries (IPPNW, 2010). 
6. Carbon leakage calculations 
In this section the amount of carbon leakage from German nuclear energy use from 2010 
until 2036 is calculated based on the facts and data presented in the previous sections. The 
decrease in emission in Germany and the increase in emission in the uranium mining 
countries is based on the life time differences of the 2002 and the 2010 AtG Novell and the 
regionally resolved life cycle analyses.  
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The formula for carbon leakage is: 
 
L = emission increase in unconstrained country/
emission reduction in constrained country (1) 
 
The “emission increase in unconstrained countries” are the emissions that the climate policy, 
hence the extended lifetimes of the nuclear power plants caused outside Europe. In section 3 
we calculated that the lifetime extension leads to an additional 2240.7 TWh of electricity that 
are produced by nuclear power. The review of the life cycle analyses in section 4 revealed 
the emission intensity of nuclear energy is on average 66 g CO2/kWh whereof 25.1 g 
CO2/kWh are emitted in the front end of the nuclear energy cycle. As has been explored in 
section 5, the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle for German nuclear energy does not take 
place in Germany. The front end emissions that are caused by the 2240.66 TWh of electricity 
are emissions that are offset outside Europe due to the lifetime extension of nuclear energy 
in Germany. These 2240.7 TWh * 25.1 g CO2/kWh = 56.2 Mt CO2 are the emission increase in 
unconstrained countries. 
The “emission reduction in constrained countries” are the emissions that are not released 
due to the climate policy, hence due to the extended life times of the nuclear power plants. 
The extended lifetimes result in a total of 2240.7 TWh of electricity that is produced through 
nuclear power. As stated in section 4 life cycle analyses show that the emission intensity of 
nuclear energy is 66 g CO2/kWh, of these 66 g CO2/kWh only 40.9 g CO2/kWh are off set in 
Germany.  2240.7 TWh * 40.9 g CO2/kWh = 91.7 Mt CO2 is the amount of CO2 that 2240.7 
TWh of electricity produced by nuclear power offset in Germany.  
It is assumed that the emission intensity with which the 2240.7 TWh would have been 
produced if there was no lifetime extension is the average emission intensity of the reference 
scenario taken from the energy scenarios of the German government (Schlesinger, 2010). The 
emission intensity for the electricity mix is calculated for the years 2008, 2020 and 2030. 
Table 2 shows the shares of the different primary energy sources for the years 2008, 2020 
and 2030 and the emission intensities of those primary energy sources. 
The emission intensity that result from the primary energy shares of the reference scenario 
of the German government after the 2002 AtG Novell is 547.6 g CO2/kWh for 2008, 520.6 g 
CO2/kWh for 2020 and 438.3 g CO2/kWh for 2030. The emission intensities are multiplied 
by the power that is after the 2010 AtG Novell produced by nuclear energy. This is 273.7 
TWh in the period 2010-2015 which is multiplied by the 2008 emission intensity. The 1076.7 
TWh produced in the period 2016-2025 are multiplied by the 2020 emission intensity and the 
890.3 TWh produced in the period 2026-2036 are multiplied by the 2030 emission intensity. 
This results in 1100.6 Mt CO2 that will be exhausted if the 2240.7 TWh would be produced 
by using the average emission intensity of the German electricity mix. 
Subtracting the emissions resulting from nuclear energy from the ones resulting from the 
average energy mix, one ends up with the emission reduction that the life time extension of 
nuclear power plants caused in Germany. This is 1100.6 Mt CO2 - 91.7 Mt CO2 = 1008.9 Mt 
CO2.  
An other interesting figure to look at is the percentage of emission that are causes by nuclear 
energy in relation to its total emission savings.  91.7 Mt CO2 /1100.6 Mt CO2= 0.09, hence 9% 
of the emissions that are not exhausted by other primary energy sources because they are 
replaced by nuclear energy are now exhausted by nuclear energy itself.  
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To calculate carbon leakage the emission increase in unconstrained countries is divided by 
the emission reduction in Germany: 
 
L = 56.2 Mt CO2/1008.9 Mt CO2 = 0.056 (2) 
 
The carbon leakage ratio is often presented as a percentage. The carbon leakage for nuclear 
energy in Germany is 5.6%. 
 
Primary energy sources 2008 [%] 2020 [%] 2030 [%] 
Emission 
intensities 
[g CO2 / kWh] 
Nuclear 23.69 8.5 0 66 
Hard coal 19.84 20.76 17.36 1100 
Braun coal 23.98 25.08 15.01 950 
Gas 13.81 6.98 16.01 600 
Pumpreservoirs 0.99 1.3 1.59 15 
other combustion materials 2.98 3.65 4.6 15 
Hydro 3.23 4.34 4.93 10 
Wind onshore 6.43 11.75 14.34 20 
Wind offshore 0 4.49 9.43 20 
Biomass 4.33 6.39 7.86 15 
Photovoltaic 0.7 5.36 7.07 15 
Geothermie 0 0.35 0.59 15 
Other renewable combustion 
materials 0 1.07 1.22 15 
Average emission intensity of 
the electricity mix 
[g CO2/kWh]
547.6 520.6 438.3  
Electricity produced by 
nuclear power [TWh] after 
2010 AtG Novell
2010-2015 
273.7 
2016-2025 
1076.66 
2026-2036 
890.3  
Table 2. Shares of different primary energy sources for the years 2008, 2020 and 2030 and 
their emission intensities for electricity production. 
7. Discussion 
The calculations are an estimate. Nuclear energy is substituted by the average energy mix. 
The average emission intensity of the German electricity mix is based on the reference 
scenario of the energy scenarios of the German government. The actual rate of carbon 
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leakage depends on the emission intensity of the primary energy source that really is 
replaced by nuclear energy. A replacement of coal could lead to less carbon leakage then a 
replacement of low carbon primary energy source. The reference scenario assumes that the 
policies that were in place at the time the study was conducted (August 2010), would 
continue. The reduction goals of the German government cannot be meet with such a slow 
decrease in emission intensity of the energy mix. The study about the energy scenarios was 
conducted to develop an energy concept that can meet the reduction goals. The 2010 AtG 
Novell is part of this new energy concept.  
For countries with large total emissions the emissions offset in through uranium milling 
and mining of exported uranium do not present a large share of the total emission. In 
countries with less total emissions countries like Niger for example this situation looks 
different. Niger’s annual emissions are about 870 times less than the German emissions and 
6500 times less than the emissions of countries like USA and China. 2009 Niger exported 485 
t of natural uranium to Germany. 55.85 kWh of electricity can be produced with one g 
natural uranium. With a front end emission intensity of 25.1 g CO2/kWh the mining and 
milling of 485 t uranium result in 642,000 t CO2. Niger’s total emissions in 2007 were 909,000 
t (Google public data from World Bank). This data suggests that 70 % of Niger’s emission 
were produced only from uranium produced for German use. 
This is an unrealistically high number. If we assume that the front end emission intensity of 
25.1 g CO2/kWh is not significantly over estimated other reasons for this high share have to 
be found. It is for example probable that the CO2 balance of Niger is incomplete and does 
not include all emissions from Uranium mining.  
Considering that Niger also exports to other countries, CO2 emission from uranium exports 
seem to represent a significant share of Niger’s total emissions. 
8. Conclusion 
The amount of carbon leakage from nuclear energy is not big but carbon leakage does exist. 
Compared to empirical studies on energy-intensive products which have often found no 
evidence of carbon leakage yet this is a significant finding. Besides the CO2 emissions offset 
outside of Germany there are also other risks and environmental contaminations related to 
the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The supply security of uranium which is an often 
mentioned plus of nuclear energy compared to fossil fuels is eroding as shown in section 5.  
The more obvious downsides of nuclear energy use like safety of operation and storage of 
waste material are in the centre of the public discussion. The downsides presented in this 
chapter have not been in the centre of attention yet. An increased awareness for those topics 
might increase the data availability and transparency. Focusing on climate goals without 
evaluating the impacts that the execution of these goals bring along is not a responsible or 
sustainable move and might lead to further problems as described in this chapter. In regard 
of all the downsides causes by uranium mining compensation should be offered by 
Germany to the uranium exporting countries. 
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Effects of the Operating Nuclear Power  
Plant on Marine Ecology and Environment  
- A Case Study of Daya Bay in China 
You-Shao Wang1,2 
1Key Laboratory of Tropical Marine Environmental Dynamics, South China Sea Institute 
of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences,  
2Marine Biology Research Station at Daya Bay, Chinese Academy of Sciences,  
China 
1. Introduction  
Bays and estuaries are known to be biologically productive and strongly influenced by 
human activities (Burger, 2003; Sohma et al., 2001; Tagliani et al., 2003; Zhao, 2005). Coastal 
bays is the region of strong land-ocean interaction, and their ecological functions are more 
complicated and vulnerable to the influence by human activities and land-source pollution 
than the open ocean (Bodergat et al., 2003; Hansom 2001; Huang et al., 2003; Yung et al., 
2001). With the increase of population and rapid economic development, littoral areas are 
facing many ecological problems. Eutrophication and environmental pollution obviously 
occurred in many coastal sea areas, especially in estuaries and coastal bays (Cloern, 1996; 
Turner and Rabalais, 1994; Yin et al., 2001). These have directly resulted in the ecological 
unbalance, the decrease of biodiversity and the rapid reduction of biological resources in 
estuaries and coastal bays. Coastal ecosystems and the study of marine biological resources 
and ecological environment have attracted worldwide attention (Buzzelli, 1998; Fisher, 1991; 
Huang et al., 1989, 2003; Sohma et al., 2001, Souter and Linden, 2000; Zhang et al., 2001; 
Yung et al, 2001). Many international programs and projects have been launched to address 
the problems confronting the world’s coastal ecosystems and biological resources (Yanez-
Arancibia et al., 1999; Huang et al., 2003). 
Tang et al (2003) applied AVHRR data to the study of thermal plume from power plant at 
Daya Bay. Satellite remote sensing can provide information on the distribution and seasonal 
variation of thermal plumes from nuclear power plants that discharge cooling waters to the 
coastal zone. Variation of phytoplankton biomass and primary production in the western part 
of Daya Bay during spring and summer has been reported (Song et al., 2004). Wang et al (2006) 
used multivariate statistical analysis to reveal the relation between water quality and 
phytoplankton characteristics in Daya Bay, China, from 1999 to 2002. Wu and Wang (2007) 
used chemometrics to evaluate anthropogenic effects in Daya Bay and found that increases 
in human activities alter the balance of nutrients in Chinese coastal waters, and that the human 
activities were the main factor to impact the ecological environment in Daya Bay. 
Data collected from 12 marine monitoring stations in Daya Bay from 1982 to 2004 reveal a 
substantial change in the ecological environment of this region (Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 
2011). The average N/P ratio increased from 1.377 in 1985 to 49.09 in 2004. Algal species 
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changed from 159 species of 46 genera in 1982 to 126 species of 44 genera in 2004, and the 
nutrients and phytoplankton are good environmental indicators which can rapidly reflect 
the changing water quality in Daya Bay (Wang et al., 2006). Major zooplankton species went 
from 46 species in 1983 to 36 species in 2004. The annual mean biomass of benthic animals 
was recorded at 123.10 g m2 in 1982 and 126.68 g m2 in 2004. Mean biomass and species of 
benthic animals near nuclear power plants ranged from 317.9 g m2 in 1991 to 45.24 g m2 in 
2004 and from 250 species in 1991 to 177 species in 2004 (Wang et al., 2008). The waste warm 
water from nuclear power plants was the main factor influencing the ecology and 
environment in western areas of Daya Bay, especially for benthos near the Nuclear Power 
Plants in Daya Bay (Wang et al., 2011). Daya Bay is a multi-type ecosystem mainly driven by 
human activities (Wang et al., 2008).   
As a case study of Daya Bay in China in this chapter, it is summarized long-term changes of 
Daya Bay and analyzed to effect of the operating Nuclear Power Plant on marine ecology & 
environment according to the monitoring and research data in Daya Bay obtained during 
1982-2004 in China (Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011).  
2. Research area, materials and methods 
China is a large coastal nation located along the western Pacific Ocean with 18000 km of 
mainland coastline, along which there are many large and important bays (Fig.1). Daya Bay 
is a semi-enclosed bay. It is one of large and important gulfs along the southern coast of 
China. Daya Bay is located at 113º29′42″-114º49′42″E and 23º31′12″-24º50′00″N (Fig.1). It 
covers an area of 600 km2 with a width of  about 15 km and a north–south length of about 30 
km, and about 60% of the area in the Bay is less than 10 m deep (Xu, 1989; Wang et al., 2006, 
2008, 2011). Dapeng Cove (the investigated station 3 is in it), in the southwest portion of 
Daya Bay, is about 4.5 km (N–S) by 5 km (E–W). Located in a subtropical region, Daya Bay’s 
annual mean air temperature is 22°C. The coldest months are January and February, with a 
monthly mean air temperature of 15°C, and the hottest months are July and August, with a 
monthly mean air temperature of 28°C. The minimum sea surface temperature occurs in 
winter (15°C) and the maxima in summer and fall (30°C) (Xu, 1989; Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 
2011). No major rivers discharge into Daya Bay, and most of its water originates from the 
South China Sea. There are three small rivers (Nanchong River, Longqi River and 
Pengcheng River) that discharge into Dapeng Cove. The Pearl River is to west of Daya Bay 
which has a diverse subtropical habitats including coral reefs, mangroves, rocky and sandy 
shores, mudflats, etc. (Wang et al., 2008). The coral reefs and mangroves have special 
resource values and ecological benefits and are very important to the sustainable social and 
economical development in these subtropical coastal areas. Coral reefs and mangrove areas 
have important relationships to the regulation and optimization of the subtropical marine 
environments and have become the subject of much international attention in recent years 
(Mumby et al., 2004; Pearson, 2005). 
Relatively few residents and industries along the cost of Daya Bay before 1980s, and there 
are about 239400 inhabitants living along the coast of Daya Bay at present (Fig.2). The 
population has nearly doubled during 1986-2002. Many factories had been built. The total 
industrial output value of the main towns along Daya Bay coast increased from 3.804 billion 
yuans of 1993 to 29.64 billion yuans of 2001(Wang et al., 2008). The total industrial output 
value of the main towns along the Daya Bay coast had increased 7.8 times between 1993 and 
2001 (Fig.3). The Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant (DNPP) (Fig.4) was the first nuclear power 
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Fig. 1. Map for Daya Bay and its Locations of the 12 monitoring stations (Wang et al., 2006, 
2008, 2011). 
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plant and the largest foreign investment joint project in China since 1982 and marked the 
first step taken by China in the development of large-capacity commercial nuclear power 
units (Zang, 1993). The sea water from the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant is discharged in 
about 95 m3 second-1 at 65C since 1993, and the warm water is put into the south area of 
Daya Bay (Fig.4).  
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Fig. 2. Population changes of the main towns along the Daya Bay coast (unit: ten thousands). 
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Fig. 3. Total industrial output values of the main towns along the Daya Bay coast in different 
year (unit: ten thousands yuans). 
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(1) Lingao phase I (From http://www.google.com.hk/) 
 
 
(2) Lingao phase II (From http://www.google.com.hk/) 
A: Lingao Nuclear Power Plant in China 
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B: Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant in China (From http://www.google.com.hk/) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Qinshan phase I (From http://www.google.com.hk /) 
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(2) Qinshan phase II (From http://www.heneng.net.cn/) 
 
 
 
 
(3) Qinshan phase III (from http://www.heneng.net.cn/) 
C: Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant from the first to the third investment in China 
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D: Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant in China (From http://www.heneng.net.cn/) 
 
 
 
 
(1) Chinshan nuclear power plant (From http://www.power-technology.com/) 
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(2) Kuosheng nuclear power plant (From http://www.aesieap0910.org/) 
 
 
  
 
(3) Maanshan nuclear power plant (From http://commons.wikimedia.org/) 
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(4) Lungmen nuclear power plant (From http://commons.wikimedia.org/) 
E: Nuclear Power Plants in Taiwan of China 
 
 
 
F: Distribution of the Nuclear Power Plants in China 
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G: Distribution of the Nuclear Power Plants in the world 
(From http://www.taizhou.com.cn/) 
Fig. 4. Different Nuclear Power Plants for opening in China. 
Another Nuclear Power PlantLingao Nuclear Power Plant (LNPP) near the Daya Bay 
Nuclear Power Plant has also run since 2002. These changes can also impacting on the 
ecological environment of Daya Bay (Zheng et al., 2001; Bodergat et al., 2003; Wu & Wang, 
2007; Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011) (Fig.5). 
The variety of ecological and environmental factors in Daya Bay has been carried out since 
1982, including 12 stations with four voyages per year. All stations were occupied between 
113º29′42″-114º49′42″E and 23º31′12″-24º50′00″N. The main marine monitoring investigation 
included the ecological environment, the ecological function of marine biological resources 
and the community organization etc in Daya Bay. Temperature and salinity of water were 
measured in the field using CTD probes. Sea-water samples for analysis of nutrients, 
dissolved oxygen, pH, chemical oxygen demand, chlorophyll a was taken using 5-L GO FLO 
bottles at surface and bottom layers, and other samples were collected according to the 
methods and sampling tools of “The specialties for oceanography survey” (GB12763-91, 
China). All sample analysis was carried out at National Field Station of Marine Ecosystem 
Research and Observation at Daya Bay, Shenzhen, China and at South China Sea Institute of 
Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Analytical methods for the various physical-
chemical and biological parameters are applied according to Wang et al (2006, 2008, 2011). 
All these samples were collected during one day at the beginning of the first month of each 
season (spring-summer-fall-winter). The samples (except phytoplankton, zooplankton, 
benthos and fish) included those taken at the surface and the bottom, and the data for this 
paper are given as mean values between the surface and bottom. 
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Fig. 5. Daya Bay and it’s around environments. 
3. Statistical analysis 
All statistical analysis methods were used according to Johnson & Wichern (1998). Kendall’s 
tau-b values were used to measure the degree of association among various variables with 
bivariate statistical analysis. Bivariate correlations between the biomass of phytoplankton and 
benthos and major physical and nutrient factors were calculated for all stations. Flexible-Beta 
cluster analysis was used between groups transforming the measures with Flexible-Beta 
Distance. Factor analysis techniques were used to investigate the various factors that are 
present in each of the three clusters identified by cluster analysis (using PROC X16 of the SAS 
system) (Wang et al., 2006, 2011). All statistical analysis programs are part of the Statistical 
Analysis System (SAS 9.0) software package (SAS Institute Incorporation). 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Long-term changes of Daya Bay  
Spatial distribution of water temperature showed high values in the western near the 
nuclear power stations and low values in the mouth of Daya Bay all the years. Stratification 
due to temperature and salinity differences between surface and bottom waters inside the 
bay start to develop in June, become strongest from July to September, and disappear in 
November; temperature and salinity were uniformly distributed with depth from 
November to May in the following year (Xu, 1989; Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). Changes of 
temperature and salinity in Daya Bay varying by seasons are shown in Fig. 6 and 7. Annual 
mean value of temperature was 24.04ºC based on the data measured from 1982 to 2004, the 
highest surface and bottom water temperatures occurred in August and the lowest values 
were in January (Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). 
Effects of the Operating Nuclear Power Plant  
on Marine Ecology and Environment - A Case Study of Daya Bay in China 
 
267 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1982 1987 1991 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean
Year
Sa
lin
ity
, ‰
Spring
Summer
Autumn
Winter
Mean
 
Fig. 6. Salinity of Daya Bay with different seasons from 1982 to 2004 (Wang et al., 2008) 
(Unit:‰). 
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Fig. 7. Temperature of Daya Bay with different seasons from 1982 to 2004 (Wang et al., 2008) 
(Unit:C). 
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Cold-water upwelling influenced the distribution of nutrients and temperature, fluctuates in 
Daya Bay. The vertical and seasonal variations and distribution of water temperature suggest 
that the bay is affected by the East Guangdong upwelling and a thermocline occurring during 
June-August (Han, 1991; Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). During this time, the thermocline 
temperature gradient averaged 0.5-1ºC m-1. The depths of the thermocline are ~ 6-10 m with a 
thickness of ~ 2-4 m in Daya Bay (Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). The thermocline disappeared 
from November to the following May due to the mixing of the seawater. 
The seasonal variation of temperature of Daya Bay from 1982 to 2004 is shown in Fig.7. 
Annual mean temperatures were increasing from 1982 to 2004, probably due to Global 
Change. Climate change scenarios for the year 2100 indicates a significant increase in air 
temperature (by 2.3-4.5ºC) which is major factor influencing the environment of the Gulf 
(Kont et al., 2003). The temperature of western Daya Bay near the Nuclear Power Plants was 
higher than those in the other sea area in Daya Bay, by about 1ºC, mainly due to waste 
warm water discharged to the south area of Daya Bay from the Nuclear Power Plants (Fig.8) 
which directly impact on the ecological environment of Daya Bay (Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 
2011; Zheng et al., 2001). Assuming the temperature of the waste water from the nuclear 
power plant to be 1ºC warmer than the surrounding seawater, then the area of Daya Bay 
affected by this warmer water was about 5.51 km2 (Han, 1991; Wang et al., 2006).  
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Fig. 8. Temperature of western Daya Bay with different seasons from 1996 to 2004 (Wang et 
al., 2008) (Unit:C). 
Spatial distribution of dissolved oxygen (DO) in Daya Bay was as uniform as temperature, 
seasonal variations were evident from 1982 to 2004 (Fig.9). Distributions of dissolved oxygen 
in spring and winter were higher than in summer and autumn. The highest dissolved oxygen 
content occurred in winter and the lowest in summer. There was a decreased from 7.29 mg l-1 
to 7.03 mg l-1 of the dissolved oxygen from 1991 to 2002, probably due to the progressive 
increases in sea surface temperature increasing of Daya Bay (Fig.7). Although the results 
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indicate there was a small decreasing trend in the dissolved oxygen (DO), the seawater of 
Daya Bay was also within the First Class of National Seawater Quality Standards for China 
(6.00 mg l-1, GB3097-1997) (Wang et al., 2003, Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). Annual mean pH 
variation was at 8.15 to 8.25 from 1982 to 2004, with a little change in Daya Bay (Fig.10). The 
results also indicated that ocean acidification is very clear in Daya Bay (Kerr, 2010).  
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Fig. 9. Dissolved oxygen of Daya Bay from 1982 to 2004 (Wang et al., 2008) (Unit: mg l-1). 
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Fig. 10. pH of Daya Bay with different seasons from 1982 to 2004 (Wang et al., 2008). 
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The chemical oxygen demand (COD) values were 0.63-1.18 mg l-1 in Daya Bay from 1989 to 
2004 (Fig.11, Wang et al., 2008). The mean chemical oxygen demand values were lower than 
the other sea areas in China, such as the COD is between 2.90 mg dm-3 and 7.50 mg dm-3 in 
the Pearl River Estuary (Lin & Li, 2003) and from 3.32 mg l-1 to 4.01 mg l-1 in Rongcheng Bay 
in temperate zone (Mu et al., 1999). The chemical oxygen demand values also indicated that 
the organic pollution in Daya Bay was much lower than the other sea areas in China. The 
results of chemical oxygen demand in Daya Bay show that the sea water was also within the 
First Class of National Seawater Quality Standards for China (≤2.00 mg l-1, GB3097-1997) 
(Wang et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). 
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Fig. 11. Chemical oxygen demand of Daya Bay from 1989 to 2004 (Wang et al., 2008) (Unit: 
mg l-1). 
Inorganic N and P levels were low from 1.53 μmol l-1 to 5.40 μmol l-1 and from 0.0945 μmol l-1 
to 1.12 μmol l-1, and mean values were 3.68 μmol l-1 and 0.266 μmol l-1 from 1985 to 2004 
within the National First Class Water Quality Standards for China (Wang et al., 2003; Wang 
et al., 2008) (Table1). These results are similar to the inorganic N and P levels of Mirss Bay in 
Hong Kong (Yin et al., 2003). NH4-N (about 49%) and NO3-N (about 43%) were the 
dominant total inorganic nitrogen (TIN) form, which account for about 90% of the TIN and 
8% of NO2-N in recent years. The NO3-N content was lower than the NH4-N, revealing a 
thermodynamic imbalance between NH4-N, NO2-N and NO3-N. Biological activity might be 
also the main factor influencing the balance (Huang et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2008), but there 
were different degrees of transformation of NH4-N for the different bay regions. The 
concentration of both N and Si were higher than inorganic P. Spatially the nutrients N 
increases from 1985 to 2004 in Daya Bay, probably as results of the waste water of the people 
lived along the coast, the land sources (such as Nanchong River, Longqi River and 
Pengcheng River discharge into Dapeng Cove and unclear power plants waste water 
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discharge into the south area of Daya Bay), seawater breed aquatics and the effect of the 
water from the Preal River on Daya Bay (Han, 1991). The nutrient P decreased from 1.12 
μmol l-1 to 0.110 μmol l-1 at 1985-2004 in Daya Bay, probably as a result of the fan-used 
detergency powder contain-P in recent years. The average ratio of TIN/P increased from 
1.377 in 1985 to 49.09 in 2004, and the highest value was 61.90 in 2003. The average ratio of 
Si/P increased from 35.27 to 285.82 at 1985-2004 (Wang et al., 2008). The limiting nutrients in 
Daya Bay has changed from N to P from 1985 to 2004 (Justice et al., 1995), and is different 
from those at Jiaozhou Bay which shifted from N and/or P to Si from the 1960s to the 1990s 
in temperate zone (Shen, 2001) and Sanya Bay which shifted from N in summer and autumn 
to P in winter in Sanya Bay from 1998 to 2000 in tropic zone (Huang et al., 2003).  
 
Year 4NH 2NO 3NO TIN 23SiO  34PO   TIN/P Si/P 
1985 0.698 0.230 0.602 1.53 39.50 1.12 1.377 35.27 
1989 0.607 1.10 1.52 3.23 10.85 0.377 8.560 28.78 
1991 1.10 0.230 0.798 2.13 20.66 0.358 5.950 57.71 
1997 1.38 0.150 2.55 4.08 14.57 0.122 33.44 119.43 
1998 1.86 0.0554 0.433 2.35 5.125 0.0405 57.99 126.54 
1999 1.99 0.389 2.46 4.84 9.810 0.118 40.02 76.46 
2000 1.59 0.508 1.92 4.01 27.54 0.252 15.91 109.29 
2001 2.28 0.134 1.93 4.33 23.21 0.229 18.91 101.35 
2002 1.32 0.446 0.680 2.40 27.01 0.0945 25.40 285.82 
2003 
2004 
2.54 0.260 3.39 6.19 23.06 0.100 61.90 230.60 
3.06 0.085 2.25 5.40 12.82 0.110 49.09 116.54 
Mean 1.68 0.326 1.68 3.68 19.47 0.266 28.96 117.07 
*Quality Standards of Seawater from GB3097-1997, TIN: China first class (μmol l-1) ≤14.28, second class 
(μmol l-1) ≤21.43; PO4-P: China first class (μmol l-1) ≤0.4839, second class (μmol l--1) ≤0.9677. 
Table 1. Concentrations of different forms N, SiO3-Si and PO4-P in Daya Bay at 1985-2004 
(Wang et al., 2008) (Unit: mol l-1).  
 
Phylum 1982 1983 1985 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2003 2004 
Bacillario-
phyta 37/134 38/120 38/127 41/137 37/140 25/78 24/72 25/96 31/92 34/100 
Pyrophyta 9/25 9/32 8/30 8/27 17/61 10/30 5/8 9/27 12/30 8/23 
Cyanophyta 0 1/3 1/3 2/4 2/5 1/2 0 2/4 2/3 2/3 
Total (Genera 
/ Species) 46/159 48/155 49/160 51/168 56/206 36/110 29/80 36/127 46/125 44/126 
Table 2. Species, genera of the phytoplankton of Daya Bay from 1982 to 2004 (Wang et al., 
2008). 
About 300 species of phytoplankton have been identified in Daya Bay since 1982 (Xu, 1989; 
Wang et al., 2008). They belong to Cyanophyta, Bacillariophyta, Pyrophyta, Chrysophyta and 
Xanthophyta etc. Most of them are diatoms (about 70%) and chaetocero (about 20%). Of the 
183 species of diatoms, chaetoceros had many more species than other genera (45 spp), 
followed by Rhizosolenia (23 spp) and Coscinodiscus (22 spp) (Yang, 1990; Wang et al., 2008). 
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The main dominant species of Daya Bay are Chaetoceros, Nitzschia, Rhizosolenia, 
Leptocylindrus and Skeletonema, such as Chaetoceros affinis, Chaetoceros compressus, Chaetoceros 
lorenzianus, Ch. Curvisetus, Ch. Pseudocurvisetus, Rhiz. alata f.grecillisma, Nitzschia delicatissima, 
Leptocylindrus danicua, Skeletonema costatum and Thalassionema nitzschioide, the chaetocero is 
Ceratium sp. as the dominant species. The phytoplankton species have been gradually 
decreasing since 1990s as compared to those during 1980s (Table 2). In particularly, there 
was only 80 species in 1998. The phytoplankton cell density has been also gradually 
decreasing since 1998 compared with 1985. Annual mean values of the phytoplankton in 
Daya Bay were between 8.88105 and 6.63107 cells m-3 at 1985-2004. Phytoplankton 
abundance peaked in spring at 1.03108 cells m-3 in 1985 (Table 3) and was lowest in spring 
at 7.30104 cells m-3 (1/1411) in 1999. Although the mean annual abundances of 
phytoplankton show a slight decrease trend from 1999 to 2004, species and values of the 
phytoplankton of Daya Bay were increasing that might be due to high ratios of TIN to P and 
Si to P occurring in recent years (Sommer et al., 2002). Annual mean values of chlorophyll a 
were 1.83-3.78 mg m-3 in different seasons from 1985 to 2004, the higher values were always 
found in autumn and summer. The nutrient structure has become more balanced for 
phytoplankton growth (Shen, 2001). 
 
Season Production 1985 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
Spring 
 
Chl a (mg m-3) 2.06 1.46 2.00 0.979 1.49 0.830 5.88 1.94 
Phytoplankton  
(cells m-3) 
1.03108 2.16107 7.30104 5.27106 6.59105 1.71106 1.53105 3.43106 
Zooplankton (ind m-3) 109.20 28.90 – 90.00 34.97 135.29 137.58 204.67 
 
Summer 
 
Chl a (mg m-3) 2.36 1.44 3.44 4.07 1.32 6.09 1.91 3.93 
Phytoplankton  
(cells m-3) 
9.61107 7.59105 6.28105 5.25107 9.31105 1.87106 2.45106 1.66107 
Zooplankton (ind m-3) 578.90 82.70 – – 404.08 248.62 191.97 131.33 
 
Autumn 
 
Chl a (mg m-3) 1.19 3.50 4.69 3.46 2.25 2.82 1.44 1.67 
Phytoplankton  
(cells m-3) 
1.53107 6.00106 1.02106 3.86105 5.63105 3.70105 1.99105 3.49105 
Zooplankton (ind m-3) 523.90 43.65 – – 131.11 258.80 58.41 581.15 
 
Winter 
 
Chl a (mg m-3) 1.70 1.77 5.01 1.85 2.81 2.98 3.32 2.06 
Phytoplankton 
(cells m-3) 
3.77107 6.73106 1.83106 8.49104 2.74106 6.21105 2.24106 3.63106 
Zooplankton (ind m-3) 189.30 66.41 94.72 – 204.16 455.54 309.32 619.05 
 
Mean 
 
Chl a (mg m-3) 
Phytoplankton 
(cells m-3) 
Zooplankton (ind m-3)
1.83 
6.30107 
 
352.70 
2.04 
8.77106 
 
55.42 
3.78 
8.88105 
 
94.72 
2.63 
1.46107 
 
90.00 
1.97 
1.22106 
 
193.58 
3.18 
1.14106 
 
283.56 
3.14 
1.60106 
 
174.32 
2.40 
6.00106 
384.05 
 
Table 3. Seasonal production measurements in Daya Bay from 1985 to 2004 (Wang et al., 
2008). 
Seasonal changes of chlorophyll a near the nuclear power plant are shown in Fig.12 (Wang 
et al., 2008). Annual mean values of chlorophyll a near Nuclear Power Plant were 1.37-2.45 
mg m-3 before operation and 2.46-3.34 mg m-3 after operation the first Nuclear Power Plant 
at 1991-1997. Seasonal changes of primary productivity near the nuclear power plant are 
very different between before operation and after operation the first Nuclear Power Plant at 
1991-1997 (Fig.13). The waste warm water can give an increase for chlorophyll a and 
primary productivity near the nuclear power plants. The waster warm water can provide 
extra amount of energy for phytoplankton growth (Wang et al., 2006).  
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265 species of zooplankton sampled from Daya Bay have been studied since 1982 (Wang et al., 
2008). They can be divided into four ecological forms: estuary and inner bay type, warm 
coastal type and warm open sea type (Lian et al., 1990). The latter two types account for most 
of the species. Variations of dominant species exhibited a seasonal succession. The abundance 
of zooplankton varied seasonally, the maximum number of individuals occurred in autumn. 
Although main species of the zooplankton in Daya Bay had a decreasing trend from 46 of 60 
familiar species in 1983 to 36 of 60 familiar species in 2004 (Fig.14), the annual mean individual 
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Fig. 12. Seasonal changes of chlorophyll a near the Nuclear Power Plant (mg/m3). 
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Fig. 13. Seasonal changes of primary productivity near the Nuclear Power Plant 
(mg·c/m2·d). 
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number of zooplankton has been gradually increasing from 55.42 ind m-3 to 384.05 ind m-3 
since 1998, and the value in 2004 has already exceed the 352.70 ind m-3 level in 1985 (Table 
3). One reason might be the strictly enforced regulations relating to the marine environment 
and fisheries from June to August in each year since 1995, and another reason might be high 
levels of plant nutrients and high ratios of Si to N and P, most phytoplankton falls into the 
food spectrum of herbivorous, crustacean zooplankton in recent years (Sommer et al., 2002, 
2008). 
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Fig. 14. Main species of the familiar zooplankton of Daya Bay changed from 1983 to 2004 
(Wang et al., 2008). 
Individual biomass changes of the zooplankton are shown in near the Nuclear power plant 
in Fig.15. Compared with the mean individual biomass of the zooplankton between 1982 to 
1991 (from 392.25 ind/m3 to 680.75 ind/m3) before operation, it is very lower for 341 ind/m3 
in 1994-1995 after the operation near the Nuclear power plant. The waste warm water is not 
good for zooplankton growth, especially in summer and autumn of each year. The waste 
warm water, which discharged to the south area of Daya Bay from the Nuclear Power 
Plants, directly impacts on zooplankton growth (Zheng et al., 2001).  
A total of 328 species of fish were captured from 1985 to 2004, and 304 species of fishes were 
identified, including many edible species of high economic value such as Sardinella jussieu 
Clupanodon punctatus, Nematalosa nasus, Thrissa setirostris, Thrissa dussumieri, Thrissa 
kammalensis, Thrissa hamiltonii, Thrissa vitirostris, Harpodon nehereus, Plotosus anguillaris, 
Lactarius lactarius, Caranx (atule) kalla, Pseudosciaena arocea, Leioganthus rivulatus, Pagrosomus 
major, Rhabdosargus sarba, Siganus oramin, Trichiurus haumela, Stromateoides argenteus, 
Stromateoides nozawae, Stromateoides sinensis and Lagocephalus lunaris spsdiceus (Wang et al., 
2008). The dominant species were perciformes including the warm-water and warm–and-
temperate-water species accounted for about 90% and 10% in Daya Bay. The main fishes 
were about 20-28 species of 47 main species of fishes were captured in Daya Bay from 1985 
to 2004 (Fig.16). Through the main species of fishes have a small change in Daya Bay from 
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1985 to 2004, the amount of the edible fish natural resource has decreased greatly from 1985 
to 2000. The mean individual weight of the fish changed from 14.60 g tail-1 in 1985 to 10.80 g 
tail-1 in 2004 (Table 4). Although a policy to ban-fishing in the China Sea was put in practice 
from July to August since 1995, the amount of the fish natural resource has recovered slowly 
because of excessive catching and pollution, speciealy in 1987-2000. The investigation data 
show that Daya Bay has a sandy bottom with coral reefs and an environment suitable for 
growth, the fish resources are abundant as compared to those in other bays in China that 
have less suitable environments. For example, there were only 91 species in Jiaozhou Bay in 
the temperate zone of China (Zhou, 1984). 
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Fig. 15. Individual biomass changes of the zooplankton near the Nuclear power plant 
(ind/m3).  
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Fig. 16. Main species of fishes in Daya Bay from 1985 to 2004 (Wang et al., 2008) 
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In order to evaluate the potential fishery production in the sea area around the Daya Bay 
Nuclear Power Plant before and after the operation, the potential fishery productions were 
270 t/a in 1992-1993 (before the operation) and 550 t/a in 1994-1995 (after the operation) in 
45 km2 sea area around the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant according to primary 
productivity and organic carbon of the phytoplankton (Peng et al., 2001).  
 
             Year                       April                May          October          December             Mean 
1985 9.70 6.30  27.80 14.60 
1987 2.85 4.16  1.92 2.98 
1996 1.08 2.51  7.39 3.66 
2000 
2004 
 
 
2.28 
 
 
10.80 
 
 
2.28 
10.80 
Table 4. Mean individual weight of the fish (g tail-1) changed from 1985 to 2004 (Wang et al., 
2008). 
Daya Bay has a high diversity of natural habitats, more than 700 species of benthos were 
found by mud sampling and trawling since 1982 (Xu, 1989; Wang et al., 2008, 2011). Bemthic 
plants were less than 10%, including about 60 species of diatoms which were the main 
benthic plants. Benthic animals were more than 90%. Besides a very few species, the benthic 
animals in Daya Bay were almost all warm-water species with relatively few individuals. 
The annual mean biomasses of benthic animals ranged from 55.70 g m-2 to 148.91 g m-2 
ranging from 1982 to 2004 (Table 5). The lowest mean biomass of the benthic animal in Daya 
Bay was found to occur during 1990-1997, which was the largest foreign investment along 
the Daya Bay coast (Zang, 1993; Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011; Tang et al., 2003). The annual 
mean biomasses of benthic animals have increased from 1990 to 2004, and also reached the 
level of 1980s in recent years. The highest biomass of 1326 g m-2 was collected in north 
region of Daya Bay in spring of 1982. Polychaeta (about 150 species account for about 21%) 
and molluscs (about 148 species account for about 21%) were the dominant groups, 
followed by crustacea (about 130 species account for about 18%) and echinoderms (about 52 
species account for about 7%), the rest (about 13%, such as Spongia, Coelenterata, Bryozoa 
and Nemertinea etc.) exhibited the lowest biomass. 73 species of ground fishes (account for 
about 10%) were captured in Daya Bay at 1982-2004. Seasonal variation of biomass showed 
similar trends with a maximum in winter and spring minimum in autumn or summer from 
2001 to 2002 (Table 6). The maximum biomass in the year mainly occurred at the northeast 
and middle parts of Daya Bay, those were living areas of the mollusca (Xu, 1989; Wang et 
al., 2008, 2011). The mean biomasses of benthic animals of western Daya Bay (near Nuclear 
Power Plants) have been decreasing from 317.7 g m-2 in 1991 to 45.24 g m-2 in 2004 (Table 7), 
and the number of benthic animal species was also decreasing since 1993 (Fig. 17). These 
results indicated that the warm water from the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant (since 1993) 
and Lingao Nuclear Power Plant (since 2002) had given great effects for this area ecology 
and environment, particularly for the benthos that was directly impacted marine organism 
(Zheng et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2008, 2011). 
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Year 1982 1987 1990 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2004 
Biomass 1.9-1326 1.5-1210 5.5-99 0.1-1197 0.4-823 2-1122 0-1236.6 0-1152 2.6-506.9 
Mean 123.1 123.6 55.70 74.20 78.60 152.80 148.91 117.71 126.68 
Table 5. Mean biomasses of benthic animals in Daya Bay from 1982 to 2004 (Wang et al., 
2008) (Unit: g m-2). 
 
Year Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
2001 256.18 88.05 47.10 248.77 
2002 96.11 14.11 64.98 279.53 
Table 6. Seasonal changed biomasses of benthic animals in Daya Bay changed from 2001 to 
2002(Wang et al., 2008). (Unit: g m-2). 
 
Year 1991 1993 1994 1996 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2004 
Biomass 0.4-1651 0.4-254.10.1-120.80.1-117.5 0.1-158.0 0.4-113.0 4.4-1222 0-197.7 0-115.6 20..6-76.6 
Mean 317.9 82.00 26.60 25.60 28.60 25.80 21.4.3 34.15 28.84 45..24 
Table 7. Mean biomasses of benthic animals of western Daya Bay from 1991 to 2004(Wang et 
al., 2008) (Unit: g m-2). 
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Fig. 17. Number of benthic animal species of western Daya Bay from 1987 to 2004 (Wang et 
al., 2008). 
Coral reefs—the hermatypic coral are concentrated in the vicinity of Dalajia, Xiaolajia and 
west in the mouth of Daya Bay located at the northern edge of the global coral reef zone. 
Based on data collected in 1983-1984, there were formerly at least 19 coral species in Daya 
Bay (not included the part of Haotou harbour, which area was only investigated in 1964), 
accounting for 76.4% of the hermatypic coral from Dalajia and Xiaolajia to the mouth of the 
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bay (Zhang & Zhou, 1987), with Acropora pruinosa (Brook) as the dominant species. Only 
~12-16 species were found in 1991-2002, accounting for 32% (Wen et al., 1996) and 36% of 
total cover rate for the hermatypic coral (Table 8). There has been a shift in the dominated 
species since 1990s.  For example the dominated species were Favites abdita (Ellis & 
Solander) in 1991 and Platygyra daedalea (Ellis & Solander) in 2002, which was 7.4% of the 
hermatypic coral for its total cover rate. The hermatypic coral were demolished from 1984 to 
2002, some of which were destroyed by men (Wen et al., 1996; Souter & Linden, 2000; 
Bellwood et al., 2004), such as bomb fishing, underwater coral reef sightseeing and 
exploitation of coral reef for making money. As one kind of sensitivity marine biology for 
water temperature, the coral bleaching is related to the going up of water temperature 
(Souter & Linden, 2000). If the seawater temperature increases by 0.5-1.5ºC in several weeks, 
about 90-95% coral will die (Zhang et al., 2001). The hermatypic coral of Daya Bay had a 
little recover from 1991 to 2002 (Wang et al., 2008). The increased temperature of Daya Bay 
being the global change and the warm water from the nuclear power plant may be also the 
other reasons for decreasing the cover rate of the hermatypic coral in Daya Bay (Zheng et al., 
2001). 
 
Year 1984 1991 2002 
Total species/total cover rate 
(%) 19/76 12/32 16/36 
Table 8. Investigation results of the hermatypic coral from 1984 to 2002 (Wang et al., 2008). 
Mangrove plants grow along the coast of Daya Bay, such as in Aotou, Nianshan, Dongshan, 
Sanmen Island and Dalajia Island etc. There were 13 species belonged to 13 families (Chen et 
al., 1999; Zhong et al., 1999; Wang et al., 2008). There were some herbaceous and the 
ornamental vine in the mangrove plants of Daya Bay, such as Cyperusmalaccensis, 
Derristktrifoliata, Canavliamaritima, Ipomoeapescaprae, Plucheaindica, Sporobolusirginicus 
and Scavolahinanensis ect. The dominant species were Kandelia candel, Bruguiera 
gymnorrhiza, Aegiceras corniiculatum and Avicennia marina; and Ceriops tagal, 
Lumnitzera eacemosa, Rhizophora stylosa have gradually being deracinated (Chen et al., 
1999). It now covers only 4% in some areas (such as in Baisha Bay of the northwest part in 
Daya Bay) as compared to 60-90% in 1950s, which is mainly consisted of small shrubs and 
bushes. A great deal of mangrove plants was felled in order to create farmland in 1970s. The 
total mangrove plants are about 850 hm2 along the Daya Bay coast at present. In recent 
years, the mangrove plants were again seriously destroyed and this phenomenon is 
accompanied with aquatic culture, the travel and economic development (Xue, 2002; Hens et 
al., 2000; Zoriniet al., 2004).  
Obviously, the coral reefs-the hermatypic coral and mangrove plants in Daya Bay have 
seriously been degraded and destroyed since 1980s and 1970s. It will be need to make a 
much greater effort to protect these diverse resources to maintain their ecological functions 
(Wang et al., 2008). 
4.2 Identification of water quality and phytoplankton, benthos characteristics 
Water quality and phytoplankton data collected from 1999 to 2002 at 12 stations in Daya Bay 
are summarized in Table 9 (Wang et al., 2006). 
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Table 9. Ranges and means of major physicochemical and biological factors in 12 stations in 
Daya Bay from 1999 to 2002 (Wang et al., 2006). 
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Cluster analysis based on the major water quality parameters measured (first column Table 
10) revealed that 12 monitoring stations could be grouped into three clusters. Flexible-Beta 
Cluster Analysis method was used and the corresponding dendrogram using FLExible-beta 
method between groups transforming measures with Flexible-Beta Distance is shown in 
Fig.18. Cluster I consisted of stations S1, S2, S7 and S11, in the south part of Daya Bay. 
Cluster II consisted of stations S5, S6, S9, S10 and S12, in the middle and northeast parts of 
Daya Bay. Cluster III consisted of stations S3, S4 and S8, in the cage culture areas of the 
southwest part of Daya Bay and the northwest part nearby the Aotou harbor of Daya Bay. 
By the FLExible-beta’s method for cluster analysis, the results could also reflect there were 
the different function areas in the sea of Daya Bay (Wang et al., 2006). 
Factor analysis techniques were used to investigate the various factors that present in each 
of three clusters identified by cluster analysis. Factors were identified by the principal 
component method with varimax rotation (using PROC X16 of the SAS system). 
Eigenvalues and cumulative proportions of correlation matrix are present in Table 10. In 
each cluster, more than 60% of the data variance could be explained by the first two 
principle components. In general, pH, NO3-N, TIN and TIN/PO4-P are the most important 
factors in differentiating the characteristics of the three clusters as evident from the factor 
loadings. Cluster I with factor 1 (positive loadings for secchi, NO3-N, DIN, TIN/PO4-P and 
BOD5) and factor 2 (positive loadings for temperature, DO, pH and chlorophyll a) combined 
accounting for 32.61 % of the data variance. Cluster II with factor 1 (positive loadings for 
NO2-N, NO3-N, TIN, PO4-P, SiO3-Si, and Chlorophyll a) and factor 2 (positive loadings for 
tubidity, TIN/PO4-P and chlorophyll a) combined accounting for 25.31 % of the data 
variance. Cluster III with factor 1 (positive loadings for temperature, pH, secchi, NO3-N, 
TIN, TIN/PO4-P, SiO3-Si/PO4-P and BOD5) and factor 2 (positive loadings for DO, pH, 
tubidity, NO2-N and chlorophyll a) combined accounting for 43.10 % of the data variance 
(Wang et al., 2006). 
Table 10 shows the corresponding factor loading in three clusters. It should be noted that 
NO3-N and TIN/PO4-P were important factors among stations in the three clusters, while 
concentrations of individual nutrient factors (i.e. NO2-N, NO3-N, TIN, PO4-P and SiO3-Si) 
were more important in Cluster II. These results were different to the research in Port 
Shelter, Hong Kong (Yung et al., 2001), which showed that nutrient ratios (i.e. TIN to TSi 
and TP to TSi) were apparently the more important factors among stations in different 
clusters (Wang et al., 2006). 
Water quality and benthos data collected from 2001 to 2004 at 12 stations in Daya Bay are 
summarized in Table11 (Wang et al., 2011). 
Bivariate correlations between benthos biomass and major physical and nutrient factors 
were calculated for all stations. The density of benthos in all stations correlated positively 
with temperature, DO, pH, NH4-N, SiO3-Si, SiO3-Si/PO4-P, chlorophyll a and negatively 
correlated with salinity, Secchi, COD, NO3-N, NO2-N, TIN, PO4-P, TIN/PO4-P, BOD5. Such 
relationship between nutrients and benthos was also found in the Lower Chesapeake Bay 
(Dauer & Alden, 1995). The results of the correlation analysis revealed that not only 
temperature, DO, pH, SiO3-Si, SiO3-Si/PO4-P, chlorophyll a, but also salinity, Secchi depth, 
NO3-N, NO2-N, TIN, TIN/PO4-P, BOD5 could play an important role in determining the 
biomass of benthos in Daya Bay (Dauer & Alden, 1995). The results are different from those 
using multivariate statistical analysis to study water quality and phytoplankton 
characteristics in Daya Bay from 1999 to 2002 (Wang et al., 2006). 
Effects of the Operating Nuclear Power Plant  
on Marine Ecology and Environment - A Case Study of Daya Bay in China 
 
281 
 Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III 
 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 
Temperature (°C) 0.01249 0.99037 0.16669 0.49016 0.87157 0.49027 
Salinity (ppt) 0.12846 0.02911 0.92371 -0.30711 0.26872 -0.96322 
DO (mg dm-3) 0.19712 0.97137 -0.85093 0.25263 0.15601 0.98775 
pH 0.07382 0.78155 -0.90136 -0.35794 0.62899 0.77741 
Secchi (m) 0.90952 0.33258 0.23706 -0.94526 0.50374 -0.86386 
Tubidity (NTU) 0.06313 -0.98470 0.29705 0.88071 0.17229 0.98505 
NH4-N (μmol dm-3) -0.81998 -0.57232 -0.01719 0.28781 -0.86639 0.49936 
NO2-N (μmol dm-3) -0.61670 -0.18310 0.98970 -0.09451 -0.80358 0.59520 
NO3-N (μmol dm-3) 0.72416 0.01289 0.92253 0.26891 0.90624 -0.42277 
TIN (μmol dm-3) 0.87689 -0.16412 0.73706 0.31524 0.98197 -0.18905 
PO4-P (μmol dm-3) -0.99369 0.01984 0.73275 -0.22751 -0.99800 -0.06318 
SiO3-Si (μmol dm-3) -0.19294 0.29027 0.81653 -0.23589 -0.98767 -0.15652 
TIN/PO4-P 0.98732 -0.11482 0.03293 0.92628 0.99951 0.03141 
SiO3-Si / PO4-P 0.45590 0.26096 -0.60317 0.19426 0.99274 -0.12029 
BOD5 (mg dm-3)* 0.89595 -0.36263 0.44634 -0.75797 0.64454 -0.76457 
Chlorophyll a  (mg m-3) -0.23591 0.95703 -0.33466 -0.12719 -0.12588 0.99205 
Cumulative % of variance 
explained 
39.40 32.61 42.60 25.33 56.90 43.10 
Table 10. Factor loadings (after varimax rotation) of first two factors for Cluster I, II and III 
(Wang et al., 2006). 
Cluster analysis based on the major water quality parameters measured (first column Table 
12) revealed that the 12 monitoring stations could be grouped into three clusters. Flexible-
beta cluster analysis method was used and the corresponding dendrogram using FLExible-
beta method between groups transforming measured with Flexible-beta distance, and the 
Flexible-beta cluster analysis result was shown in Fig.19. Cluster I consisted of the stations 
S1, S2, and S6 in the southern part of Daya Bay, where there are more effects from the Pearl 
River and South China Seas (Xu, 1989), such as the East Guangdong upwelling (Xu, 1989; 
Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). Cluster II consisted of stations S3, S8 and S11 in the cage 
culture areas in the southwest part, the northwest part near the Aotou harbor and the 
northeast part near the Fenhe harbor of Daya Bay. The fish farming in Daya Bay has 
increased from an annual production of about 100 tons (440 ha cage culture area) in 1988 to 
approximately 60,000 tons (14,000 ha cage culture area) in 2005, a nearly 600-fold growth 
during the past 17 years (Wu et al., 2009b). Cluster III consisted of the stations S4, S5, S7, S9, 
S10 and S12 in the southwest, the middle and northeast parts of Daya Bay. The results of 
cluster analysis could also reflect the different functional areas of Daya Bay. These results 
are different from those reported for the water quality and phytoplankton characteristics in 
Daya Bay by Wang et al. (2006), and indicated also that human activities were the main 
factor impacting the ecological environment in Daya Bay (Wang, et al., 2008, 2011; Wu & 
Wang, 2007; Wu et al., 2009, 2010).  
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Table 11. Ranges and means of major physco-chemical and biological factors of 12 stations in 
Daya Bay from 2001 to 2004 (Wang et al., 2011). 
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Fig. 19. Results of the FLExible-beta’s method for cluster analysis showing the three clusters 
of all stations (Wang et al., 2011). 
Factor analysis techniques were used to investigate the various factors that are present in 
each of three clusters identified by cluster analysis. Factors were identified by the principal 
component method with varimax rotation. Eigenvalues and cumulative proportions of 
correlation matrix are present in Table 12 (Wang et al., 2011).  
In each cluster, more than 50% of the data variance could be explained by the first two 
principle components. In general, NO3-N, NH4-N and TIN are the most important factors in 
differentiating the characteristics of the three clusters as evident from the factor loadings. 
Cluster I with factor 1 (positively with COD, NH4-N, NO3-N, TIN, TIN/PO4-P and BOD5) 
and factor 2 (positively with temperature, pH, Secchi and NO2-N) accounted for 45.54 % of 
the data variance. Cluster II with factor 1 (positively with DO, COD, NO3-N, BOD5 and 
Chlorophyll a) and factor 2 (positively with NH4-N, NO2-N, NO3-N, TIN, PO4-P and SiO3-
Si/PO4-P) accounted for 38.36 % of the data variance. Cluster III with factor 1 (positively 
with for DO, NO3-N, TIN, PO4-P and SiO3-Si) and factor 2 (positively with salinity, Secchi 
depth, NO3-N and NO2-N) combined for 23.78 % of the data variance.  
Table 12 shows the corresponding factor loading in three clusters. It should be noted that 
NO3-N and NH4-N were important factors among stations in the three clusters, whereas 
concentrations of individual nutrient factors (i.e. NH4-N, NO2-N, NO3-N, TIN and PO4-P) 
were more important in Cluster II. These results were similar to the research for spatial 
characterization of nutrient dynamics in the Bay of Tunis (Souissi et al., 2000), for long-term 
changes in water quality and phytoplankton characteristics in Port Shelte (Yung et al., 2001) 
and also for the water quality and phytoplankton characteristics in Daya Bay (Wang et al., 
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2006), which showed that the nutrients were apparently the more important factors among 
stations in different clusters) 
 
 Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III 
 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 
Temperature (°C) -0.07402 0.99726 -0.91594 0.17441 0.41463 -0.84822 
Salinity (ppt) 0.08681 -0.99622 -0.86609 -0.23685 -0.79031 0.58854 
DO (mg dm-3) -0.95422 0.29911 0.90756 -0.23741 0.66559 -0.56114 
pH 0.10302 0.99468 0.34421 -0.88746 -0.95259 -0.18645 
Secchi (m) -0.08829 0.99609 -0.97061 -0.00703 -0.81068 0.51100 
COD (mg dm-3) 0.99806 -0.06229 0.96300 0.13467 0.30587 0.37842 
NO3-N (μmol dm-3) 0.71192 -0.70226 -0.11188 0.98878 0.09577 0.63140 
NO2-N (μmol dm-3) -0.34213 -0.93965 0.04398 0.88400 0.13031 0.98026 
NH4-N (μmol dm-3) 0.85008 0.52665 0.50845 0.85305 0.73916 -0.65671 
TIN (μmol dm-3) 0.96037 -0.27873 0.24975 0.96593 0.69021 0.18550 
PO4-P(μmol dm-3) -0.67938 -0.73379 -0.03668 0.99788 0.90839 -0.09308 
SiO3-Si(μmol dm-3) -0.83054 -0.55696 0.32481 -0.39576 0.99190 0.01782 
TIN/PO4-P 0.72370 0.69012 -0.11296 0.06295 -0.09709 0.01522 
SiO3-Si/ PO4-P -0.92164 -0.38804 -0.01222 0.79633 0.13335 0.24584 
BOD5 (mg dm-3) 0.99133 0.13138 0.98990 0.09895 0.17930 0.25444 
Chlorophyll a  (mg 
m-3) -0.99963 -0.02708 0.99220 0.02532 0.33479 -0.16112 
Cumulative % of 
variance explained 54.46 45.54 42.63 38.56 37.04 23.78 
Table 12. Factor loadings (after varimax rotation) of first two factors for Cluster I, II and III 
(Wang et al., 2011). 
5. Conclusions and suggestions in the future 
Daya Bay as a multi-type ecosystem including coral reef, mangrove and rock reef has a rich 
biodiversity.  It is a good place for the reproduction and culturing of fish, shrimp, crabs and 
shellfish. Due to constant interaction between land and ocean area, its ecology is more 
complicated and vulnerable than that of the open seas. It is especially vulnerable to the 
effects of frequent human activities and land-based pollution. Depsite the progressive 
increases of human activities including more domestic sewage and industrial waste water 
discharged as well as nutrient enrichment and toxins derived from the cage culture of the 
fish and seashell, the concentrations of N, P, DO and COD must not be allowed to exceed 
water quality standards at the risk of serious ecosystem degradation and still were within 
the First Class of National Seawater Quality Standards for China. The temperatures of 
seawater in Daya Bay were increasing from 1982 to 2004 probably due to global change. The 
average ratio of N/P increased from 1.377 in 1985 to 49.09 in 2004, and the limiting factor of 
nutrients changed from N to P. The composition of biological community has been small, 
with biodiversity simplified and the biological natural resource declined. For example, the 
species of phytoplankton decreased from 206 species of 56 genera in 1990 to 126 species of 
44 genera in 2004, the waster warm water from the Nuclear Power Plant can provide extra 
amount of energy for phytoplankton growth (Wang et al., 2006); the main species of the 
zooplankton of Daya Bay had decreased from 46 species of 1983 to 36 species of 2004, the 
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waste warm water is not a good environment for zooplankton growth, especially in summer 
and autumn of each year, which directly impacts on zooplankton growth (Zheng et al., 
2001); the mean individual weight of the fish has changed from 14.8 g tail-1 of 1985 to 10.80 g 
tail-1 of 2004. Assessment for the potential fishery production between before and after the 
operation indicated that the potential fishery production after the operation was one time 
compared with before the operation in 45 km2 sea area around the Daya Bay Nuclear Power 
Plant (Peng et al., 2001). More than 700 species of benthos were found, the annual mean 
biomasses of benthic animals increased from 72.40 g m-2 in 1996 to 126.68 g m-2 in 2004. The 
mean biomasses and species of benthic animals near the Nuclear Power Plants decreased 
from 317.9 g m-2 in 1991 to 45.24 g m-2 in 2004 and from 250 species in 1991 to 177 species in 
2004, the temperature value increased about 1ºC compared with the other sea areas in Daya 
Bay (Wang et al., 2008). The waste warm water from the Nuclear Power Plants was the main 
factor influencing ecology and environment in the western area of Daya Bay, particularly for 
the benthos that directly impacted marine organism (Wang et al., 2008, 2011; Zheng et al., 
2001). Many changes had taken place in Daya Bay from 1982 to 2004, such as stony coral 
bleaching, changed in dominate species of coral community, seriously degraded and 
destroyed mangrove plants. These results indicated that the ecosystem of Daya Bay is 
undergoing a rapid deterioration in some areas and in some aspects. At the same time, some 
aspects of its ecological environment were recovering due to strategic protection and 
management steps for protection and management of coastal marine ecosystems in China. 
For example, the annual mean biomasses of benthic animals increased from 72.40 g m-2 of 
1996 to 1126.68 g m-2 of 2004 and the nutrient P decreased from 1985 to 2004. Daya Bay is a 
multi-type ecosystem mainly driven by human activities (Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011; Wu 
& Wang, 2007).  
The results of the present study indicated that the mean abundances of phytoplankton in all 
stations correlated positively with temperature, salinity, DO, pH, the ratio of TIN to PO4-P, 
NH4-N, NO3-N, TIN and PO4-P and negatively correlated with secchi, tubidity, SiO3-Si to 
PO4-P, and SiO3-Si and NO2-N by calculation with bivariate correlations. All stations could 
be groups into three clusters with Flexible-Beta Cluster Analysis method. Cluster I consisted 
of stations S1, S2, S7 and S11 in the south part and the northeast part of the Daya Bay. 
Cluster II consisted of stations S5, S6, S9, S10 and S12 in the middle and northeast parts of 
Daya Bay. Cluster III consisted of stations S3, S4 and S8 were in the cage culture areas in the 
southwest part of Daya Bay and in the northwest part near the Aotou harbor of the Daya 
Bay. The results also suggest that the nutrient and phytoplankton are good environmental 
indicators can rapidly image the changing water quality in Daya Bay, and this is the first 
attempt to analyze the water quality and phytoplankton characteristics in Daya Bay by 
multivariate statistics based on the investigated data in Daya Bay. The results of 
multivariate statistical analysis revealed that the temperature, dissolved oxygen, NH4-N and 
NO3-N could also play an important role in determining the density of phytoplankton in 
Daya Bay (Wang et al., 2006).  
The results of the present study indicated that the biomass of benthos at all stations 
correlated positively with temperature, DO, pH, NH4-N, SiO3-Si, SiO3-Si/PO4-P and 
chlorophyll a and negatively correlated with salinity, Secchi depth, COD, NO3-N, NO2-N, 
TIN, PO4-P, TIN/PO4-P and BOD5 by calculation with bivariate correlations between 
benthos and major physical and nutrient factors. All stations could be grouped into three 
clusters. Cluster I consisted of stations S1, S2, and S6 were in the south part of Daya Bay. 
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Cluster II consisted of stations S3, S4, S8 and S5 in the cage culture areas in the southwest 
part, the northwest part near the Aotou harbor and the northeast part near the Fenhe harbor 
of Daya Bay. Cluster III consisted of stations S7, S9, S10 S11 and S12 in the southwest, the 
middle and northeast parts of Daya Bay. The results also suggest that the nutrient and 
benthos are good environmental indicators that can rapidly image the changing water 
quality in Daya Bay. As a multi-type ecosystem Daya Bay seems to be mainly driven by 
human activities (Wang et al., 2008). The results revealed that temperature and nutrients 
could also play an important role in determining the biomass of benthos in Daya Bay (Wang 
et al., 2011).  
The warm water from the Nuclear Power Plants and waste water from the cage culture 
areas had greatly influenced ecological processes and the environment in this region 
according to changes in biomass of benthos and water quality at different stations in Daya 
Bay (Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011). Particularly the benthos was directly impacted as marine 
organisms, thus there is a need for more research about waste warm water from the Nuclear 
Power Plants and from cage culture areas affecting the regional ecosystem of Daya Bay 
(Wang et al., 2006, 2008, 2011; Wu et al., 2009, 2010). Furthermore the development of fish-
farming in Daya Bay should in future be controlled (Wu et al., 2009). According to the 
research of long-term changes of Daya Bay, regional coordination in protection and 
management of such vulnerable coastal marine ecosystems should be strengthened. The 
following strategic protection and management steps are recommended(Wang et al., 2008): 
(i) Enhance information dissemination and education to improve environmental protection 
awareness for people in the region; (ii) Strengthen the long-term monitoring of the marine 
environment and coastal ecosystems in Daya Bay, enhance the research of regional 
environmental capacity, and use that capacity to establish large-scale control of pollutant 
discharges; (iii) Promote the protection of coral reefs, mangroves, coastal ecosystem and 
regional biodiversity by carrying out scientific plans for resource use based on marine 
system functions; (iv) Strictly enforce regulations relating to the marine environment and 
fisheries from June to August in each year; (v) More research about the waste warm water 
from the Nuclear Power Plants for effecting the ecosystem of Daya Bay should be carried 
out. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter is a review of the microbiological leaching of uranium ores. Microbiological 
leaching has been use as an alternative approach to conventional hydrometallurgical 
methods of uranium's extraction. In the microbiological leaching process, iron-oxidizing 
bacteria oxidize pyretic phase to ferric iron and sulfuric acid, and uranium is dissolved from 
the ore due to sulfuric acid attack. If uranium in the ore material is reduced state and in 
involves tetravalent form and a redox reaction is involved whereby uranium oxidized to the 
hexavalent form. Future sustainable development requires measures to be taken to reduce 
the dependence on non-renewable raw materials and the demand for primary resources. 
New resources for metals must be developed with the help of novel technologies. In 
addition, improvement of previously existed mining techniques can be resulted in metal 
recovery by the sources that have not been of economical interest up to today. The metal-
winning processes based on the activity of microorganisms offer a possibility to obtain 
metals from mineral resources which are not accessible by conventional mining. Generally 
bioleaching is a process described as being “dissolution of metals from their mineral source 
by certainly and naturally occurring microorganisms” or “use of microorganisms to 
transform elements so that the elements could be extracted from a material when water is 
filtered through it”. However, there are some slight differences in definition: Usually, 
“bioleaching” is described as the conversion of solid metal values into their water soluble 
forms using microorganisms. Bacterial leaching is the extraction of metals from their ores 
using microorganisms. The capital costs are low compared to those for a smelter. 
Environmental pollution caused by mineral processing is a serious problem and on the 
other hand, microorganisms play crucial roles in biogeochemical cycling of toxic metals and 
radionuclides. Recent progresses have been made to understand metal–microbe interactions 
and new applications of these processes to the detoxification of metal and radionuclide 
contamination have been developed. It also suggests an opportunity to reduce of 
environmental and air pollution by sulphur dioxide. 
2. Historical review 
One of the initial reports in which leaching might have been involved in mobilization of 
metals is given by the Roman writer Plinius Secundus. In his works on natural sciences, 
Plinius describes how copper minerals are derived by means of utilizing a leaching process. 
In cold weather during the winter the sludge freezes to the hardness of pumice. It is known 
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from experience that the most wanted chrysocolla is formed in copper mines, the following 
in silver mines. The Rio-Tinto mines in southwestern Spain are usually considered the 
cradle of biohydrometallurgy. These mines have been exploited since pre-Roman periods 
due to their copper, gold, and silver values. However, with respect to commercial 
bioleaching operations on an industrial scale, biohydrometallurgical techniques had been 
introduced to the Tharsis mine in Spain 10 years earlier. As a consequence of the ban of 
open-air ore roasting and its resulting atmospheric sulfur emissions in 1878 in Portugal, 
hydrometallurgical metal extraction has been taken into consideration in other countries 
more intensely. In addition to the ban, cost savings were another incentive for development: 
Heap leaching techniques were assumed to reduce transportation costs, allowing 
employment of locomotives and wagons for other services. From 1900 on, no open air 
roasting of low-grade ore was conducted at the Rio-Tinto mines. The researchers conducted 
on microbial leaching indicate an increasing rate of recovery and solubility of metals in 
direct, indirect, Thiosulfate and Polysulfide mechanism, due to microorganism activity. The 
initial work on uranium bioleaching in the early 1950s was taken to prevent solubilization, 
but it soon became apparent that this process could be applied for a commercial scale to 
extract uranium for low-grade ores. During 1952 and 1953, the plant at Urgeirica started a 
uranium heap leaching process on a commercial scale. This is an early turning point in the 
microbiological leaching of uranium ores. 
Harrison et al. (1966) reported the role of the iron oxidizing Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans 
in leaching of uranium. The uranium ore was stacked in heaps, similar to dump leaching of 
low-grade copper ore, and leached using an acidic ferric sulfate solution at the Elliot Lake 
Mine, Ontario, Canada. The presence of the bacteria in the heaps was discovered and their 
role in maintaining oxidizing conditions by conversion of ferrous to ferric iron for extraction 
of the uranium was defined. Guay’s (1976) investigations showed that the effectiveness and 
efficiency of microorganism’s influence, such as Thiobacillus, requires the presence of 
certain amount of iron. He also conducted some research on mixing level, aiersion, and 
oxidation rate of iron that may affect uranium’s microbial leaching. He employed a specific 
type of microbes such as Thiobacillus in his study. Amongst the various parameters 
affecting the sufficiency of microbial leaching; he just focused upon the aforementioned 
parameters. Brierley (1980), one of the distinguished researchers in microbial leaching, has 
done a case study on uranium ore (coffinite and uraninite) in Gerantez mine in Canada .His 
investigation’s outcomes demonstrated a promising and positive effect of Thiobacillus 
ferrooxidans in climbing recovery  rate of  uranium. Cerda’s studies (1991) on Pitchblende 
ore in green-grayish shiest samples, collected from Spain’s mines, revealed a close 
relationship of pyrite and Chalcopyrite in reduction of acid consumption in microbial 
leaching, in comparison with  regular leaching. In continuous surveys carried out over on 
microbial leaching by different researchers. Gonzalez (1993) utilized column leaching, 
seepage and shaking table to study the effect of pyrite amount in uranium’s microbial 
leaching. His investigation’s results showed an augmenting trend of uranium recovery 
while there is an optimum amount of pyrite. Beyond the optimum level of pyrite, not only 
the pyrite presence is not beneficiary, but also it may introduce complicity in leaching 
process. He has also done some research on pH optimization, temperature, and stirred time. 
In a case study conducted by Junior (1993) on uranium ore in Figopira in Brazil, potentiality 
of microbial leaching in uranium recovery enhancement has been emphasized. Schipper’s 
(1995) study on two mines in Germany indicated the identification of microbe variety in 
 
Microbial Leaching of Uranium Ore 
 
293 
waste materials. The waste materials (low grade black Schist) consisted of 0.05% of uranium 
and 0.5 to 7% of carbonate. Sampling showed the microorganisms aerobic and anaerobic 
were present till 1.5 to 2 meter of surface depth and more than 99% of Thiobacillus 
ferrooxidans were present within this depth. In this study, there was no investigation on 
microbial leaching capability and identification of microbes was just concerned. Munoz 
(1995), dedicated researcher in uranium’s microbial leaching in Spain, has presented his 
research’s results in many published papers in Elsevier. Bioleaching process, mineralogy of 
uranium ore, bearing rock type, level of toxic material, and leaching variables are among the 
factors which have been probed by him. He has worked on pitchblende ore with 0.097 % 
uranium content. Leduc, L.G. (1997) studied ten different isolated of Thiobacillus 
ferrooxidans with regard to their degree of resistance to the metals copper, nickel, uranium, 
and thorium. The miscellaneous isolates had different susceptibilities to the tested metals, 
and moreover none of the metals had a stimulus effect. Uranium and thorium were 20 to 40 
times more toxic to ferrous iron oxidation than either copper or nickel. Mathur A.K. (2000) 
investigated the application of ferric ion as an oxidant and in combination with other anions 
such as ferric sulfate or chloride as a leachant is well accepted for recovery of metals, 
particularly from ores of copper, cobalt, nickel, zinc and uranium. Biogenically generated 
ferric sulfate that has been in vogue for many dump and heap leaching operations, to 
recover uranium and copper values. Hefnawy (2001) used fungi for Aloga uranium ore 
bioleaching in Egypt. The amount of uranium solubilized by A. terreus and P. spinulosum 
was increased by intensifying ore concentrations on the growth media, reaching its 
maximum at 4 % (w/v). Whereas, the highest percentage of uranium released by both fungi 
was obtained at 1 % (w/v), in this concentration the released uranium being 75 and 81.5% 
respectively for ore and 72.8 and 77.6% respectively for the second ore. The best leaching 
occurs when the final pH shifts toward acidity. The biosorption of released uranium by 
fungal Mycelium was also increased by augmenting ore concentrations on the growth 
media. Kalinowski and Oskarsson (2002) represented common ligand producing bacterial 
species (Pseudomonas fluorescens, Shewanella putrefactions and Pseudomonas stutzeri) 
were incubated in a chemically defined medium supplemented U-ore that had been exposed 
to natural weathering conditions for 30 years having a content of 0.0013 % U by weight. For 
comparison, non-leached uranium ore (0.61 % U by weight) from the same area were 
incubated by P. fluorescens and S. putrefaciens. P. fluorescens is the only species that thrives 
and manages to mobilize measurable amounts of uranium from the two ores. Despite the 
extensive increase in pH from 4.7 to 9.3 P. fluorescens supplemented with ore manages to 
mobilize 0.001-0.005 % of the total amount of U from both ores. The release of U was 
interpreted to be attributed to the production of pyoverdine chelators, which is a typical 
ligand produced by fluorescent pseudomonades, as U could not be detected in either sterile 
controls or in experiments with the two other bacteria. In Sumera Saeed (2002) investigation 
the bioleaching behavior of rock phosphate (Jordan imported) was studied using different 
strains of Aspergillus niger. X-ray diffraction analysis revealed the presence of fluorapatite 
[Ca2 (PO4)3F] as the main source of phosphorus. Average content of phosphorus in testing 
ore was 33.6% scanning electron microscope showed the presence of significant amount of 
phosphorus. Decrease in pH was observed due to organic acids produced by Aspergillus 
niger strains during growth on liquid media containing glucose. Akcil (2004) represented an 
investigation of the potential bioleaching developments in Turkey [27]. Bene Ditto (2005) in 
his study identified sulfur reduction bacteria in Brazil uranium mine water. This is basically 
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problem in Brazil nuclear industrial. Choi Moon-sung (2005), schist with 0.01 % U3O8 
content in S. Korea under study. He could reach 0.8 uranium recovery with use Acidbacillus 
ferrooxidans. Jong un lee (2005), the effects of several conditional factors on efficiency of U 
bioleaching via using an iron-oxidizer, Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans, from U-bearing black 
shale (349 ppm of U) were investigated. In the case inoculated with the cells, lower pH, 
higher redox potential and higher amount of aqueous Fe3+ than those of non-inoculated 
reactor observed until 200h. Such development of condition, which was facilitated by 
microbial activity, can enhance the rate and extent of U leaching from the solid substrate. 
3. Bioleaching mechanisms 
There are two major mechanisms of bacterial leaching. One involves the ferric-ferrous cycle 
(indirect or non-contact mechanism), while the other involves physical contact of the 
organism with the insoluble sulphide (direct or contact mechanism) and is independent of 
indirect mechanism. Originally, a model with two types of mechanisms which are involved 
in microbial mobilization of metals has been proposed: 
3.1 Direct mechanism 
Microorganisms can oxidize metal sulfides by a direct mechanism obtaining electrons 
directly from reduced minerals. Cells have to be attached to the mineral surface and a close 
contact is needed. Bioleaching of metal sulfides (MS) can be achieved in direct and indirect 
modes of bacterial metabolism. Figure 1 (a) shows a scheme of the reaction mechanism for 
the bio-oxidation of sulphide minerals-direct mechanism. The direct mechanism is given by:  
 MS+2O2MSO4   (1) 
Where M is a bivalent heavy metal.  
The following equations describe the “direct” mechanism for the oxidation of pyrite: 
 2FeS2+7O2+2H2O2FeSO4+2H2SO4   (2) 
3.2 Indirect mechanism 
The oxidation of reduced metals through “indirect” mechanism is mediated by ferric iron 
(Fe3+) originating from the microbial oxidation of ferrous iron (Fe2+) compounds present in 
minerals. Ferric iron is an oxidizing agent and can oxidize, e.g., metal sulfides and is 
chemically reduced to ferrous iron which, in turn, can be oxidized microbial again. In this 
case, iron has a role as electron carrier. It was proposed that no direct physical contact is 
needed for oxidation of iron. Figure 1 (b) shows a scheme of the reaction mechanism for the 
bio-oxidation of sulphide minerals-indirect mechanism. 
 4FeSO4+O2+2H2SO4 2Fe2(SO4)3+2H2O  (3) 
 FeS2+Fe2(SO4)33FeSO4+2S  (4)  
 2S+3O2+2H2O2H2SO4  (5) 
The indirect mechanisms can be demonstrated, i.e., for uranium leaching as follows: 
 UO2+Fe2(SO4)3UO2SO4+2Fe2SO4 (6) 
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However, the model of “direct” and “indirect” metal leaching is still under discussion. 
Recently, this model has been revised and replaced by another one which is not dependent 
upon differentiation between a “direct” and an “indirect” leaching mechanisms.  
 
 
(a)                                                              (b) 
Fig. 1. The reaction mechanism for the bio-oxidation of sulfide minerals (a) Direct 
mechanism -, (b) Indirect mechanism  
3.3 Thiosulfate mechanism 
The mineral dissolution reaction is not identical to all metal sulfides and the oxidation of 
different metal sulfides proceeds via different intermediates. This also has been recently 
reviewed. Briefly, a thiosulfate mechanism has been proposed for oxidation of acid insoluble 
metal sulfides such as pyrite (FeS2) and molybdenite (MoS2), and a polysulfide mechanism 
for acid soluble metal sulfides such as sphalerite (ZnS), chalcopyrite (CuFeS2) or galena 
(PbS). In the thiosulfate mechanism, solubilization is through ferric iron attack on the acid-
insoluble metal sulfides with thiosufate being the main intermediate and sulfate the main 
end-product. Using pyrite as an example of a mineral, the reactions may be represented as 
[35, 36]: 
 FeS2+6Fe3++3H2OS2O32-+7Fe2++6H+   (7) 
 S2O32-+8Fe3++5H2O2SO42-+8Fe2++10H+  (8) 
3.4 Polysulfide mechanism 
Polysulfide and elemental sulfur are the main intermediates in the “polysulfide mechanism” 
during oxidation of galena, sphalerite, chalcopyrite, hauerite, orpiment and realgar. The 
presence of iron (III) at the beginning of mineral degradation is an important prerequisite. In 
the case of the polysulfide mechanism, solubilization of the acid-soluble metal sulfide is 
through a combined attack by ferric iron and protons, with elemental sulfur as the main 
intermediate. This elemental sulfur is relatively stable but may be oxidized to sulfate by 
sulfur-oxidizing microbes such as Acidithiobacillus thiooxidans or Acidithiobacillus caldus 
according to reaction 11:  
 MS+Fe3++HM2++0.5H2Sn+Fe2+ (n2)  (9) 
 0.5H2Sn+Fe3+0.125S8+Fe2++H+   (10) 
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 0.125S8+1.5O2+H2OSO42-+2H+   (11)  
The ferrous iron produced in reactions (9), (10) may be reoxidized to ferric iron by iron-
oxidizing microorganisms such as Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans or bacteria of the genera 
Leptospirillum or Sulfobacillus. 
 2Fe2++0.5O2+2H+2Fe3++H2O  (12) 
The role of the microorganisms in the solubilization of metal sulfides is, therefore, to 
provide sulfuric acid (reaction 11) for a proton attack and to keep the iron in the oxidized 
ferric state (reaction 12) for an oxidative attack on the mineral. 
4. Influenced factors on uranium microbial leaching 
4.1 Diversity of microbial culture 
In general, types of microorganisms found in heap leaching processes are similar to those 
found in stirred tank processes, however, the proportions of the microbes may vary 
depending on the mineral and the conditions under which the heaps or tanks are operate. In 
processes that operate from ambient temperatures to about 40°C, the most important 
microorganisms are considered to be a consortium of Gram-negative bacteria. These are the 
iron- and sulfur-oxidizing Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans, the sulfur-oxidizing 
Acidithiobacillus thiooxidans and Acidithiobacillus caldus, and the iron-oxidizing 
leptospirilli, Leptospirillum ferrooxidans and Leptospirillum ferriphilum. Consortia of 
acidophilic thiobacilli and leptospirili are believed to be superior to pure cultures for the 
biological oxidation of sulfide minerals. Microbial diversity is extensive in acid mine waters, 
including uranium mine leaching solutions. While moderately acidophilic thiobacili is 
numerous, thermo acidophilic archaea, resembling Sufolobus and Acidianus, has been 
isolated from uranium-mine waste heaps. 
4.2 Mineralization of uranium 
Another important factor of bioleaching is the mineralization of the uranium. Table 1, 2 
show the results of different uranium ores which are subjected to bioleaching. According to 
this, oxides, phosphates, sulfates and carbonates are solubilized relatively convenient, while 
dissolution of silicates is difficult or even impossible. 
 
Solution ability Natural form Valence Uranium oxide 
Insoluble Uraninite IV UO2 
Little soluble - IV U2O5 
Little soluble Pitchblende IV,VI U3O8 
Soluble Carnotite VI UO3 
Table 1. The type of uranium oxides in nature [40]  
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Degree of bioleaching Chemical composition Uranium ores 
+ UO Uraninite 
+ UO-nHO Gummite 
+ CaUO-11HO Becquerelite 
+ (U,Ca,Ce)(Ti,Fe)O Brannerite 
+ (Fe,Ce,U)(Ti,Fe,V,Cr)O Davidite 
- U(SiO)-x(OH)xCoffinite 
- +  Ca(UO)SiO-6HO Uranophane 
- +  Mg(UO)SiO-6HO Sklodowskite 
+ Ca(UO)(PO)-12HO Autunite 
+ Cu(UO)(PO)-8HO Torbernite 
+ NH-UO-PO-3HO uramphite 
+ Cu(UO)(AsO)-12HO Zeunerite 
- +  K(UO)(VO)-3HO Carnotite 
- +  Ca(UO)(VO)-8HO Tyuyamunite 
+ (UO)(SO)(OH)-4HO Zippeite 
+ (UO) SO (OH)-12HO Uranopilite 
+ Cu(UO)(SO)(OH)-HO Johannite 
+ NaCaUOSO(CO)F-10HO Schroeckingerite 
+  Urano-oranic Compounds
+: easy , -: hard , + -: variable 
Table 2. Uranium mineralization and bioleaching. 
4.3 Country rock type 
The bioleaching process also depends upon nature of the country rock. If this is alkaline, it is 
probable that precipitates would be formed which would lead to causing problem to natural 
percolation of the leaching. This issue lowers the uranium yield because some pockets of ore 
are not attacked. On the other hand, when the country rock is acidic, acid consumption by 
the rock will be low. 
4.4 Nutrient element 
The quantity of nutrient element content in the country rock is an important aspect for 
microbial leaching. The solid medium should supply at least adequate minerals to 
microorganism growth of not being stopped. The presence of organic compounds (yeast 
extract) inhibited pyrite oxidation from Thiobacillus ferrooxidans. Certain metals presented 
in bioleaching environments can inhibit microbial growth; therefore, these metals cause 
leaching efficiencies to reduce. Based on dry weight, nitrogen is the most important 
following element after carbon for the synthesis of new cell mass. In commercial operations, 
inexpensive fertilizer grade ammonium sulfate is typically added to biooxidation tanks or 
bioleaching heaps to ensure that sufficient nitrogen is available. 
4.5 Toxic material and resistance to metals 
Additions of copper, nickel, uranium, or thorium adversely influenced iron (II) oxidation by 
Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans with uranium and thorium showing higher toxicities than 
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copper and nickel. Silver, mercury, ruthenium, and molybdenum reduced the rate of 
growth of Sulfolobus grown on a copper concentrate. Resistance to metal ions is a function 
of those thiobacilli tested to date. Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans is resistant to a variety of 
metal ions such as chromium, copper, zinc, nickel, thorium, uranium and mercury. The 
resistance of Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans to mercury is ferrous iron dependent.  
4.6 Temperature 
Temperature is among the most important parameters influencing the diversity of the 
microbial communities. Use of thermophiles was found to improve metal sulfide 
biooxidation in at least two ways. First, reaction rates increased with increasing 
temperature. Second, elevated temperature increased the extent of metal extraction from 
certain minerals. Bioleaching processes are carried within range of temperatures from 
ambient to a demonstration plant that has been operated at 80°C. Temperature ranges of 2-
35ºC and 4-21ºC, respectively, were observed. Moderately thermopiles iron-oxidizing and 
sulfur-oxidizing bacteria were initially cultured from mining environments and hot springs. 
However, psychrophiles have not been isolated from cold tailing effluents where they 
would be expected. The temperature used for bioleaching in most of studies is 35ºC. 
Although Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans was reported to grow most rapidly at 30ºC, it 
oxidised iron faster at 35ºC. This case has crucial implications for industrial bioleaching 
since the oxidation of sulphides is exothermic, and hence cooling may be essential to 
maintain a satisfactory industrial process. As it is expected the types of presented iron and 
sulfur-oxidizing microbes differentiation depending upon temperature range. The types of 
microbes found in processes operating from ambient to 40°C tend to be similar irrespective 
of mineral, as are those within the temperature ranges 45–55°C and 75–80°C. As described 
below, there are two broad categories of biologically-assisted mineral degrading processes. 
An ore or concentrate is either placed in a heap or dump where it is irrigated or a finely 
milled mineral suspension is placed in a stirred tank where it is vigorously aerated. In 
general, mineral solubilization processes are exothermic and when tanks are used, cooling is 
required to keep the processes that function at 40°C at their optimum temperature. At 
higher temperatures the chemistry of mineral solubilization is much faster and in the case of 
minerals such as chalcopyrite, temperatures of 75–80°C are required for copper extraction to 
take place at an economically viable rate. Table 3 shows a Classification of 
chemolithotrophic bacteria in terms of their optimum temperature ranges. 
 
Bacterial class Optimum temp. range /°C 
Cryophiles < 20 
Mesophiles 20-40 
Moderate thermophiles 40-55 
Extreme thermophiles > 55 
Table 3. Classification of chemolithotrophic bacteria in terms of their optimum temperature 
ranges. 
4.7 Pyrite content 
Pyrite plays a key role in many biooxidation operations. Its oxidation produces acidity, heat 
and dissolved iron. Pyrites vary greatly in their chemical and biological reactivity. It also is 
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associated with many ores, including zinc, copper, uranium, gold and silver. Pyrite is 
formed in a reducing environment with a continuous supply of sulphates and iron in the 
presence of easily decomposable organic matter. In general, microbiological leaching 
processes of uranium have been applied to the ores that contain accessory Fe-sulfides. The 
pyrite content of the ore is important and that is why this type of attack has not been widely 
utilized in extraction of uranium from its ores since the technology is limited to minerals 
with highly sulfide content. The ores from eastern Canada are especially susceptible to this 
kind of process since pyrites are associated with uranium. On the other hand the uranium 
ores along with low pyrite content are less suitable for microbial leaching .In this case, the 
suitable quantity of pyrite has to be added in medium. 
4.8 Hydrogen ion concentration (pH) 
Microorganisms that biooxidize sulfide minerals at low pH are resistant to acidic conditions 
and most heavy metals in process solutions. Typically, microbial cultures are pre-grown or 
adapted to a particular ore feed in the laboratory or pilot plant. From an industrial 
perspective it is essential that biomining microorganisms are able to grow at low pH and 
tolerate high concentrations of acid. Two important reasons for this are to enable iron 
cycling and to permit reverse electron transportaion to take place. The optimum pH for  
Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans is between 2-3, but when the substrate is in large part pyretic, 
the pH can reach extremely low values, (less than 1). This is because of the availability of 
abundant sulphur and the precipitation of ferric hydroxide when the solution reaches 
saturation. Acidithiobacillus caldus is a single mixotrophic species which can utilise sulphur 
or tetrathionate and yeast extract or glucose. Blais et al. (1993) have demonstrated that less 
acidophilic bacteria in sludge such as Thermithiobacillus tepidarius, T. aquaesulis, T. 
denitrificans, T. thioparus and other species formerly placed in Thiobacillus, may initiate the 
acidification to the point where the acidophilic species can take over. Acidophilic bacteria 
decreased the pH of a sulphur-containing synthetic salts medium to the level of 1.4-1.6 
during 10 days. Table 4 shows pH range for Acidithiobacillus culture. 
 
pH 
Range 
Optimum 
pH Microorganism 
2-4.5 3.5-4 Acidithiobacillus albertensis 
1.3-4.5 2.0-2.5 Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans 
0.5-5.5 2.0-3.0 Acidithiobacillus thiooxidans 
1.0-3.5 2.0-2.5 Acidithiobacillus caldus 
Table 4. pH range for Acidithiobacillus culture 
Mine spoils which were alkaline in nature (pH=9), with low sulphur content and a highly 
concentration of chlorides tended to be free of Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans. The limiting 
pH value for growth of Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans in rock material and drainage was 
found to be about 7.2. 
 
Nuclear Power– Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 
 
300 
4.9 Aerobic/anaerobic growth 
Aeration of the solution or slurry is important in all bacterial oxidation processes using 
obligately acidophilic bacteria cultures. if the oxygen concentration falls to low levels, less 
than 0.5 to 1.0 mg L-1 for processes carried out in stirred vessels, the culture will normally 
revert in to its lag phase and the bacterial process stop. A lack of carbon dioxide restricts the 
culture growth and could limit the rate and amount of reaction of the sulphide mineral. 
Acidithiobacillus species are strict aerobes with the exception of Acidithiobacillus 
ferrooxidans, which is a facultative aerobe. In the absence of oxygen, Acidithiobacillus 
ferrooxidans is able to grow on reduced inorganic sulphur compounds using ferric iron as 
an alternative electron acceptor. The volume of air that must be supplied is based on the 
sulfide oxidation required. For example, at Wiluna in Western Australia, about 8 t air was 
supplied per tonne of concentrate, at typical oxygen utilization efficiencies of 25%. Aeration 
of bioheaps can accelerate biooxidation reactions, reducing leach cycle time. Air may be 
delivered via a network of pipes installed in a gravel layer at the base of heaps.  
5. Microbial leaching and environmental 
Environmental pollution caused by mineral processing is a serious problem; however, 
microorganisms play crucial roles in bioremediation of toxic metals and radionuclides, and 
thus are very much involved in resolving such problems. In this technology, 
microorganisms or their constituents such as enzymes are used to degrade or transform the 
soil. Much progress has been made with regard to understanding processes involving 
metal–microbe interactions and new applications of such processes to the detoxification of 
metal and radionuclide contamination have been developed. Such processes also provide an 
opportunity to reduce levels of sulphur dioxide polluting the environment and air (Lioyd, 
2001, 2002, Morin, 2006). The Gram-negative eubacterium Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans is 
important for industry and ecology because firstly, it is capable of solubilizing metals from 
ores, such as copper, uranium, and cobalt, and decomposing recalcitrant gold-containing 
ores. Secondly, this bacterium is able to remove heavy metals from contaminated industrial 
effluents or soils and desulfurize fossil fuels to avoid corrosion and atmospheric acid 
depositions (Corinne Appia-ayme, 1999). Chemical approaches are available for metal 
remediation, but are often expensive to apply and lack the specificity required to treat target 
metals against a background of competing ions. In addition, such approaches are not 
applicable to cost-effective remediation of large-scale subsurface contamination in situ. 
Biological approaches, on the other hand, offer the potential for the highly selective removal 
of toxic metals coupled with considerable operational flexibility; they can be used in situ in a 
range of bioreactor configurations (Lioyd, 2001).  
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The performed investigation into microbial leaching signifies enhancing of metals recovery 
particularly gold, uranium, copper and zinc, due to microorganism activity in comparison 
with traditional leaching method. In parallel with the recovery augmenting, utilization of 
microbial methods as compared with ordinary method like roasting is more 
environmentally friendly and its cost will be less. Hence, commercial applications in South 
Africa, Australia, South America, Spain, India and china are increasing in the last two 
decades. In most of executed operations within laboratory and commercially scale, 
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autotrophic bacteria's have been utilized which belong to bacillus species. Nowadays, 
investigation on new and other microorganism, mixed culture and fungi's is underway in 
order to probe their function and viability. The appropriately microbe type selection is too 
important in microbial leaching operations because the rate of being successful is mainly 
dependent upon environmental conditions, characteristics of mineralogy, country rock and  
the requisite technique in a way that there might be different results due to using a microbe 
type for two similar minerals along with divergent environmental conditions. On the other 
hand, microbial leaching methods include miscellaneous techniques involving; in-situ, 
dumps, heap, vat and stirred which making use of each of them is dependent on the metal 
grade, time and capacity.  In order to secure the stable supply of raw materials for the 
industrial needs, it is necessary to develop noble recovery technology of valuable metals 
from refractory and low-grade mineral ore deposits, intermediate metallurgical products, 
and waste. Then, it is essential to find methods to treat the ores economically and 
environmentally to recovery valuable metal. The researches did on Microbial leaching 
indicating an increase in rate of metal recovery and solubility through direct, indirect, 
thiosulfate and polysulfide mechanism, due to microorganism activity. Generally, microbial 
leaching is able to process low grade and marginal ores, mining and industrial waste which 
couldn’t be processed by other methods including gravity, electrical, magnitude and 
physiochemical methods. Hence this capability causes mineral ores tonnage to increase. 
Another advantage of microbial leaching is to use of microorganism and metal metabolically 
and potentially in order to decrease water and land pollution and control environmental 
damages. Microorganism could help to selective solution of metals through penetrating into 
the molecular structure of the materials, breaking existing bond and forming free ions or 
new compounds. 
Regarding nature of uranium mineralization which are generally low grade in most cases 
(160 cases in the crust), and considering this fact that conventional processing methods 
won’t be feasible for this low metal content, researches conducted to microbial leaching of 
uranium ores such as oxides and phosphate like Pitchblende, Uraninite, Cafinite, Gomitite, 
Uranium shale.  
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1. Introduction  
Nuclear energy is the energy in the nucleus, the core of an atom. Atoms itself are tiny partic-
les of the universe. Nuclear energy can be used to generate electricity in nuclear power 
plants which currently satisfies about 35% of the European Unions’ electrical energy needs. 
As of January, 2011 there is a total of 195 nuclear power plant units (including the Russian 
Federation) with an installed electric net capacity of 170 Giga Watt (GW) in operation in 
Europe and 19 units with approximately 17 GW are under construction in six countries 
[ENS, 2011]. Nuclear power can be generated from the fission of uranium, plutonium or 
thorium and by the fusion of hydrogen into helium. In nuclear fission, atoms are split apart 
to form smaller atoms, releasing energy which is used to produce electricity. Today it is 
almost all uranium. Uranium is non-renewable. It is a common metal found in rocks all over 
the world. Natural uranium is almost entirely a mixture of two isotopes, U-235 and U-238. 
Digging natural uranium U-235 must be extracted and processed to fission in a reactor. 
Compared with U-235, U-238 cannot fission to a significant extent. Natural uranium is 99.3 
per centum U-238 and 0.7 per centum U-235. Therefore, nuclear power plants use enriched 
uranium in which the concentration of U-235 is increased from 0.7 per centum U-235 about 4 
to 5 per centum U-235. This enrichment is expensive and done in a specific separation plant. 
The U-235 used in today’s reactors seems to be available from natural uranium for a number 
of decades. But the key energy fact is that fission of an atom of uranium liberates about 10 
million times as much energy as does the combustion of an atom of carbon from coal 
[McCarthy, 1995]. 
Nuclear power plant reactors contain a core with a large number of fuel rods. Each of which 
is filled with pellets of uranium oxide, an atom of U-235 fissions when it absorbs a neutron. 
The fission produces two fission fragments and other particles that fly off at high velocity - 
about 80 per centum of the neutron absorptions in U-235 result in fission; the other 20 per 
centum are just (n, gamma) reactions, resulting in just another gamma flying about. When 
they stop the kinetic energy is converted to heat [McCarthy, 1995]. The heat from the fuel 
rods is absorbed by water which is used to generate steam to drive the turbines that 
generate the electricity. The steam withdrawn and run through the turbines controls the 
power level of the nuclear power plant reactor. Hence, nuclear power plants use nuclear fis-
sion for producing electrical energy.  
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Electricity generated in nuclear power plants does not produce polluting combustion gases 
like traditional coal and/or gas power plants, an important fact that plays a key role helping 
to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and tackling global warming especially as elec-
trical energy demand rises in the years ahead. Hence, nuclear power is back in favor, at least 
in political circles. Worldwide are 436 nuclear power plants in operation, and 47 under 
construction. 133 nuclear power plants are planned, and 282 are proposed. In total 898 
nuclear power plants will run in the near future worldwide. This could be assumed as an 
ideal win-win situation, but the other site of the coin is that the production of high-level 
nuclear waste (HLW) outweighs this advantage. Therefore, management and disposal of ra-
dioactive waste became a key issue for the continued and future use of nuclear power plants 
in the EU. Because the safe and sustaining disposal of HLW is not solved yet, of high 
political and public concern, and part of international research programmes. Thus the 
objective of this chapter is to highlight the state-of-the-art of possible concepts for safe and 
sustaining storage of HLW in geological disposals that are exist, are under construction, 
and/or under discussion. 
2. Nuclear waste  
Nuclear waste is a specific type of waste that contains radioactive chemical elements that do 
not have any practical purpose. Nuclear waste is produced as by-product of a nuclear pro-
cess like nuclear fission in nuclear power plants, the radioactive left over from nuclear 
research projects, and nuclear bomb production. But the largest source of nuclear waste is 
naturally occurring radioactive material as isotopes such as carbon-14, potassium-40, 
uranium 238, and thorium-232. If these radioactive elements are concentrated they may 
become highly enriched to be treated as nuclear waste. In general nuclear waste is divided 
into low, medium, and high-level waste by the amount of radioactivity the waste produces. 
The majority of nuclear waste belongs to the so called low-level nuclear waste (LLW) which 
has a low level of radioactivity per mass or volume. This type of waste is all-around, and 
can be estimated to be approximately 80 per centum of the overall nuclear waste. It often 
consists of items that are only slightly contaminated but still dangerous due to radioactive 
contamination of a human body through ingestion, inhalation, absorption, or injection. 
Hence, it should not be handled by anyone without training. LLW usually includes  
 material used to handle the highly radioactive parts of nuclear reactors such as cooling 
water pipes and radiation suits, etc.,  
 low level radioactive waste from medical procedures in diagnosis and treatments or x-
rays,  
 industrial waste which may contain , , or  emissions, 
 earth exploration in order to find new sources of petroleum, 
 industrial production like producing plastics,  
 agricultural products, most notably for the conservation of foodstuffs, etc. 
Not only LLW is still dangerous for the human body, also low-level radioactive material. 
Opposite to LLW nuclear power plants produce high-level nuclear waste (HLW) in their 
core that averages approximately 20 per centum of the total of nuclear waste. This waste 
depends on the rods (fuel elements) which includes large quantities of high level radioactive 
fission products and is generating heat. Also their extremely long half-live-time transuranic 
fragments (longer than 500,000 years) create extreme long time periods before the nuclear 
waste will settle to safe levels of radioactivity. Therefore, this nuclear waste at the very first 
is put in an intermediate and/or temporary storage facility, under strict safety conditions. 
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This facility normally is a large storage reservoir, a so called wet storage device, located next 
to the reactor. The wet storage reservoir is not filled with ordinary water but with boric acid, 
which helps to absorb some of the radiation given off by the radioactive nuclei inside the 
spent fuel elements. Within this large wet storage reservoir the high-level radioactive 
isotopes become less radioactive due to their decay and also generate less and less heat. 
Hence, the final disposal of HLW is delayed to allow its radioactivity to decay. Forty years 
after removal from the reactor less than one thousandth of its initial radioactivity remains, 
and it is much easier to handle. Thus canisters of vitrified waste, or spent fuel elements 
assemblies, are stored in large wet storages in special ponds, or in dry concrete structures or 
casks for at least this length of time. But this requires specific methods to handle the HLW. 
Some of the methods being under consideration include short term storage, long term 
storage, and transmutation. The longer the spent fuel element is stored in the intermediate 
storage facility, the easier it will be to handle. But many nuclear power plants have been 
holding spent fuel elements for so long that their reservoirs are getting full. They must 
either send the spent fuel elements off or enlarge their wet storage reservoirs to make room 
for more spent fuel elements. As the wet reservoirs are filled up a major problem occur. If 
the spent fuel elements are placed too close together, the remaining nuclear fuel could go 
critical, starting a nuclear chain reaction. Therefore, another method of temporary storage is 
used because of the overcrowding of wet reservoirs, which is the dry storage reservoir. The 
dry storage reservoir accommodates the HLW and putting it in reinforced casks or 
entombing it in concrete bunkers. This is after the HLW has already spent about 5 years 
cooling in a wet storage reservoir. The dry casks reservoirs are also usually located close to 
the reactor site. But for long-lived and HLW it is usually envisaged that this waste has to be 
placed in a final disposal facility, whatever this connoted. From the political perspective it 
seems there is no immediate economic, technical or environmental need to speed up with 
the construction of final geological disposal facilities for radioactive waste. Because the 
European Commission has prolonged the time schedule for their member states to develop 
their sustainable permanent HLW disposal facilities, which first were terminated for 2018. 
But now the year is 2030. With this in mind and from a sustainable development perspective 
– and if we do not want to pass the burden finding a permanent repository solution for 
HLW on the future generations – it has to be noticed that the temporary storage of HLW 
today is clearly not a satisfactory solution which with we can proceed for longer.  
3. Options for disposing nuclear waste  
The basic idea in long-term storage of HLW that is currently preferred by international 
experts consists of placing the waste in a depth of at least 500 metres below the surface in a 
stable geological setting, that has maintained its integrity, and will maintain its integrity for 
millions of years. The ambition is to ensure that the HLW will remain undisturbed for the 
few thousand years needed for their levels of radioactivity to decline to the point where they 
no longer represent a danger to present and future generations. The concept of deep geolo-
gical disposal is not new, it is more than 40 years old, and the technology for building and 
operating such repositories is now mature enough for use.  
As a general concept, the natural security afforded by the chosen geological formation is 
enhanced by additional precautionary measures. The wastes deposited are vast immobilised 
in an insoluble form, in blocks of glass for example [Donald, 2010; Lutze, 1988; Weber et al., 
1995], and then placed inside corrosion-resistant containers. Spaces between waste packages 
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are filled with highly pure, impermeable clay, and the repository may be strengthened by 
means of concrete structures. These successive barriers are mutually reinforcing and ensure 
that radioactive waste can be contained over the very long term. The main reason for relying 
on the deep geological disposal concept is based on the assumption that a geological 
environment is an entirely passive disposal system with no requirement for continuing 
anthropogenic involvement for its safety. It is assumed that it can be abandoned after 
closure with no need for continuing surveillance and monitoring. Thus, the safety of the 
deep geological repository system is based on multiple barriers, both engineered and 
natural, the main one being the geological barrier itself [OECD-NEA, 2003; Rao, 2001]. One 
option of disposing HLW which meets the above condition is the concept of a geological 
repository in the deep ocean floor, which is called seabed disposal [Carney, 2001]. It 
includes burial beneath a stable abyssal plain and burial in a subduction zone that slowly 
carry waste downward into the Earth's mantle. These option is currently not being seriously 
considered because of technical considerations, legal barriers in the Law of the Sea, and 
because in North America and Europe sea-based burial has become taboo from fear that 
such a repository could leak and cause widespread contamination [Nadis, 1996]. 
Another option of disposing HLW based on the above condition is the land-based waste 
disposal method of a geological repository in the deep rock, which is called the rock bed 
disposal. This repository concept can be realized as mined [Alexander, 2007; Loon, 2000; 
Miller, 2000] or borehole disposal [Anderson, 2004; Brady, 2009; Gibb, 1999; Gibb, 2005]. 
These repositories require as an essential boundary condition the option of recovering 
nuclear waste from the deep geological disposal during the initial phase of the repository, 
and during subsequent phases, which results in increased cost. But recovering nuclear waste 
provides a certain degree of freedom of choice to future generations to change waste mana-
gement strategies if they wish or if there is a need for.  
Based on the state-of-the-art in science and engineering [IAEA, 2001] geological repositories 
must be designed in such a way that it can be assumed that no radioactivity will reach the 
Earth's surface. Hence, environmental impact assessments must cover a 10,000 years 
analysis for worst-case scenarios, including geological and climate changes and inadvertent 
anthropogenic intrusion. These assessments maintain that even under those conditions the 
impact on the environment would be less than current regulatory limits, which in general 
are lower than natural [IAEA, 2006]. In 2007 a symposium on “Safety Cases for Deep 
Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Where Do We Stand?” [OECD_NEA, 2007] was 
organized by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), in co-operation with the European Commission (EC) 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to share experiences on  
 developing and documenting a safety case both at the technical and managerial levels,  
 regulatory requirements and expectations of the safety case, 
 progress made in the last decade, the actual state of the art and the observed trends, 
 international contributions in this field. 
Beside the existing concepts of man-made geological disposal facilities for long-lived waste 
another optional solution is to reduce the mass of long-lived, high-level waste using a 
technique known as partitioning and transmutation. Transmutation involves isolating the 
transuranic elements and long-lived radionuclide’s in the radioactive waste and aims at 
transforming most of them by neutron bombardment into other non-radioactive elements or 
into elements with shorter half-lives. The governments in some countries are investigating 
this option but it has not yet been fully developed and it is not clear whether it will become 
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available on a large scale. This is because in addition to being very costly, partitioning and 
transmutation makes fuel elements handling and reprocessing more difficult, with potential 
implications for safety. Cost is an important issue in radioactive waste management as 
related to sustainable development. If the nuclear industry did not set aside adequate funds, 
a large financial burden associated with plant dismantling and radioactive waste disposal 
would be passed on to the next generations. Henceforth, in most of the OECD countries, the 
costs of dismantling nuclear power plants and of managing long-lived wastes are already 
included in electricity generating costs and billed to end consumers; in other words, they are 
internalised. Although quite high, in absolute terms, these costs represent a small pro-
portion – less than 5 per centum – of the total cost of nuclear power generation. 
Today different waste management and disposal strategies exist which deal with all types of 
radioactive waste originating in particular from the operation of nuclear power plants and 
back end nuclear fuel element cycle facilities. Short-lived low and intermediate level 
radioactive waste, generated comparatively in large volumes, have meanwhile successfully 
been managed from the disposal perspective world-wide. But high level radioactive waste 
disposal is an unsolved problem today. Worldwide it is accepted and a consensus view to 
dispose HLW in deep geological formations for long term and safe radioactive waste 
management [IAEA, 2006]. On the one hand the depth for geological disposal of nuclear 
waste is seen several hundred meters’ below the surface in a mine, which is deemed as mi-
ned disposal concept. On the other hand the depth for a disposal zone is seen in much 
deeper depth. This depth can become achievable through boreholes in 1 to 6 kilometers’ 
underground, in hard rock, which is deemed as borehole disposal concept in nuclear waste 
management [Brady, 2009].  
4. National management plans disposing nuclear waste  
The ultimate disposal of vitrified wastes, or of spent fuel elements without reprocessing, re-
quires their isolation from the environment. The most favoured method is burial in dry, 
stable geological formations some 500 metres deep. Several countries in Europe, America 
and Asia are investigating sites that would be technically and publicly acceptable. But no 
country has yet established a workable, permanent and safe storage site for HLW or even a 
successful interim storage policy in place. A good overview on national HLW management 
plans can be found in [Wiki, 2011-1], to which is referred in the following paragraph, partly 
literally. 
The United States has 104 civilian nuclear reactors in operation today, generating 
approximately 20 per centum of the total electricity. Beside the 104 existing nuclear reactors 
1 nuclear reactor is under construction and 11new nuclear reactors are on the immediate 
horizon. Nuclear fuel and HLW is currently stored in the U.S. federal states at 126 sites 
around the nation. In 1978 the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) began studying Yucca 
Mountain, Eureka County, Nevada, to determine whether or not it would be suitable for the 
nation's first long-term (final) geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and HLW. Yucca 
Mountain is located in a remote desert on federally protected land within the secure boun-
daries of the Nevada Test Site in Nye County, Nevada. The depth of the nuclear geological 
waste repository will be between 200 and 425 m under surface. The host rock is volcanic 
tuff. Signing the Joint Resolution 87 on July 23, 2002, allow the DoE to take the next step in 
establishing a safe repository in which to store the United States nuclear waste. The DoE is 
preparing an application to obtain the Nuclear Regulatory Commission license to proceed 
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with construction of the repository. If the DoE receives a license from the U.S. Nuclear Re-
gulatory Commission to build and operate a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, it will 
begin shipping nuclear waste from commercial and government-owned sites to the 
repository sometime after 2017. But this opening date of 2017 is a best-achievable schedule 
because the Yucca Mountain is years behind schedule, and according to a new economic 
analysis, its construction may cost more than $50 Billion. For Yucca Mountain it is planned 
to use underground cavities with a connecting gallery to build up the log-term geologic 
repository storing the casks in horizontal galleries. The effectiveness of different technical 
barriers is under investigation. But the potential risk of this long-term geological repository 
can be seen by future trends in the global climate and earth quakes. Because it is not possible 
for computer models to precisely replicate all conditions of a realistic disposal facility. Thus 
the staffs of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) use abstraction to simplify the 
information to be considered in a performance assessment. The degree of abstraction has to 
reflect the need to improve reliability and reduce uncertainty. Nonetheless, it is important 
for the model to be sufficiently detailed to ensure that it yields valid results for the 
performance assessment. Hence, a suitable model is a compromise between mathematical 
difficulties attached to complicated equations and the accuracy in the final result. In general, 
there are two different approaches to obtain a model of a realistic disposal facility: 
1. Deductive or theoretical approach, based on the derivation of the essential relations of 
the disposal facility 
2. Empirical or experimental approach, based on experiment on the disposal facility 
Practical approaches often use a combination of both approaches, which might be the most 
advantageous way to precisely replicate conditions of a realistic disposal facility. 
However, the Yucca Mountain project [Mascarelli, 2009; YUCCA, 2008] was widely 
opposed, with some major concerns being long distance transportation of waste from across 
the United States to this site, as well as the possibility of accidents, and the uncertainty of 
success in isolating nuclear waste from the human environment in the long term range. Yet, 
in 2009, the Obama Administration rejected use of the site in the United States Federal 
Budget proposal, which eliminated all funding except that needed to answer inquiries from 
the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), “while the Administration devises a new 
strategy toward nuclear waste disposal” [OMB, 2010]. On March 5, 2009, the Energy 
Secretary told in a Senate hearing "the Yucca Mountain site no longer was viewed as an 
option for storing reactor waste.”[Hebert, 2009].   
As with many countries with a significant nuclear power program, the 18 operating nuclear 
power plants in Canada generated about 16 per centum of its electricity in 2006; Canada has 
focussed its research and development efforts for the long-term management of HLW on the 
concept of deep geological disposal. In 1975 the Canadian nuclear industry defined its 
waste-management objective as to "...isolate and contain the radioactive material so that no 
long term surveillance by future generations will be required and that there will be negligib-
le risk to man and his environment at any time. ... Storage underground, in deep imperme-
able strata, will be developed to provide ultimate isolation from the environment with the 
minimum of surveillance and maintenance.” [Dyne, 1975]. In 1977 a Task Force commissio-
ned by Energy, Mines and Resources Canada concluded that interim storage was safe, and 
recommended the permanent disposal of used nuclear fuel in granites’, with salt deposits as 
a second option [Hare, 1977]. This recommendation was echoed shortly afterward by a 
concurrent Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning [Porter, 1978; Porter, 1980]. 
Many European countries have studied the deep disposal of HLW concept for a long time. 
In 1983, the Finnish government decided to select a site for permanent repository by 2010. 
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With four nuclear reactors providing 29 per centum of its electricity, Finland in 1987 enacted 
a Nuclear Energy Act making the producers of radioactive waste responsible for its 
disposal, subject to requirements of its Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority and an abso-
lute veto given to local governments in which a proposed repository would be located. The 
Finnish Parliament approved the deep geologic repository Onkalo in igneous bedrock at a 
depth of about 500 meters in 2010, a huge system of underground tunnels that is being hewn 
out of solid rock and must last at least 100,000 years [Ford, 2010]. The repository concept is 
similar to the Swedish model, with containers to be clad in copper and buried below the 
water table beginning in 2020.  
In Sweden there are ten operating nuclear reactors that produce about 40 per centum of 
Sweden’s electricity. The responsibility for nuclear waste management has been transferred 
in 1977 from the government to the nuclear industry, requiring reactor operators to present 
an acceptable plan for waste management with a so called absolute safety to obtain an 
operating license. The conceptual design of a permanent repository was determined by 
1983, calling for a placement of copper-clad iron canisters in a granite bedrock about 1,650 
feet underground, below the water table known as the KBS-3 method an abbreviation of 
kärnbränslesäkerhet, nuclear fuel safety [Wiki, 2011-2]. Space around the canisters will be 
filled with betonies clay. On June 3rd 2009 Swedish government choose a location for deep 
level waste site at Östhammar, near Forsmark nuclear power plant. A legal and institutional 
framework of the Swedish radioactive waste management is described in [Berkhout, 1991]. 
France 59 nuclear reactors contributing about 75 per centum of its electricity. France has 
been reprocessing its spent reactor fuel since the introduction of nuclear power. France also 
reprocesses spent fuel elements for other countries, but the nuclear waste is returned to the 
country of origin. Disposal in deep geological formations is being studied by the French 
agency for radioactive waste management in underground research labs. Government in 
1998 approved Meuse/Haute Marne Underground Research Lab for further consideration. 
Legislation was proposed in 2006 to license a repository by 2015, with operations expected 
in 2025. Moreover, a good perspective of the French waste management strategy for a 
sustainable development of nuclear energy is described in [Courtois, 2005]. 
Nuclear waste policy in Germany is the most controversial. With 17 reactors in operation, 
accounting for about 30 per centum of its electricity, Germanys planning for a permanent 
geologic repository began in 1974, focused on the salt dome Gorleben. The site was announ-
ced in 1977 with plans for a reprocessing plant, spent fuel element management, and perma-
nent disposal facilities at a single site. Plans for the reprocessing plant were dropped in 1979. 
In 2000, the federal government agreed to suspend underground investigations for three to 
ten years, and committed to ending its use of nuclear power, closing one reactor in 2003. 
Meanwhile spent fuel elements have been transported to interim storage facilities at 
Gorleben, Lubmin and Ahaus until temporary storage facilities can be built near reactor 
sites. Previously, spent fuel was sent to France or England for reprocessing, but this practice 
was ended in July 2005. Meanwhile the exploration of the salt dome Gorleben is carried on. 
Moreover, the legal and institutional framework of the German radioactive waste politics is 
described in [Berkhout, 1991; Wellmer, 1999].  
Switzerland’s four nuclear reactors provide about 43 per centum of its electricity. ZWILAG, 
an industry-owned organization, built and operates a central interim storage facility for 
spent nuclear fuel elements and HLW, for conditioning LLW and for incinerating wastes. 
The Swiss program is currently considering options for the siting of a deep repository for 
HLW disposal, and for low & intermediate level wastes. Construction of a repository is not 
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foreseen in this century. Research on sedimentary rock is presently carried out at the Swiss 
Mont Terri rock lab. 
Great Britain has 19 operating reactors, producing about 20 per centum of its electricity. It 
processes much of its spent fuel elements at Sellafield where nuclear waste is vitrified and 
sealed in stainless steel canisters for dry storage above ground for at least 50 years before 
eventual relocate in a deep geologic disposal. In 2006 the Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management (CoRWM) recommended geologic disposal in 200–1,000 meters underground, 
based on the Swedish model, but has not yet selected a site. Moreover, the Britain radio-
active waste management politics is described in [Berkhout, 1991]. 
The Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) in Russia is responsible for 31 nuclear reactors 
which generate about 16 per centum of its electricity. In the long term, Russia is planning for 
a deep geologic disposal. Most attention has been endowed to locations where waste has 
accumulated in temporary storage at Mayak, near Chelyabinsk in the Ural Mountains, and 
in granite at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. 
In the People’s Republic of China, ten nuclear reactors provide about 2 per centum of 
electricity and five more are under construction. Geological disposal has been studied since 
1985, and a permanent deep geological repository was required by law in 2003. Sites in 
Gansu Province near the Gobi desert in northwestern China are under investigation, with a 
final site expected to be selected by 2020, and actual disposal by about 2050. 
The 16 Indian nuclear reactors produce about 3 per centum of electricity, and seven more 
are under construction. Interim storage for 30 years is expected, with eventual disposal in a 
deep geological repository in crystalline rock near Kalpakkam. 
The 55 Japanese nuclear reactors produce about 29 per centum of its overall electricity. In 
2000, a Specified Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act created a new organization to 
manage HLW, and later that year the Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan 
(NUMO) was established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry. NUMO is responsible for selecting a permanent deep geologic repository site, 
construction, operation and closure of the facility for waste emplacement by 2040 
5. Mining disposing concept of nuclear waste  
Geological disposals in deep geological formations as radioactive waste repositories have 
been recognized since 1957 [NAS, 1957]. Such deep geological sites provide a natural isolati-
on system that is stable over a long-term to contain long-lived radioactive waste. In practice 
LLW is generally disposed in near surface facilities or old mines. Compared with LLW HLW 
is generally disposed in host rocks that are crystalline (granite, gneiss) or argillaceous (clay) 
or salty or tuff.  The depth of these mined repositories is in between 300 and 700 m. 
In Germany, it is planned but not decided yet to dispose radioactive waste in a repository in 
deep geological formation several hundred metres below the surface in a salt dome. It is 
assumed that salt will be a natural barrier which is able to protect the environment from ra-
diation. Rock salt possesses particularly good isolating properties for radioactive, heat-
generating wastes. Henceforth, the investigation of repository sites in Germany concentrate 
on rock salt formations as a host rock which actually is the Gorleben project [Wellmer, 1999]. 
In northern Germany more than 200 salt structures are known with massive rock salt 
formations about 250 million years old at deep depths. Thus, the selection was quickly 
narrowed down to the 200 salt domes located in Lower Saxony in northern Germany. There 
was never a search for alternatives, such as those in granite or clay. Hence, the Gorleben salt 
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dome, with a mined depth of 840 m, was explored for decades. Since 1979, more than1.5 
milliards € has been conducted at Gorleben to determine whether the salt dome can be used 
to securely store the hot radioactive waste for hundreds of thousands of years.  
The hazardousness of radioactive waste decreases in time due to the radioactive decay. 
Nevertheless, in case of long-living nuclides the radiation after 100,000 years requires to iso-
late waste from the biosphere. Therefore, in long-term analysis periods up to 1 million years 
and more have to be considered. 1 million years is a very long time scale but from a realistic 
viewpoint man-kind is unable to forecasting within the same time period in the future. But 1 
million years are short compared with geological situations that can be traced back for 
several 10 or 100 millions of years. Therefore, the question rises whether the actual 
repository concepts can reliable be forecasted within the next 1 million years. 
Long-term safety analyses have been performed to estimate the radiological effects of the 
considered repository on the biosphere for the next 1 million years. For this purpose, assu-
med future events and processes such as the thermal expansion of the host rock, subrosion, 
gas generation or appearance of an ice-age, salt leaching in a salt dome, etc. are combined to 
scenarios and the consequences of these scenarios can be estimated by numerical simulation.  
A simulation study can be performed to test and/or optimize the behavior of engineered 
systems before construction. This help avoiding costly re-designs necessary due to fatal 
hypothetical errors, and ensuring cost-effective, high quality, and safe engineered solutions. 
The diversity and interdisciplinary nature and the intrinsic complexity of a conceptual 
approach of a geological disposal necessitate using computational modeling and simulation 
(CMS) to accomplish advanced and secure solutions. Using CMS in geological repository 
analysis requires data obtained from measurements at the real world system under test. 
Thus, building a model of a salt dome for scenario analysis require data sets obtained from 
(laser) measurements. Such data represent a scatter plot, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Laser data obtained from a salt dome scan after (Koerber, 2004; Moeller, 2005) 
The scatter plot dot distribution in Figure 1, which represents the measured data, can be 
applied for surface morphing in conjunction with NURBS (Non Uniform Rational B-
Splines). This result in solids that are closed surfaces or more usually poly-surfaces that 
enclose a volume, as shown in Figure 2.   
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Fig. 2. B-Spline representation of laser measurements obtained from a salt dome scan after 
(Koerber, 2004; Moeller, 2005) 
The special kind of B-Spline representation (NURBS) in Figure 2 is based on a grid of 
defined points Pi,j, which can be approximated through  bi-cubic  parameterized analytical 
functions as follows: 
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in which Ni,p and Nj,q represent the basis of a B-Spline, Si,j are the weighted control points 
with the weights i,j  : As the parameter values u and v can be chosen continuously, the 
resulting object is mathematically defined at any point, synonymic showing no irregularities 
or breaks. But there are several parameters to justify the approximation of the given points 
which change the look of the described object. Therefore, if needed, interpolation of all 
points can be achieved: 
 First, the polynomial order describes the curvature of the resulting surface or curve, gi-
ving the mathematical function a higher level of flexibility.  
 Second, the defined points can be weighted according to their dominance in accordance 
to the other control points. A higher weighted point influences the direction of the 
surface or curve more than a lower weighted. Furthermore, knot vectors u and v define 
the local or global influence of control points, so that every calculated point is defined 
by smaller or greater arrays of points, resulting in local or global deformations, 
respectively. 
NURBS [Cottrell, 2001] are easy to use while modeling and especially modifying is achieved 
by moving control points, which allows adjusting the objects by simply pulling or pushing 
the control points. Based on this concept a methodology to interpolate given sets of points is 
available. Using multiple levels of surface morphing, the multi-level B-Spline approximation 
(MBA) adjusts a predefined surface. Constraints like the curvature or direction at special 
points can be given and are evaluated within the algorithm. 
Mined repositories in salt often show salt deposits which have a layered structure as shown 
in the model of a salt mine in Figure 3, where alternating more or less potassium bearing salt 
rock layers appear. It is assumed that a leaching process occur in the salt mine under test 
which result in major structural changes in terms of instability of the cavern, erosion, and so 
on [Koerber, 2004; Moeller, 2005]. 
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    (a)                                              (b) 
Fig. 3. Salt leaching effect in a salt mine. Figure 3.a show three different salt rock layer and 
the mining shaft, figure 3.b additionally show the growth of a brine body after (Koerber, 
2004; Moeller, 2005) 
Characteristically for potassium bearing salt is that not just salt is leached resulting in some 
kind of salty water the so called brine. In fact a circulation process occurs, while certain 
components become leached, others drop out [Sander, 1988] and accumulate at lower level, 
masking the leaching process in that area. The composition of the brine constantly changes 
over time while interactions constantly take place between salt rock and solution. These 
dynamic interactions can be localized along the reaction surface between brine (fluid) and 
rock (solid), more basically between objects with different geochemical attributes. The 
direction and velocity of the solution can be described by vectors, determined by an under-
lying process model, which integrates the relevant parameters of all involved objects (rock, 
fluid, reaction surface, and so on). The leaching problem in the salt mine can be 
approximated based on data obtained from laser measurements and modeling based on 
NURBS. But this approach don´t optimally meet the requirements necessary to model the 
salt leaching process. Implicit geometry and CSG were no candidates, as well as subdivision 
and parametric models. It appears questionable whether the easily differentiable structure 
of parametric models or the arbitrary grid structure of subdivision models, justify the hassle 
expected from maintaining legal topology due to dynamic topology, which brings cell 
decomposition into the focus which fit well with the hydro-geochemical process as one cell 
can simply switch attributes from salt to brine without bringing topology into any trouble. 
One major concern in this investigation is that the reaction surface moves very slow, 
perhaps 1cm per cycle of the underlying process model, which would then be the required 
resolution for e.g. voxel. Hence, currently a model which combines cell decomposition and 
parametric properties by linking attributes not to voxel but to a regular grid of control 
points between which linearly interpolation is possible is in favor. This allows finer 
transition between control points/voxel without requiring more memory executing the 
model. Formally this is a linear solid B-Spline but since the control points lie on a regular 
grid, and the geometry thus is implicit, the similarities to voxel are obvious. First tests in 2D 
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show very good fits. Hence, Figure 4 shows the mimicked (no process model is used) 
leaching process in a salt mine, which does not highlight the hard edges which are typical 
for voxel.      
 
 
Fig. 4. Bilinear interpolating 2D cell decomposition of the investigation area in a salt mine 
with superposed leaching process after (Koerber, 2004; Moeller, 2005) 
Some issues, like embedding different objects in one geometrical model, identifying the 
reaction surface and deriving its differential properties still have to be too considered while 
analyzing what may happen in a salt dome if water became an important fact and leaching 
will be became a potential risk for stability of the salt dome under test.  
6. Borehole disposing concept of nuclear waste  
Boreholes occur when using drilling technique, which has been economically developed on 
the basis of long-year experiences of the rotary drilling method in the petroleum industry.  
Moreover, petroleum drilling costs have decreased to the point where boreholes are now 
routinely drilled to multi-kilometer depths. Research boreholes in Russia and Germany have 
been drilled to 8 – 12 km which are super or ultra deep. Boreholes with a depth of 3 – 5 km 
are called deep and with a depth of 5 – 7 km are the very deep ones. The risk when drilling 
rock at medium deep up to the deep depth in between 2- 4 km is stress which may result in 
a hole breakout through stress. Thus, stress breakout is a feature of deep wells particularly 
in strong rock. Hence casing throughout the full depth of the borehole is essential. Drilling 
at deeper depth up to 7 km has to bear in mind temperature as a risk factor. Another 
important issue when drilling deep boreholes are the resulting enormous costs. In a case 
study it was shown for 950 deep boreholes to dispose the entire 109,300 metric tons of heavy 
material inventory will end up in calculated costs of around $ 20 million per borehole, 
which sum up to approximately $ 19 billion [Brady, 2009].  
When drilling deep boreholes the achievable borehole diameter is depending on the drilled 
depth. This only allows a limited tailoring to suit the waste packaging. Because the deeper 
the depth the less the size of the diameter. At 8 km depth the size of the borehole will be 
approximately less than 0.5 m and in 1 km depth the borehole size can be more than 5 m. 
The foregoing mentioned drilling diameters suit with that which come up in the petroleum 
industry which raise the question are they adequate with the boreholes necessary for a HLW 
geological disposal. A deep borehole disposal of HLW which use off-the-shelf oilfield and 
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geothermal drilling techniques into the lower 1 – 2 km portion of a vertical borehole with a 
conic width of approximately 0.4 – 1.2 m diameter and 3 – 5 km deep, followed by borehole 
sealing, is described in [Brady, 2009]. This disposal at a depth of 3 – 5 km allows a 1 – 2 km 
long HLW disposal zone, as shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Deep borehole disposal schematic after (Brady, 2009) 
This 1 – 2 km long waste disposal zone can hold 200 – 400 HLW canisters. The canisters 
could be emplaced one at a time or as part of a canister string which represent a grouping of 
10 or 20 canisters. The design concept of this borehole concept is such that the borehole 
allows accommodating 34 outer diameter canisters. The borehole seal system will use a 
combination of bentonite, asphalt and concrete, at which a top seal will consist of asphalt 
from 500 m to 250 m, with a concrete plug extending from 250 m to surface.  
But the diameters for the borehole shown in Figure 5 are not comparable with the ones ne-
cessary to obtain a technology enhanced HLW geological disposal concept as described in 
the following paragraph of section 5 in this chapter. The background for the technology 
enhanced HLW geological disposal approach bear in mind that geological deep disposal 
involves sinking large diameter borehole 3 to 5 km down into the granitic basement of the 
continental crust, with containers of HLW in the bottom 1km or so, and scaling the hole 
above the deployment zone. This very deep in engineering terms is described as very deep 
borehole disposal [Gibb, 2005]. Thus, it is anticipated that deep borehole disposal will be on 
the under of 3 km deep, and necessitate at least a diameter of more than 10 m. This diameter 
is necessary for dumping the containers and retrieves the containers if needed. Both can be 
done if an elevator is embedded as part of the technology enhanced HLW geological dispo-
sal approach, because the elevator fit into the drilled diameter. The big advantages of such a 
deep borehole disposal, the same reason has been discussed by Brady [Brady, 2009], are that 
it avoid groundwater problems almost together and provides a far-field geological barrier of 
enormous strength. The geological barrier is the only barrier to any escape of radionuclides 
that can demonstrably survive on the timescale of millions of years [Gibb, 2005]. In order to 
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evaluate the system performance of a deep technology enhanced HLW geological disposal 
concept, it is necessary to adopt or develop a standard by which the performance can be 
measured. But the political decision in Germany to postpone the final judgment for 
implementation of a final HLW geological disposal only allows estimating the performance 
differences between the mined and the borehole geological disposal concepts. 
As assumed in the preceding paragraph of the borehole geological disposal concept HLW is 
embedded in mineral and ceramic crystalline lattices, such as zircon, cubic zirconium and 
monazite, encapsulated in deep boreholes deeper than 3 kilometer and up to five kilometers’ 
underground, in hard rock in order to overcome the uncertainties of the mined disposal con-
cept of a few hundred meters’ depth (300 – 800 m). Thus, the deep borehole disposal concept 
put HLW back inside the rocks from which it came as uranium. The depth of clearance of 
more than one to five kilometers’ is the most critical as one want to get to an area where the 
geology is stable and there is almost no water flowing. After filling the disposal in the 
foregoing mentioned depth of the clearance with high radioactive waste, boreholes would 
be backfilled and secured by rock welding or other techniques of at least 1 – 2 kilometers 
height, as described by Brady [Brady, 2009]. But the drilling technique of deep boreholes as 
described by Brady [Brady, 2009], which use off-the-shelf oilfield and geothermal drilling 
techniques, is not the technical approach introduced in this section of the chapter as 
technology enhanced HLW geological disposal approach. It is rather a flame melts tech-
nique which melts hard rock and it is assumed that this will allow borehole diameters of ap-
proximately 10 meters and more which will limit entry of water and migration of 
contaminants through the borehole after it is decommissioned. It is assumed that this 
concept is being safe to isolate HLW from the biosphere for a very long time, protecting both 
mankind and environment from radiation to its best possible extent, compared with the 
mining approach, described in section 4 of this chapter. 
Rock welding is the basic principle of a technology to sink vertical constructions or to drift 
horizontal driving, which has been developed at the Los Alamos Laboratories in New 
Mexico, U.S.A., in recent years, performing underground construction of non-specified 
extent. The achieved results showed that rock welding technology reached a three times 
higher performance than traditional drilling techniques by only causing 40% less costs 
[CGER, 1994]. But the staff of this research project report that this technique could not be 
employed near inhabited areas, since the energy source used to melt the rock was a nuclear 
reactor which would have contaminated the ground water in case of a disaster. To overcome 
this energy dependent problem, a research group with scientists from the Universities 
Hamburg, Germany, Košice, Slovak Republic, Brno, Czech Republic, in co-operation with 
the German-Czech Science Foundation (WSDTI), Germany, searched and studied an option 
on a rock welding technique which does not need a nuclear reactor as energy source for rock 
melting. The resulting technical principle is deemed as flame melting technique beneath 
extreme high pressure, temperature, and frequency. This approach replaces the nuclear 
energy source used in the borehole project using a rock welding technique in Los Alamos. 
This new technique is based on a cost effective high energy oxygen-hydrogen-mixture 
energy source. Based on this research work a first mock up assessment was carried out in 
support of implementation of geological disposal based on the flame melting technique 
concept to melt rock indicate amendatory against present mining geological disposal 
concepts. The necessary exploration to test the flame melting technique to melt rock material 
at the laboratory scale was accomplished at the Technical University Košice, and the 
Slovakian Academy of Science, Slovak Republic. This test site is led by the two Slovakian 
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Professores Felix Sekula and Tobias Lazar. For this purpose a flame jet pump system, 
buildup of cobalt, was developed. The crown of the flame jet pump system is covered by a 
200 µm thick ceramic coat of hafnium nitride. The head base of the jet pump system has an 
outflow nozzle by which the oxygen-hydrogen gas mixture flow through and melts the rock 
by means of the burning flame. Rock boulders with the dimension of 0.5 m³ were used to 
melt rock by means of the burning flame. At this laboratory scale holes of approximately 70 
mm diameter could be realized.  The flame jet pump system melt holes in the rock boulder 
in such a way, that the burned waste package could disappear through the melted 
chambers, as shown in Figure 6. In this laboratory investigation the average penetration rate 
achieved was 7 mm/sec. Investigating the flame melted holes show that no disjoining 
pressure have occurred under the head of the jet pump system. However, radial cracks of 
such dimension occur that the rock boulders collapse in the final stage. Thus, the melted 
rock could pass through the melted chambers into the radial cracks, which has been kept in 
several records. Moreover, inspecting the flame melting rock boreholes show at several 
areas a special crust within the ambiance of the melted chambers as well as at the collapsed 
probes. At this laboratory scale holes of approximately 70 mm diameter the radial cracks are 
not developed through a disjoining pressure which happened in the Los Alamos test bed in 
the real rock massive, rather than thermal force. Thermal force generates radial cracks in the 
direction of the free areas of the rock boulder.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Laboratory test bed of the flame melting technique (with permission of Professors 
Lazar and Sekula, Technical University of Košice, Slovak Republic)  
The flame jet pump system injection head is shown in Figure 7. 
In general, for both concepts, the mined one in salt rock and the borehole one in hard rock, it 
is assumed that one can thus safely isolate the higher radioactive waste from the biosphere 
for a very long time, protecting both man and environment from radiation to the best 
possible extent. Before it can be determined whether a potential location really is suitable to 
be a site for a long term disposal, all aspects of the overall situation regarding the geological 
disposal has to be investigated. Thus, one has to investigate in particular the effectiveness of 
the geological and geotechnical barriers and design a coherent long term management of a 
higher activity radioactive waste concept.  
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Fig. 7. Laboratory version of the flame jet pump system injection head (with permission of 
Professors Lazar and Sekula, Technical University of Košice, Slovak Republic)  
For this reason a principle concept as basis for a repository that permit embedding elevators 
in the large diameter borehole and, provided that the security barriers are arranged in a 
suitable way, allowing retrieval from the final repository of the containers installed in the 
smaller boreholes, is shown Figure 8. This assumption is due to the consensus view that at 
first repositories will be designed for retrievable storage; but there is often a clear implica-
tion that if, after a suitable period, there are no technical difficulties and the political climate 
permits, the system of tunnels and access shafts will be scaled up and the repository will 
become a disposal. As it can be seen in Figure 8 big borehole diameters in rock massive only 
will melt the borehole border while the kernel will be mechanical removed. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Deep borehole disposal concept with borehole-border-melting dimensions 
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The great advantage of this type of disposal is that it prohibits groundwater problems and 
almost a far-field geological barrier of enormous strength. The geological barrier is the only 
barrier to any escape of radionuclide’s that can demonstrably survive on the timescale of 
millions of years. In contrast to the very active groundwater flows at conventional 
repository depth R in Figure 9, the migration of intra-rock aqueous fluids becomes 
increasingly sluggish with depth.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Conceptual model for a very deep borehole disposal of high level radioactive waste, 
after  Chapman and Gibb, 2005) 
At depth of 4 to 5 km in the granite basement, hydraulic conductivities tend to be less, and 
often much less than 10-11 meters per second, i.e. fluids migrate at most a few hundreds of 
meters in a million years. Due to this ultra-less risk in groundwater contamination by 
radionuclides one has to achieve water tightness of the storage caverns as most important 
ancillary condition. Assuming that a drilling techniques exist with a sufficient melting of 
granite than the solid rock will become individually melted in the cavers as well as in the 
shaft to preserve the integrity of the container and that the melt will recrystallize completely 
to holocrystalline granite on a time scale appropriate to the thermal decay of the high level 
radioactive waste. Henceforth, from the consensus point of view a proof is needed to show 
that the cracks already present in the host rock and the cracks created there by melting are 
completely closed against high pressure by the rock melt, down to sufficient depth.  
Nevertheless, several main problems are unsolved to date melting solid rock like granite, 
based on the flame melting technique beneath extreme high pressure, temperature, and 
frequency, which conduct a bunch of questions. These questions refer to the knowledge 
gained in our previous research work and are focused on the very details to achieve such a 
deep borehole with the flame melt technique due to expected constraints, which we are 
aware. Hence, the questions are answered based on the knowledge to date. 
Whichever reactions occur if large quantities of water appear during the melting process? 
For a consensus answer at the very first it is necessary being aware that: 
 before go for flame melting of solid rock like granite, precise geological and hydro-
geological investigations are necessary to select the appropriate location of the 
geological repository. 
Assuming that this has been done as part of the consensus view, the question thereafter can 
be answered referring to state of the art knowledge based on facts like: 
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 temperature of the melted rock is in between 1400 and 1800°C, 
 temperature of the melting flame is approximately 2530°C, 
 water has a temperature gradient of 1°C per 33 m depth; which result for a depth of 
2000 m in a water temperature of 66°C; with the precondition that are no aquifers at this 
location, 
 flame melting can be used if and when water inflow from cracks exist, which can be the 
case in solid rock, as well as additionally generated through the melting temperature, 
 evaporating the melted product the water detract energy, but as an additive impact  the 
water vapour pressure acts in a reinforcing manner on the melted product, 
 water evaporates incremental, 
 water vapour – dissociated due to the temperature of H2 and O –, press the melted 
product into the existing fissures and cracks, while the melting flame is continuously 
burning (temperature approx. 2530°C) – can also burn below water surface level –, 
 no chemical reaction between the water and the melting flame itself has to be 
considered, 
 in case of substantial water inflow from cracks, additional special waterproofing 
procedures are needed. Thus, potential geological repository locations without cracks 
should be chosen as far as possible, 
 high temperatures in the rock, e.g. due to aquifers, have a reinforcing impact on the 
melting process, because less energy is needed to melt solid rock.  
Is the vitrified rock seam around the melted hole hydraulically tight? 
A consensus answer depends on the decision on the location selected for the flame jet pump 
system drilled deep borehole and its depth: 
 apart from the cracks, the rock seam must be hydraulically tight without the melted 
products, which can be determined by sample drillings on the location selected for the 
the flame jet pump system drilled deep borehole,  
 melted products closes the cracks in the rock, and closes the pores of the rock seam, 
 quantity of melted products can be regulated by the melting flame, 
 thermo-shock tests are needed to determine the depth of crack closure.  
How melted holes in solid rock must to be filled for hydraulic tightness? 
A consensus answer relates on both, the cracks and the bed of the flame melted hole in solid 
rock: 
 depth of crack to be filled with melted products can be determined by non-destructive 
measurement devices such as sound measurements, with can additionally be supported 
by  drillings, 
 tightness of the bed of large flame melted bore holes is determined by test drillings, 
 tightness of completed cavities can be determined by means of water pressure tests. 
What is the long-term behavior (ageing) of the solidified melt? 
In general, solid rock has a crystalline structure, and the melted products will recrystallize 
completely to holocrystalline granite on a time scale appropriate to the thermal decay of the 
HLW. Henceforth, from a consensus view it can be assumed that on the long scale the same 
long-term behaviour of the real rock massive will happen, because both of which are based 
on the same primary elements, what has been investigated in a previous research study 
[Rybar, 2004]. 
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What influence has the chemical milieu i.e. the chemical composition of the rock and the fissure water 
on the solidified melted products? 
From a consensus view it can be assumed: 
 influences on the solidified melted products are the same as the influences on the real 
rock massive, 
 aggressive substances do not influence the chemical milieu in the granite rock, since 
they only occur in small quantities, 
 no bacteriological influences can be found at the intended depth. 
How will long-tern bonding of filling material influence the vitrified rock? 
From a consensus view it can be assumed: 
 bonding of the filling material of the vitrified rock seam will not occur, 
 retrieving stored containers from the geological repository may have a huge impact on 
filling the cavities of the repository which can make this process difficulty. Thus, at the 
very early beginning, one has to investigate the interactions that cohere with this option 
very carefully. 
What is the cooling behavior of the solidified rock melted products (contraction cracks)? 
From a consensus view it can be assumed: 
 cool down process of the melted products is very slow because of the low thermal 
conductivity e (e = 0.25 to 0.73 W(m°C)), 
 thermo-shock tests will provide detailed knowledge, 
 possible appearance of contraction cracks due to thermal tensions are to be closed by 
subsequent injections. 
How far does the melted rock penetrate into the open fracture system of the rock, and what are the 
factors determining the penetration depth? 
From a consensus view it can be assumed, referring to:  
 published results from flame melting tests of the Los Alamos geological disposal project 
in the United States, show in near to the surface cavities that thermally induced cracks 
may have a length of up to 600 times of  the drilling hole diameter (< 100 mm), using 
the traditional rotary drilling method, 
 to date knowledge that the penetration depth of melting material depends on its 
viscosity and the quantity which can be regulated by the flame melting process. 
Demonstrations’ or estimates of radiation damages at vitrified rock? 
From a consensus view it can be assumed: 
 tests at nuclear power stations reactors currently in operation show satisfactory results 
in their concrete structures with different rock aggregation materials (a precondition for 
their construction approval), 
 in nuclear power stations, the kinetic energy of the neutrons is also slowed down by 
water – which is also possible with the cavities assembled by melted rock, 
 apart from this, the radiation detection methods used in radiation measurement can 
also be used. 
In view of the foregoing preliminary answered questions the operational improvements for 
supporting final radionuclide’s disposal research and technological development can be 
estimated and valuated. Furthermore, an economic assessment can be carried out to support 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 
 
326 
implementation of a geological repository for HLW based on the flame melting technique 
concept, as well as a mathematical risk calculation. A risk is mathematically defined by the 
number of potential hazards. The number of potential hazards can be described through the 
arithmetical average over an expectation, which represent the conjunction of products of a 
quantitative indication of possible consequences such as the extent of a claim and the claims 
amount as well as the quantitative indication of the probability, considering the de facto 
incidence of the consequence of a claim.  The risk analysis formula is: 
 R H S   
with R: risk of the expectation, H: probability of the eventuate of the incidence, S: normative 
dimension of claim. 
This formula allows calculating possible impacts of claims quantitatively, expressed through 
the probability, which allow comparing potential risks.  
Referring to borehole geological disposals the risk analysis allows calculating possible 
impacts of borehole geological disposals on the civilization quantitatively, expressed 
through the probability, which allow comparing potential risks, which is essential for 
planning safety related arrangements.  The goal is to keep the potential risk as minor as 
possible (minimization). By means of physical simulation possible variations of initial and 
boundary conditions can be embedded to analyze varying safety related arrangements with 
their specific risk to calculate the pros and cons of technical arrangements and their costs. 
But the essential risk analysis for borehole geological disposals require quite more than the 
quantitative approach described before, it also need a qualitative approach.   
The quantitative risk analysis for borehole geological disposals requires a scenario planning 
and analysis with adequate initial and boundary conditions, to run simulation case studies. 
Thus, a scenario analysis can be performed to predict possible future events of a given entity 
considering alternative possible outcomes, assuming changing scenarios but inherently 
consistent constraints,  for improved decision-making, that require as prerequisite a scenario 
planning, a method based on simulation runs for decision making. This runs combine 
known facts about the future, with plausible alternative trends that are key driving forces. 
Hence, the quantitative risk analysis leads to the definition of scenarios with adequate 
constraints, which run as respective physical model of the borehole geological disposal, to 
predict the needs and expectations of safety related arrangements. With ongoing progress of 
the borehole geological repository project the physically defined scenarios can be adapted to 
the major information density available and being used for the whole project duration up to  
bringing the borehole geological disposal into service. 
7. Conclusion  
This research work demonstrate the fundamentals of the mined and borehole geological 
repository approaches for high level radioactive waste with reference on the actual situation 
of national management plans disposing nuclear waste. These plans are of interest for 
deciding about the structural approach developing a geological disposal and the possible 
disposing sites which have been taken into account. For a mining disposal concept the 
problem of salt leaching is described in detail, referring to NURBS as an option to model the 
dynamic process of salt leaching mathematically. Beside the mining concept the borehole 
approach is demonstrated. One borehole approach is based on deep depth but a small 
borehole diameter of about 1 m. The drilling technique applied is based on the long-year 
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experiences of the rotary drilling method in the petroleum industry. The second 
demonstrated borehole approach is focused on deep depth too but with a bigger diameter of 
about 10 m. The drilling approach used in this study is a rock welding principle to sink 
vertical constructions which has been developed at the Los Alamos Laboratories in New 
Mexico, U.S.A.  But the energy source used to melt the rock in the Los Alamos project was a 
nuclear reactor which would have contaminated the ground water in case of a disaster. To 
overcome this energy dependent problem a flame melting technique beneath extreme high 
pressure, temperature, and frequency has been developed and is demonstrated. Based on 
the research work described in this chapter a first mock up assessment was carried out in 
support of implementation of geological disposal based on the flame melting technique 
concept to melt rock. The main advantages of the research work are: 
 demonstration of to date existing approaches to support implementation of geological 
repositories, 
 complementary approach to support the implementation of geological repositories in 
Europe, 
 demonstration of  a technology enhanced approach to support implementation of 
geological repositories, 
 collaborative research work at the European level. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper addresses to the problems related with protection of the existing and advanced 
nuclear fuel types against unauthorized proliferation via introduction of some admixtures 
into their composition. So, the task may be defined as follows: these admixtures must create 
the barriers difficult to overcome for the use of nuclear fuels in nuclear explosive devices 
(NED) but, at the same time, these admixtures must preserve (or even enhance) energy 
potential of nuclear fuels for further peaceful use at civilian nuclear power plants (NPP). 
Such an approach to proliferation protection of nuclear fuels is often called as an isotopic 
denaturing. The term “isotopic denaturing” is used to designate any artificial changes in 
isotopic composition of chemical element which can give some new desirable properties to 
this element. 
2. Protection of nuclear materials in fuel cycle against unauthorized 
applications 
As is known, main raw materials for NPP are natural uranium and thorium. Natural 
uranium contains 0.71% 235U, and self-sustainable chain fission reaction (CFR) may be 
maintained by thermal neutrons provided rather large amounts of uranium, graphite or 
heavy water are available. As for natural thorium, there are no fissile isotopes, like 235U, in 
its composition at all. So, manufacturing of a small-size NED with uranium charge requires 
application of isotopic enrichment in order to produce highly enriched (weapon-grade) 
uranium (HEU, 90-95% 235U). Some artificial fissile materials (plutonium or 233U) can be used 
as a nuclear charge but they may be produced only under neutron irradiation of natural 
uranium or thorium in nuclear reactors. 
At present, nuclear reactors apply uranium fuels of various enrichments. So, isotopic 
composition of uranium-based fuel for civilian NPP takes an intermediate position between 
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natural uranium and HEU. Conversion of civilian uranium fuel into HEU, or weapon-grade 
uranium, requires application of isotopic re-enrichment operations. 
Plutonium, suitable element for NED, is produced by nuclear reactors in the process of their 
operation. As is known, weapon-grade plutonium (WGPu) consists mainly of 239Pu with 
small content of 240Pu (4-7%) and negligible amounts of heavier plutonium isotopes. WGPu 
may be produced in the special reactors with short irradiation cycle. Power reactors at NPP 
are operated with relatively long irradiation cycle and, thus, with high fuel burn-up. So, 
plutonium produced in power reactors (reactor-grade plutonium, RGPu) contains the larger 
amounts of heavier plutonium isotopes. Lengthy irradiation of uranium fuel can change 
significantly isotopic composition of uranium (in particular, isotopes 232U and 236U do 
appear). As an example, isotopic composition of uranium fuel (initial enrichment - 4.4% 
235U) after LWR operation up to fuel burn-up of 4% HM is presented in Table 1. Thus, 
uranium fuel may be used to produce fissile materials, suitable for NED, in nuclear reactors 
but it requires application of some special operations. 
 
Composition of fresh fuel Composition of uranium and plutonium in spent fuel, % 
(fuel burn-up - 4 % HM) 
4.4 % 235U Uranium 232U 235U 236U 238U  
1.410-9 1.26 0.59 98.15  
Plutonium (RGPu) 238Pu 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu 
1.7 58.0 22.3 12.3 5.7 
Table 1. Isotopic compositions of uranium and plutonium in spent LWR fuel 
Artificial fissile uranium isotope 233U, high-efficiency material for NED, may be produced by 
neutron irradiation of natural thorium. However, undesirable by-products are generated in 
this process including other uranium isotopes, namely 232U, 234U and 236U. In particular, light 
uranium isotope 232U can complicate significantly any operations with produced uranium. 
Radiochemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) includes extraction of radioactive 
fission products (FP) whose intense emission of ionizing radiation creates a protective 
barrier against unauthorized access to fissile materials. So, SNF reprocessing can be 
regarded as an operation which can remove (or, at least, weaken under incomplete 
purification) the radiation barrier. SNF partitioning into separate elements or groups of 
elements can facilitate diversion of fissile materials. In order to reduce the diversion risk, 
appropriate protective actions should be undertaken. In addition to the organizing measures 
related with physical protection of nuclear enterprises and technological control, the 
following barriers against diversion of fissile materials should be considered: 
1. Radiation barrier mainly formed by FP. Such a barrier can be formed in the process of 
the reactor operation and by a special short-term irradiation of fresh fuel assemblies in 
the dedicated nuclear facilities. Radiation background of fissile materials is one else 
component of the radiation barrier. 
2. Incomplete SNF purification from radioactive FP can result in intense radiation fields 
which make very difficult any further operations with extracted fuel. 
3. Isotopic dilution of 235U, i.e. the use of relatively low-enriched uranium (LEU). 
4. Incomplete separation of uranium from plutonium (or full exclusion of any 
technological procedures needed for uranium-plutonium separation) in the course of 
SNF reprocessing. This measure makes it impossible to use these materials directly in 
NED. 
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5. Application of automatic remote technology for fuel, fuel rods and fuel assemblies 
fabrication. This measure can complicate access to fissile materials. 
6. Dilution (or denaturing) of fissile materials by their isotopes which can complicate the 
use of fissile materials in NED. A particular case of isotopic denaturing is a well-known 
dilution of 235U by 238U, i.e. the use of LEU fuel. Another example: neutron irradiation of 
mixed uranium-thorium fuel in nuclear reactors can produce fissile isotope 233U 
isotopically diluted by 238U. 
If we consider fissile plutonium isotope 239Pu, then the heavier plutonium isotopes (mainly, 
240Pu) play the same role of isotopic diluents. In addition, light plutonium isotope 238Pu is an 
intense source of spontaneous fission neutrons and intense source of thermal energy from 
-decays (half-life of 238Pu is equal to 87.7 years). 
In thorium fuel cycle the same role may be played by 232U (half-life – 68.9 years). 
In practice, the measures listed above may be used in combinations. For example, open fuel 
cycle of power LWR is provided with the following protective barriers: 
 Isotopic dilution (LEU fuel). 
 Intense radiation background caused mainly by FP. 
 SNF contains non-separated mixture of uranium and plutonium. 
Just this set of protective barriers represents a basis for the USA standard on SNF 
proliferation protection (Spent Fuel Standard (USA National Academy of Sciences, 2000)). 
As 232U and its neutron predecessor 231Pa are nuclides of low abundance, it seems reasonable 
to consider their properties in detail. 
3. Nuclear properties of 232U and 231Pa 
Basic nuclear properties of main uranium isotopes are presented in Table 2 (Reilly et al., 
1991; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 1997). As it may be seen, some nuclear properties of 
232U make it a valuable material for proliferation protection of uranium-based nuclear fuel. 
 
 232U 234U 235U 238U 
Half-life, years 68.9 2.45105 7.04108 4.47109 
Specific yield of -particles, 
1/(gs) 
81011 2.3108 7.9104 1.2104 
Mean energy of -particles, 
MeV 
5.3 4.76 4.4 4.19 
Specific yield of spontaneous 
fission neutrons, 1/(g s) 
1.3 5.0210-3 2.9910-4 1.3610-2 
Fission cross-section 
(En  0.0253 eV), barns 
77.15 0.465 583.2 1.210-5 
Table 2. Basic nuclear properties of main uranium isotopes 
232U is a starting isotope for chain of radioactive decays, and some 232U decay products (208Tl, 
212Bi) emit high-energy gamma-radiation (2.6 MeV and 1.8 MeV, respectively) that improves 
detectability of 232U-containing nuclear materials (Gilfoyle & Parmentola, 2001) and 
complicates radiation conditions, especially for any unauthorized actions. Nuclear 
properties of main 232U decay products are presented in Table 3. 
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Decay products 228Th 224Ra 220Rn 216Po 212Bi 212Po 
Half-life 1.91 years 3.62 days 55.6 
sec 
0.145 sec 1.01 hours 310-7 sec 
Energy of -particles, 
MeV 
(relative intensity) 
5.42 
(71.7%) 
5.34 
(27.6%) 
5.69 
(94.9%) 
5.45 (5.1%) 
6.29 
(100%) 
6.78 
(100%) 
6.09 (9.7%) 
6.05 
(25.2%) 
8.78 
(100%) 
Table 3. 232U decay products, emitters of -particles 
Like 238U, isotope 231Pa can play a role of a fertile nuclide which is not split by thermal 
neutrons but promotes breeding of fissile materials. Dependencies of radiative capture 
cross-sections on neutron energy are presented in Fig. 1 for isotopes 238U and 231Pa. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Dependency of radiative capture cross-sections on neutron energy for 238U and 231Pa 
The following two important aspects should be noted here. Firstly, within thermal energy 
range, 231Pa is a superior neutron absorber as compared with 238U. For example, radiative 
capture cross sections of thermal neutrons (En  0.0253 eV) for these two isotopes are equal 
to: σc(231Pa)  227 barns, σc(238U)  3 barns. So, the presence of 231Pa in fuel composition can 
promote effective generation of fissile isotopes 232U and 233U. Secondly, there is a rather large 
energy distance between capture resonances of 238U and 231Pa. Capture resonances of 231Pa 
belong to relatively low energies (below 100 eV). This means the presence of 231Pa in fuel 
composition can depress thermal region in energy spectrum of neutrons (see Fig. 2). 
It can be seen that, although neutron energy spectrum in VVER-1000 contains a certain 
fraction of thermal neutrons, introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition can remove the 
thermal fraction completely. That is why stainless steel may be used here as a structural 
material. Indeed, the absence of thermal fraction in neutron spectrum does not result in 
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additional neutron loss but fuel rods can keep their ability for working up to the higher 
values of fuel burn-up than with zirconium-based alloys. 
Now let us consider nuclear properties of 232U, product of neutron capture by 231Pa and 
rapid -decay of 232Pa (T1/2 (232Pa)  1,3 days (Babichev et al.,1991)). Like 235U, isotope 232U is 
a fissile nuclide. Dependencies of fission cross-sections on neutron energy are presented in 
Fig. 3 for isotopes 235U and 232U. 
It can be seen that, within thermal energy range, fission cross-sections of 232U are 
substantially lower than those for 235U while radiative capture cross-sections of these 
isotopes are comparable each other. For example, radiative capture cross sections of thermal 
neutrons (En  0.0253 eV) for these two isotopes are equal to: σc(232U)   73 barns, 
σc(235U)  99 barns. So, neutron-multiplying properties of 232U are inferior to those of 235U 
within thermal energy range. 
This conclusion can be confirmed by Fig. 4 which demonstrates energy dependency of 
(νef - 1), i.e. the number of excess fission neutrons per one absorbed neutron. 
235U looks superior to 232U within thermal energy range but quite another situation takes 
place in resonance range. So, it may be expected that introduction of 231Pa into uranium-
based fuel composition with aim to increase fuel burn-up will be more efficient just in 
resonance neutron spectrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. 231Pa effect on energy spectrum of neutrons 
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Fig. 3. Dependency of fission cross-sections on neutron energy for isotopes 235U and 232U 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Energy dependency of the number of excess fission neutrons per one absorbed 
neutron for isotopes 235U and 232U 
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4. Proliferation resistance of nuclear materials in open fuel cycle. The ways 
for closure of fuel cycle 
Presently, there are different points of view on future development of nuclear fuel cycles. 
Some countries (USA, Canada, Germany and Sweden) are implementing in practice an open 
nuclear fuel cycle (Fig. 5) that does not foresee a radiochemical SNF reprocessing in the 
visible future. One of the reasons for this choice is a wish of decreasing a risk of nuclear 
weapon proliferation. SNF may be only converted into the forms suitable for long-term safe 
storage. However, such a strategy of nuclear power development has already resulted in 
large SNF stockpiles, potentially dangerous nuclear materials (NM). So, the preferable 
option for future development of nuclear power consists in transition to the closed fuel 
cycles with SNF reprocessing, separation of radioactive FP and recycling of residual fuel. 
 
Low  Enriched
Uranium (LEU),  <20% 235U
Protected  Fuel
NPP
Storage
Spent  Fuel  (LEU  +  Pu +  MA +  FPs)
1.2%    0.1%    5% HM
Protected  Fuel
1 10 100
Time  after  discharge,  years
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
PWR  Spent  Fuel  S/A
   at  1  foot  distance
Dose  Rate,  rem/h
 
Fig. 5. Open fuel cycle 
LEU is a fresh fuel for open nuclear fuel cycle. Plutonium in spent fuel assemblies is 
protected by intense gamma-radiation of fission products (Fig. 5). That is why unirradiated 
materials are more vulnerable for unauthorized proliferation. 
Isotopic uranium denaturing may be regarded as an effective method for upgrading self-
protection of unirradiated uranium-containing materials. The term “isotopic denaturing” is 
used conventionally for designation of any artificial changes in natural isotopic composition 
of a chemical element with aim to give him some new, desirable properties. In practice, 
uranium may be denatured by the following two ways: direct introduction of intense 
radioactive isotope 232U into uranium fuel composition or direct introduction of relatively 
weaker radioactive isotope 231Pa into uranium fuel composition. 231Pa is a neutron 
predecessor of 232U, main isotope of uranium denaturing. So, only short-term pre-irradiation 
of fresh fuel assemblies in the research reactors may be sufficient to produce proliferation 
resistant fuel assemblies, suitable even for export deliveries. 
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4.1 Isotopic denaturing of uranium as a way for creating an internal source of - 
particles 
Along with progress in development of high-efficiency enriching technologies, potential 
threat of LEU diversion and re-enrichment up to the weapon-grade level excites more and 
more apprehensions. These reasons indicate that, besides reduction of uranium enrichment 
below 20% 235U, other measures may be also required to upgrade LEU self-protection 
against its unauthorized re-enrichment. Taking into consideration the growing world-wide 
scope of LEU utilization, including LEU with enrichment in the vicinity of the upper 
boundary (20% 235U), high LEU vulnerability to unauthorized re-enrichment must be 
recognized. Particular apprehensions are related with 20%-uranium. So, some additional 
actions should be undertaken to protect LEU against its unauthorized re-enrichment. 
The effects of 232U introduction into LEU are caused by the following specific properties of 
232U (see Table 2): 
 Good neutron-multiplying properties of 232U (Ganesan et al., 2002) and its neutron 
predecessor 231Pa make it possible to extend time period of continuous reactor 
operation without refueling up to the values comparable with the reactor life-time. As a 
result, unauthorized extraction of plutonium from spent fuel assemblies becomes 
unfeasible. 
 It is impossible to remove 232U from denatured uranium without application of 
sophisticated and expensive isotope separation technologies. 
 232U is a neutron source from spontaneous fission reactions and a source of high-energy 
-particles. Alpha-particles emitted by 232U are able to dissociate molecules of uranium 
hexafluoride and, thus, could make it practically impossible to re-enrich denatured 
uranium up to the weapon-grade level. Besides, -particles are able to initiate (,n)-
reactions with impurities of light elements (LE) and, thus, intensify internal neutron 
generation. Growth of neutron background in the re-enriching process of LEU-uranium 
containing 0.10.5% 232U can decrease the CFR energy yield by three orders of 
magnitude. In essence, NED with such a re-enriched uranium is a “dirty” bomb only. 
Thus, export deliveries of LEU-based fuel assemblies to foreign NPP receive an 
additional proliferation barrier. 
5. Increased burn-up of proliferation protected LWR fuel containing 231Pa 
One of specific features in operation of nuclear power reactors consists in a necessity to 
perform regular refuelings. This necessity is caused by the following effects: depletion of 
fissile materials, FP accumulation, potential rupture of fuel cladding with intense release of 
radioactive materials. LWR, the mostly spread type of power reactors, requires refueling 
every 1-2 years, when fuel burn-up reaches 4-6% HM. 
Extension of fuel life-time up to relatively long time periods (several decades, for instance) 
can reduce drastically the number of refuelings or exclude them at all. Reduction or full 
exclusion of refueling procedures decreases the demands for fresh fuel and decreases 
quantity of SNF discharged per unit of produced energy. Those reactors, which are capable 
to operate for a sufficiently long time without any refueling, may be used as the only energy 
source in remote regions, at the floating NPP, as energy source for space investigations 
(research bases on the Moon or Mars, cosmic flights into the outer space). Our studies 
demonstrated that introduction of 231Pa into LWR fuel composition could extend 
significantly the fuel life-time and reach ultra-high fuel burn-up. 
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It should be noted that achievability of ultra-high fuel burn-up was studied here only from 
the standpoint of neutron-multiplying properties of advanced fuel compositions. The 
problems of suitable structural materials, evolution of their strength properties and 
durability for a long fuel life-time are not analyzed here. At present, maximal fuel burn-up 
(about 30% HM) was achieved in the research fast reactor BOR-60 (Grachev et al., 2003). It 
may be expected that the higher values of fuel burn-up could be achieved if the following 
operations would be multiply carried out: partial fuel burn-up (near to the practically 
achievable value of 30% HM), application of DUPIC-technology for removal of gaseous and 
volatile FP, re-fabrication of fresh fuel pellets. 
5.1 Evolution of neutron-multiplying properties in chains of isotopic transformations 
In this section we compared time evolutions of neutron-multiplying properties in two 
isotopic chains: traditional chain that starts from 232Th (232Th → 233U → 234U → …) and non-
traditional chain that starts from 231Pa (231Pa → 232U → 233U → …) (see Fig. 6). Radiative 
capture cross-sections σc and fission cross-sections σf were calculated for a typical neutron 
spectrum of VVER-1000 (β-decays were not taken into account). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Chains of isotopic transformations (232Th → 233U → 234U → …) and (231Pa → 232U → 
233U → …) (neutron spectrum of VVER-1000) 
It can be seen that neutron-multiplying properties in non-traditional chain are gradually 
improved: the starting isotope 231Pa is a neutron absorber, fission cross-section of the second 
isotope 232U prevails over its capture cross-section, and the third isotope 233U is a well-
fissionable material. So, non-traditional chain represents the combination of two consecutive 
fissionable isotopes (232U and 233U) while, in traditional chain, the third isotope 234U is a 
neutron absorber only. 
Thus, in non-traditional chain, parasitic neutron absorption by FP and depletion of fissile 
materials during the reactor operation can be partially compensated by 231Pa feeding. This 
makes it possible to talk about a possibility for substantial extension of fuel life-time and 
achievability of ultra-high fuel burn-up. By the way, in traditional LWR fuel, the negative 
effects caused by FP accumulation and depletion of fissile materials are compensated by 
238U(n,γ)239Pu chain significantly weaker than by 231Pa(n,γ)232U(n,γ)233U chain in non-
traditional fuel because of lower capture cross-sections: σc(238U)  0.9 barns, σc(231Pa)  43 
barns. 
232Th 233U 234U 
σс = 6 b σс = 3 b 
… 
σс = 19 b 
σf = 43 b σf = 0.5 b 
231Pa 232U 233U 
σс = 9 b σс = 43 b 
… 
σс = 6 b 
σf = 0.4 b σf = 14 b σf = 43 b 
σf = 0.03 b 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 
 
340 
So, it can be concluded that non-traditional chain (231Pa → 232U → 233U → …) appears to be 
more attractive from the standpoint of neutron-multiplying properties (as a consequence, 
from the standpoint of extended fuel life-time or achievability of ultra-high fuel burn-up) in 
comparison with traditional chain (232Th → 233U → 234U → …) due to the following reasons: 
1. Combination of two consecutive well-fissionable isotopes (232U and 233U). 
2. High rate of their generation from the starting isotope 231Pa, whose neutron capture 
cross-section is larger substantially than that for the starting nuclide 232Th in traditional 
chain of isotopic transformations. 
It is noteworthy that 231Pa may be regarded, to a certain extent, as a burnable neutron 
poison: for fuel life-time 231Pa is burnt up to 80% and converted into well-fissionable 
isotopes, neutron capture cross-section of 231Pa is substantially larger than that of fertile 
isotope 232Th. 
As is known, the existing LWRs are characterized by thermal neutron spectrum. In 
advanced LWR designs, for example, in LWR with supercritical coolant parameters 
(SCLWR), different regions of the reactor core are characterized by different neutron spectra 
depending on coolant density. Thermal spectrum prevails within the core region containing 
dense coolant (γ  0.72 g/cm3) while resonance neutron spectrum dominates within the core 
region containing coolant of the lower density (γ  0.1 g/cm3) (Kulikov, 2007). 
Reasonability of 231Pa introduction into fuel composition for the cases of thermal and 
resonance neutron spectra is analyzed in the next section. 
5.2 Reasonability of 231Pa involvement in the case of thermal neutron spectrum 
Numerical analyses of fuel depletion process were carried out with application of the 
computer code SCALE-4.3 (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1995) and evaluated nuclear 
data file ENDF/B-V for elementary cells of VVER-1000. The only exception consisted in the 
use of martensite steel MA956 (elemental composition: 74,5% Fe, 20% Cr, 4,5% Al, 0,5% Ti 
and 0,5% Y2O3) instead of zircaloy as a fuel cladding material. Substitution of martensite 
steel for zirconium-based cladding is caused by the higher values of fuel burn-up. 
Traditional (232Th-233U) and non-traditional (231Pa-232Th-233U) fuel compositions were 
compared for the case of thermal neutron spectrum (coolant density – 0.72 g/cm3). Infinite 
neutron multiplication factor K∞ is shown in Fig. 7 as a function of fuel burn-up. 
It can be seen that substitution of 231Pa for 232Th decreases K∞ at the beginning of cycle, i.e. 
decreases an initial reactivity margin to be compensated. This effect is caused by different 
capture cross-sections of these isotopes - 231Pa is a significantly stronger neutron absorber 
than 232Th. In parallel, thanks to the larger capture cross-section of 231Pa, intense breeding of 
two consecutive well-fissionable isotopes (232U and 233U) takes place. So, gradual 
introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition results in the smoother relaxation of neutron 
multiplication factor in the process of fuel burn-up. 
Acceptable fraction of 231Pa in non-traditional fuel composition is limited by the value of 
neutron multiplication factor (above unity) at the beginning of cycle. So, the effects caused 
by introduction of 231Pa may take place only in those fuel compositions where fraction of 
main fissile isotope is sufficiently large. For example, fraction of main fissile isotope 233U 
may be increased up to the level corresponding to the situation when neutron multiplication 
factor at the beginning of cycle is equal to about 1.10 at full replacement of 232Th by 231Pa. 
The calculations showed that this condition may be satisfied at maximal 233U fraction about 
30%. Evolution of neutron multiplication factor in the process of fuel burn-up is presented in 
Fig. 8 for traditional and non-traditional fuel compositions. 
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Fig. 7. 231Pa effects on fuel burn-up in thermal neutron spectrum 
 
 
Fig. 8. Achievability of ultra-high fuel burn-up by introduction of 231Pa (thermal neutron 
spectrum) 
As is seen from Fig. 8, traditional thorium-based fuel (30% 233U + 70% 232Th) provides rather 
high reactivity margin (K∞ (BOC) ≈ 1,9) with achievable value of fuel burn-up about 29% 
HM. Introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition decreases initial reactivity margin but, at the 
same time, increases fuel burn-up. If 232Th is completely replaced by 231Pa, i.e. (30% 233U + 
70% 231Pa) fuel composition is analyzed, then neutron multiplication factor remains 
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practically unchanged in the vicinity of unity for a full duration of fuel life-time. This means 
that the negative effects from neutron absorption by FP and depletion of fissile isotope are 
almost completely compensated by breeding of secondary fissile isotopes from 231Pa. In this 
case, about 80%-part of 231Pa is converted into secondary fissile isotopes which can provide 
ultra-high fuel burn-up (near to 57% HM). 
If fuel loading in such a reactor is similar to the fuel loading of VVER-1000 (about 66 tons), 
then achievable value of fuel life-time is near to 40 years for the reactor power of 3000 MWt. 
It is interesting to note that 235U as well as 233U may be used to achieve ultra-high fuel burn-
up. Moreover, 235U option looks very attractive because of two reasons: firstly, 235U 
resources are more available than resources of 233U, and, secondly, achievement of the same 
fuel burn-up will require lower quantity of 231Pa, artificial isotope to be produced in the 
dedicated nuclear power facilities. 
5.3 Reasonability of 231Pa involvement in the case of resonance neutron spectrum 
Traditional (232Th-233U) and non-traditional (231Pa-232Th-233U) fuel compositions were 
compared for the case of resonance neutron spectrum (coolant density – 0.1 g/cm3). Infinite 
neutron multiplication factor K∞ is shown in Fig. 9 as a function of fuel burn-up. 
 
 
Fig. 9. 231Pa effects on fuel burn-up in resonance neutron spectrum 
Comparison of the curves presented in Figs. 7, 9 allows us to conclude that introduction of 
231Pa into fuel composition is more preferable from the standpoint of higher fuel burn-up in 
the case of resonance neutron spectrum. This conclusion can be explained by better neutron-
multiplying properties of 232U just in resonance neutron spectrum as compared with thermal 
neutron spectrum (see Fig. 4). 
As it follows from Fig. 9, introduction of only 12% 231Pa increased fuel burn-up twice. 
Neutron multiplication factor at the beginning of cycle increased too, i.e. neutron-
multiplying properties of fuel composition became better. 
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Like previous analysis, fraction of main fissile isotope 233U may be increased up to the level 
corresponding to the situation when neutron multiplication factor at the beginning of cycle 
is equal to about 1.10 at full replacement of 232Th by 231Pa. In addition, potential use of 235U 
instead of 233U was analyzed to evaluate a possibility for achieving ultra-high fuel burn-up. 
So, numerical studies confirmed reasonability for introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition 
because this introduction results in reduction of initial reactivity margin and in substantial 
growth of fuel burn-up. Maximal positive effect from introduction of 231Pa may be observed 
in resonance neutron spectrum. Besides, introduction of 231Pa makes it possible to reach 
ultra-high fuel burn-up regardless of what main fissile isotope is used, 233U or 235U. In 
particular, (20% 233U + 80% 231Pa) fuel composition can reach fuel burn-up of 76% HM in 
resonance neutron spectrum (see Fig. 10). 
 
 
Fig. 10. Achievability of ultra-high fuel burn-up by introduction of 231Pa (resonance neutron 
spectrum) 
5.4 Effects of 231Pa on safety of the reactor operation 
On the one hand, introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition can provide small value of 
initial reactivity margin and high value of fuel burn-up. On the other hand, if relatively 
large 231Pa fraction is introduced into fuel composition, reactivity feedback on coolant 
temperature becomes positive, and safety of the reactor operation worsens. 
Numerical studies demonstrated that, if maintenance of favorable reactivity feedback on 
coolant temperature during fuel life-time is a mandatory requirement, then, in thermal 
neutron spectrum, 231Pa fraction in fuel composition is limited by a quite certain value while, 
in resonance neutron spectrum, introduction of 231Pa is impossible at all. However, this 
conclusion is correct only for large-sized reactors, where neutron leakage is negligible. 
So, only thermal neutron spectra should be considered to provide favorable reactivity 
feedback on coolant temperature. The results presented in Fig. 11 demonstrate a possibility 
for increasing fuel burn-up in thermal neutron spectrum by introduction of 231Pa into fuel 
composition. 
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Fig. 11. Achievability of ultra-high fuel burn-up by introduction of 231Pa with conservation 
of favorable feedback on coolant temperature (thermal neutron spectrum) 
As is known, fuel burn-up in VVER-1000 can reach a value about 4% HM. Introduction of 
231Pa and higher contents of 235U can increase fuel burn-up by a factor of 8 with the same 
initial reactivity margin, i.e. more powerful system of reactivity compensation is not 
required. 
Requirement of favorable reactivity feedback on coolant temperature completely excludes 
any introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition in the case of large-sized reactors with 
resonance neutron spectra. But , introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition of small-sized 
reactors does not worsen safety of the reactor operation because of relatively large neutron 
leakage. This indicates that the mostly attractive area for 231Pa applications is a small nuclear 
power including small-sized NPP for remote regions, for the floating NPP, for space stations 
on the Moon or Mars and for cosmic flights into the outer space. 
The following conclusions can be made in respect of potential 231Pa applications: 
  Application of 231Pa as a burnable neutron poison can reduce initial reactivity margin 
and increase fuel burn-up. 
  Introduction of 231Pa into fuel composition makes it possible to reach ultra-high fuel 
burn-up (above 30% HM) both in thermal and resonance neutron spectra. 
  The actual problem of 231Pa production in significant amounts should be resolved. 
6. Proliferation protection of nuclear materials in closed uranium-plutonium 
fuel cycle 
NPP operation in open fuel cycle results in accumulation of huge SNF stockpiles that 
represents a long-term hazard to the humankind. Ultimate SNF disposal is a difficult 
technical problem requiring large number of practically “eternal” deep underground 
repositories. That is why many various options for closure of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) are 
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currently under research and development including extraction of residual uranium, 
plutonium and minor actinides from SNF. 
As known, closed uranium-plutonium NFC includes reprocessing and recycling of nuclear 
fuel and evokes a lot of contradictory opinions with respect to potential risk of plutonium 
proliferation. This connected with two points: 
 Although plutonium extracted from SNF of power reactors (for example, LWR of PWR, 
BWR or VVER type) is not the best material for nuclear weapons, nevertheless it can be 
used in NED of moderate energy yield (Mark, 1993). 
 Recycled plutonium will be disposed at the facilities of closed NFC, and this will 
increase the probability of it using for illegal aims (diversion, theft). 
Under these conditions, the absence of any internationally coordinated plan concerning the 
utilization or ultimate SNF disposal enforced the leading nuclear countries to undertake the 
steps directed to strengthening the nonproliferation regime (IAEA safeguards, Euratom's 
embargo on the export of SNF reprocessing technology). But several countries, in the first 
turn the USA, refused from deployment of breeder reactors which are intended for 
operation in closed NFC, and focused at once-through NFC. On the other hand, the social 
demand of solving excess fissile materials (plutonium, the first of all) problem which have 
both civil and military origins, stimulated carrying out the research on plutonium utilization 
in MOX-fuel. At the same time, the studies of advanced NFC protected against uncontrolled 
proliferation of fissile materials have been initiated. 
6.1 Radiation protection of MOX-fuel. GNEP initiative 
Specialists from ORNL (USA) investigated the ways for introduction of -radiation sources 
into fresh fuel (Selle et al., 1979). Sixty-four -active radionuclides were selected and studied 
as candidates for admixing into fresh fuel (see Fig. 12). 
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Fig. 12. Closed (U-Pu)-fule cycle protected (ORNL, USA)* 
Radionuclides 137Cs (T1/2  30 years) and 60Co (T1/2  5.27 years) appeared the most 
preferable candidates. But cesium is a volatile element, and it can be easily removed from 
fuel by heating up. Intensity of -radiation emitted by 60Co rapidly relaxes. 
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Specialists from LANL (USA) proposed the advanced version of the international NFC that 
enhances proliferation resistance of plutonium (Cunningham et al., 1997). This proposal 
constituted a basis for the US President’s initiative on the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP) that was supported by many countries (including Russia) with well-
developed nuclear technologies (see Fig. 13). 
According to the proposal, spent fuel assemblies discharged from power reactors of a 
country-user must be transported to the Nuclear Club countries for full-scale reprocessing. 
Extracted plutonium and minor actinides must be incinerated in the reactors placed on the 
territory of the International nuclear technology centers. Plutonium is not recycled in power 
reactors of a country-user. The Nuclear Club countries provide fresh LEU fuel deliveries 
into a country-user. 
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Fig. 13. Open fuel cycle protected (LANL, USA) 
Upon exhaustion of rich and cheap uranium resources, nuclear power has to use artificial 
kinds of fresh fuel (plutonium, 233U or their mixtures). The GNEP initiative does not 
consider this opportunity. It is proposed to use such power reactors which are able to work 
without refueling for 15-20 years. After this time interval they must be returned to the 
Nuclear Club countries for SNF discharging and reprocessing and for insertion of fresh fuel. 
The concentrated incineration of plutonium and minor actinides in the International nuclear 
technology centers can lead to unacceptably large local release of thermal energy with 
unpredictable negative environmental and climatic effects. As for reactors with long-life 
cores, these are small and medium-sized power reactors. Besides, during transportation and 
mounting, they can be very attractive sources of plutonium in amounts large enough for 
manufacturing of several dozens of nuclear bombs. 
6.2 Enhancement of LWR MOX-fuel cycle proliferation resistance by plutonium 
denaturing 
Some nuclear properties of 238Pu make this isotope a valuable material for proliferation 
protection of uranium-plutonium fuel. Firstly, 238Pu is an intense source of thermal energy 
(T1/2  87 years, specific heat generation - 570 W/kg). So, introduction of 238Pu into 
plutonium creates almost insuperable barrier to manufacturing of even primitive implosion-
type NED. Plutonium heating up by isotope 238Pu can provoke undesirable phase transitions 
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and thermal pyrolysis of conventional explosives applied for compression of central 
plutonium charge. Secondly, 238Pu is an intense source of spontaneous fission neutrons, even 
more intense than 240Pu. As a consequence, probability of premature CFR initiation in NED 
sharply increases while energy yield of nuclear explosion drastically drops down to the 
levels comparable with energy yield of conventional explosives. Thus, LWR MOX-fuel cycle 
with ternary fuel compositions (Np-U-Pu) is characterized by enhanced proliferation 
resistance. 
Like uranium, plutonium can be isotopically denatured by two ways: either direct 
introduction of intensely radioactive isotope 238Pu into MOX-fuel composition or 
introduction of relatively low intense radioactive isotope 237Np into MOX-fuel composition. 
237Np is the nearest neutron predecessor of main denaturing isotope 238Pu. So, only short-
term pre-irradiation of fresh MOX-fuel assemblies would be sufficient to produce 
proliferation resistant fuel assemblies, suitable even for export deliveries to any countries. 
6.2.1 The effect of 237Np and 238Pu introduction on Pu protection in LWR fuel 
It is proposed that the equilibrium isotope vectors are obtained for MOX-fuel circulating 
between LWR, spent fuel reprocessing as fuel manufacturing facilities. The fuel feed 
includes isotopes 237Np, 238Pu and 239Pu is produced in Hybrid Thermonuclear Installation 
(HTI) blankets. 
Using the code GETERA (Belousov et al., 1992) for cell calculations of fuel burn-up, Pu 
isotopic compositions of MOX-fueled PWR were determined for moments of the beginning 
and end of cycle. 238Pu fraction in plutonium was adopted to be an index of Pu protection 
against uncontrolled proliferation. It means that the impact of higher plutonium isotopes on 
neutronics of chain reaction in imploded plutonium charge of NED was not taken into 
account. 
The fuel being loaded in PWR may be considered as material consisting of two parts: the first 
part includes equilibrium composition of 238U and plutonium isotopes produced by 238U while 
the second part ("feed part of fuel") includes equilibrium composition of 237Np, 238Pu and other 
plutonium isotopes produced entirely by the feed. Equilibrium contents of 238Pu in plutonium 
of PWR fuel depending on 238Pu contents in plutonium of feed (with different 237Np fractions 
in "feed part of fuel") for equilibrium multi-cycle operation regime are presented in Fig. 14. 
The plot region situated under the bisectrix B is a region where plutonium protection in feed 
is higher than plutonium protection in fuel. Respectively, the plot region situated above the 
bisectrix B is a region where plutonium protection in fuel is higher than that in feed. The 
curves of this figure characterize the correlation between plutonium protection levels in feed 
and fuel when the "feed part of fuel" contains 237Np in addition to plutonium. Basing on 
these data, it is possible to select the appropriate equilibrium regime of NFC. 
Proper selection of the feed compositions, i.e. fractions of 238Pu and 237Np, makes it possible 
to attain the same level of fuel plutonium protection for various combinations of 238Pu and 
237Np content in feed. For example, 32%-level of fuel plutonium protection can be attained in 
case of feed containing (0% 237Np, 52% 238Pu) or (20% 237Np, 43% 238Pu) or (40% 237Np, 32% 
238Pu). The latter option corresponds to equal level of plutonium protection both in fuel and 
in feed. The line "S" that connects the right ends of the curves shown in Fig. 14 may be 
regarded as an "ultimate option" of the (Np-U-Pu) NFC considered here. The points of this 
line correspond to particular option of the (Np-U-Pu) NFC where 238U is absent in fuel 
composition, and its fertile functions passed to 238Pu and 237Np. So, this NFC may be called 
as a (Np-Pu) NFC. In this NFC the highest fuel Pu protection level (65% 238Pu) can be 
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reached with feed Pu protection of 90% 238Pu. As known, the IAEA safeguards are not 
applied to plutonium containing 80% 238Pu or more (Rolland-Piegue, 1995; Willrich & 
Taylor, 1974; Massey &  Schneider, 1982). 
 
0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00
(Pu-238/Pu)  in  feed,  %
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
 (P
u-
23
8/
Pu
)  
in
  f
ue
l, 
 %
0% Np-237
20%
40%
60%
80%
B
S
 
Fig. 14. Proliferation resistance of plutonium in fuel as function of proliferation resistance of 
plutonium in feed and 237Np content in "feed" part of fuel. B - bisectrix. 
Inherent heat generation of plutonium is considered as a significant factor of its protection. 
The rates of inherent heat generation for various feed compositions are presented in Table 4. 
Here, the rates of specific heat generation for weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) and 
reactor-grade plutonium (RGPu) are presented as well. 
 
 238Pu/Pu in fuel and in feed 
( Np/(Np + Pu) in feed ) 
Generation WG 
Pu 
RG 
Pu 
17% 
(7%) 
33% 
(15%) 
44% 
(19%) 
qPu, W/kg Pu 2.3 13. 97 186 248 
nsfPu, 106(n/sec)/kg Pu 0.06 0.38 0.71 1.06 1.30 
qfuel, W/kg fuel --- --- 14.9 41.2 99.5 
nsffuel, 106(n/sec)/kg fuel --- --- 0.11 0.24 0.53 
Feed 237Np/238Pu/239Pu, 
kg/(GWe*a) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
38 / 82 / 402 
 
103 / 194 / 377 
 
176 / 318 / 421 
Table 4. Decay heat generation (qPu) and neutron generation by spontaneous fissions (nsfPu) 
in LWR fuel with equal plutonium protection both in fuel and in feed. 
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Basing on the results shown above, it can be concluded that denatured fuel plutonium 
containing more than 25% 238Pu is characterized by the internal heat generation which 
exceeds that of RGPu by more than order of magnitude and, by the larger extent, that of 
WGPu. In addition, denatured fuel plutonium is characterized by the higher neutron 
background caused by spontaneous fissions. The factors mentioned above enhance 
plutonium protection against its utilization in NED. The same factors complicate, to certain 
degree, the handling procedures with such a fuel in nuclear technologies. 
Values of specific heat generation and neutron emission due to spontaneous fission of MOX-
fuel being loaded for the equilibrium cycle options analyzed are shown in Table 4 also. For 
comparison, "dry" technology for handling with spent fuel assemblies may be applied if 
specific heat generation does not exceed 20-35 W/kg fuel. It may be also concluded that 
plutonium denaturing with 238Pu is restricted by thermal constraints imposed on 
permissible specific heat generation of fuel. The same tendency exists in connection with 
spontaneous neutrons emission. These constraints need to be taken into account in fuel 
fabrication, fuel rods and fuel assemblies manufacturing and transport operations. These 
complications of fuel management may be considered as certain "payment" for proliferation 
resistance of MOX-fuel cycle. 
Actually speaking, the protection of plutonium in (Np-U-Pu)-fuel cycle is supposed to be 
enhanced due to addition 237Np and 238Pu into fuel. The degree of fissile nuclides protection 
depends mainly on magnitude of 238Pu fraction in plutonium. Meanwhile, 237Np itself can be 
also considered as a potential material for NED. For example, critical mass of 237Np (metal 
sphere, steel reflector) is about 55 kg (Koch et al., 1997). It’s ten times more than that of 239Pu. 
The magnitude of critical mass of 237Np is sensitive with respect of its dilution. For example, 
minimum critical mass of NpO2 is as much as 315 kg (Nojiri & Fukasaku, 1997; Ivanov et al. 
1997). Besides, in fuel composition 237Np is present together with plutonium which is 
characterized by essential neutron source strength due to spontaneous fissions. Therefore, in 
order to apply extracted 237Np in NED it is needed to perform effective 237Np purification 
from plutonium (plutonium fraction is restricted by value of 10-4 - 10-3). 
6.3 Increase of fuel burn-up in denatured (Np-U-Pu) fuel cycle 
Good neutron-multiplying properties of 238Pu and its neutron predecessor 237Np make it 
possible to extend substantially time period for continuous reactor operation without 
refuelings. As a consequence, unauthorized extraction of plutonium from SNF becomes 
practically unfeasible. 
Indeed, under reactor irradiation of (Np-U-Pu) fuel it is occurs the following “non-
traditional” transition chain (see Fig. 15): 237Np  238Pu  239Pu ... A successive transition 
of these nuclides leads to enhancement of multiplication properties. 
Actually, as it can be seen in Fig. 16, excess neutron generation per one absorption (eff-1) in 
237Np is negative for neutrons of all energy range (excepting fast neutrons), positive for 
neutrons with En > 1 KeV for 238Pu and, as is known, essential positive one for 239Pu. 
So, for (Np-U-Pu)-fuel the nuclides we are dealing with can be characterized as follows 
(Table 5). 
At the same time, during irradiation in reactor core FP accumulation results in growth of 
neutron absorption. So, these tendencies can be counterbalanced and such fuel will be 
characterized by stabilized neutron-multiplying properties over long burning-up. 
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Burn-up calculations for mono-nitride fuel in cell of PWR-type reactor with heavy water as a 
coolant were performed by using code GETERA. The cell parameters were similar to that of 
VVER-1000 cell (see Table 6): 
 
 
Fig. 15. Chain of isotopic transformations in uranium-plutonium fuel cycle 
 
237Np 238Pu 239Pu 
"Burnable poison" nuclide Moderate fissile nuclide 
(En> 1 KeV) 
Well-known fissile nuclide 
Table 5. Characteristics of nuclides for (Np-U-Pu)-fuel 
 
Fuel rod diameter  9.1 mm 
Thickness of stainless steel cladding  0.4 mm 
Coolant ( heavy water ) D2O 
Water volume / fuel volume  1.6 
Fuel  Mono-nitride ( porosity - 30% ) 
Specific heat generation  110 kW/l  
Table 6. Cell parameters of PWR-type reactor 
In Fig. 17 it is shown the dependence of K on fuel burn-up for various fuel compositions. 
For comparison it is demonstrated also a curve of K for LWR-UOX. It can be seen that, 
actually, there is possibility to attain fuel burn-up of 25-30%HM ( corresponding residence 
time is about 20-25 years.). It is worth-while mentioning that, according to papers (Ivanov et 
al. 1997; Bychkov et al. 1997) presented at the International Conference “GLOBAL’97”, 
vibro-packed MOX fuel in stainless steel cladding was irradiated in fast reactor BOR-60 
(Russia) and it was obtained burn-up of 26% HM on standard fuel assemblies and burn-up 
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of 32% HM in experimental fuel rods. No thermal-mechanical and physical-chemical fuel-
cladding interaction was observed in any of the analyzed cross-sections. 
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Fig. 16. Dependencies of excessive neutron number per one absorption (eff-1) on neutron 
energy for nuclides of uranium-plutonium fuel cycle 
The results mentioned above referred to so-called "ultimate" fuel compositions which didn't 
contain 238U. Actually speaking, these results can be considered as preliminary ones to 
demonstrate scale of benefit. Undoubtedly, it is needed to analyze impact of wide fuel 
compositions (including 238U) on stabilized multiplication properties of ultra long-life cores 
taking into consideration reactor safety in both critical and sub-critical regime of operations. 
Anyway, application of ultra long-life core concepts will lead to essential decrease of SNF 
flow rate, reduction of reprocessing, remanufacturing and shipping operations. It’s a factor 
for internationalization of Nuclear Energy System fuel cycle. Since fuel cycles been 
discussed are “rich” with respect to excess neutron generation in CFR, there is no necessity 
to perform fine purification of fuel being reprocessed. It’s a factor of enhancement of the fuel 
cycles protection. 
Application of NPP with ultra long-life core concepts is expected to be profitable for 
electricity generation in developing countries which have not improved nuclear technology 
infrastructure. 
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Fig. 17. Dependencies of K on fuel burn-up for various fuel compositions 
7. Mixed (Th – U - Pu) fuel cycle 
Plutonium has no its own “fertile” isotope. So, it is impossible to protect plutonium by 
isotopic dilution, like uranium. Upon exhaustion of cheap 235U resources, the isotope 
dilution principle can be applied to 233U-238U mixture. So, it seems reasonable to consider the 
following proliferation resistant fuel - (232Th-233U-238U) [23]. If 238U content is small but 
sufficient for low content of 233U in uranium fraction, then plutonium build-up may be 
suppressed. 
In other words, the mixed (232Th-233U-238U-Pu) fuel cycle should be studied along with 
“classical” (232Th-233U) and (238U-Pu) cycles. In both “classical” cycles, fissile materials (233U 
or Pu) may be figuratively called by “highly-enriched” fuel. In the mixed cycle, on the 
contrary, fissile isotope 233U is diluted with 238U in uranium fraction, and thus (233U-238U) 
mixture may be regarded as a “low-enriched” fuel. It is noteworthy that homogeneous 
mixture of two fertile isotopes 238U and 232Th is a more effective neutron absorber than both 
separate isotopes. This effect can improve neutron-physical properties of the mixed fuel 
because it can increase fuel burn-up and thus reduce flow rate of spent fuel assemblies for 
reprocessing (Kulikov, 2007). 
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In the mixed fuel cycle, the following double-strata structure may be estimated as an 
effective and proliferation resistant option (Figs. 18, 19): the top stratum includes full-scale 
reprocessing of spent fuel assemblies in the International nuclear technology centers with 
complete incineration of plutonium and minor actinides, the bottom stratum includes a 
simplified thermal-chemical (DUPIC-type) re-fabrication of fresh fuel with feeding by 
proliferation resistant 233U. Such a closed nuclear fuel cycle may be equally effective in 
power reactors of PWR and CANDU types. 
So, if fuel contains homogeneous mixture of two fertile isotopes 238U and 232Th, the 
following new qualities do appear: 
  Fissile isotope 233U produced in neutron irradiation of thorium is diluted with fertile 
isotope 238U. So, 233U-238U mixture represents, in essence, a kind of “low-enriched” 
uranium. 
  Reduced content of 238U suppresses build-up rate of plutonium. 
  Mixed fuel is highly effective not only in thermal but in resonant neutron spectrum too 
because fissile isotope 233U has sufficiently good neutron-multiplying properties both in 
thermal and resonant neutron spectra. 
  Fissile isotope 239Pu converts rapidly into heavier plutonium isotopes with low 
neutron-multiplying properties because of larger   c/f. So, plutonium loses its 
attractiveness as a material suitable for NED manufacturing. 
As is known (Benedict et al., 1981), fissile isotope 233U can be additionally protected by its 
denaturing with 232U because this isotope has the following proliferation-resistance 
properties (Fig. 19): 
1. 232U is an intense source of high-energy -radiation emitted by its decay products. 
2. 232U is an intense source of spontaneous neutrons, i.e. spontaneous fission neutrons plus 
neutrons from (,n)-reactions with light impurities. 
3. 232U is an intense heat source from its own -decays and from decays of its daughter 
products. 
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Fig. 18. Double-Strata closed fuel cycle protected 
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Fig. 19. 232U as a Spikant 
Qsf (Spontaneous Fission Neutrons)  1.3·103 n/(s·kg 232U); 
Q,n (Uranium Dioxide)  15·106 n/(s·kg 232U) (·20 – equilibrium); 
232U–leader among U isotopes as a spontaneous neutrons generator. 
7.1 Proliferation protection of multi-isotope fuel containing uranium generate and 
protactinium-uranium mixture produced by Hybrid Fusion Facility 
Neutron irradiation of natural thorium in blanket region of Hybrid Fusion Facility (HFF) 
based on (D,T)-plasma can produce many thorium, protactinium and uranium isotopes. 
High-energy (14 MeV) thermonuclear neutrons are able to initiate some threshold (n,xn)-
reactions leading to intense generation of 230Th, 231Pa, 232U, 233U and 234U. The longer 
irradiation time, the larger content of these isotopes in irradiated thorium. Content of 232U, 
for example, can reach a value of several percents. 
NFC closure and SNF reprocessing can release huge amounts of fissionable materials: about 
210 000 tons of uranium regenerate, RGPu and minor actinides, where uranium regenerate 
is a dominant fraction. Uranium regenerate may be regarded as a fertile material suitable for 
further use by nuclear power industry. Uranium regenerate will be released in the amounts 
large enough to feed NPP of total electric power at the level of 1500 GWe, i.e. 4 times higher 
that total power of global nuclear energy system today. 
Uranium regenerate contains the following isotopes: 232U, 233U, 234U (minor fraction) and 
235U, 236U, 238U (main fraction). Uranium produced in thorium blanket of HFF contains only 
isotopes of minor fraction, i.e. 232U, 233U and 234U. So, if HFF-produced uranium is admixed 
to uranium regenerate, content of only minor fraction increases. Content of minor fraction 
can be made comparable with content of main fraction. In the extreme case, minor fraction 
becomes a dominant one, and NFC shifts towards 233U-based fuel. 
Thus, uranium fraction of nuclear fuel represents a mixture of practically all significant 
uranium isotopes: 232U, 233U, 234U, 235U, 236U, 238U. The following three aspects should be 
noted. Firstly, main fissile isotopes, 233U and 235U, are accompanied by lighter and heavier 
uranium isotopes, essential neutron absorbers. Secondly, if 232Th and 231Pa are introduced 
into fuel composition replacing partially uranium regenerate, then plutonium generation 
rate is suppressed. Thirdly, the presence of 236U in fuel composition can initiate the chain of 
isotopic transformations leading to accumulation of 232U, 233U, 238Pu, main isotope for 
plutonium denaturing (De Volpi, 1982): 
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236U(n,γ)237U(β-, T1/2  7 days)237Np (n,)238Np (β-, T1/2  2.1 days)238Pu 
So, produced plutonium will contain not only 240Pu, usually accompanying isotope to 239Pu 
in power reactors, but 238Pu too. 
In mixed (Th-U-Pu) fuel cycle, plutonium plays an auxiliary role only while 233U is a main 
fissile isotope, and plutonium content in fuel composition may be diminished. Finally, 
plutonium could be removed from global nuclear energy system for peaceful utilization in 
the dedicated nuclear power facilities. The GNEP initiative advanced by the US President 
(Sokolova, 2008) foresees just a similar option. This aspect represents a special significance 
from the standpoint of plutonium protection against unauthorized diversion to non-energy 
purposes (Mark, 1993). 
Uranium fraction consisting of practically all significant uranium isotopes from 232U to 238U 
is, in essence, low-enriched uranium with rather small content of main fissile isotopes (233U 
and 235U). Isotopic enrichment of such a multi-isotope composition will be a very difficult 
problem for potential proliferators in the case of its unauthorized diversion. 
The presence of α-emitters (mainly, 232U, 233U and 234U) in uranium fraction can initiate 
physical and chemical processes leading to α-radiolysis of uranium hexafluoride including 
molecular dissociation with generation of minor fluorides, exchange reactions of 
recombination and coagulation. These processes can provoke serious violations in the 
correspondence between the order in masses of uranium isotopes and the order in masses of 
uranium hexafluoride molecules. This correspondence is a necessary condition for 
successful uranium enrichment. 
So, closed mixed (233U-232Th-238U) fuel cycle can offer the following advantages in 
comparison with “classical” (238U-Pu) and (232Th-233U) cycles: 
 Fissile isotope 233U is diluted by fertile isotope 238U in uranium fraction of fuel 
composition. 
 238U content in fuel composition may be diminished thus suppressing plutonium 
production. As a consequence, load of the International centers on plutonium 
utilization may be reduced. 
General conclusion can be defined as follows: fuel of mixed (Th-U-Pu) cycle contains fissile 
isotopes with upgraded level of their protection against any unauthorized attempts of their 
diversion to non-energy purposes. 
8. Probability analysis of risk reduction in non-energy applications of 
denatured uranium 
Proliferation protection of uranium and uranium-plutonium fuel can be quantitatively 
evaluated within the frames of the concept developed for risk assessment in authorized 
applications of nuclear materials. The concept includes some relationships which can be 
used to evaluate probability for a certain chain of unauthorized actions (UAA) to occur and 
to evaluate damage from potential NED applications. 
8.1 Scenarios for UAA with nuclear materials and models for UAA detection 
One of main directions in nuclear non-proliferation ensuring is a formation of inaccessibility 
conditions for NM against any UAA. This is a main strategic function of MPC&A system at 
any nuclear-dangerous objects. However, the following questions arise: 
1. What can occur with nuclear materials, if these conditions are violated due to some 
kind of reasons? 
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2. How can we estimate the threats? 
3. What must we do under these accidental conditions? Answers to the questions are 
related to the threats of NM diversion including the threat of NED manufacturing from 
diverted NM and its military application. In order to give a correct response to these 
questions, two, at least, conditions must be satisfied: 
 We must know how to evaluate the threats of NED manufacturing from diverted NM 
and their military applications. 
 We must work out the recommendations on effective countermeasures to be 
undertaken against any UAA. 
An important condition for successful counteraction against the use of diverted NM in NED 
manufacturing consists in development of the control system over illegal NM trafficking. 
External UAA monitoring system can apply various strategies of the searching process for 
potential UAA objects. 
Unlike authorized activity, unauthorized actions with NM can be characterized by the 
following specific features: 
 Secrecy of unauthorized works. The secrecy level is defined by NM properties and 
financial expenses to be paid by potential proliferators. 
 Striving for manufacturing of NED with maximal destructive capability. 
 Striving for maximal shortening of UAA time which follows from the fact that potential 
proliferator understands properly the threats from external UAA monitoring system. 
These tendencies are the conflicting ones from position of potential proliferator who strives 
to reach his ultimate purpose. For example, proliferator strives for NED manufacturing with 
maximal destructive capability but this requires application of sophisticated nuclear 
technologies for processing of diverted NM. In their turn, nuclear technologies require large 
financial and long time expenses with appropriate reduction of the secrecy level and rising 
of the detection probability. 
So, when analyzing various scenarios of NM diversion, we presumed a rational behavior of 
nuclear proliferators, i.e. the proliferator has to accept a certain compromise between his 
striving for manufacturing of NED with maximal destructive capability and rising of the 
detection probability caused by application of sophisticated nuclear technologies. In any 
case rather long chain of technological processes is required to manufacture NED from 
diverted NM. 
8.2 Concept of risk of NM applications in destructive purposes 
Potential risk of NM application for NED manufacturing and military use by terrorist 
groups can be evaluated as follows: R  PD, where P – probability of NED manufacturing 
and military use; D – potential damage from the use of NED for destructive purposes. 
Probability P depends on proliferator capabilities, initial and final NM states. The 
probability may be written in the following form: P  P(F, SI → SF ), where F – proliferator 
capabilities (his material and financial funds, available technological basis); SI – initial NM 
state (mass, physical form, chemical composition, radioactivity, local position, etc); SF – final 
NM state (design of NED, local position, chemical and isotopic compositions, radioactivity, 
etc). Potential damage D depends on final NM state only, i.e. D  D(SF ). 
Assumption on a rational behavior of nuclear proliferator enables us to think that 
proliferator will follow the well-grounded plan with proper accounting for the detection 
probability, if sophisticated nuclear technologies are applied for processing of diverted NM 
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(for example, fine NM purification with removal of all significant impurities, isotopic re-
enrichment and so on). So, the risk of NED manufacturing and military use can reach a 
maximal point either within or on the boundaries of the domain that includes all potential 
UAA undertaken by nuclear proliferators. The maximal risk and its location in UAA 
domain depends on the level of external UAA monitoring and on financial capabilities of 
nuclear proliferators (see Fig. 20). 
 
 
 
Fig. 20. Variations of the risk related with NM application in destructive purposes when 
sophisticated nuclear technologies are involved into NM processing 
This circumstance can be used to simplify analysis by using a conservative approach to 
evaluating the maximal risk of NM usage for NED manufacturing. Within the frames of this 
approach, probability P for successful completion of UAA chain (from initial state SI to final 
state SF ) can be replaced by the following maximal evaluation: 
       ,    max ,max I sf I F FR F S P F S S D S    (1) 
8.3 Probability to avoid UAA detection 
The following problem is considered below: it is required to search for UAA object which 
was created on a certain territory. Let’s consider a discrete limited set N consisting of n 
components each of them may be checked up in one identification step. If the set N contains 
a closed limited subset S that includes s components and characterizes dimensions of UAA 
object from the viewpoint of the identification process, then probability for successful 
identification of any component belonging to the subset S is equal to Pdet  s/n. Naturally, 
non-detection probability per one identification step is equal to Pundet  1 – Pdet  1 – s/n. 
Let’s assume that UAA object is not moved and UAA can be unambiguously detected by 
one identification procedure. If the identification rate V  dn/dt is a constant value, and 
UAA object is a sufficiently concealed object, i.e. s << n, then time dependency of non-
detection probability may be presented as follows: 
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        (2) 
where   s / n V, parameter of successful detection, is a product of two multipliers, one of 
them depends on properties of UAA object only. 
If UAA can not be detected for one identification step, or if UAA object moves during the 
identification process, then a necessity arises to perform a repeat examination of the regions 
which were checked up previously. In this case, time dependency of non-detection 
probability may be written in the following form: 
  
s V t tn
undetP t e e
     (3) 
8.4 UAA chains. Indicators of the searching process for UAA objects 
The following main links can be identified in UAA chains resulting in NED manufacturing 
from diverted uranium-containing NM: NM theft → chemical and physical reprocessing → 
isotopic re-enrichment → manufacturing of main NED components → military use of NED. 
Each link of UAA chain is defined by its duration ti and mean time interval needed to detect 
the proliferator 1/λi, which are the functions of the proliferator capability F, changes of NM 
properties (Si-1 → Si ) and efficiency of the searching process. In general case, detection 
probability is described by exponential function. So, probability Pi for successful completion 
of the i-th link without detection and suppression can be written in the following form: 
 , , , ( )i i
t
i undet i unsup i unsup i iP P P e P t
     (4) 
where Pundet,i – non-detection probability of diverted NM at the i-th link; Punsup,i – non-
suppression probability for UAA performed by detected proliferator at the i-th link. So, risk 
of NED manufacturing and military use is defined by the following equation: 
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i i i
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i
R D P t e D P e
         (5) 
UAA object can be detected from the really existing indicators including the indicators related 
with consumption of energy and water resources in the unauthorized activity. The following 
indicators can be used in the search for UAA aimed at NED manufacturing and military use: 
 Emission rate (A). 
 Resource consumption rate (W). 
 Capital expenses (К). 
When searching the UAA-object being to several independent indicators, then total non-
detection probability is a product of partial non-detection probabilities for different UAA 
indicators, i.e. 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) W K W AK At tt tK W A tundet undet undet undetP t P t P t P t e e e e e
              , (6) 
where 
          ·   ·   · K W A K W Af K f W f A            , (7) 
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where  – efficiency of the searching process for appropriate UAA indicators. 
Relationship between UAA indicators and detection parameters can be derived from the 
following models for strategic behavior of nuclear proliferator: 
1. The proliferator creates a new infrastructure for his unauthorized activity. According to 
equation (2), UAA detection parameter in the random searching process for new 
resources is proportional to the scale of new resources which were put in operation. In 
the simplest case, the scale is defined by the resource consumption rate W and capital 
expenses K. So, in this case: λW  W·W and λK  K·K. 
2. The proliferator applies already available infrastructure to perform UAA. Let’s assume 
that industrial enterprises in the search region consumes resources W in accordance 
with distribution N(W), and frequency of the inspecting actions Fins(W) depends on the 
resource consumption rate also. Optimal scheme of the searching process can be found 
from the following optimality criterion: efficiency of the searching process does not 
depend on the proliferator strategy, i.e. λ(W)·TP(W) is a constant value for any W, where 
TP is proliferation time. Naturally, the larger available resources may be used by 
nuclear proliferator, the shorter time is needed to modify NM for successful NED 
manufacturing and military application. So, detection parameter depends on power 
consumed by a nuclear enterprise. Since power W consumed by nuclear enterprises and 
proliferation time TP are linked by the energy E required to modify NM as T  E/W, the 
following equation can be written: λ(W) · (E / W)  const, or 
λ(W)  const · (W / E)  W· W. 
In both models the emission rate parameter is proportional to the territorial area where 
abnormal emission level was observed, i.e. λA ~ S(A) ~ R2(A) ~ A, or λA A·A. So, each 
addend in equation (7) can be written as a product of two multipliers:  
 ·  ·  · K W AK W A        (8) 
For example, detection parameter λW is equal to the mean UAA detection frequency on the 
resource consumption rate W. Of course, the UAA detection frequency depends on the 
sensitivity of the detecting devices to the resource consumption rate W, or to W-indicator. 
The sensitivity defines efficiency αW of the searching process. 
8.5 Comparative evaluations of external UAA monitoring efficiency and enhancement 
of inherent proliferation protection 
The following problems are considered below: it is required to analyze dependency of metal 
uranium proliferation protection on uranium enrichment at different efficiencies of the 
searching process, and it is required to analyze the effects of uranium denaturing on its 
proliferation resistance, if uranium is denatured by admixing small amounts of 232U that 
intensifies inherent neutron background. Nuclear proliferator does not resort to uranium re-
enrichment up o the weapon-grade level, his main goal consists in a NED manufacturing. 
Relative values of uranium proliferation protection were calculated for different efficiencies 
α of the searching process including the case when α  0, i.e. the case of uranium self-
protection. 
Mark-Hippel-Lyman model (Mark, 1993) of CFR initiation and propagation was used to 
evaluate damage from NED manufacturing and military use. CFR parameters were 
calculated by direct mathematical simulation of neutron multiplication process with 
application of Monte Carlo code MCNP-4B (Briesmeister, 1997) and evaluated nuclear data 
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file ENDF/B-VI (National Nuclear Data Center, 2001). Mathematical model and algorithm 
for determination of the model parameters correspond to the approach described in paper 
(Kryuchkov et al., 2008). 
The results obtained in calculations of relative proliferation protection (inverse value to the 
risk) for different monitoring efficiencies and for different levels of uranium denaturing by 
232U are presented in Fig. 21. 
 
 
Fig. 21. Proliferation protection of metal uranium as a function of its enrichment 
The following conclusions can be derived from numerical evaluations of metal uranium 
proliferation protection: 
1. Measures of external monitoring (outside of MPC&A system) are ineffective ones in 
comparison with the measures aimed at upgrading of uranium self-protection for 
highly-enriched compositions. 
2. Efficiency of external monitoring can excel efficiency of inherent self-protection for 
uranium enriched below 20% 235U. 
3. Upgrading of uranium self-protection by its denaturing, i.e. by formation of internal 
neutron source, weakly depends on uranium enrichment and provides approximately 
the same effect in a rather wide range of uranium enrichments. 
So, nuclear non-proliferation requires maximal restrictions to be imposed on any 
transactions of pure HEU while free material must be maintained in a self-protected state 
produced by isotopic denaturing, for instance. 
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1. Introduction 
The progress of global warming requires us to construct a sustainable society immediately. 
At the same time, energy demand in developing countries especially in Asian countries such 
as China and India is increasing rapidly and at a large scale. In the context of global 
warming, fossil fuels such as coal and oil should not be used as primary energy sources 
because they significantly increase concentration of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide 
(CO2) in atmosphere. Therefore nuclear energy can be one of the candidates of carbon-free 
primary energy source. 
However, it is also true that there are concerns relating to the use of nuclear power such as 
nuclear proliferation, radioactive waste and possibility of severe accident. These concerns 
make it difficult to apply nuclear power widely in the world even though it does not emit 
CO2. We are now in the end of the first commitment period of Kyoto protocol. There are 
mainly three mechanisms to reduce CO2 emission from human activity. One of them is 
called “Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)”, which supports implementation of 
technology and finance for CO2 reduction in developing countries. Nuclear power is not 
confirmed as an option of CDM due to its concern of safety issue. 
On the other hand, there are many remarkable movements on another nuclear power, which 
utilizes “thorium” as fuel, in the world recently. Thorium nuclear power becomes to be 
discussed not only by nuclear specialists but also in the field of global warming. This is 
because thorium nuclear power has a potential to achieve both production of electricity 
without emitting CO2 and reduction of concerns of ordinary nuclear power at the same time. 
In this chapter, outline of thorium nuclear power will be introduced and its implementation 
scenario in the global scale from a view of global warming will be demonstrated. In 
addition, background of recent trend of global warming, which calls thorium nuclear power, 
will be shown. The focal point of above calculation is mass-balance of fissile materials 
because implementation amount of thorium nuclear power is mainly governed by supply 
amount of fissile materials. 
2. Necessary understandings on global warming 
It is indispensable to know how much CO2 is emitted from different sectors in order to 
prepare adequate approaches in technical and economical views. 46 % of CO2 is coming 
from energy sectors such as electricity and heat production (International Energy Agency 
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[IEA], 2009). Governing factor of CO2 emission from electricity production is coal usage. 
Coal is a widely spread energy resource and its remaining resource is still large. Its price is 
also cheap. Recent technological progress of carbon capture and storage (CCS) is expected to 
reduce CO2 emission from the whole life of coal usage. Most of technical elements of CCS 
system have been cleared and some feasibility studies are now carried in Norway, Canada 
and Australia. However, careful design of total system of CCS will be needed in order to 
avoid CO2 leakage during its transportation from its production point to its final disposal 
area (Kamei, 2008). Solar power is also available for clean electricity supply. But it should be 
noted that solar power is available only in daytime and its output fluctuates due to weather 
condition. 
One of the practical low-carbon energy sources is nuclear power. Nuclear power has been 
recognized as an effective way as countermeasure of global warming. But it was not counted 
as an option of CDM because of its several concerns. These concerns are nuclear 
proliferation, safety and radioactive waste. As Solana, the high representative for the 
common foreign and security policy of European Union (EU) said, expansion of nuclear 
power to developing countries in Asia will cause a concern of nuclear proliferation. We still 
have the memories of a severe accident of Chernobyl as a possibility relating to the use of 
nuclear energy. In addition, we are still facing the ongoing severe accident at Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. Recently, public opinion in the USA revealed that hey 
still have concern against radioactive waste, which contains plutonium (Pu) and trans-
uranium materials (TRU). 
23 % of world CO2 emission is coming from transportation sector (IEA, 2009). This is the 
highest growing sector of CO2 emission. Road transport sector occupies 73 % of all 
transportation (IEA, 2007). This trend is estimated to continue because transportation is 
essentially needed for growth in economy. Therefore, it is indispensable to reduce CO2 
emission from transportation sector. Though there are several candidates of low-carbon 
transportation, electric vehicle (EV) will rapidly expand its use because infrastructure to 
supply fuel to EV has already been established. Technological keys for EV and hybrid-
vehicles are battery and electric motor using permanent magnet. Historically speaking, EV 
came to commercial phase earlier than gasoline engine cars. However EV could not obtain 
major position in the market because it could not have long driving range. Recent 
progresses of large capacity battery and high power electric motor help commercialize of 
EV. 
Sectoral approach has been suggested by Japan at the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) 
as an effective way to reduce CO2. We should understand both advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach to successfully carry out. One of the advantages is that it is 
easy to determine each country’s CO2 reduction target by this approach. On the other hand, 
the disadvantage is that some sector’s reduction has a possibility to become some other 
sector’s imposition. The most apparent case is transportation sector, which mainly uses oil 
as its fuel at moment. It is easy for this sector to greatly achieve CO2 reduction target by 
electrification. However, power generation sector will be forced to consider additional effort 
to reduce CO2 emission, which is not their original responsibility. Therefore, it becomes very 
important to discuss comprehensive approach, which can avoid such phenomena of 
emission transition from one sector to other sector, to effectively carry this sectoral 
approach. 
The other important information to design a suitable approach to globally reduce CO2 
emission is nation-based CO2 emission data. China is now the biggest CO2 emission country 
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(IEA, 2009) and it is estimated to emit more CO2 in near future because of its huge economic 
growth and its large population. The second biggest CO2 emitting country is the USA. 
About 41% of CO2 emission of the world is occupied only by these two countries. Therefore, 
it is also necessary to consider a way of CO2 reduction, which can be applied even by these 
two great countries as their own countermeasure. 
Present accumulation of CO2 in atmosphere is mainly caused by the previous emission of 
CO2 from developed countries such as the USA, European countries and Japan. There are 
only a few developing countries included in the top 15 ranking of CO2 emission. However, 
we have to take care of the future prediction that developing countries are growing now and 
they will become to emit more CO2. For example, India is the fourth largest CO2 emitting 
country in the world. India is also the second largest country in population at the same time. 
Therefore, it is necessary to prepare CO2 emission reduction methods, which can be adopted 
by these developing countries, too. One of the concerns of national energy security is 
whether energy is stably supplied or not. From this point of view, energy resource, which 
can be obtained within its own land area, is most applicable. Even though there are several 
limitations, but renewable energy such as solar power will be nation’s own energy source. 
Consequently, there are several points in global scale CO2 reduction. CO2 has to be reduced 
both from power generation sector and transportation sector, but some sector’s reduction 
must not be pushed into other sector. Though there may be some effective method of CO2 
reduction, they should be available even by China and the US. It also should be available by 
developing countries such as India. 
3. Thorium nuclear power 
In spite of the concerns mentioned above, nuclear power can play a major role for providing 
sustainable energy with very low CO2 emission. One of its advantages is that applying 
nuclear power will satisfy simultaneous reduction of CO2 both from power generating 
sector and transportation sector. That is to say, if newly installed nuclear power plants 
supply electricity to electric vehicles, it does not disturb efforts of power generating section. 
China has already presented that they are going to expand use of nuclear power for 
providing electricity. Number of nuclear power plant under operation is 11. Number of 
nuclear plants under construction is 12. Number of plan is 147. Though the super-heated 
progress was cooled-down after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, 
essential trend is not changed. Even after this severe accident at Fukushima, US’s president 
Obama said that nuclear power will also be used as clean energy source. There are still 
many countries planning to implement nuclear power in developing countries such as India. 
However, those concerns relating to nuclear power are still remaining in reality, so it is 
necessary to overcome these concerns if nuclear power is expanded to the world. For 
example, nuclear proliferation and radioactive waste must occur essentially as far as only 
uranium is used as nuclear fuel. Plutonium is the main production from the fertile isotope of 
uranium (mass number is 238) during the reaction in the nuclear reactor. If spent nuclear 
fuel is reprocessed, plutonium can be separated. Uranium-235, which is the fissionable 
isotope of uranium, becomes radioactive waste after nuclear fission. Uranium-238 changes 
to trans-uranium (TRU) materials such as americium and curium, which govern radioactive 
waste because of their long half-life. Needless to say, huge earthquakes happen again. 
There is a possibility to overcome these concerns relating to uranium usage by adopting 
thorium as nuclear fuel in parallel to uranium. In this section, outline of thorium nuclear 
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power will be briefly described and its recent trend in the world will be introduced. 
Thorium is naturally obtained fertile material. Thorium itself can not make fission reaction, 
but it transmutes to fissionable uranium-233 by absorbing neutron as shown below. 
UPaThnTh 233233233232 
 
22m 27d
 
Thorium is a lighter element than uranium and thus it produces less amount of plutonium 
and TRU because more than 90 % of uranium-233 fissions without growing heavier nucleus 
by neutron absorption. Thorium nuclear fuel in a molten-salt reactor (MSR) produces 0.5 kg 
of plutonium, while uranium fuel produces 230 kg of plutonium in a light water reactor 
(LWR) during 1 year operation of 1 GWe capacity plant (Furukawa et al., 2008). 8 kg of 
plutonium is necessary at least for the minimum nuclear explosion, thus it can be said that 
production of plutonium in thorium MSR is very small. In addition, spent thorium fuel 
accompanies strong gamma ray, which makes it difficult to fabricate nuclear weapon by 
using uranium-233 obtained from spent thorium fuel. Tatsujiro Suzuki, a member of Japan 
Atomic Energy Committee, proposed a new approach toward nuclear non-proliferation and 
nuclear disarmament in 2009. Here, he suggested using thorium-MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in 
the present commercially used LWRs (Suzuki, et al., 2009). 
Major factors of TRU are americium and curium. Total amount of these elements produced 
in the same condition mentioned above is 0.3 g from thorium MSR (Furukawa et al., 2008). 
This value is much smaller than the production amount being 25 kg from uranium LWR. It 
takes about one million years for the spent uranium fuel without reprocessing to be the 
same radioactive toxicity of natural uranium. Even with reprocessing, it will need about 100 
thousand years. However, it is estimated to be about a few hundred years for the thorium 
fuel because production amount of americium and curium is very small. 
Thorium is about 4 times abundant than uranium and it is widely available even in 
developing countries such as India, China and Brazil as summarized in Table 1. Developed 
countries such as Australia, Canada and Norway have large reserve of thorium, too. The 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) announced last year that the USA reserves 915 thousand tons 
of thorium (USGS, 2009). 
We see several notifications on thorium utilization from the side of global warming, not 
from nuclear industry. Fritz Vahrenholt, CEO of Repower, mentioned in 2001 that 
conventional LWR will not come back to Germany but safe thorium reactor will be possible. 
Thorium utilization was recommended as one of the technical approaches to reduce CO2 
emission in the specialist meeting on climate change at Kyoto in 2007. Former Australian 
Governor-General Major General Michael Jeffrey said that “while solar has the best prospect 
of a clean and sustainable energy source, thorium should not be discounted, as it is cleaner 
and can not be used to make weapons grade materials” in 2008 (Future Summit, 2008). 
9 papers discussing about thorium fuel in LWR, heavy water reactors (HWR) and MSR were 
seen in the ANFM IV, which is an international symposium on nuclear power. It was 
impressive that the general chairman of this symposium wrote as follows; “thorium fuel 
cycles may be unusual to many of us in the US, but they are important topics 
internationally, and are subjects that we must carefully study in order to ensure the future 
success of our industry.” Chinese Tsinghua University in Beijing organized an international 
workshop on thorium utilization in 2007 (TU2007) collaboratively with international atomic 
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energy agency (IAEA). China does not have enough amount of uranium but they have huge 
amount of thorium. Greneche of AREVA said, “It is important to use semi-breeding reactor 
with thorium fuel. Though CANDU is better than LWR, its conversion ratio (CR) is still 
smaller than 1. MSR has an attractive feature in this point of view.” Its second workshop, 
TU2009, was held in Baotou, China. Baotou is the most important city of rare-earth industry, 
which is indispensable for manufacturing EV. Thorium has already been accumulated as by-
product of rare-earth mining in a residual pool. 
 
Country Reserve [t] Ratio 
Turkey  380,000 14% 
India  290,000 10% 
Norway  170,000 6% 
USA  915,000 33% 
Brazil  16,000 1% 
Denmark  54,000 2% 
Australia  300,000 11% 
Egypt  15,000 1% 
South Africa  35,000 1% 
Canada  100,000 4% 
Greenland  54,000 2% 
Liberia  1,000 0% 
China  388,000 14% 
Other 95,000 3% 
World total 2,813,000 100% 
Table 1. Thorium resource (Nishikawa, 2010) 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of Norway published a report of thorium utilization 
in 2008 (The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of Norway, 2008). Several private companies 
such as “Statkraft” and “Thor Energi AS” are carrying R&D of thorium fuel. Former 
secretary general of IAEA Hans Blix became a board member of Thor Energi AS. In the US, 
one section titled “study on thorium-liquid fueled reactors for naval forces” was included in 
the legislation of “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010”. Finally the 
description of thorium-liquid fueled reactors was removed, but $ 61.5 million has been 
assigned to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), which is the origin of thorium-liquid 
fuel reactor, MSR. There were several movements between private companies of nuclear 
industries (Peachey, 2009). AREVA, French nuclear company, signed an agreement on 
collaboration of thorium nuclear fuel with US private company named Thorium Power Co. 
Ltd (its name has been changed to “Lightbridge” in September, 2009). Canadian nuclear 
company, AECL signed with Chinese companies group for testing thorium fuel rod in 
CANDU reactor in Qinshan nuclear power plant at Shanghai. 
Many popular magazines are coming to pick up thorium issues. Newsweek presented an 
article entitled “The Lost Chance” to return to the road not taken 50 years ago — thorium 
fuel cycle in 2001 (Howard & Graham, 2007). Australian scientific magazine COSMOS 
reported about the thorium utilization as “green nuclear power” in 2007 (Dean, 2007). Sam 
Knight reported recent situations on UK’s “Financial Times” in 2008 (Knight, 2008). “U.S. 
News & World Report” presented thorium utilization in a special issue of green economy in 
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2009 (Garber, 2009). An international meeting of thorium energy alliance (TEA) was held at 
Googleplex, the head-office of Google, in March, 2010. Wide range of thorium utilization 
was discussed including high temperature gas cooled reactor and molten-salt reactor called 
LFTR (Liquid Fluid Thorium Reactor). The 3rd conference of TEA has successfully organized 
in May, 2011 at Washington DC. Its sister conference was held at London in October, 2010 
by international thorium energy organization (IThEO). Accelerator driven sub-critical 
reactor (ADSR) was also picked up as a remarkable topic of thorium utilization. 
4. Implementation scenario of thorium nuclear power 
One of the most attractive reactor types to use thorium is MSR (Weinberg, 1997). The 
successful R&D program was carried in the USA on MSR for the usage of thorium since 
1950's to 70’s. Molten-salt reactor experiment (MSRE) was successfully operated during 1965 
and 1969. Based on this success, molten-salt breeder reactor (MSBR) was started to develop 
for targeting commercial power reactor (Rosental et al., 1972). Furukawa et al. have 
proposed one design of MSR named FUJI (Furukawa, et al., 1990). MSR was chosen among 6 
candidates by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). There are aggressive activities 
in the US, Canada and France with different types of MSR such as LFTR or tube-in-tube 
reactor. 
Most of MSR has a common technical background. Inner pressure of reactor vessel of MSR 
is only about 0.5 MPa because it applies molten-salt as coolant, which has very low vapour 
pressure. Therefore, there is no need to fabricate very high pressure vessel such as necessary 
in LWR. It reduces risks of bottleneck in its supply chain. Economy of MSR also has been 
examined (Roy & Robertson, 1971). Comparison between MSBR and LWR indicated that (1) 
capital cost will be nearly the same, (2) fuel cycle cost will be greatly reduced due to no 
requirement of manufacturing of fuel rods because MSR is liquid fuel and (3) maintenance 
cost will be also reduced because there is no necessity of fuel exchange. This is achieved by 
on-line re-fuelling and re-processing with liquid fuel. There is other recent work showing 
cost evaluation of MSR and pressurized water reactor (PWR) in view of capital cost, 
operations and maintenance, fuel, waste disposal and decommissioning (Moir, 2002). The 
result is summarized in table 2. The fuel cost of MSR was recalculated based on the use of 
uranium-233. Total cost of MSR will be about 30 % smaller than that of PWR. 
 
 MSR PWR 
Capital cost  2.01 2.07 
Operations & maintenance cost 0.58 1.13 
Fuel cycle cost 0.12 0.74 
Waste disposal cost 0.10 0.10 
Decommissioning cost 0.04 0.07 
Total 2.85 4.11 
Table 2. Cost evaluation of MSR and PWR (cent/kWh) 
The most important of thorium usage is that thorium does not contain fissile isotope. 
Therefore, uranium containing both fissile isotope (uranium-235) and fertile isotope 
(uranium-238) was used as the first nuclear fuel in the history. Uranium fuel produces 
fissionable plutonium and some countries are planning to use it as future nuclear fuel in fast 
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breeder reactor (FBR). However, there is still concern to use plutonium with uranium-238 
because it has a possibility to spread plutonium to the world. Total stock amount of 
plutonium in the world is nearly 2,000 t and it continues increasing in the future. This 
plutonium can also be used as fissile material with thorium. Thorium is available in any 
kind of nuclear reactors and many researches are carried now on commercially used 
reactors, too. Thorium is still not used as nuclear fuel because it is not available for nuclear 
weapon. Recent global trend of nuclear disarmament also supports starting use of thorium. 
Disadvantage of thorium containing no fissile isotope can now be solved by applying 
plutonium in spent nuclear fuel of LWR (Kamei et al., 2008; Kamei et al., 2009). Though it 
was known that plutonium could be applied as fissile with thorium, there was not enough 
amount of plutonium in 1970’s to start thorium reactors because plutonium is artificially 
produced material. Now, there is about 200 thousand t of spent nuclear fuel and 2,000 t of 
plutonium is accumulated. Spent nuclear fuel occurs at least 12,000 tons every year 
depending on the total capacity of LWR in the world. Czech, Japan and France are studying 
to use plutonium in spent fuel for thorium MSR. Direct fluorination facility named FERDA 
has been developed in order to obtain plutonium from spent nuclear fuel (Uhlir, 2008). 
Outline of possible implementation path of thorium utilization including different types of 
nuclear reactor such as LWR and new technologies including MSR can be summarized as 
shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fissile 
Fertile = Thorium
-Short term … LWR, HWR etc. (by USA, Canada, EU, China etc.)
-Middle term … MSR (China, US, EU, Canada and Japan)
-Long term … Fissile breeding by ADS and nuclear fusion
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
U-LWR
U-HWR
Th-MSR
Breeder
Th-LWR
Th-HWR
Pu supply
233U supply
Power generation
Fissile production by ADS or fusion
In any case, the most important subject is “how to get fissile”.
 
Fig. 1. Implementation path of thorium nuclear power. 
The most important point to describe implementation scenario of thorium utilization is 
fissile supply. Plutonium will be the only fissile material having enough amounts in the very 
begging of world thorium utilization. Though Plutonium can be used with uranium-238, it 
is considered here that plutonium will be used with thorium. It is because natural uranium 
containing uranium-235 can be fed to uranium fuel cycle. As far as present capacity of 
uranium usage continues in this century, uranium resource is still enough. On the other 
hand, uranium-235 is also available to be used with thorium. However, it has several 
limitations. The first point is that in order to be used with thorium, highly enriched uranum-
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235 more than 20% enrichment is necessary. This causes additional concern of nuclear 
proliferation. The second point is that uranium usage also should be used continuously 
since it is an established technology emitting no CO2 during its electricity production. In 
addition, once uranium usage is terminated in an early stage, plutonium supply will be 
shortage in order to expand thorium utilization. This will be demonstrated later. Thus, 
parallel usage of uranium and thorium will be necessary to construct sustainable energy 
sources available both in developed countries and developing countries. 
Once thorium is ignited by plutonium, uranium-233 is artificially produced during 
operation of thorium fuelled LWR and HWR. This uranium-233 can be used in the following 
thorium LWR and HWR. Plutonium can also be fed to start MSR. It is estimated to require 
about 10 years for developing proto-type MSR. Uranium-233 produced from LWR, HWR 
and MSR will be stored and then can be used as fissile to start following MSR. As presented 
in the next section, production amount of plutonium and uramium-233 is small. Therefore, 
production of uranium-233 from thorium by using accelerator or fusion technology will be 
necessary for large scale implementation. It depends on how design whole view of new 
nuclear power supply system. 
In order to quantitatively evaluate implementation capacity of thorium fuel cycle, mass-
balance of fissile material has been calculated. Calculation model is shown in Fig. 2. In this 
calculation, both uranium fuel cycle and thorium fuel cycle are considered as analysis 
targets. Fissile material for uranium fuel cycle can be obtained from natural mining. Though 
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Fig. 2. Calculation model of implementation of thorium fuel cycle 
recycled plutonium from spent nuclear fuel can be also fed to uranium fuel cycle as fissile, it 
is not considered this calculation. Because of the lack of fissile isotope in thorium, it is 
necessary to obtain fissile material from outside of thorium fuel cycle. Direct production of 
uranium-233 from thorium by using spallation neutron triggered by accelerator or nuclear 
fusion neutron can be available inside of thorium fuel cycle without depending on uranium 
fuel cycle. However, in this calculation, plutonium fed from uranium fuel cycle is 
considered as fissile material to start thorium fuel cycle. Capacity of uranium fuel cycle is 
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determined by the prediction of international energy agency (IEA) to be 680 GWe at 2030. In 
this case, 13 of 1 GWe LWRs will be implemented every year. 1 GWe of LWR generates 
about 30 t of spent fuel every year.  
MSR is considered as a power reactor in thorium fuel cycle because of its high conversion 
ratio of fissile material. Two designs of MSR, FUJI-Pu2 and FUJI-U3, are applied in this 
calculation based on different initial fissile. FUJI-Pu2, which uses plutonium as fissile 
material, will be used for starting the thorium fuel cycle. Spent thorium fuel from FUJI-Pu2 
contains uranium-233 and this can be provided to the next generation of thorium MSR. 
Other design of MSR, FUJI-U3, will be supported by uranium-233 obtained after termination 
of FUJI-Pu2. Both types of MSR have 200 MWe of electricity capacity and 30 years of 
lifetime. The performance of these reactors is summarized in Table 3. 
 
 FUJI-Pu2 FUJI-U3 
Electricity capacity 200 MWe 200 MWe 
Lifetime  30 years  30 years 
Pu inventory (initial) 5.78 t - 
Pu feed (total in life) 1.16 t - 
233U inventory (initial) - 1.132 t 
233U feed (total in life) - 0.344 t 
Batch cycle 7.5 years 7.5 years 
233U production (batch cycle) 0.295 t 0.029 t 
233U production (terminated) 0.295 t 1.505 t 
MA production (terminated) 285 kg 5.32 kg 
Th inventory (initial) 31.3 t 56.3 t 
Conversion ratio 0.92 1.01 
Table 3. Specification of MSR 
5. Calculation results 
Implementation capacity of thorium MSR in a global scale was calculated based on the 
plutonium supply from uranium fuel cycle. Calculation was carried as follows. At first, 
capacity of uranium fuel cycle at certain year is determined. Then production of spent 
nuclear fuel is obtained. It was assumed that MSR will begin to be used around 2024. Its 
capacity grows gradually and corresponding amount of required plutonium is calculated. 
This amount is reduced from spent nuclear fuel. Here, capacity of processing spent nuclear 
fuel to molten-salt fuel is assumed enough high. Calculation result is shown in Fig. 3. 
The first Y-axis is referred by electricity capacity. The second Y-axis is referred by storage of 
spent fuel. Black cross line indicates growth of LWR. The gray line corresponds to the 
storage of spent nuclear fuel without MSR. The black chain line is the storage of spent 
nuclear fuel with consumption by MSR. Gray hatching is capacity of FUJI-Pu2. White dot 
hatching is capacity of FUJI-U3. It is assumed that FUJI-Pu2 begins to be used from 2024. 
Number of FUJI-Pu2 reactor at 2024 is 32. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is rapidly 
consumed with the growth of FUJI-Pu2. The growing ratio of FUJI-Pu2 decreases at 2029, 
when stock of spent fuel becomes almost 0. Since then, annual production of spent fuel from 
uranium fuel cycle is consumed within the same year for new implementation of FUJI-Pu2. 
After one batch cycle of fuel salt processing of FUJI-Pu2, uranium-233 is extracted and fed to 
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FUJI-U3. Therefore, two different designs of MSR can be used since 2029. Spent fuel salt 
from FUJI-U3 is also reprocessed after one batch cycle and fed to next generation of FUJI-U3. 
Capacity of LWR is 948 GWe and that of MSR including both FUJI-Pu2 and FUJI-U3 is 392 
GWe at around 2050. Thorium MSR also produces its own spent fuel. However the amount 
is considerably smaller than the amount from uranium LWR. This is because spent fuel of 
thorium MSR comes out of reactor after its lifetime being 30 years. On the other hand, spent 
fuel of LWR occurs every year. It is estimated here that thorium MSR will be 
commercialized in 2020's. Therefore, spent fuel of thorium MSR will appear around 2050's. 
Its quantitative evaluation has been demonstrated in the previous work (Kamei, 2008). 
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Fig. 3. Calculation result of Implementation capacity of thorium MSR (case 1) 
Other result is shown in Fig. 4. It is assumed here that capacity of uranium fuel cycle will be 
constant within next 40 years by considering the effect of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant accident. In this case, implementation capacity of thorium MSR will be about 258 GWe 
around at 2050, which is small because supply of fissile plutonium is reduced. 
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Fig. 4. Calculation result of Implementation capacity of thorium MSR (case 2) 
The amount of plutonium from dismantled weapon head is estimated to be about 91.9 t and 
145 t for the USA and Russia, respectively (International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2008). 
Additional 40 t of plutonium can be separated based on the agreement between the USA 
and Russia to reduce number of nuclear weapons to be 2,000. Briefly speaking, contribution 
of plutonium from weapon head is about 15 GWe around at 2050 to additionally implement 
thorium MSR to the implementation capacity by spent nuclear fuel from uranium fuel cycle. 
6. Sustainable development with thorium utilization 
In this section, relation between thorium utilization and its surroundings will be discussed 
in a view of comprehensive approach on sustainable development. The key issues are 
protection of radioactive hazard by thorium, rare-earth production accompanied with 
thorium, electric vehicle using lots of rare-earth and CO2 reduction from human activities. 
6.1 Production of thorium as by-product of rare-earth 
One of the important sectors to reduce CO2 emission is transportation sector. Many motor 
companies have presented to supply EV or hybrid-vehicle (HV) recently as summarized in 
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Table 4. Reborn GM in 2009 put EV for their new backbone like “Chevrolet Volt”. Chevrolet 
Volt was given the award of 2011 Green Car of the Year. Many new EV companies appeared 
in China, which became the world largest production and sales of cars. BYD, which was just 
a battery company, is one of the most famous EV companies in China. 
 
Country Company Brand 
Japan Toyota Prius (HV) 
Nissan Leaf (EV) 
Honda Insight (HV), CR-Z (HV) 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV (EV) 
EU VW New compact coupe (HV) 
Audi e-tron (EV) 
BMW MINI E (EV) 
Daimler Smart EV (EV) 
Renault Z. E. (EV) 
PSA OEM, Mitsubishi (EV) 
USA GM Chevrolet Volt (EV) 
Ford Focus EV (EV) 
Tesla motors Roadster (EV) 
Korea Hyundai i10 electric (EV) 
China BYD e6 (EV) 
India Tata Indica Vista EV (EV) 
Table 4. Development of Low-Carbon Vehicle 
Rare-earth materials such as neodymium and dysprosium are minerals for fabricating a 
strong permanent magnetic of electric motor. World annual production of rare-earth 
materials is about 120 thousands t at 2010 (Watanabe, 2008). The production amount is 
expected to increase at about 3 or 5 % every year. At moment, China shares 97 % of rare-
earth production in the world. These materials can be mined from other Asian countries, 
too. However, accompanying thorium as by-product of rare-earth mining becomes a 
radioactive waste having possibility to bring environmental hazard (Nishikawa, 2010). 
Thorium is not commercially used as nuclear fuel until now. It has been left as radioactive 
waste, which become environmental and social concerns at the resource countries. Detail 
investigation is needed but roughly residual thorium is estimated to be produced at least 10 
thousand t every year. This makes it difficult for Japanese trade companies to find rare-
earth. 
6.2 Consumption of thorium 
Consumption of thorium has been simulated by using the capacity of thorium fuel cycle 
demonstrated in the previous section. The result is shown in Fig. 5. 
Here, it is assumed that 1 % of rare-earth production corresponds to the amount of thorium. 
It is also assumed that initial value of thorium storage at 2005 is zero. Typical designs of 
thorium MSR, FUJI-Pu2 and FUJI-U3, require 31.3 t and 56.4 t of thorium as initial value, 
respectively. Stockpile of thorium will be about 40 thousand t around at 2024, when 
commercial utilization of thorium MSR begins. Though stockpile of thorium will be 
accumulated by production of rare-earth, thorium is also consumed and the stockpile will 
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be about 60 thousand t around at 2050. If there is no utilization of thorium, its stockpile will 
be more than 130 thousand t. 
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Fig. 5. Consumption of thorium. 
6.3 CO2 reduction from transportation sector 
CO2 emission from transportation sector has been simulated based on the prediction of 
capacity of thorium MSR also described in the previous section. The result is shown in Fig. 6. 
It is assumed here that number of vehicles increases with 3.5% of growth rate, which is same 
to the recent trend (The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, 2009). Number of 
vehicle in the world around at 2005 is about 900 million. This emitted 4.5 Gt of CO2. Number 
of vehicle will be about 4 billion around at 2050 emitting 18.6 Gt of CO2. If 100 million EV 
are supplied every year since 2010, all vehicles can be replaced with EV at 2050. Even 
though this estimation is somewhat large, it is assumed in order to evaluate higher case of 
CO2 reduction. 392 GWe of thorium MSR can supply electricity to 2.75 billion EV. This is 
obtained that EV is supplied its electricity by thorium MSR with 80 % of load factor. It is 
assumed that one EV can drive 10 km per 1 kWh, drives averaged 10,000 km in a year. This 
corresponds to 60 million t of CO2 emission from thorium MSR. This was calculated that 1 
kWh of nuclear power emits 0.022 kg with its load factor being 80 %. If the rest of 1.25 
billion cars are also EV and supplied its electricity by coal fire plant, CO2 emission is 1.23 Gt. 
It was assumed that coal fire plant emits 0.975 kg of CO2 per 1 kWh. Total CO2 emission is 
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1.29 Gt both from thorium MSR and coal fire plant. It can be seen that collaborative 
implementation of thorium MSR and EV has a great potential to CO2 reduction by solving 
the problem of sectoral approach. 
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Fig. 6. CO2 reduction by thorium utilization. 
6.4 Concept of “The Bank” 
Implementation capacity of thorium MSR is limited by the amount of supply of fissile 
material. Thorium is recognized as radioactive waste and residual of rare-earth mining. As 
indicated in the Fig.5, thorium will not be necessarily completely consumed even though it 
is utilized as nuclear fuel. Therefore, there is a possibility that thorium, which is not 
managed correctly, cause environmental hazard. In order to promote progress of EV for the 
reduction of CO2 emission from transportation sector, rare-earth mining is indispensable. 
Thus it is also necessary to manage thorium for keeping environment healthy. Estimation of 
implementation capacity of thorium MSR is based on the supply of fissile material from 
uranium fuel cycle since thorium does not contain its own fissionable isotope. And the other 
important point is that it will need more than 10 years for the first commercial 
implementation of thorium nuclear power. There are several countries, which hold thorium 
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as future energy source like India, but most of the countries have no plan to store thorium. 
Therefore it is necessary to storage thorium. Such an idea proposed here is called “The 
Bank”. This is named from “thorium energy bank”. Outline of “The Bank” is illustrated in 
Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7. Concept of “The Bank”. 
The most important purpose of “The Bank” is to store thorium obtained as residual of rare-
earth mining. This is mainly for protecting environment of mining country of rare-earth 
from radioactive thorium. The other function is to lend thorium to countries, which does not 
own its thorium resource. Former US president Jimmy Carter proposed a concept of a 
nuclear fuel bank. This is to provide fissile material, enriched uranium, in order not to 
expand the technology of enrichment having fear of nuclear proliferation. Similar proposal 
was also brought from former director of IAEA, Dr. El Baradei. US President Obama also 
indicated at the speech in Prague, 2009 that the concept of nuclear fuel bank will be an 
important role to bring peace nuclear power. “The Bank” accepts both thorium and 
uranium-233 as fertile material and as fissile material, respectively. 
However, “The Bank” will not have any uranium- 233 at the beginning of its operation. 
Thus other fissile material such as plutonium must be provided from uranium fuel cycle. 
Once thorium fuel is used at some country, the spent thorium fuel will be returned to “The 
Bank”. Uranium-233 is the interest of debt of thorium. Trend of demand toward rare-earth 
and thorium will be different. Rare-earth is now eagerly required but thorium is not now. 
“The Bank” will be an international organization. Head office of “The Bank” can be located 
in Norway, Sweden, Australia and Japan, which have no risk of nuclear proliferation. It will 
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be better that the country of the head office has an ability to handle radioactive material. The 
head office will have several functions. One of the functions is to store separated thorium 
during the refining process of rare-earth mining. The stored thorium can be lent to 
countries. These countries have to return both thorium and fissionable uranium-233 in the 
spent thorium fuel to “The Bank”. Uranium-233 is produced by absorption of neutron of 
thorium. Uranium-233 is the interest against the debt of thorium from “The Bank”. As far as 
the capacity of thorium nuclear power in the world is limited by the supply of plutonium 
from uranium fuel cycle, amount of produced thorium from rare-earth mining is larger than 
the consumption of thorium as nuclear fuel. Thus, price of thorium will be kept at low level. 
The other function of “The Bank” is reprocessing of spent thorium fuel. If LWR or HWR are 
used as power reactor, solid fuel rod including thorium and fissile materials (uranium-233 
or plutonium) will be returned. If MSR is used, frozen fuel salt will be returned. For the 
former case, direct fluorination method called FERDA will be able to apply obtaining 
plutonium and uranium-233 from solid spent fuel. For the latter case, dry-process method 
using molten-salt will be available for reprocessing. 
The last function of “The Bank” is to fabricate thorium fuel. If countries plan to implement 
thorium nuclear power, there is a possibility that it is not allowed to have fuel fabricating 
facility depending on the international discussion. United Arab Emirates (UAE) can be 
considered as such a case. UAE has signed with the USA in the agreement of nuclear power. 
UAE implements nuclear power plant but they do not have enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities. Nuclear fuel will be fed by the USA and spent nuclear fuel will be sent to France or 
other countries. “The Bank” will have several branch offices. The function of the branch 
office will just to store and lend thorium. 
It is not necessarily request to all the countries to join this frame of “The Bank”. Some 
countries such as India having thorium resource and functions of re-processing and fuel 
fabrication can continue their own plans. The function of “The Bank” will be attractive to the 
countries having rare-earth resources but having no plan to utilize thorium. Countries in the 
South-East Asia such as Vietnam or Myanmar will correspond to this case.  
Recently, there are many researches on breeding of uranium-233 from thorium by utilizing 
accelerator or fusion technologies. However it is estimated to take more than 20 years to be 
commercialization. Therefore it is necessary to store thorium until such a wide utilization. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, emerging tendency of thorium nuclear power has been introduced. It is 
impossible to describe all information running in the world at this time. However, outline of 
thorium utilization could be explained. Though thorium utilization has a very attractive 
feature, quantitative evaluation will be necessary to make a new energy supply vision in the 
near future. Implementation strategy of thorium fuel cycle discussed in this chapter will be a 
help for such a purpose. Several results demonstrated here based on the mass-balance of 
fissile materials show that thorium nuclear power will be available but still be limited. In 
spite of this result, it should not be said that thorium nuclear power is not enough. The 
concept of sustainability contains lots of different aspects. If thorium is not correctly used, it 
becomes an environmental hazard. However, if thorium is used, it produces clean and safe 
energy. We learned that present uranium LWR has a possibility of severe accident from 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. However, most countries do not have huge 
earthquake. Therefore, uranium LWR can be used by enhancing its safety. Thorium fuel 
 
Implementation Strategy of Thorium Nuclear Power in the Context of Global Warming 
 
381 
cycle will be introduced with a collaboration of this established uranium fuel cycle which 
supplies plutonium as fissile material to thorium fuel cycle. Though more detailed scenario 
for the implementation of thorium fuel cycle will be needed including fuel reprocessing, an 
international frame work for nuclear safeguard, thorium fuel cycle has an attractive option 
to provide carbon-free primary energy source. 
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1. Introduction 
With the present-day availability of fissile U235 and Pu239, as well as fusion and accelerator 
neutron sources, a fresh look at the Thorium-U233 fuel cycle is warranted. Thorium, as an 
unexploited energy resource, is about four times more abundant than uranium in the Earth’s 
crust and presents a more abundant fuel resource as shown in Table 1. 
 
Element Symbol Abundance 
[gms / ton] 
Lead Pb 16 
Gallium Ga 15 
Thorium Th 10 
Samarium Sm 7 
Gadolinium Gd 6 
Praseodymium Pr 6 
Boron B 3 
Bromine Br 3 
Uranium U 2.5 
Beryllium Be 2 
Tin Sn 1.5 
Tungsten W 1 
Molybdenum Mo 1 
Mercury Hg 0.2 
Silver Ag 0.1 
Uranium235 U235 0.018 
Platinum Pt 0.005 
Gold Au 0.02 
Table 1. Relative abundances of some elements in the Earth’s crust. 
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Fig. 1. Thorium dioxide with 1 percent cerium oxide impregnated fabric, Welsbach 
incandescent gas mantles (left) and ThO2 flakes (right). Yttrium compounds now substitute 
for Th in mantles. 
2. Properties of thorium 
Thorium (Th) is named after Thor, the Scandinavian god of war. It occurs in nature in the 
form of a single isotope: Th232. Twelve artificial isotopes are known for Th. It occurs in 
Thorite, (Th,U)SiO4 and Thorianite (ThO2 + UO2). It is four times as abundant as uranium 
and is slightly less abundant than lead.  
It can be commercially extracted from the Monazite placer deposit mineral containing 3-22 
percent ThO2 with other rare earth elements or lanthanides. Its large abundance makes it a 
valuable resource for electrical energy generation with supplies exceeding both coal and 
uranium combined. This would depend on breeding of the fissile isotope U233 from thorium 
according to the breeding reactions: 
 
1 232 233
0 90 90
233 233 0 *
90 91 -1
233 233 0 *
91 92 -1
1 232 233 0 *
0 90 92 -1
n  + Th Th  +   
Th Pa  + e  + +  
Pa U  + e  + +  
__________________________________
n  + Th U  + 2 e  + 2 3
 
  
  
   
 (1) 
Together with uranium, its radioactive decay chain leads to the stable Pb208 lead isotope 
with a half-life of 1.4 x 1010 years for Th232. It contributes to the internal heat generation in 
the Earth, together with other radioactive elements such as U and K40.  
As Th232 decays into the stable Pb208 isotope, radon220 or thoron forms in the decay chain. 
Rn220 has a low boiling point and exists in gaseous form at room temperature. It poses a 
radiation hazard through its own daughter nuclei and requires adequate ventilation in 
underground mining. Radon tests are needed to check for its presence in new homes that 
are possibly built on rocks like granite or sediments like shale or phosphate rock containing 
significant amounts of thorium. Adequate ventilation of homes that are over-insulated 
becomes a design consideration in this case.  
Thorium, in the metallic form, can be produced by reduction of ThO2 using calcium or 
magnesium. It can also be produced by electrolysis of anhydrous thorium chloride in a 
fused mixture of Na and K chlorides, by calcium reduction of Th tetrachloride mixed with 
anhydrous zinc chloride, and by reduction with an alkali metal of Th tetrachloride. 
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Thorium is the second member of the actinides series in the periodic table of the elements. 
When pure, it is soft and ductile, can be cold-rolled and drawn and it is a silvery white metal 
retaining its luster in air for several months. If contaminated by the oxide, it tarnishes in air 
into a gray then black color oxide (Fig. 1). 
Thorium oxide has the highest melting temperature of all the oxides at 3,300 degrees C. Just 
a few other elements and compounds have a higher melting point such as tungsten and 
tantalum carbide. Water attacks it slowly, and acids do not attack it except for hydrochloric 
acid.  
Thorium in the powder form is pyrophyric and can burn in air with a bright white light. In 
portable gas lights the Welsbach mantle is prepared with ThO2 with 1 percent cerium oxide 
and other ingredients (Fig. 1).  
As an alloying element in magnesium, it gives high strength and creep resistance at high 
temperatures.  
Tungsten wire and electrodes used in electrical and electronic equipment such as electron 
guns in x-ray tubes or video screens are coated with Th due to its low work function and 
associated high electron emission. Its oxide is used to control the grain size of tungsten used 
in light bulbs and in high temperature laboratory crucibles.  
Glasses for lenses in cameras and scientific instruments are doped with Th to give them a 
high refractive index and low dispersion of light.  
In the petroleum industry, it is used as a catalyst in the conversion of ammonia to nitric acid, 
in oil cracking, and in the production of sulfuric acid.  
3. Advantages of the thorium fuel cycle 
The following advantages of the thorium fuel cycle over the U235-Pu239 fuel cycle have been 
suggested: 
1. Breeding is possible in both the thermal and fast parts of the neutron spectrum with a 
regeneration factor of η > 2. 
2. Expanded nuclear fuel resources due to the higher abundance of the fertile Th232 than 
U238. The USA resources in the state of Idaho are estimated to reach 600,000 tons of 30 
percent of Th oxides. The probable reserves amount to 1.5 million tons. There exists 
about 3,000 tons of already milled thorium in a USA strategic stockpile stored in the 
state of Nevada.  
3. Lower nuclear proliferation concerns due to the reduced limited needs for enrichment 
of the U235 isotope that is needed for starting up the fission cycle and can then be later 
replaced by the bred U233. The fission-fusion hybrid totally eliminates that need (Bethe, 
1978). An attempted U233 weapon test is rumored to have evolved into a fizzle because 
of the presence of the U232 isotope contaminant concentration and its daughter products 
could not be reduced to a practical level.  
4. A superior system of handling fission product wastes than other nuclear technologies 
and a much lower production of the long-lived transuranic elements as waste. One ton 
of natural Th232, not requiring enrichment, is needed to power a 1,000 MWe reactor per 
year compared with about 33 tons of uranium solid fuel to produce the same amount of 
power. Thorium would be first purified then converted into a fluoride. The same initial 
fuel loading of one ton/year is discharged primarily as fission products to be disposed 
of for the fission thorium cycle. 
5.  Ease of separation of the lower volume and short lived fission products for eventual 
disposal. 
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Fig. 2. Regeneration factor as a function of neutron energy for the different fissile isotopes. 
6. Higher fuel burnup and fuel utilization than the U235-Pu239 cycle. 
7. Enhanced nuclear safety associated with better temperature and void reactivity 
coefficients and lower excess reactivity in the core. Upon being drained from its reactor 
vessel, a thorium molten salt would solidify shutting down the chain reaction, 
8. With a tailored breeding ratio of unity, a fission thorium fueled reactor can generate its 
own fuel, after a small amount of fissile fuel is used as an initial loading.  
9. The operation at high temperature implies higher thermal efficiency with a Brayton gas 
turbine cycle (thermal efficiency around 40-50 percent) instead of a Joule or Rankine 
steam cycle (thermal efficiency around 33 percent), and lower waste heat that can be 
used for process heat for hydrogen production, sea water desalination or space heating. 
An open air cooled cycle can be contemplated eliminating the need for cooling water 
and the associated heat exchange equipment in arid areas of the world (Fig. 3.). 
10. A thorium cycle for base-load electrical operation would provide a perfect match to 
peak-load cycle wind turbines generation. The produced wind energy can be stored as 
compressed air which would be used to cool a thorium open cycle reactor, substantially 
increasing its thermal efficiency, yet not requiring a water supply for cooling.  
11. The unit powers are scalable over a wide range for different applications such as 
process heat or electrical production. Small units of 100 MWe of capacity each can be 
designed, built and combined for larger power needs. 
12. Operation at atmospheric pressure for a molten salt as a coolant without pressurization 
implies the use of standard equipment with a lower cost than the equipment operated 
at a 1,000-2,000 psi high pressure in the Light Water Reactor (LWRs) cycle. 
Depressurization would cause the pressurized water coolant to flash into steam and a 
loss of coolant. 
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13. In uranium-fuelled thermal reactors, without breeding, only 0.72 percent or 1/139 of the 
uranium is burned as U235. If we assume that about 40 percent of the thorium can be 
converted into U233 then fissionned, this would lead to an energy efficiency ratio of 139 
x 0.40 = 55.6 or 5,560 percent more efficient use of the available resource compared with 
U235.  
14. Operational experience exists from the Molten Salt reactor experiment (MSRE) at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Tennessee. A thorium fluoride salt was not 
corrosive to the nickel alloy: Hastelloy-N. Corrosion was caused only from tellurium, a 
fission product (Ragheb et. al., 1980). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Dry cooling tower in foreground, wet cooling tower in background in the THTR-300 
pebble bed Th reactor, Germany. 
Four approaches to a thorium reactor are under consideration: 
1. Use of a liquid molten Th fluoride salt, 
2. Use of a pebble bed graphite moderated and He gas cooled reactor, 
3. The use of a seed and blanket solid fuel with a thermal Light Water Reactor (LWR) 
cycle, 
4. A driven system using fusion or accelerator generated neutrons. 
4. Thorium abundance 
Thorium is four times as abundant than uranium in the Earth’s crust and provides a fertile 
isotope for breeding of the fissile uranium isotope U233 in a thermal or fast neutron 
spectrum.  
In the Shippingport reactor it was used in the oxide form. In the HTGR it was used in 
metallic form embedded in graphite. The MSBR used graphite as a moderator and hence 
was a thermal breeder and a chemically stable fluoride salt, eliminating the need to process 
or to dispose of fabricated solid fuel elements. The fluid fuel allows the separation of the 
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stable and radioactive fission products for disposal. It also offers the possibility of burning 
existing actinides elements and does need an enrichment process like the U235-Pu239 fuel 
cycle.  
Thorium is abundant in the Earth’s crust, estimated at 120 trillion tons. The Monazite black 
sand deposits are composed of 3-22 percent of thorium. It can be extracted from granite 
rocks and from phosphate rock deposits, rare earths, tin ores, coal and uranium mines 
tailings.  
It has even been suggested that it can be extracted from the ash of coal power plants. A 1,000 
MWe coal power plant generates about 13 tons of thorium per year in its ash. Each ton of 
thorium can in turn generate 1,000 MWe of power in a well optimized thorium reactor. Thus 
a coal power plant can conceptually fuel 13 thorium plants of its own power. From a 
different perspective, 1 pound of Th has the energy equivalent of 5,000 tons of coal. There 
are 31 pounds of Th in 5,000 tons of coal. If the Th were extracted from the coal, it would 
thus yield 31 times the energy equivalent of the coal. 
The calcium sulfate or phospho-gypsum resulting as a waste from phosphorites or 
phosphate rocks processing into phosphate fertilizer contains substantial amounts of 
unextracted thorium and uranium. 
Uranium mines with brannerite ores generated millions of tons of surface tailings containing 
thoria and rare earths. 
The United States Geological Survey (USGS), as of 2010, estimated that the USA has reserves 
of 440,000 tons of thorium ore. A large part is located on properties held by Thorium Energy 
Inc. at Lemhi Pass in Montana and Idaho (Fig. 5). This compares to a previously estimated 
160,000 tons for the entire USA. 
The next highest global thorium ores estimates are for Australia at 300,000 tons and India 
with 290,000 tons. 
5. Thorium primary minerals 
Thorium occurs in several minerals: 
1. Monazite, (Ce,La,Y,Th)PO4, a rare earth-thorium phosphate with 5-5.5 hardness. Its 
content in Th is 3-22 percent with 14 percent rare earth elements and yttrium. It occurs 
as a yellowish, reddish-brown to brown, with shades of green, nearly white, yellowish 
brown and yellow ore. This is the primary source of the world’s thorium production. 
Until World War II, thorium was extracted from Monazite as a primary product for use 
in products such as camping lamp mantles. After World War II, Monazite has been 
primarily mined for its rare earth elements content. Thorium was extracted in small 
amounts and mainly discarded as waste. 
2. Thorite, (Th,U)SiO4 is a thorium-uranium silicate with a 4.5 hardness with yellow, 
yellow-brown, red-brown, green, and orange to black colors. It shares a 22 percent Th 
and a 22 percent U content. This ore has been used as a source of uranium, particularly 
the uranium rich uranothorite, and orangite; an orange colored calcium-rich thorite 
variety. 
3. Brocktite, (Ca,Th,Ce)(PO4)H2O. 
4. Xenotime, (Y,Th)PO4. 
5. Euxenite, (Y,Ca,Ce,U,Th)(Nb,Ta,Ti)2O6. 
6. Iron ore, (Fe)-rare earth elements-Th-apatite, Freta deposits at Pea Ridge, Missouri, 
Mineville, New York, and Scrub Oaks, New Jersey. 
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Ore Composition 
Thorite  (Th,U)SiO4 
Thorianite (ThO2 + UO2) 
Thorogummite Th(SiO4)1-x (OH)4x 
Monazite (Ce,La,Y,Th)PO4 
Brocktite (Ca,Th,Ce)(PO4)H2O 
Xenotime (Y,Th)PO4 
Euxenite (Y,Ca,Ce,U,Th)(Nb,Ta,Ti)2O6 
Iron ore Fe + rare earths + Th apatite 
Table 2. Major Thorium ores compositions. 
6. Global and USA thorium resources 
Estimates of the available Th resources vary widely. The largest known resources of Th 
occur in the USA followed in order by Australia, India, Canada, South Africa, Brazil, and 
Malaysia. 
 
Country 
ThO2 Reserves 
[metric tonnes] 
USGS estimate 
2010 
ThO2 Reserves 
[metric 
tonnes] 
NEA estimate 
*** 
Mined 
amounts 
2007 
[metric 
tonnes]* 
USA 440,000 400,000 -** 
Australia 300,000 489,000 - 
Turkey  344,000  
India 290,000 319,000 5,000 
Venezuela  300,000  
Canada 100,000 44,000 - 
South 
Africa 
35,000 18,000 - 
Brazil 16,000 302,000 1,173 
Norway  132,000  
Egypt  100,000  
Russia  75,000  
Greenland  54,000  
Canada  44,000  
Malaysia 4,500  800 
Other 
countries 
90,000 33,000 - 
Total 1,300,000 2,610,000 6,970 
* Average Th content of 6-8 percent. 
** Last mined in 1994. 
***Reasonably assured and inferred resources available at up to $80/kg Th. 
Table 3. Estimated Global Thorium Resources (Van Gosen et. al., 2009). 
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The Steenkampskraal Mine in South Africa, located 350 km Northwest of Cape Town was 
operated by the Anglo American Company as the world’s largest producer of Thorium and 
rare earth elements over the period 1952-1963. It was acquired by the Rare Earth Extraction 
Company (Rareco).  
Concentrated deposits occur as vein deposits, and disseminated deposits occur as massive 
carbonatite stocks, alkaline intrusions, and black sand placer or alluvial stream and beach 
deposits. 
Carbonatites are rare carbonate igneous rocks formed by magmatic or metasomatic 
processes. Most of these are composed of 50 percent or higher carbonate minerals such as 
calcite, dolomite and/or ankerite. They occur near alkaline igneous rocks. 
The alkaline igneous rocks, also referred to as alkali rocks, have formed from magmas and 
fluids so enriched in alkali elements that Na and K bearing minerals form components of the 
rocks in larger proportion than usual igneous rocks. They are characterized by feldspathoid 
minerals and/or alkali pyroxenes and amphiboles (Hedrick, 2009). 
 
Deposit type Mining District Location ThO2 reserves 
[metric tonnes] 
Vein deposits Lehmi Pass district Montana-Idaho 64,000 
 Wet Mountain area Colorado 58,200 
 Hall Mountain Idaho 4,150 
 Iron Hill Colorado 1,700 (thorium 
veins) 
690 (Carbonatite 
dikes) 
 Diamond Creek Idaho - 
 Bear Lodge Mountains Wyoming - 
 Monroe Canyon Utah - 
 Mountain Pass district California - 
 Quartzite district Arizona - 
 Cottonwood area Arizona - 
 Gold Hill district New Mexico - 
 Capitan Mountain New Mexico - 
 Laughlin Peak New Mexico - 
 Wausau, Marathon 
County 
Wisconsin - 
 Bokan Mountain Alaska - 
Massive Carbonatite stocks Iron Hill Colorado 28,200 
 Mountain Pass California 8,850 
Black Sand Placer, Alluvial 
Deposits 
Stream deposits North, South 
Carolina 
4,800 
 Stream placers Idaho 9,130 
 Beach placers Florida-Georgia 14,700 
Alkaline Intrusions Bear Lodge Mountains Wyoming - 
 Hicks Dome Illinois - 
Total, USA   194,420 
Table 4. Locations of USA major ThO2 proven reserves (Hedrick, 2009). 
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Fig. 4. Th concentrations in ppm and occurrences in the USA. Source: USA Geological 
Survey Digital Data Series DDS-9, 1993. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Lehmi Pass is a part of Beaverhead Mountains along the continental divide on the 
Montana-Idaho border, USA. Its Th veins also contain rare earth elements, particularly 
Neodymium.  
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Fig. 6. Black sand Monazite layers in beach sand at Chennai, India. Photo: Mark A. Wilson 
(Hedrick, 2009).  
 
 
Fig. 7. Thorite (Th, U)SiO4, a thorium-uranium silicate (Van Gosen, 2009). 
7. Global and USA uranium resources 
Depleting hydrocarbon fuel resources and the growing volatility in fossil fuel prices, have 
led to an expansion in nuclear power production. The Station Blackout accident, caused by a 
combined earthquake and tsunami event at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors on March 11, 
2011 will lead to a reconsideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
existing U238-Pu239 fuel cycle against the alternative Th232-U233 fuel cycle. 
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As of 2010, there were 56 nuclear power reactors under construction worldwide, of which 21 
are in China. Some are replacing older plants that are being decommissioned, and some are 
adding new installed capacity. The Chinese nuclear power program is probably the most 
ambitious in history. It aims at 50 new plants by the year 2025 with an additional 100, if not 
more, completed by the year 2050. Standardized designs, new technology, a disciplined 
effort to develop human skills and industrial capacities to produce nuclear power plant 
components all point to a likely decline in plant construction costs in coming years and 
growing interest in new nuclear projects with ensuing pressure on nuclear fuels.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Number of power reactors under construction worldwide. Total: 56. Net electrical 
capacity: 51.9 MWe. Data source: IAEA, 2010. 
It should be noted that there are currently 150 international reactor projects in some 
advanced permitting stage. An additional 300 projects are in some early planning stage. 
Added to a significant fraction of the currently 439 operating power reactors will likely 
double global nuclear capacity in the coming couple decades (most countries seem willing 
to try to extend the operating lives of existing reactors through safety-compliant upgrades 
and retrofits). Building a nuclear power plant practically requires contracting its fuel supply 
for 40-60 years. When adding all new projects it is reasonable to conclude that fuel 
requirements could double in the coming couple decades.  
About 30 percent of the known recoverable global uranium oxide resources are found in 
Australia, followed by Kazakhstan (17 percent), Canada (12 percent), South Africa (8 
percent), Namibia (6 percent), and Russia, Brazil and the USA, each with about 4 percent of 
the world production. 
The uranium resources are classified into “conventional” and “non-conventional” resources. 
The conventional resources are further categorized into “Reasonably Assured Resources,” 
RAR and the believed-to-exist “Inferred Resources,” IR.  
The RAR and IR categories are further subdivided according to the assumed exploitation 
cost in USA dollars. These cost categories are given as < 40 $/kg, < 80 $/kg, and < 130 $/kg. 
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The non-conventional resources are split into “Undiscovered Resources,” UR, further 
separated into “Undiscovered Prognosticated Resources,” UPR with assumed cost ranges of 
< 80 $/kg and < 130 $/kg, and “Undiscovered Speculative Resources” USR. 
The USR numbers are given for an estimated exploitation cost of < 130 $/kg and also for a 
category with an unknown cost. 
In the twentieth century, the USA was the world leading uranium producer until it was 
surpassed by Canada and Australia. In 2007, Canada accounted for 23 percent and Australia 
for 21 percent of global production, with the USA at 4 percent. Africa is becoming a new 
frontier in uranium production with Namibia 7 percent, Niger 8 percent, and South Africa 1 
percent. Exploration and new mine development is ongoing in Botswana, Tanzania. Jordan 
and Nigeria. 
The federal, provincial and local governments in Australia have all unilaterally and 
forcefully banned the development of any new uranium mines, even though existing mines 
continue operation. The French company Areva was not successful in receiving approval to 
build a new uranium mine in Australia. It has mining activities in the Niger Republic and 
received exploration licenses in other countries such as Jordan. 
Canadian producer Cameco rates as the first world producer of uranium oxide, followed by 
French Areva, and then Energy Resources of Australia (68 percent owned by Rio Tinto), 
which produces some 6,000 tons per year.  
As of 2007, five operating uranium mines existed in the USA, with 3 in Texas, one in 
Wyoming and one in Northern Nebraska. The state of Texas has a positive attitude towards 
uranium mining, and energy production in general, with an advantageous regulatory 
framework that streamlines the permit process using in situ leaching of uranium. Texas, 
being an “Agreement State,” implies that the USA Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
has delegated its authority to the state regulatory agencies such as the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), and companies deal directly with the state agencies in 
Texas rather than with the federal government’s NRC. Most of the uranium mining 
operations in the USA and Kazakhstan use in situ leach methods, also designated as In Situ 
Recovery (ISR) methods. Conventional methods are used in 62 percent of U mining, with 28 
percent as ISR and 9 percent as byproduct extraction. 
By 2008, U production in the USA fell 15 percent to 1,780 tonnes U3O8. The U production in 
the USA is currently from one mill at White Mesa, Utah, and from 6 ISR operations. In 2007, 
four operating mines existed in the Colorado Plateau area: Topaz, Pandora, West Sunday 
and Sunday-St. Jude. Two old mines reopened in 2008: Rim Canyon and Beaver Shaft and 
the Van 4 mine came into production in 2009. 
As of 2010, Cameco Resources operated two ISL operations: Smith Ranch-Highland Mine in 
Wyoming and Cross Butte Mine in Nebraska, with reserves of 15,000 tonnes U3O8. The 
Denison Mines Company produced 791,000 tonnes of U3O8 in 2008 at its 200 t/day White 
Mesa mill in Southern Utah from its own and purchased ore, as well as toll milling. 
Uranium in the Colorado Plateau in the USA has an average grade of 0.25 percent or 2,500 
ppm uranium in addition to 1.7 percent vanadium within the Uravan Mineral Belt.  
Goliad County, Texas has an average grade of 0.076 percent (760 ppm) uranium oxide in 
sandstone deposits permeated by groundwater suggesting in situ leaching methods where 
water treated with carbon dioxide is injected into the deposit. The leachate is pumped and 
passed over ion exchange resins to extract the dissolved uranium. 
 
Thorium Fission and Fission-Fusion Fuel Cycle 395 
Country Production 
[tonnes U] 
Share of 
world 
production 
[percent] 
Main 
owner 
Extraction 
method 
Mine 
Canada 6,383 15 Cameco Conv McArthur 
River 
Australia 4,527 10 Rio Tinto Conv Ranger 
Namibia 3,449 8 Rio Tinto Conv Rδssing 
Australia 3,344 8 BHP 
Billiton 
Byproduct Olympic 
Dam 
Russia 3,050 7 ARMZ Conv Priargunsk
y 
Niger 1,743 4 Areva Conv Somair 
Canada 1,368 3 Cameco Conv Rabbit 
Lake 
Niger 1,289 3 Areva Conv Cominak 
Canada 1,249 3 Areva Conv McLean 
Kazakhsta
n 
1,034 2 Uranium 
One 
ISR Akdata 
Total 27,436 62    
Table 5. World main producing uranium mines, 2008. Source: World Nuclear Association, 
WNA. 
Phosphate rocks containing just 120 ppm in U have been used as a source of uranium in the 
USA. The fertilizer industry produces large quantities of wet process phosphoric acid 
solution containing 0.1-0.2 gram/liter (g/l) of uranium, which represent a significant 
potential source of uranium.  
8. Nonproliferation characteristics 
In the Th-U233 fuel cycle, the hard gamma rays associated with the decay chain of the formed 
isotope U232 with a half life of 72 years and its spontaneous fission makes the U233 in the 
thorium cycle with high fuel burnup a higher radiation hazard from the perspective of 
proliferation than Pu239.  
The U232 is formed from the fertile Th232 from two paths involving an (n, 2n) reaction, which 
incidentally makes Th232 a good neutron multiplier in a fast neutron spectrum: 
 
1 232 1 231
0 90 0 90
25.52231 0 231
90 1 91
1 231 232
0 91 91
1.31232 0 232
91 1 92
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and another involving an (n, γ) radiative capture reaction: 
 
1 232 233
0 90 90
22.2233 0 233
90 1 91
27233 0 233
91 1 92
233 1 1 232
92 0 0 922
m
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
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  
 (3) 
The isotope U232 is also formed from a reversible (n, 2n) and (n, γ) path acting on the bred 
U233: 
 
1 233 1 232
0 92 0 92
1 232 233
0 92 92
2n U n U
n U U
  
     (4) 
 
The isotope Th230 occurs in trace quantities in thorium ores that are mixtures of uranium and 
thorium. U234 is a decay product of U238 and it decays into Th230 that becomes mixed with the 
naturally abundant Th232. It occurs in secular equilibrium in the decay chain of natural 
uranium at a concentration of 17 ppm. The isotope U232 can thus also be produced from two 
successive neutron captures in Th230: 
 
1 230 231
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1.31232 0 232
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The hard 2.6 MeV gamma rays originate from Tl208 isotope in the decay chain of aged U232 
which eventually decays into the stable Pb208 isotope: 
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As comparison, the U233 decay chain eventually decays into the stable Bi209 isotope: 
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A 5-10 proportion of U232 in the U232-U233 mixture has a radiation equivalent dose rate of 
about 1,000 cSv (rem)/hr at a 1 meter distance for decades making it a highly proliferation 
resistant cycle if the Pa233 is not separately extracted and allowed to decay into pure U233.  
The Pa233 cannot be chemically separated from the U232 if the design forces the fuel to be 
exposed to the neutron flux without a separate blanket region, making the design fail-safe 
with respect to proliferation and if a breeding ratio of unity is incorporated in the design.  
Such high radiation exposures would lead to incapacitation within 1-2 hours and death 
within 1-2 days of any potential proliferators.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criterion for fuel self protection is a lower 
dose equivalent rate of 100 cSv(rem)/hr at a 1 meter distance. Its denaturing requirement for 
U235 is 20 percent, for U233 with U238 it is 12 percent, and for U233 denaturing with U232 it is 1 
percent. 
The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) had plans on cleaning U233 down to a few 
ppm of U232 using Laser Isotopic Separation (LIS) to reduce the dose to the occupational 
workers. 
The contamination of U233 by the U232 isotope is mirrored by another introduced problem 
from the generation of U232 in the recycling of Th232 due to the presence of the highly 
radioactive Th228 from the decay chain of U232. 
9. Radiation dosimetry 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criterion for occupational protection is an 
effective dose of 100 cSv (rem)/hr at a 1 meter distance from the radiation source. 
It is the decay product Tl208 in the decay chain of U232 and not U232 itself that generates the 
hard gamma rays. The Tl208 would appear in aged U233 over time after separation, emitting a 
hard 2.6416 MeV gamma ray photon. It accounts for 85 percent of the total effective dose 2 
years after separation. This implies that manufacturing of U233 should be undertaken in 
freshly purified U233. Aged U233 would require heavy shielding against gamma radiation. 
In comparison, in the U-Pu239 fuel cycle, Pu239 containing Pu241 with a half life of 14.4 years, 
the most important source of gamma ray radiation is from the Am241 isotope with a 433 
years half life that emits low energy gamma rays of less than 0.1 MeV in energy. For 
weapons grade Pu239 with about 0.36 percent Pu241 this does not present a major hazard but 
the radiological hazard becomes significant for reactor grade Pu239 containing about 9-10 
percent Pu241.  
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The generation of Pu241 as well as Pu240 and Am241 from U238 follows the following path: 
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 (8) 
Plutonium containing less than 6 percent Pu240 is considered as weapons-grade. 
The gamma rays from Am241 are easily shielded against with Pb shielding. Shielding against 
the neutrons from the spontaneous fissions in the even numbered Pu238 and Pu240 isotopes 
accumulated in reactor grade plutonium requires the additional use of a thick layer of a 
neutron moderator containing hydrogen such as paraffin or plastic, followed by a layer of 
neutron absorbing material and then additional shielding against the gamma rays generated 
from the neutron captures. 
The generation of Pu238 and Np237 by way of (n, 2n) rather than (n, γ) reactions, follows the 
path: 
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The production of Pu238 for radioisotopic heat and electric sources for space applications 
follows the path of chemically separating Np237 from spent LightWater Reactors (LWRs) fuel 
and then neutron irradiating it to produce Pu238. 
 
Isotopic 
composition 
[percent] 
Pu239 
weapons 
grade 
Pu239 
reactors 
grade 
U233 U233 + 1 
ppm U232 
U232   0.0000 0.0001 
U233   100.0000 99.9999 
Pu238 0.0100 1.3000   
Pu239 93.8000 60.3000   
Pu240 5.8000 24.3000   
Pu241 0.3500 9.1000   
Pu242 0.0200 5.0000   
Density 
[gm/cm3] 
19.86 19.86 19.05 19.05 
Radius [cm] 3.92 3.92 3.96 3.96 
Weight [kg] 5 5 5 5 
Table 6. Typical compositions of fuels in the uranium and thorium fuel cycles (Kang, von 
Hippel, 2001). 
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Fuel, 
U232/U233 
Time to 5 cSv 
effective dose 
[hr] 
Effective dose 
rate 
cSv/hr 
0.01 0.039 127.0000 
100 ppm 3.937 1.2700 
5 ppm 84.746 0.0590 
1 ppm 384.615 0.0130 
Reactor grade Pu239 609.756 0.0082 
Weapons grade Pu239 3846.154 0.0013 
Table 7. Glove box operation dose rate required to accumulate a limiting occupational 5 cSv 
(rem) dose equivalent from a 5 kg metal sphere, one year after separation at a 1/2 meter 
distance(Kang, von Hippel, 2001).  
Both reactor-grade plutonium and U233 with U232 would pose a significant radiation dose 
equivalent hazard for manufacturing personnel as well as military personnel, which 
precludes their use in weapons manufacture in favor of enriched U235 and weapons-grade 
Pu239. 
 
Material Type of 
radiation 
Dose equivalent rate at time after separation 
[cSv(rem)/hr] 
0 yr 1 yr 5 yr 10 yr 15 yr 
Pure U233 γ total 0.32 0.42 0.84 1.35 1.89 
U233 +1 ppm U232 γ total 0.32 13.08 35.10 39.57 39.17 
γ from Tl208 0.00 11.12 29.96 33.48 32.64 
Pu239,,  
weapons grade 
γ 0.49 0.71 1.16 1.57 1.84 
neutrons 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
γ + neutron 1.05 1.27 1.72 2.13 2.40 
Pu239,  
Reactor grade 
γ total 0.49 5.54 16.72 28.64 37.54 
γ from 
Am241 
0.00 3.24 14.60 26.00 34.80 
neutrons 2.66 2.66 2.65 2.64 2.63 
γ + neutrons 3.15 8.20 19.37 31.28 40.17 
Table 8. Dose equivalent rates in cSv (rem)/hr from 5 kg metal spheres at a 1/2 meter 
distance for different times after separation (Kang, von Hippel, 2001). 
10. Actinides production, waste disposal Issues 
There has been a new interest in the Th cycle in Europe and the USA since it can be used to 
increase the achievable fuel burnup in LWRs in a once through fuel cycle while significantly 
reducing the transuranic elements in the spent fuel. A nonproliferation as well as 
transuranics waste disposal consideration is that just a single neutron capture reaction in 
U238 is needed to produce Pu239 from U238: 
 
1 238 239
0 92 92
23.5239 239 0
92 93 -1
2.35239 239 0
93 94 -1
n  + U U  +   
U Np  + e  
Np Pu  + e  
m
d
 


 (10) 
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whereas a more difficult process of fully 5 successive neutron captures are needed to 
produce the transuranic Np237 from Th232: 
 
1 232 233
0 90 90
1 233 234
0 90 90
24.1234 234 0
90 91 -1
6.70234 234 0
91 92 -1
1 234 235
0 92 92
1 235 236
0 92 92
1 236 237
0 92 92
6.75237
92 93
n  + Th Th  +   
n  + Th Th  +   
Th Pa  + e
Pa U  + e
n  + U  U  +
n  + U  U  +
n  + U  U  +
U  Np
d
h
d
 
 


 
 
 
 237 0-1 + e
 (11) 
 
This implies a low yield of Np237 however, as an odd numbered mass number isotope 
posing a possible proliferation concern; whatever small quantities of it are produced, 
provisions must be provided in the design to have it promptly recycled back for burning in 
the fast neutron spectrum of the fusion part of the hybrid. 
In fact, it is more prominently produced in thermal fission light water reactors using the 
uranium cycle and would be produced; and burned, in fast fission reactors through the (n, 
2n) reaction channel with U238 according to the much simpler path: 
 
1 238 1 237
0 92 0 92
6.75237 237 0
92 93 1
2
d
n U n U
U Np e
  
   (12) 
 
The Np237 gets transmuted in the Th232 fuel cycle into Pu238 with a short half-life of 87.74 
years: 
 
1 237 238
0 93 93
2.12238 238 0
93 94 1
d
n Np Np
Np Pu e
   
   (13) 
 
A typical 1,000 MWe Light Water Reactor (LWR) operating at an 80 percent capacity factor 
produces about 13 kgs of Np237 per year.  
This has led to suggested designs where Th232 replaces U238 in LWRs fuel and accelerator 
driven fast neutron subcritical reactors that would breed U233 from Th232. 
Incidentally, whereas the Pu238 isotope is produced in the Th fuel cycle, it is the Pu240 isotope 
with a longer 6,537 years half-life, that is produced in the U-Pu fuel cycle: 
 
1 238 239
0 92 92
239 239 0 *
92 93 -1
239 239 0 *
93 94 -1
1 239 240
0 94 94
n  + U   U  +   
U   Np  +  e  + +  
Np   Pu  +   e  + +  
n  + Pu  Pu  +  
 
  
  
 
 (14) 
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11. Thorium fission-hybrid fuel cycle 
The thorium fusion fission hybrid is discussed as a sustainable longer term larger resource 
base to the fast breeder fission reactor concept. In addition, it offers a manageable waste 
disposal process, burning of the produced actinides and serious nonproliferation 
characteristics.  
With the present day availability of fissile U235 and Pu239, and available fusion and 
accelerator neutron sources, a new look at the thorium-U233 fuel cycle is warranted. Since no 
more than 7 percent of the ThO2 as a breeding seed fuel can be added to a Heavy Water 
Reactor, HWR before criticality would not be achievable; this suggests that fusion and 
accelerator sources are the appropriate alternative for the implementation of the Thorium 
fuel cycle. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Material flows in the DT (top) and Catalyzed DD fusion-fission hybrid (bottom) 
alternatives with U233 breeding from Th232. The Catalyzed DD approach does not contain the 
Li and T paths (Ragheb, 1981). 
The use of the thorium cycle in a fusion fission hybrid could bypass the stage of fourth 
generation breeder reactors in that the energy multiplication in the fission part allows the 
satisfaction of energy breakeven and the Lawson condition in magnetic and inertial fusion 
reactor designs. This allows for the incremental development of the technology for the 
eventual introduction of a pure fusion technology.  
For an immediate application of the fusion hybrid using the Th cycle, the DT fusion fuel 
cycle can be used: 
U233 
U233 Fission DT 
F i  
Th232 
D 
T 
Li 
Li 
T 
U233 
U233 Catalyzed 
DD 
Th232 
D 
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 2 3 4 11 1 2 0D + T He (3.52 MeV)+ n (14.06 MeV) + 17.58 MeV   (15) 
The tritium would have to be bred from the abundant supplies of lithium using the 
reactions with its two isotopes: 
 
6 1 4 3
3 0 2 1
7 1 4 1 3
3 0 2 0 1
Li + n (thermal) He (2.05 MeV)+ T (2.73 MeV) + 4.78 MeV
Li + n (fast) He + n + T - 2.47 MeV


 (16) 
In this case a molten salt containing Li for tritium breeding as well as Th for U233 breeding 
can be envisioned: 
2 4. .LiF BeF ThF  
 
For a practically unlimited supply of deuterium from water at a deuterium to hydrogen 
ratio of D/H = 150 ppm in the world oceans, one can envision the use of the catalyzed DD 
reaction in the fusion island: 
 
2 2 3 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 3 1
1 1 2 0
2 3 4 1
1 1 2 0
2 3 4 1
1 2 2 1
2
1
(1.01) (3.03) 4.04
(0.82) (2.45) 3.27
(3.52) (14.06)  17.58 
(3.67) (14.67) 18.34
___________________________________________
6 2
D D T H MeV
D D He n MeV
D T He n MeV
D He He H MeV
D
   
   
   
   
 1 4 11 2 02 2 43.23H He n MeV  
 (17) 
 
with each of the six deuterons contributing an energy release of 43.23 / 6 = 7.205 MeV. 
For plasma kinetic reactions temperatures below 50 keV, the DHe3 reaction is not significant 
and the energy release would be 43.23 - 18.34 = 24.89 with each of the five deuterons 
contributing an energy release of 24.89/5 = 4.978 MeV. 
 
2 2 3 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 3 1
1 1 2 0
2 3 4 1
1 1 2 0
2 1 3 4 1
1 1 2 2 0
(1.01) (3.03) 4.04
(0.82) (2.45) 3.27
(3.52) (14.06)  17.58 
_________________________________________
5 2 24.89
D D T H MeV
D D He n MeV
D T He n MeV
D H He He n MeV
   
   
   
    
 (18) 
In this case, there would be no need to breed tritium, and the lithium can be replaced by Na 
in a molten salt with the following composition: 
2 4. .NaF BeF ThF  
With a density and percentage molecular composition of: 
34.52 ,(71 2 27 %)
gm mol
cm
     
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12. Fission-fusion hybrid molten salt breeder 
A system consisting of fusion fuel factories using DT or Catalyzed DD fusion and fission 
satellites receiving the bred fissile fuel for burning is shown in Fig. 9. 
A one dimensional calculational model considers a plasma cavity with a 150 cm radius. The 
plasma neutron source is uniformly distributed in the central 100 cm radial zone and is 
isolated from the first structural wall by a 50 cm vacuum zone. 
The blanket module consists of a 1 cm thick Type 316 stanless steel first structural wall that 
is cooled by a 0.5 cm thick water channel, a 42 cm thick molten salt filled energy absorbing 
and breeding compartment, and a 40 cm thick graphite neutron reflector. 
The molten salt and graphite are contained within 1 cm thick Type 316 stainless steel 
structural shells  
Computations were conducted using the one dimensional Discrete Ordinates transport 
ANISN code with a P3 Legendre expansion and an S12 angular quadrature. 
The catalyzed DD system exhibits a fissile nuclide production rate of 0.880 Th(n, γ) reactions 
per fusion source neutron. The DT system, in addition to breeding tritium from lithium for 
the DT reaction yields 0.737 Th(n, γ) breeding reactions per fusion source neutron.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Optimization of fissile U233 and fusile tritium (T) breeding. 
Even though both approaches provide substantial energy amplification through the fusion-
fission coupling process, the DT system possesses marginal tritium breeding in the fusion 
island of 0.467 triton per source neutron and would need supplemental breeding in the 
fission satellites to reach a value of unity. 
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The largest Th(n,γ) reaction rate (0.966) occurs when the sodium salt is used in conjunction 
with the DT reaction. For this case, however, the tritium required to fuel the plasma must be 
supplied to the system, since that produced in the blanket would be negligible (3.18x10-3). A 
system of such kind has been proposed and studied by Blinken and Novikov. 
A catalyzed or semi-catalyzed DD fusion cycle will not need tritium breeding. Both the DT 
and Catalyzed DD approaches provide substantial energy amplification through the fusion-
fission coupling process. However, the DT system possesses marginal tritium breeding in 
the fusion island and would need supplemental breeding in the fission satellites to reach a 
value of the tritium breeding ratio unity. 
As a first generation cycle, a DT fusion cycle needs serious consideration of its tritium 
breeding potential. Enhancement of the fusile breeding would require the use of neutron 
multipliers and optimized flux trap geometrical configurations. 
13. Discussion 
Thorium supplies constitute a yet unused energy resource (Taylor, 1964). They occur 
primarily in the rare earth ore mineral Monazite and the thorium mineral thorite. The size of 
the global resource is estimated at 1.3x106 metric tonnes of ThO2. The USA and Australia 
hold the world’s largest known reserves with uncertain estimates ranging from 0.19x106 – 
0.44x106 metric tonnes of ThO2. Many of the USA reserves sizes are not known, as a result of 
unavailable data for lack of economical extraction attractiveness without an energy use 
option for thorium. 
The main international rare earths processors presently opt to process only thorium-free 
feed materials to avoid its radioactive content, even though they still have to cope with the 
radioactive isotope Ce142 which occurs in cerium. This has been negative for the low-cost 
monazite ores and other thorium bearing ores. This could change in the future if thorium is 
adopted as a byproduct for energy use. Supplies of rare earth elements are globally available 
in the international trade pipeline from diverse sources without discerned immediate 
shortages or bottlenecks.  
Thorium occurs associated with uranium in some ores such as Thorite (Th,U)SiO4 and, if 
exploited, would help expand the known U resource base.  
Other ores are associated with rare earth elements or lanthanides such as monazite (Ce, 
La,Y,Th)PO4 which also contain other economically significant metal occurrences such as 
yttrium. In this case, Th as a fuel resource could be extracted for future energy applications 
as a byproduct of the other more important rare earth elements extraction process until such 
time when primary Th ores such as thorite and monazite would be exploited. 
Four approaches to a thorium reactor are under consideration: 
1. Use of a liquid molten Th fluoride salt, 
2. Use of a pebble bed graphite moderated and He gas cooled reactor, 
3. The use of a seed and blanket solid fuel with a Light Water Reactor (LWR) cycle, 
4. A driven system using fusion or accelerator generated neutrons. 
A concern is the potential risks to sustained economical development and of conflicts, both 
domestic and international, over the distribution of ever scarcer and more expensive 
resources. A pessimistic view maintains that the available resources cannot keep up with 
population and income growth, resulting in poverty and conflict for access to them. The 
optimistic view is that the market incentives will spur the birth of new approaches and 
solutions. The flaring of the first and second Gulf Wars had an element of the control of the 
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Middle Eastern petroleum resources. Earlier, an oil embargo of Japan by the USA was 
followed two months later by the attack on Pearl Harbor.  
The sober way to deal with temporary resource shortages is to wait long enough for the 
price increases to encourage the development of new resources and/or substitutes. 
The Station Blackout accident, caused by a combined earthquake and tsunami event at the 
Fukushima Daiichi reactors on March 11, 2011 will lead to a reconsideration of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the existing U238-Pu239 fuel cycle against the alternative 
Th232-U233 fuel cycle. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The energy problem  
In the 21st century the stress due to environmental issues like the greenhouse effect, 
pollution, desertification, and local climate abnormality, as well as social issues like 
population explosion (100 M per year), poverty and starvation, may become intolerable, 
leading to large-scale disorder. However, it seems that there isn’t a more effective measure 
for averting such disorder and solving human poverty as ensuring an adequate supply of 
clean and cheap energy. In principle, it is impossible to predict the future. Nevertheless, a 
hypothetical prediction based on reliable principles, can be quite useful. A future energy 
scenario based on the initial work of Marchetti [Marchetti 1985, 1987, 1988, 1992], and later 
modified by the members of the Thorium Molten-Salt Forum [Furukawa, 2006; Furukawa, et 
al. 2008] is shown in Figures 1-4. The growth rate of primary energy in the world is 
estimated at 2.3% yearly (see Figure 1). 
In Figure 2 the historical/predicted fractional contribution F from prominent sources is 
shown as a function of time. In the figure the ‘‘logistic function” logarithm of F/(1 - F) is 
plotted against the calendar year. The main sources of energy shown are wood in the past, 
coal, oil and natural gas at present and nuclear and solar for the future. For the solar energy 
two graphs are shown in view of the uncertainty in the introduction of this source for large-
scale deployment. For nuclear energy two scenarios are shown, one with a total nuclear 
energy production measured in power times years of 900 TWe year and the other with 2000 
TWe year (see Figure 3).  
In the past 30 years the market share of usages of all main sources of energy (coal, oil, 
natural gas and fission) has been surprisingly constant as can be seen from Figure 2. This 
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logistic function analysis suggests that political or financial influences on the energy market 
have been stronger than market mechanisms resulting in non-rationality. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Primary world energy consumption in the last 150 years. 
In principle any variant of a solar-based technology could provide clean energy as it will not 
cause global warming or man-made abnormal weather patterns. But solar energy is low in 
energy density, irregular in output and it is still uneconomical and impractical for large 
industrial scale power plants. Even with a concentrated effort, the first industrial scale solar 
energy plant may only come on line after a few decades and large-scale deployment to meet 
projected demand would take more than 50 years after that (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Historical and predicted trends in energy usage by source in a 300 year time span.  
CO2 production and its attributed effect on global energy warming are expected to be a 
continuing problem. Even if a rapid increase in nuclear fission power generation takes place 
as shown in the shaded areas of Figures 2 and 3, the decrease of CO2 will not be sufficient as 
shown in Figure 4 
Other efforts such as local solar energy, eolic or wind power and hydroelectric power use 
etc., and in particular energy saving, are also necessary. The message of Figure 4 is that a 
great reduction in the use of energy will be required. Depending on the population 
explosion and energy demand increase, the artificial heat emission will increase tenfold in 
the next hundred years, based on the assumption of a 2.3 % yearly growth of world primary 
energy consumption as shown in Figure 1. A global warming, especially a local micro-
climate abnormality will not be tolerable, and it will encourage shifting to the solar energy 
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era. In the long term there is no option but to curtail population growth and to reach a 
plateau of zero growth. Fred Hoyle [ Hoyle, 1977], has argued that at current rate of energy 
production growth, within long times for human perception (a couple of thousand years) 
but very short times in geological terms, the amount of predicted energy generation on  the 
surface of planet Earth will match the energy production on the surface of the Sun! The 
inescapable implication is that growth has to be curtailed until a state of equilibrium is 
attained with no increase in energy production.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Fission Energy Production 
 
 
Fig. 4. Historical and predicted CO2 yearly emissions. A twofold increase from the present, 
50 billion tons/year is expected by 2065. 
A recent technological development with influence in the future energy panorama is the 
introduction of electric energy for massive surface transport. It is the result of the recent 
developments of new batteries with greatly improved (energy /weight) ratio which are 
revolutionizing land transport. As fully electric vehicles supplant the internal combustion 
engine vehicle, the reliance on fossil fuels, petrol and gas, CO2 emitting fuels, will slowly 
decrease. This will create an additional, increasing demand on electric utility generation 
which will have to supply the energy load of land transport that currently is provided by 
gasoline, diesel and gas. 
In a final analysis, at the present time, there is no other technological choice but to rely on 
nuclear energy. Hence a revolution in the global energy strategy is called for by increasing the 
investment for fission-energy systems so that we return to a rising fission use while the market 
share of other energy sources falls as shown by the curves of other energy sources in Figure 2.  
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1.2 The nuclear energy problem 
The current structure of the nuclear industry is inadequate to the challenges that the human 
society requires in the next hundred years. In spite of 60 years of development the present 
nuclear industry presents a number of shortcomings that require a profound reassessment 
for a sustainable and secure nuclear industry. In spite of the notable safety record of the 
nuclear power electric generation industry, compared to almost all other forms of electric 
generation, there is the not unjustified fear that present nuclear power technology is not 
safe. The safety issue is of paramount importance for society to accept nuclear power. 
Nuclear radioactive waste and nuclear weapons proliferation issues of current technology 
are also high in the agenda for the rejection of current technology by society. If the foregoing 
problems could be solved then the economic factors take prevalence in the selection of the 
energy supply system for ensuring public acceptance.  
The root cause of the problems outlined lie in the extreme complexity of the solid fuel 
reactor, which itself is the result of the form in which the technology developed. Nuclear 
energy was born in the war effort of the 1940’s. The huge research and development 
investment in nuclear science to develop the atomic bomb, before and after the war in 1945, 
was applied to produce and develop the nuclear reactor. In the US and elsewhere 
governments financed nuclear power plants for naval use and nuclear facilities designed to 
produce the required materials 235U and 239Pu that allowed the construction of weapons. 
However, this effort was not confined to the war era or its immediate aftermath. The cold 
war that prevailed from 1945 to the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, continued to dictate the 
science and technology that was developed. Hence concepts such as economy, simplicity 
safety and non-proliferation characters of the nuclear technology that was developed, were 
the least important factors taken into consideration in the building of the industry that we 
have now. The technological fallout from military applications is what mostly constitutes 
the present nuclear industry.  
Thus the compact boiling water reactor used in warships, a technological development fully 
paid for by governments, became, after scaling up, the current BWR for civilian use.  
Thus the nuclear fuel cycle that was able to breed extra fissionable 239Pu for bomb 
production was chosen to supplant, with advantage, the production of 235U which needs 
natural uranium mining and costly enrichment.  
Thus the PUREX hydrometallurgical process was developed in order to be able to extract, 
from spent nuclear fuel, the pure plutonium for weapons manufacture and to obtain as 
useful by-product uranium with the remaining concentration of 235U that could be used in 
other nuclear reactors. The nuclear energy industry that resulted from this, military biased, 
development has the following shortcomings: 
1. The employment of discrete solid fuel elements containing either uranium enriched in 
235U or plutonium as metal oxides (MOX) or as metal alloys clad in special zirconium 
alloy. They have to be built to extreme quality standards so as to withstand, during its 
short service life, high mechanical stress factors in the form of high temperature, 
thermal shock, high pressure, and extreme gamma and neutron radiation doses.  
2. The employment of very high pressures in a large reactor space for the containment of 
the pressurised water moderator and cooling media with a pressure flange to allow 
periodic opening  for service and fuel elements change. This dictates a reactor vessel 
which has to be built to extremely demanding high standards in order to provide safety 
against a catastrophic failure; a technology which few enterprises worldwide can 
supply.  
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3. The wasteful and inefficient use of reactor fuel elements whose contained energy usage 
is in the range of only 5%,  and which, in the case of reprocessing, requires destroying 
into scrap metal, chemical acid dissolution, refining and metallurgical reconstruction 
into new fuel elements.  
4. The production of considerable radioactive nuclear waste which although being very 
small in size and weight in comparison with waste from burning fossil fuels, it is of 
orders of magnitude of higher toxicity and, the actinide fraction of it,  of extremely long 
lifetimes.  
5. The requirement of scarce sources of natural uranium. The known amounts of this 
source is a matter of debate, on whether they are sufficient for providing energy for 
future generations.  
6. The production of large amounts of plutonium, of the order of 230 kg/year for each 
1000 MWe power plant. This becomes a nuclear proliferation nightmare if deployed 
globally, particularly in view of the present century’s phenomenon of uncontrolled 
terrorism.  
7. The inability of current technology to satisfy the world’s energy demand due to its long 
doubling time, of the order of 20-30 years, caused by the high complexity of the 
technology.  
8. In view of these shortcomings, the future development of nuclear energy requires a 
profound and fundamental reassessment if it is to supply worldwide, plentiful energy 
and support a clean lasting human society.      
In this paper we propose and describe a thorium molten salt nuclear energy system 
(THORIMS-NES) which is a complete concept designed to overcome most of the stated 
shortcomings by the employment of several important factors: The use of thorium instead of 
uranium as the fertile element, the eventual use of 233U as the fissile element instead of 235U or 
239Pu, the use of a liquid fuel instead of solid fuel elements and a stepwise chronology of 
introduction and development of items of technology. This system has the virtue of simplicity 
and will result in an affordable, sustainable, secure, clean and safe source of the required huge 
sized nuclear power industry and therefore will be acceptable to society so that humanity may 
look with optimism to a future of progress with plentiful energy for many generations. 
2. New nuclear system THORIMS-NES 
As stated above, the Thorium Molten Salt Nuclear Energy System (THORIMS-NES) is a 
complete fuel cycle concept which departs from current or presently employed fuel cycles. It 
proposes a power reactor which is radically different from current practice in the sense that:  (A) 
– It uses a liquid fuel instead of solid fuel elements, (B) – It uses thorium instead of uranium as 
the as the fertile element to breed the fissile isotope 233U. (C) - It separates the nuclear power 
production from the nuclear fuel breeding by proposing a simple thorium molten salt reactor 
(Th-MSR) devoted exclusively for energy generation by burning initially 235U or 239Pu and 
eventually 233U. (D) – It proposes an Accelerator Molten Salt Breeder (AMSB) devoted 
exclusively to the production of fissile 233U and (E) - It will incorporate fuel reprocessing in 
Regional Centers. It is a “Symbiotic” system with each function optimized by its simplicity.  
The THORIMS-NES concept includes a planned timetable beginning, in the first stage, with 
the construction of the miniFUJI, a 10 MWe small power reactor whose purpose is to recover 
the know-how of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) obtained in the period 1964-
1969 during which the molten salt reactor experiment (MSRE) took place [Rosenthal et al., 
1970]. The miniFUJI is a demonstration reactor that may be developed in a short time 
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estimated at 7 years. The second stage is the building of the FUJI reactor. This is a 150 MWe 
thorium molten salt reactor planned to go online in 14 years and to be deployed worldwide 
as a affordable, simple, safe and reliable power reactor burning either 235U or 239Pu with the 
purpose of using up fuel derived from dismantling nuclear weapons from spent fuel 
reprocessing. The third and last stage estimated some 25 years in the future is the 
establishment of regional Breeding and Chemical Processing Centers with production of 
233U by thorium spallation in AMSB to supplant the use of uranium or plutonium and enter 
into the thorium nuclear power stage.  
In the following section the properties of the various, present-day fuel cycles are 
summarized in order to point out how the THORIMS-NES concept is able to deal with the 
shortcomings and problems of current nuclear power technology for the sake of a 
sustainable and secure tomorrow.  
2.1 Review of nuclear fuel cycles 
Table 1 contains a classification of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. The table is a modification of the 
classification introduced by W. H. Hannum, et al. 2005. It contains the following fuel cycles: 
1.-Once-through route, 2.-  Plutonium recycling in thermal reactor, 3.- Full recycling in fast 
reactor, to which we introduce a forth class of fuel cycle:  4.- Full recycling in molten salt 
reactor. For each fuel cycle there is a text about the various items which characterize it 
allowing a comparison of the virtues and undesirable qualities and a clear idea of the 
differences and advantages that the proposed THORIMS-NES affords.  
2.2 Why thorium?  
Thorium-based reactor fuels have a number of advantages over uranium–based fuels.  
Th is geochemically three times more abundant in the Earth than U. Resources of about 2 M 
tons have been confirmed with estimated amounts of about 4 M tons [IAEA, 2000]. The 
amount of Th necessary for production of 1,000 TWe per year required for this century, as 
shown in Figure 3, is estimated at only about 2 M tons, which compares with more than 
1.5M tons of U already extracted from the earth. Large resources exist as heavy components 
of “beach sands” which can be mined with little pollution. 
Natural Th has only one isotope, 232Th, of 100% abundance except for about 10ppm 230Th. 
(An isotope which is fairly rich in Th from U-ores). Hence in the production of a fuel no 
“enrichment” of the fuel is required. Chemically refined thorium is added directly to the 
molten salt as discussed below. 232Th in the reactor fuel is converted to the fissile 233U by the 
reaction: 
232Th (n,γ) 233Th (β−: 22.3 m half-life) 233Pa (β−: 27 d half-life) 233U 
Fissile 233U is suitable for thermal reactors with the advantage that with fertile 232Th it can 
largely eliminate the production of long lived trans-uranium elements (TRU, or actinides) 
including Pu isotopes. These elements have exceedingly long half lives of the order of 10 000 
years or more. Actinide production in a thorium-fueled reactor is estimated to be 2 or 3 
order of magnitude smaller than that in a uranium-fueled reactor. This is due to the lighter 
nature of 232Th against 238U. The negligible production of plutonium makes the thorium-
fueled reactor a nuclear weapons proliferation-resistant technology. Plutonium is the ideal 
isotope for the manufacture of atomic bombs due to the weak accompanying radioactivity.  
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[1] [Furukawa K. &  Erbay L. B., 2010] 
Table 1. Nuclear fuel cycle classification.  
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[1] [Furukawa K. &  Erbay L. B., 2010] 
Table 1. Nuclear fuel cycle classification (continued).  
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233U can also be used to make nuclear weapons, if it were possible to get pure materials. But 
this is a difficult matter, as shown below. The military issue is a very confidential matter, but 
as was conclusively explained by Sutcliffe, a specialist of Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL): “235U is most easily made into a weapon; Pu is next most easily made 
into a weapon; 233U is hardest and least desirable for weapons.” [Sutcliffe W., 1994]. “No 
nuclear weapons that have ever been built use fissile 233U” [Sorensen K., 2010]. The reason 
for this fact is that 233U fuel is accompanied by very strong gamma activity requiring 
sophisticated remote handling or a liquid-fuel technology for easy handling. The gamma 
activity is due to production of the 232U isotope which takes place in a thorium-fueled 
system by the following five reactions [ORNL-5132, 1976; Ganesan, et al., 2002].  
232Th(n, 2n & , n ) 231Th ()  231Pa(n, ) 232Pa () 232U 
230Th(n,   ) 231Th ()  231Pa(n, ) 232Pa () 232U 
233U(n,  2n & , n) 232U 
These reactions occur with the initial inventory of 232Th and 233U present and 230Th, even 
though only traces are present. 
233U is formed in situ with burn-up and thus 232U is also formed by a small amount through 
the breeding reaction from 232Th following the above: 
232Th(n, ) 233Th () 233Pa () 233U(n, 2n) 232U 
The production of 232U is greater in a fast neutron spectrum because of the threshold nature 
of the (n, 2n) reactions. In other words, the production of 232U would be higher in a fast 
reactor in comparison to the production in a thermal reactor. Other possibilities exist as 
discussed by Ganesan, et al., 2002. 
The strong gamma activities associated with 232U are such that detection of any diverted 233U 
is easy providing increased security and non-proliferation. [Moniz and Neff, 1978; Ganesan, 
et al., 2002]. Transport of significant amounts of 233U with more than 10 ppm level of 232U 
require remote handling operations and constitutes a high radiological hazard that requires 
lead or concrete shielding. This property is such as to make impractical any form of 
diversion for illegal purposes. Note that it is the daughter products 212Bi (1.8 MeV gamma) 
and 208Tl (2.6 MeV gamma) isotopes that are very strong gamma emitters and not 232U itself. 
These daughter products are formed after five successive alpha decays. 
2.3 Why liquid fuel?  
At the first nuclear reactor seminar that took place at Chicago University during World War 
II,  in collaboration with some Nobel-prized scientists, Dr. Eugene Wigner [Weinberg A.M., 
1997] argued:  What is the nuclear power generator, primarily? Quite simply, it is a 
“Chemical Engineering Device”, since it means “equipment for utilizing the nuclear 
chemical reaction energy”. Wigner also predicted and recommended that in case of 
“Chemical Engineering Devices”, a “fluid” concept would be most desirable as reaction 
media for the nuclear fuel, and advocated that an ideal nuclear power reactor would 
probably be “the molten-fluoride salt fuel reactor”. This concept was later developed by Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), USA through the Molten-Salt Reactor Program (MSRP) 
during 1957-1976 [Rosenthal M.W, et al., 1972; Engel J. R. et al., 1980] under the able 
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guidance of his successor Dr. Alvin Weinberg. In the course of this program a Molten Salt 
Reactor (MSR) operated at ORNL during the four years between 1964 and 1969.  
The operation was successful; it ran its course without any accident or incident and the 
program was fully documented. This extensive and invaluable literature is freely available 
in the WEB site established by Kirk Sorensen in 2010 [Sorensen K., 2010]. The operation of a 
power reactor with a liquid fuel as opposed to the well established practice of using solid 
fuel elements has a large number of advantages. These advantages are most apparent with 
the liquid media that was developed during the MSRP: A eutectic mixture of lithium 
fluoride and beryllium fluoride called FLIBE, with fertile thorium and fissile uranium or 
plutonium dissolved in the fluoride molten salt. (7LiF-BeF2-ThF4-UF4 ; 73,78 -16 – 10 - 0,22 
mol %) This fluid serves a triple function: 1.- as fuel element, 2.- as heat transfer medium, 3.- 
as fuel processing medium. Each of these functions will be described in the following. 
2.3.1 As liquid fuel element  
In a molten salt reactor the fissionable isotopes, the fertile isotopes and the products of the 
nuclear reactor operation: both, fission products and heavy elements resulting from neutron 
capture reactions, reside as ionic elements dissolved in the molten salt. The liquid is forced 
to circulate in such a fashion that when it enters the reaction chamber, the presence of 
graphite moderator material creates conditions for nuclear reaction criticality. The fuel 
generates heat as the fission reaction proceeds. The heated liquid fuel exits the reaction 
chamber and the criticality of the fuel ceases while it circulates through the pump, heat 
exchangers and other devices before returning to the reaction chamber.  
Under reactor operation the fuel is subject to an extremely intense field of and  
radiation as well as a very high neutron flux which produces damage in the reactor fuel 
elements. Radiation damage is well known [Olander D.R., 1976; Weber H.W., et al., 1986]. It 
affects the crystal structures, produces point defects and dislocations in the solids and grain 
boundaries, swelling due to fission gases, pore migration and fuel restructuring. Solid fuel 
elements are heterogeneous materials and assemblies. There are possible interactions 
between components and different behavior of the constituents. Extensive studies have to be 
done both experimentally as well as modeling of the structural behavior of fuel elements 
and assemblies, for radiation damage assessment, whenever a change of components is 
proposed. This radiation damage determines a very short life for solid fuel elements such 
that safety determines an obligatory exchange when only 5%, to at most 10%, of the useful 
energy has been burned.  
On the other hand, a molten liquid fuel is free from structural radiation damage. An ionic 
liquid can be considered a randomly organized dynamic aggregate of ions that has no fixed 
structure. Any effects on the atomic level produced by radiation such as atomic 
displacements due to nuclear fission or reactions are inconsequential and in no way alter the 
basic properties or structure of the liquid. This property determines that there is no need for 
fuel element replacement during the life of the reactor. The chemistry of the liquid fuel may 
be monitored and may be adjusted by a very simple addition of components in an external 
section outside of the reactor vessel. It is easy to add additional fuel salt containing fissile 
233U, 235U or 239Pu   in order to maintain an optimum fuel composition or likewise to remove 
some deleterious component as we discuss in the following. 
An important advantage of a liquid fuel relates to radioactive gasses produced by the fission 
process. Radioactive gasses such as 133Xe and 135Xe in solid fuels are entrapped in the crystal 
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structure and produce fuel swelling. They also act as neutron poisons due to the huge cross 
section for thermal neutrons of 135Xe of 2.6 × 106 barns [Stacey W. M., 2007]. The 
accumulation in the fuel represents a potential danger in the case of accidental release to the 
atmosphere. The presence of 135Xe in the fuel requires additional reactivity in order to 
compensate for its neutron absorption properties. 135Xe reactor poisoning played a major 
role in the Chernobyl disaster. [Pfeffer J. I. &  Nir S., 2000]. A further deleterious effect of the 
entrapped radioactive gasses in solid nuclear fuels is the inability of a solid fuelled reactor to 
significantly decrease the power level. Reducing reactor power alters the equilibrium 
condition between 135Xe production as a decay product of 135I and its “burn up” as a result of 
the neutron capture reaction. A large reduction of power produces a buildup of 135Xe to an 
extent capable of shutting down the reactor. Further problems are Xenon-135 oscillations 
due to the interdependence of 135Xe buildup and the neutron flux which can lead to periodic 
power fluctuations [Iodine pit, 2011]. 
In a molten salt fuel reactor fission product gasses diffuse and are uniformly distributed in 
the fuel preventing these oscillations. Moreover: “Fission product Kr and Xe are virtually 
insoluble in the (Molten salt) fuel and can be removed, if the moderator graphite is 
sufficiently impermeable, by simple equilibration with an inert gas (helium)” [Grimes W. R. 
1969]. Hence simple injection of an inert carrier gas such as He can continuously remove 
fission product poison gasses. The gasses are collected in active charcoal and can be stored 
and allowed to decay before final disposal. The poison gas removal and the possibility of 
fuel replenishment or retrieval imply that a molten salt reactor can operate at a low excess 
reactivity or “sub criticality” by leakage. These properties significantly reduce the possibility 
of any severe accidents. Furthermore, if poison gasses are removed, then the reactor power 
can be reduced or increased at will allowing it to follow the load demand without the 
limitation that 135Xe buildup imposes on solid fuelled reactors. 
The molten salt reactor shares with liquid-metal cooled reactors some advantages: The first 
is that the reactor vessel may operate at low pressure. The container housing the liquid 
metal or molten salt only requires resisting just the necessary pressure to ensure fuel 
circulation. Pressure range contemplated in a MSR is about 0.5 MPascal (4.93 Atm or 72,5 
PSI) which contrasts to pressures in the range of 15 MPascal (148 Atm or 2180 PSI)  as are 
used in PWR. Hence no large pressure sealing flange is required. This constitutes a 
significant safety and cost advantage. The possibility of catastrophic reactor vessel failure 
completely disappears in a liquid fuel reactor. 
The second advantage shared by the molten salt reactor and liquid-metal cooled reactors is 
the feasibility of high temperature operation which is several hundred degrees higher than 
any water cooled reactor. This implies significantly higher thermal efficiency for electrical 
energy production as well as the possibility of using the high temperature for hydrogen 
production. Development of less expensive methods of production of bulk hydrogen is 
relevant to the establishment of a hydrogen economy which is being currently considered. 
[Häussinger P., et al., 2002]. 
A molten salt fuelled reactor has the property that increasing operating temperature in the 
reactor vessel produces a volumetric expansion of the liquid. This has the consequence of a 
corresponding exit from the reactor of an amount of liquid reactant fuel. This produces a 
decrease in the overall reactivity and hence an inherent automatic mechanism of power 
reduction. This negative reactivity coefficient with temperature is universally recognized as 
a most desirable safety feature for power reactors.  
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Among engineering circles a very popular dictum is: “Simple is beautiful”. Perhaps the 
most attractive feature of a fluid fuel reactor is the beauty of its simplicity. This connects 
tightly with ECONOMY in general. Economy in capital costs, economy in fuel 
manufacturing costs and economy in operational costs. Economy is closely related to the 
possibility of nuclear energy deployment in lesser developed or underdeveloped countries. 
Bringing nuclear power to an economy level to make it competitive with coal fired power 
plants is the most powerful mechanism to replace fossil fuel utilization and meet 
greenhouse gas emission standards required by international agreements.  
2.3.2 FLIBE as the fluid fuel medium 
ORNL made a choice of a fuel-salt based on the 7LiF-BeF2 (FLIBE) solvent [Rosenthal M.W., 
et al., 1972; Engel J. R., et al., 1980; Yoyuuenn & Zousyyokuro. 1981; Furukawa, K. et al., 
2005], on the basis of its very low thermal neutron cross-section, but also on the structural-
chemical properties which make it very similar to MgO-SiO2, which is a main component of 
the earth mantle and has a deep correlation with silicate slag useful in the metal refining 
furnace. Furthermore, it has very promising properties as a chemical processing medium 
[Furukawa K. & Ohno H., 1978].(see below).  
A comprehensive data-book of FLIBE has been prepared [Furukawa K.& Ohno H., 1980]. 
The important thermo-physical properties of molten FLIBE are shown in Table 2 and are 
compared with other technologically important molten-salts and liquid Na. This solvent salt 
has significant and useful characteristics. It dissolves fertile ThF4 and fissile 233UF4 (and/or 
239PuF3) salts as shown in Table 3. Its flexibility is significant for the selection of fuel-salt 
composition. Suitable combination sets of fuel-salt compositions for obtaining a melting 
point (MP) lower than 773K [500ºC] (lower zone in BeF2) are: 
 
7LiF 73 - 73 - 74 - 74 - 72 - 69 mole % 
BeF2 19 - 18 - 16 - 15 - 16 - 16 mole % 
ThF4 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 15 mole % 
233UF4 0.2 ---- 0.4 mole %, 
 
and for obtaining a melting point lower than 798K [525ºC] are: 
 
7LiF 73----53 74---58 74---63 74---64 Mole % 
BeF2 20---40 16---32 13---24 12---21 mole % 
ThF4 7 10 13 15 mole % 
233UF4 0.2 ---- 0.4 mole %. 
 
It is necessary to predict the viscosity coefficient of the fuel salt. This is easily obtained with 
the known semi-empirical method using the huge experimental data available [Cantor S. 
1968] and applying the mutual replacement ability of UF4 and ThF4 due to the similar ionic 
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size. This is also supported by the good similarity of phase diagrams in LiF-BeF2-UF4 and 
LiF-BeF2-ThF4. 
a. (i) In UF4 (+ThF4) < 30 mole %, viscosity will decrease until 15 mole % BeF2.  
(ii) In UF4 (+ThF4) > 30 mole %, viscosity will increase by an increase of BeF2. 
b. UF4 (+ThF4) < 25 mole %, and 10 mole % < BeF2 < 30 mole %, which is the most 
interesting region in MSR.  
2.3.3 As heat transfer medium 
The important thermo-physical properties of molten FLIBE and the characteristics of FLIBE-
based fuel salt seen in Table 2 and 3, respectively, indicate that this solvent salt has 
significant and acceptable characteristics as a working fluid and coolant. Such excellent 
characteristics are based on (1) low pressure coolant, (2) highest heat capacity due to the 
main constituent ions being the smallest possible, (3) low viscosity fluid, and (4) suitable 
Prandtl number of 10-20 in the fuel-salt. Especially the parameter for heat-transfer per unit 
pump power has the highest value for FLIBE among the others included in the Table 2. 
 
 
NaNO3-
KNO3 
-NaNO2 
[HTS] 
NaBF4
-NaF 
Li2CO3
-
Na2CO3
-K2CO3
LiF-NaF 
-KF 
[FLINAK]
LiF -BeF2 
[FLIBE] Na 
Chemical composition. (mol%) 7  44  49 92  8 41  36  23 
46.5 11.5  
42 66   34 - 
Melting point (K) [ ºC] 
 415 [142] 657[384]
672 
[399] 727 [454] 732[458.9]371[98]
Volumetric heat capacity C 
(J/m3K) x10-6 2.79 2.82 3.49 4.01 4.80 1.05 
Density d (Kg/m3) x 103 
 1.79 1.87 2.02 2.17 2.05 0.83 
Thermal conductivity. h (W/mK) 0.59 0.35 0.55 1.2 1.00 66. 
Kinematic viscosity. k (m2/s)x106 2.26 0.8 11.8 4.2 7.44 0.29 
heat-transfer capability 
(C/k )0.4 h 0.6 x 10-3 49.7 55.7 25.2 69.4 52.8 1.264 
heat-transfer per unit pump -
power C3/d x 10-15 12.1 12.1 21 29.4 53.8 1.39 
The viscosity coefficients are about (6-7) x 10-3 Pa s and do not depend strongly on composition. More 
detailed physical properties data was summarized by Cantor (1968), although it should be 
supplemented by several reports of ORNL. The phase diagrams of binary and ternary fluoride systems 
are comprehensively collected by Thoma (1975) and Janz G. J., et al., 1978. 
Table 2. Thermo-Physical Properties of Molten-Salts and Sodium (At about 770K [500oC]). 
This parameter represents the power requirement for pumping the fluid through a channel, 
which is related to the design of the pump for a molten salt as working fluid and coolant in 
the power cycle. Since there will be no phase change during the process, it will enable the 
design of an effective and simple coolant loop. In the power - heat generation system the 
main design studies will depend on the thermal aspects of the heat generating fluid flow 
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system in the core and heat exchanger group (see Figure 5). There are no doubts about the 
FLIBE-based fuel salt being a suitable heat transfer medium. 
 
Fuel-salt  
FLIBE: 7LiF – BeF2 – ThF4 –(233UF4 –239PuF3)  
Weak nuclear chemical reaction of solvent*  
Ideal ionic liquid with stable ions.  
Large heat-capacity & high fluidity.*,**  
 
Low melting-point (480-530ºC ). **,***  
 
Chemically inert, low aqueous solubility.**  
 
Compatible with Hastelloy-N (Ni-Mo-Cr) alloy. 
High (flexible) solubility for multiple ions.***   
Solubility for nuclear fission/spallation 
products.  
 Easy prediction of physico-chemical 
behavior.***  
Very limited radioactivity release in accident.  
 
Easy reactor operation.  
[mole %] 
 [72-74]–[15-18]– [13-9] – [0.2-0.8] 
Very small thermal neutron cross-section 
Immune to radiation damage* 
Transparent, ambient pressure liquid** *** 
Single phase fluid: 
High Boiling point about 1400°C, no need to 
pressurize the system. 
Good compatibility with structural materials.**,*** 
Compatible with graphite (no wetting) 
 
Solubility for nuclear capture reaction materials 
(actinides).  
No-solubility for Xe/Kr/T *,*** 
 
 
If released it solidifies as a stable glass*** With 
trapping of radioactivity and no dissemination. 
Easy on maintenance/repair/dismantling 
★ Triple-functional medium for  
* NUCLER-ENGINEERING,  
** HEAT-TRANSFER MEDIUM  
*** CHEMICAL-ENGINEERING purposes
Table 3. Summary of Characteristics of FLIBE-Based Fuel Salt 
2.3.4 As fuel processing medium 
Most present day spent fuel reprocessing is by a hydrometallurgical procedure called 
PUREX (Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by EXtraction). This is the most developed and 
widely used process in the industry at present. A number of variations of this basic process 
(UREX, TRUEX, DIAMEX, SANEX, UNEX) have been developed all of them being 
variations of the organic solvent extraction from aqueous solutions which result from acid 
dissolution of spent fuel. Alternative procedures that do not use water or organic liquids are 
high temperature processes called by the generic terms “Pyroprocessing or Dryprocessing” 
In this case solvents are molten salts (e.g. LiCl+KCl or LiF+CaF2) and molten metals (e.g. 
cadmium, bismuth, magnesium) rather than water and organic compounds. 
In the THORIMS-NES concept the reprocessing media is FLIBE, the same media that is used 
as a molten salt fluid fuel. Although less developed than hydrometallurgical methods these 
high temperature procedures have a number of advantages. Among them 1.- They do not 
use solvents containing hydrogen and carbon, which are neutron moderators creating risk 
of criticality accidents, 2.- They are more compact than aqueous methods, 3.- They can 
separate many or almost all of the elements contained in spent fuel: remaining fertile or 
fissile uranium and plutonium, fission products and transuranic actinides, 4.- Simplicity of 
the separating equipment, 5.- No radiation damage is expected on the processing media, the 
liquid molten salt.  
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Fig. 5. Block diagram showing the three heat exchange loops in the FUJI series reactors 
Separation of components in a molten salt can be achieved by a number of chemical 
processes such as: 1.- Electro deposition in a liquid or solid electrode [Kennedy J. W. 1950; 
Yang  H., et al., 2010]; 2.- Absorption into a liquid metal cathode (cadmium or bismuth) 
[Delpech S. et al., 2008]; 3.- By the production of volatile compounds which can be separated 
by fractional distillation [ORNL-4577, 1971] or 4.- By selective precipitation of oxides 
[Rosenthal M.W et al., (1972)]. Pyroprocessing is the ideal procedure for processing fuel 
from a molten salt reactor. All the materials to be processed, separated or recovered are 
already in a suitable molten salt medium which can be used for the recovery process.  
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Molten Salt Reactor Program (MSRP) included 
on-line fuel processing of the fuel salt. Additionally, an intense R & D for chemical 
processing of spent fuel salts was done by ORNL [Whatley M.E (1970)]. One of the most 
significant advantages in THORIMS-NES is the elimination of the continuous chemical 
processing of the molten salt fluid during reactor operation. This deviation from the ORNL-
MSRP is performed in order to achieve the greatest simplification of the reactor. The 
chemical processing of spent reactor fuel is considered in the THORIMS-NES concept as a 
separate operation from reactor operation. Fuel processing at the reactor during power 
operation is limited to removal of gaseous products.  
Spent fuel reprocessing is to be performed under strict supervision at regional centers where 
chemical treatment of spent fuel takes place, breeding of fissile 233U is carried out by an 
Accelerator Molten Salt Breeder (AMSB) and new molten salt fuel is produced. (see 4.2 
below) 
2.4 Construction materials: Hastelloy N and graphite 
The FUJI reactor vessel and all components in contact with the molten salt as well as the 
AMSB are constructed exclusively by a structural Ni alloy, Hastelloy N, and graphite. 
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2.4.1 Structural alloy  
Structural alloy Hastelloy N (Ni- 15~18% Mo- 6~8% Cr- 5% Fe) [Rosenthal M.W  et al., 1972; 
Engel J.R. et al., 1980; Zousyokuro Y., 1981; Haynes International, Inc., 2002] is used as a 
main container material. It is composed of Ni, Cr, Fe, Mo and other minor alloying elements. 
To improve high temperature embrittlement due to He of fission products (f.p.), two 
modified Hastelloy N have been developed where Mo, Si and B were reduced and Ti 
(1.5~2.0%) and Nb (2%) added.  
Less noble Cr is the most reactive among the alloy constituents. A Cr depleted zone was 
observed on the surface exposed to MSRE fuel salt after 22.000 hr at 650˚C (923K) [McCoy H. 
E. Jr., 1967], but the depth of the degraded zone did not propagate above 0.2 mil (= 5Wm). 
Advanced corrosion tests simulating non-isothermal dynamic conditions had been 
performed by thermal and forced convection test loops. The weight change of standard and 
modified Hastelloy N after over 22.000 hr exposure to MSBR fuel salt at maximum 704˚C 
(977K), and temperature difference 170˚C [Koger J.W., (1972)] have been measured. The 
corrosion specimens in the hot legs resulted in weight loss and weight gain in the cold legs. 
The estimated corrosion rate of Hastelloy N was 0.02 mil/y, and modified Hastelloy N 
exhibited higher corrosion resistance. These corrosion levels are acceptable to the reactor 
design, although careful dehydration of salt and graphite is essential.  
Standard Hastelloy N exposed to fuel salt under irradiation revealed material embrittlement 
due to inter-granular attack, where grain boundaries were degraded due to the existence of 
Te (f.p.) although not penetrating deeply. To solve this problem the following action was 
taken: [A] Hastelloy N was modified adding 1 to 2% Nb significantly reducing the Te attack. 
[B] The redox potential, that is the U4+/U3+ ratio, control is essential for preventing Te 
attack [Keiser J. R., 1977]. The extent of cracking appeared very weak at a U4+/U3+ ratio ≤ 
60, and extensive at the ratio > 80. The experience of the Molten-Salt Reactor Experiment 
(MSRE) at ORNL suggested that Te possibly converts to innocuous telluride (e.g. “CrTe”) by 
a reaction: CrF2 + Te + 2UF3 → 2UF4 + CrTe, where the equilibrium of the reaction is 
controlled by varying the U4+/U3+ ratio, that is, the redox  potential by adding Be (reducing) 
or NiF2 (oxidizing). The potential should be kept within the region of stable Te compound 
(U4+/U3+ <60) and beyond that of U-carbide deposition on graphite (U4+/U3+ > 6). The Te 
problem will be solved by applying both measures [A] and [B]. Alternatively, Russian work 
developed candidate materials for the MSR. Under similar test conditions the alloy showed 
a maximum corrosion rate ≈ 6Wm/y [Ignatyev V. et al., 1993], and no trace of Te attack in 
the promising material. The development of monitoring techniques is necessary for 
ensuring sound/efficient reactor operation.  
The reactor system does not need continuous monitoring of major fuel constituents such as 
Li, Be, Th, F and U [Rosenthal M.W. et al., 1972], because the chemical composition drift is 
very slow. Electrochemical in-line monitoring of the redox potential has been developed: the 
U4+/U3+ ratio, which responds to the corrosive atmosphere and the distribution of f.p. and 
tritium in the reactor system. In-line monitoring of the U4+/U3+ ratio in MSRE showed that 
the observations agreed well with the result of thermodynamic and spectroscopic analyses, 
accompanied with a Ni/NiF2 reference electrode [Rosenthal M.W. ,et al., 1972] The U4+/U3+ 
ratio can be easily kept in the suitable region by varying dissolution of Be into the salt. 
Preparation of modified Hastelloy N data for ASTM standard and ASME coding (Tensile 
test data, Ductility data, Creep test data, Toughness data, on base and weld metals) should 
be carried out as the first step of the miniFUJI project.  
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2.4.2 Graphite  
Graphite is used as neutron moderator and reflector with the Th and fuel molten salt 
directly immersed in it. The basic requirements were dictated by the research in the MSBR at 
ORNL. [Rosenthal M.W  et al., 1972 ; Engel J.R et al., 1980 ;Zousyokuro Y., 1981]. The 
graphite used should be stable under neutron irradiation, not penetrable by the fuel salt, 
and immune to absorption of Xe and Kr.  
Under irradiation, point defects are formed and they tend to be agglomerated with each 
other in crystallites causing growth in the c-axis direction and a small shrinkage in the other 
two directions [Reynolds W. N., 1966] resulting in material distortion. The lifetime is 
determined by the failure criterion, and by the degradation of thermal conductivity. The 
volume change for monolithic graphite has been concluded to be the best criteria of quality 
after irradiating with fast neutrons ( > 50 keV) at 715˚C (988K). Such results obtained at 
ORNL were supported by R&D of EdF-CEA and the former USSR.  
Although the core graphite in the MSBR should have to be replaced every 4 years, the 
graphite in FUJI does not need be replaced in its full life. The effective seal of graphite 
against fuel salt penetration is resolved by choosing a pore-diameter less than 1 m due to 
the surface tension of the salt. It means that graphite presents no serious problem for the 
MSR, although large size homogeneous graphite is not easy to fabricate.  
If the irradiation dose limit of graphite can be increased, the electric generation cost of FUJI 
will be improved significantly. Toyo Tanso Co. (Japan) holds the top share of isotropic 
graphite in the world, having supplied reactor grade IG-110, for the High-Temperature Gas 
Reactor (HTGR) at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and HTR-10 at 
China Tsinghua University. They promised to cooperate with the FUJI development, in the 
basic research. Irradiation with energetic particles, including carbon ions and high-energy 
electrons will be performed to understand more precisely the damage mechanism and to 
develop better materials.  
2.5 Separation of power generation and fissile production process  
At the early days of nuclear power it was realized that the operation of a nuclear reactor 
produced additional fissile material via the capture reaction on “fertile” isotopes: mainly 
238U or 232Th. This realization opened the door to the dream of producing fuel in the same 
amount or even exceeding the amount of burnt fuel and opening a practically inexhaustible 
source of energy. This possibility gave birth to the concept of breeder reactors used in 
nuclear power plants to produce nuclear power and more fissile nuclear fuel than it 
consumes. Breeder reactors have been built and operated in the USA, UK, France, Russia, 
India and Japan. A breeding ratio substantially larger than 1 can only be obtained in a fast 
neutron spectrum. Hence water as cooling media is precluded and a substantial amount of 
experience has been obtained in fast breeder reactors cooled by liquid metal, either liquid 
sodium or liquid lead.  
After considerable effort in breeder reactor development the “Fission Breeding Power 
Stations” has become a sophisticated, huge-size complex system. However, still insufficient 
in its breeding capacity and with a doubling-time longer than 30 years in the Fast Breeder 
Reactor (FBR) and 20 years even in the Molten-salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) proposed by 
ORNL. [ORNL WASH-1222, 1972]. In order to overcome the breeding limitation of the 
power reactor and to ensure the required design simplicity, the THORIMS-NES system 
separates into distinct operations the power producing function and the fuel breeding 
function. THORIMS-NES is composed of simple power generation stations: Molten Salt 
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Reactors (MSR), named FUJI-series (See 3 FUJI Reactor, 4.1 miniFUJI Reactor; ) and fissile 
producing stations Accelerator Molten Salt Breeder (AMSB). (See 4.2 AMSB). These two, 
power and breeding stations are complemented by batch-type process-plants (See 4.4 
Regional Center) establishing a Symbiotic Th Breeding Fuel-cycle System. This separation 
recognizes that the fission reactors are neutron-poor and are best for producing energy and 
that fission power stations themselves should be simpler and size-flexible. They should be 
extremely reliable power producing units for continuous uninterrupted operation deployed 
in the neighborhood of population centers.  
This separation also recognizes that the fuel breeding, neutron-rich fissile producer power 
plant does not need continuous operation. It may operate producing, in a batch-wise 
manner, the required fuel. This separation will be essential for establishing a huge-size 
breeding fuel cycle, growing with a doubling time of 10 years. The THORIMS-NES system 
also recognizes that at the present time there are considerable weapons grade 235U and 239Pu 
inventories resulting from the Cold War era. Also there are at the present time 235U 
enrichment facilities as well as facilities under construction or operation which are issues of 
international concern. The weapons grade fuel is being used for power plant fuel 
manufacture [Megatons to Megawatts, 2010] and the MSR is an ideal platform for its burn 
up. This resource is not estimated to last very long. Another source of fissile material is the 
considerable amounts of spent nuclear fuel at repositories containing remaining 235U and 
239Pu which can be accessed by reprocessing and recovering operations as discussed below. 
The U.S. and Germany have abandoned reprocessing, and the plants in the UK, France, 
Russia, Japan, China and Pakistan can process only a fraction of the spent nuclear fuels 
accumulating all over the world. The reprocessing could be performed by a fluorination 
molten-salt chemical-processing Method. [Uhlir Jan., 2011]. France laid the foundation for 
this method. The former Soviet Union, with the cooperation of France and the former 
Czechoslovakia, nearly completed it by about 1988. [Novy, I., et al., 1989; Furukawa K., 
2001]. In this method, the spent oxide fuels are pulverized and made to react 
instantaneously in fluorine gas (Called a “flame reaction” because of the high-temperature 
combustion). The fluorination flame reactor technology used as the basis of this method has 
been put into practical use on a large scale at Pierrelatte in southern France to produce 
uranium hexafluoride gas for uranium enrichment from uranium oxide. The former Soviet 
Union called it the "FREGATE" project. By eliminating the last process of solid nuclear fuel 
production from the original FREGATE process and aiming only at supplying molten-salt 
nuclear fuel, the resulting modified process becomes surprisingly simple. Further, the solid 
spent nuclear fuel around the world can be processed economically. The best and most 
economical solution is to utilize the FREGATE process all over the world to prepare 
plutonium-containing molten-salt to be burnt in a  thorium molten-salt reactor. If FLIBE is 
added to the molten-salt resulting from the modified FREGATE process allowing the 
fluorides of various fission products to contaminate the salt, then a molten-salt nuclear fuel 
containing plutonium can be easily prepared. Plutonium and other nuclear wastes retained 
in the salt gradually disappear owing to neutron absorption reactions and radioactive decay 
while the molten-salt reactor is operated.  
These resources depend on the economics of reprocessing against the production of fresh 
fuel from mining and enrichment operations. The existence of these two sources of nuclear 
fuel implies that, within the THORIMS-NES system, the deployment of the AMSBs (See 4.2 
AMSB) and associated process-plants is only required some 25 years in the future. 
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3. FUJI reactor 
3.1 FUJI reactor description 
The FUJI-series power reactors are modeled on the successful molten salt reactor program 
(MSRP) carried out at ORNL [ORNL reports 2010]. However important differences are 
incorporated: FUJI Power reactors should be simpler, size-flexible and fissile-fuel self-
sustaining, which allows a most simple/stable operation and requiring minimum 
maintenance work. Such idealistic performance was almost realized by the FUJI concept, 
eliminating the continuous chemical processing in situ and periodical core-graphite 
replacement, both of which were needed for the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR). 
[Furukawa K., et al., 1985; 1989; 1990]. Figure 6 shows a vertical cross section of the primary 
fuel salt system of FUJI. A standard conceptual design of FUJI [Furukawa K., et al., 1987; 1992] 
is 350 MW thermal and 160 MW electric. The reactor-vessel is cylindrical 5.4 m diameter and 
4.0 m high, inside of which it is filled only by graphite (93.9 vol.%) and fuel-salt as shown in 
Figure 6. The reactor-vessel is weld-sealed in the factory and does not need opening during its 
entire life. The core is constituted by liquid fuel directly immersed inside central hexagonal 
graphite rods surrounded by a graphite neutron reflector. Graphite inventory is 161 tons and 
spatially arranged to get a best performance attaining an initial conversion-ratio of 1.002.  
 
Fig. 6. Cross section of the primary system of Molten-Salt Power Reactor (FUJI) 
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The standard fuel salt of FUJI is 7LiF-BeF2-ThF4-UF4 (69.78-18-12-0.22 mol%). (See 2.3.2) The 
total volume of fuel salt is 13.7 m3 flowing upward at a rate of 33.2 m3/min. The inner 
diameter of the main fuel piping is 25 cm. The structural Ni alloy, Hastelloy N (See 2.4.1) is 
appropriate for up to 1170K or more. Hence it can operate as industrial-heat supply up to 
930K, and in the future 1030K will be feasible. As such it allows for hydrogen production, as 
well as cogeneration, desalination, and district heating. Centrifugal pumps transfer the 
outlet fuel salt to heat exchangers, where the heat is transferred to a secondary coolant salt 
of NaBF4-NaF, which transports the heat to a super-critical steam generator for electric 
generation, resulting in a thermal efficiency of more than 44%.  
Several analyses have been carried out to establish nuclear characteristics of FUJI series 
cores which use several kind of fissile materials (233U, 235U and 239Pu) with denominations 
such as FUJI-233U or FUJI-Pu [Mitachi K., et al., 1994; Mitachi K. & Furukawa K. 1995] and 
several output powers. A full schematic image of the FUJI molten salt reactor is shown in 
Figure 7. It includes the reactor containment building, primary heat transfer and cooling 
circuit, secondary cooling salt circuit, supercritical steam generator, turbines and electrical 
generators.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Full view of FUJI molten salt reactor. 
The reactor design has a three level containment security: The reactor core is contained in a 
primary Hastelloy N vessel which is inside the high-temperature containment. The tertiary 
level is the reactor containment building. The design is extremely safe as the fuel is only 
critical inside the core. In the unlikely event of reactor fuel salt leakage the molten salt will 
be caught by a spill pan and flow into a drain tank preventing any release of radioactive 
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material. Full power failure results in a freeze-valve melting and releasing all the fuel to a 
passively-cooled emergency drain tank surrounded by borated water. 
3.2 Coolant salt 
In the experimental reactor MSRE at ORNL, ortho-FLIBE (7Li2BeF4 , MP: 732K, see Table 2) 
was used as a coolant salt. In spite of its higher melting point, it has a high price, and was 
replaced by sodium-fluoroborate (92 mole % NaBF4 - 8 mole% NaF, MP: 653K, see Table 2). 
The detailed physico-chemical data have been summarized [Cantor S., 1968; Ohno H. and 
Furukawa K., 1972]. This molten salt has a satisfactory good compatibility with Hastelloy N, 
and its contact with the fuel-salt would not induce any serious result. It has a slight higher 
vapour pressure over BeF3, but only 174 Torr (23.2 kPa) at 873K. This salt has about 30 ppm 
hydrogen, which is useful for the collection of tritium penetrating from the fuel salt. 
Collected tritium (T) is extracted as water vapor (HTO) in the He cover gas, and the 
environment release will be less than the regulation limit. The T management has been 
successful in the MSR system. 
3.3 Reactor chemistry 
Reactor Fuel and the Behavior of Fission Products (f.p.) 
FUJI will consume 400 g/day of 233U including 350g/day by fission, meaning that 1920 kg 
(8300 moles) of 233U are converted to f.p. in its full life. [Furukawa K., et al., 1989; 1990; 
Rosenthal M. W., et al 1972 ; Engel J.R., et al., 1980]. This behaviour will be explained by 
dividing the f.p. in the following three groups. Their crude amounts in full life operation 
were estimated as shown in Table 4.  
Group I: Noble-gas f.p. and tritium (Kr, Xe and T). Kr and Xe have practically no solubility, 
and more than 99 % can be easily separated to cover-gas, reducing their huge neutron 
absorption to achieve a fuel self-sustaining condition. 210 g in total of T will be produced at 
the rate of about 380 Ci (14TBq)/day, decaying with the half-life of 12.36 y. From the 
experimental examination of ORNL [Engel J. R., et al., 1980; Houtzeel A. & Dyer F. F., 1972] 
the environmental release of T in FUJI will be less than 1 Ci (37GBq)/day (See 3.2) 
Group II: Soluble/stable fluorides (Rb, Cs, Sr, Ba, Y, the Lanthanides, Zr, Br, I, etc.) Almost all 
isotopes of Rb, Cs, Sr, Y, Ba have noble-gas precursors, which will be isolated to gas-phase of 
off-gas lines, and finally deposited in beds, except the short half-life isotopes: 32s 90Kr (final 
daughter: Sr), 3.1m 89Kr (Y), 3.8m 137Xe (Cs), 14.1m 138Xe (Ba), and some parts of their 
daughters will remain in the fuel salt. These fluorides are stably dissolved in fuel salt owing to 
the low concentrations (See Table 4), and will not have any severe problems in reactors. I and 
Br will be soluble as I- and Br- ions in the reducing condition containing an appreciable UF3.  
Group III : Noble and Semi-noble f.p. (Ge, As, Nb, Mo, Ru, Rh, Pd, Ag, Cd, Sn, Sb, etc,) They 
will exist in the elemental state in the reductive fuel salts. In the MSRE, the deposit of such 
elements mostly occurred as an accumulation of finely divided well-mixed materials rather 
than “plating” [Houtzeel A. & Dyer F. F., 1972]. Some part will escape as aerosol to off-gas 
phase.  
The total amount of trivalent fluorides in fuel salt including U+3, the lanthanides and Y+3 
should not exceed 1.3 mole% of the solubility limit. In FUJI it will be safely about 0.63 mole 
% or less in the final stage. FUJI can soundly and simply be operated without any chemical 
processing except fission gases and T separation for its full life. The detailed examination of 
f.p. behavior in MSRE was reported by ORNL [Houtzeel A. & Dyer F. F., 1972; Rosenthal 
M.W, et al., 1972]. 
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production from 
233U 
 
amount dissolved in 
fuel salt 
 
separated to gas 
phase 
I 
Xe 27.6 a/o  312.0 Kg 
Kr 6.5 a/o  45.9 Kg 
T   0.1 Kg 
II 
I 2.6 a/o 27.6 Kg [0.032m/o]  
Br 0.42 a/o 2.8 Kg [0.005m/o]  
Te 4.1 a/o 43.5 Kg [0.050m/o]  
Cs 17.8 a/o 56.0 Kg [0.060m/o] 144.0 Kg 
Rb 7.2 a/o 0.5 Kg [0.001m/o] 51.0 Kg 
Sr 11.8 a/o 28.1 Kg [0.047m/o] 60.5 Kg 
Ba 6.3 a/o 0.3 Kg [0.005m/o] 72.0 Kg 
Ce 14.1 a/o 166.0Kg [0.170m/o]  
Nd 16.4 a/o 199.0Kg [0.200m/o]  
Y 5.9 a/o  
1.5-7.5Kg 
[0.003-0.013m/o] 42-37 Kg 
Zr 30.0 a/o 232.0Kg [0.370m/o] 2-10 Kg(?) 
III 
Mo 21.6 a/o [deposit 175.9Kg] 2-10 Kg(?) 
Se 0.9 a/o 6.1 Kg [0.010m/o]  
Sn 0.3 a/o 3.0 Kg [0.004m/o]  
Table 4. Predicted amount of fission products accumulated at the life-end of “FUJI-II” (in 
(atomic %), (mole %) and kg) 
3.4 The reactor moderator 
The reactor moderator is graphite (See Table 5) which fills a very large portion of the reactor 
vessel. [Furukawa K., et al., 1987] As shown in Figure 8, it is mostly built up of perforated 
graphite vertical rods of hexagonal shape. As shown in the figure, the rods have a varying 
size perforation. The core is divided in various sections: The central section houses the 
control rods. They are surrounded by Zone I of hexagonal graphite rods with the smaller 
diameter perforations. Zone II occupies the largest area and contains intermediate size 
perforations. In the outer, blanket zone of the core, the perforations are larger. The core is 
surrounded on sides, top and bottom by a graphite reflector.  
The radial moderator-fuel variation has been designed in order to ensure the flattest neutron 
flux distribution in the core. A graphite density of 1,8 g/cm3 was assumed in calculations. 
The graphite moderator is not expected to be replaced in the life of the reactor. To prevent 
damage, a neutron irradiation limit of 3 x 1022 nvt is selected (<50 keV). [Op cit.]. Therefore 
the maximum core flux should be less than 6 x 1013 n cm-2s-1 in a 30 year life with 60% load 
as a local power station. High quality graphite with high irradiation resistance and small 
pore size (< 1 μm) is used. 
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Fig. 8. Geometry of the FUJI reactor graphite moderator. Molten fuel flows through the 
circular channels in the graphite.  
3.5 The reactor control system 
The MSR FUJI has very high safety and reliability owing to the very small excess reactivity, 
due to the fuel-salt loss and other several advantages, and has essentially no possibility of a 
severe accident. [IAEA, 2007]. 
The MSR uses control rods which are made of graphite for the control of power. It employs 
shut-down control rods using B4C, which are always withdrawn when the reactor is in 
operation. When inserting the graphite control rod into the core, this graphite functions as a 
moderator which promotes the fission reaction, contrary to the scram control rods. 
Graphite rods will be drawn by floating power in a fail-safe mode. 
3.6 The Reactor fuel chemistry control 
The chemical valence shift by the fission of 233U fuel salt is quite small. However, the 
development of a monitoring technique is necessary to ensure sound and efficient operation 
of the FUJI. Fortunately, the reactor system does not require continuous monitoring of the 
major fuel constituents such as Li, Be, Th, F and U [ORNL-4812, 1972]. Therefore, an 
electrochemical on-line monitoring of the redox potential has been developed; it only 
depends on the U4+/U3+ ratio, which responds to the corrosive atmosphere and to the 
distribution of fission products and tritium in the reactor system. On-line monitoring of the 
U4+/U3+ ratio in the MSRE has proven the results previously obtained in thermodynamic 
and spectroscopic analyses. These have shown that observations agreed with those from 
thermodynamic and spectroscopic analyses, in the presence of a Ni/NiF2 reference electrode 
[ORNL-4396, 1969]. The U4+/U3+ ratio can easily be kept within the suitable region by 
varying the time during which beryllium (Be) is dissolved in the melt. 
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Experimental 
Reactor ORNL 
(Operated 1965-
1969) MSRE 
Pilot plant 
miniFUJI 
Standard power 
station FUJI-II 
(Fuel self 
sustaining) 
Heat capacity (MWTh) 7,3 16,7 350,0 
Electric power (netMWe) - 7,0 155 
Thermal efficiency (%) - 42b 44,3b 
Reactor vessel size (m) 
(diameter x height) 1,45 x 2,2 1,8 x 2,1 5,5 x 4,1 
Core: Max diameter (m) 1,14 0,6 1,4; 3,4a 
Graphite frac. (Vol%) 77,5 90 93,90a 
Blanket: Thickness (cm) - 20 35 
Graphite frac. (Vol%) - 70 65 
Reflector: Thickness (cm) 7? 40 68 
High temp. Containment 
(m) Diameter x height (5,8 x 7,2) 3,7 x 3,2 12,0 x 8,0 
Core/blanket Power 
density Average-Peak 
(KWth/l) 
2,9-6,6 16,4-24,9 9,5-17,5 
Neutron flux: (n/cm2s) 
Maximum thermal 0,5 x 10
14 0,58 x 1014 2,4 x 1014 
Max graphite (>50 keV) 0,3 x 1014 0,75 x 1014 0,8 x 1014 
Fuel conversion ratio - 0,58c 1,002c 
233U inventory (kg) 32,0 27,0 370,0 
[Per 1 GWe] (Ton) [-] [6,4] [2,4] 
232Th (Ton) - 0,65 20,1 
Fuel salt:233UF4 (mol %) 0,14c 0,47d 0,22d 
Total volume (m3) 2,1 0,45 13,7 
[Reactor](m3) [0,54] [0,30] [9,7] 
Flow rate (m3/Min) 4,5 1,59 33,2 
Temperature (°C) 632-654 560-700b 585-725b 
Main piping (inn. 
dia.cm) 15,0 8,0 25,0 
Graphite inventory (ton) 3,7 8,8 161,6 
a The second core-zone.  
b 2% up by “Ultra-ultra supercritical steam-turbine cycle [593 oC, 317 Atm]” at a fuel temperature of 
725°C. 
c In the stationary state after 500 days from start up.  
d 7LiF - BeF2 - ThF4 - 233UF4 = (72-x) – 16 – 12 – x (mol%)   
e 7LiF - BeF2 - ZrF4 - UF4 = 64,5 - 30,2 - 5,2 - 0,154 (mol%) (91% 233U) 
Table 5. Main design parameters of three molten salt reactors: the MSRE at ORNL, the 
miniFUJI and the FUJI Power reactor. [Furukawa K., et al., 1992] 
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4. Technological description of THORIMS-NES  
THORIMS-NES depends on the following three principles: [Furukawa K, et al., 1990; 2005] 
(I) Thorium utilization (See 2.2). (II) Application of molten-fluoride fuel technology (See 2.3). 
(III) Separation of fissile-producing breeder’s process plants: Accelerator Molten-Salt 
Breeder (AMSB) from power generating fission-reactors: utility facilities Molten-Salt Reactor 
(MSR). This separation will be essential for the global establishment of breeding-cycle 
applicable over the world. This separation is dictated by the need for a doubling time of the 
fission industry to be 10 years or less as mentioned in section 2. 
The THORIMS-NES concept is composed of: simple power stations Molten Salt Reactors 
(MSR) named FUJI-series, fissile-producers Accelerator Molten salt Breeders (AMSB), and 
batch-type process plants establishing a symbiotic Th breeding fuel-cycle system. The 
THORIMS-NES concept also includes a detailed timetable for development [Furukawa 
2008]. It includes a Short Term Program estimated in 7 years during which the prototype 
miniFUJI reactor would be built, a Middle Term Program, estimated in 14 years from the 
initial  start of the miniFUJI, during which the small molten salt power station FUJI would 
be built, and a Long Term Program, estimated 25 years from the start of the miniFUJI, 
during which the AMSB and regional fuel processing center would be constructed in order 
to complete the Symbiotic  Thorium Breeding fuel cycle capable of satisfying the huge 
electric energy demand (see Figure 1). In the following sections the main features of each of 
these programs will be described.  
4.1 miniFUJI reactor 
The development program begins with the Pilot-plant: miniFUJI  followed with the FUJI 
power reactor. The development of FUJI-series MSR is based on the reliable R&D at ORNL 
[Rosenthal M.W  et al., 1972; Engel J.R et al., 1980; Zousyokuro Y., 1981]. Almost all reactor 
engineering problems were clarified and/or solved. Their experimental reactor 7 MWth 
MSRE successfully operated 17.655 hrs without any accident (1965-69). The operation time 
of molten-salt loops was 26.076 hrs corresponding to just 3 years. However, it was about 40 
years ago, and such technology experience should be rebuilt by the operation of the pilot-
plant (miniFUJI) [Furukawa K., et al., 1987; 1989; 1990]. 
The fuel salt does not need any irradiation test, and the development of the structural steel 
Hastelloy N was essentially finished and is currently on the phase of performing an 
endurance test of modified Hastelloy N. The time and expenditure required for the 
development of FUJI would be short and small. The “miniFUJI” will differ from the ORNL-
MSRE, in that it will generate electricity of 7 MWe. The design contemplates a reactor-vessel 
of 1.8m in diameter and 2.1m in hight [Harms A.A. & Heindler M., 1982] and with piping of 
8 cm in diameter. Figure 9 shows a cross section of the miniFUJI. This facility could be 
commissioned in about 7 years. The demonstration reactor “FUJI” which will follow will be 
started with the detailed design work in parallel. [Furukawa, et al., 1983; Furukawa, et al., 
1985] Table 5 provides comparative information of the main design parameters for the 
experimental MSRE operated at ORNL, the miniFUJI and the FUJI power reactor. 
[Furukawa, et al., 1992] 
4.2 Production of 233U in accelerator molten-salt breeder (AMSB) 
During the 1980s, the technical feasibility of an accelerator-based nuclear fuel breeding 
facility AMSB [Baes C. F., 1969; 1974; McCoy Jr. H. E., 1967], was established based on a 
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‘‘single-fluid target/blanket concept” using the same kind of molten salts as FUJI, except 
with a higher ThF4 content to establish an idealistic single-phase molten-fluoride fuel cycle.  
AMSB is composed of three parts: (1) a 1 GeV and 200–300 mA proton accelerator, (2) single-
fluid molten-fluoride target/blanket system and (3) heat transfer and electric power 
recovery system. A diagram of the system is shown in Figure 10. The size of target/blanket 
salt bath is 4.5 m in diameter and 7 m in depth. The Hastelloy N vessel is protected by a 
graphite reflector.   
The salt is introduced at the top forming a vortex of about 1 m in depth. The proton beam is 
injected in an off-centered position hitting near the bottom of the vortex to minimize the 
neutron leakage and to improve the generated heat dissipation. This target/blanket molten-
salt system is sub-critical and is not affected by radiation unlike similar systems based on 
solid targets. This makes heat removal easy, and does not need target shuffling.  
 
Fig. 9. Cross section of the miniFUJI reactor vessel and secondary containment housing the 
primary cooling circuit, control rod and the path for gravity fuel drainage. 
The design of the beam injection port will be aided by improved gas-curtain technology. 
Engineering of this simple configuration, based on the MSR technology, will be manageable. 
The high proton current accelerator will utilize multi-beam funneling. The spallation 
neutrons transmute Th to 233U and also cause fission in the target. The following two items 
need to be considered. (i) Suppression of the fission of produced 233U, (ii) Utilization of the 
fission energy in the target/blanket salt for electric-power feedback for the operation of the 
AMSB. A heat output of about 1400MWth is required to achieve the power for the 
accelerator proton beam of 1 GeV, 300 mA. The above two requirements will be satisfied by 
adding Pu to the target salt composition; for example: LiF–BeF2– ThF4–233UF4–239PuF3: 64–
18–17.15–0.3–0.55 mol%. The role of the Pu component is the same as FUJI-Pu,  that is, 
burning itself and increasing the net production rate of 233U.  
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Fig. 10. Schematic diagram of single-fluid molten-salt target/blanket system in accelerator 
molten-salt breeder (AMSB). 
The annual net production rate of 233U is about 700 kg/y under the following beam and 
target conditions: [Koger J.W., 1972] Proton beam: (1 GeV, 300 mA), Target/blanket size: 4.5 
m in diameter, 6 m in depth; Initial fissile/fertile inventory: (233U: 2.240 kg), (239Pu: 4.200 kg), 
(232Th: 28.000 kg). This performance can be improved by in situ chemical processing.  
4.3 Regional center chemical processing and fissile production 
As mentioned previously the THORIMS-NES program contemplates three consecutive time 
terms leading to a global deployment opening of the Thorium Era in nuclear power 
utilization. The long term program, some 25 years after the initiation with the miniFUJI 
reactor (See 4.1), implies the building of medium and large size molten salt FUJI power 
stations (See 3.1), the establishment of fissile production: the Accelerator Molten Salt Breeder 
(See 4.2) (AMSB, AMSB-Pu), as well as the establishment of molten salt fuel processing units 
to supply the power stations.  
These last two operations are highly sensitive about the issue of weapons proliferation as it 
implies the handling of tonnage quantities of sensitive 233U, 235U and 239Pu fissile material as 
well as highly radioactive fission products and extremely long lived actinides for treatment 
or waste disposal. Hence these facilities should be built in specially planned, 20–30 bases or 
‘‘Regional Centers”, heavily safeguarded under international supervision throughout the 
world. [Furukawa K., et al., 2008] Figure 11 shows in a block diagram the units, 
relationships and functions that the regional center would house. 
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As shown, after finishing the FUJI reactor life, the spent fuel-salt will be sent back to the 
“Regional Centers”. The salt is processed in batch mode for removal of 233U, other remaining 
fissile and some fission products (f.p.). Which elements are removed will be decided on the 
basis of optimization, material compatibility, neutron economy, cost economy, etc. [Harms 
A.A. & Heindler M., 1982]. The decontaminated diluents salt is adjusted to make-up to a 
suitable ThF4 content and charged to AMSB to keep constantly a 0.5 mole% in 233U content 
for the target/blanket salt. After starting the operation of AMSBs the thorium breeding cycle 
system will gradually be achieved. In the AMSBs (See 4.2), 1GeV/300mA proton 
accelerators produces about 400 kg/year of 233U. 
The initial 233U inventory of FUJI-233U (160MWe) is about 800 kg, so each of the AMSB can 
support the commissioning of one FUJI-233U every two years. Also, high gain type AMSB 
with Pu can produce more 233U possibly resulting in an effective doubling-time of about 2~3 
years and generate sufficient thermal output power to make  the AMSB a self-sustained 
system, which will be able to start up sufficient numbers of FUJI reactors to meet the steep 
growth of energy demand. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Breeding & Chemical Processing Regional Center. Accommodating the AMSBs, 
chemical-processing plant and radio-waste plant. External input and output units are: 
Molten salt power reactors coupled by molten salt. The connection with the U–Pu cycle 
systems is shown via external or internal fuel processing plants.  
The significant aspects of this fuel cycle are the followings: The total system is simply 
integrated by a single phase of molten fluorides based on 7LiF-BeF2 solvent, after doing 
some make-up in each component facilities. Each “Breeding & Chemical Processing 
Regional Center” (See Figure 11) will accommodate 4 to 10 AMSBs, two Chemical 
Processing Plants and one Radio-Waste Managing Plant. It is contemplated that on the long 
term several tens of centers will be built in different locations in the world. 
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5. Technical advantages of FUJI 
5.1 Safety 
FUJI and the AMSB are significantly safe reactors, and there is no possibility of "Severe 
accidents". [Furukawa K., et al., 2002] The most important safety properties are due to the 
following:  
1. The system pressure is lower than 0.5 MPa (72 psi, 5.1 kg/cm2)  
2. The fuel salt is chemically inert, is not reactive with air or water, and suffers no 
radiation damage.  
3. The boiling point of the fuel salt is 1673K, much higher than the operation temperature 
973K.  
4. The fuel will only become just critical when it coexists with the graphite moderator. 
Therefore, leaked fuel salt will not be able to introduce re-criticality.  
5. FUJI has a large negative prompt temperature reactivity coefficient. The temperature-
coefficient of graphite is slightly positive, but controllable due to the slow temperature 
increase due on its large heat capacity.  
6. The delayed-neutron yield of 233U fission is smaller than that of 235U, but it is 
controllable due to longer neutron lifetime, and large negative prompt temperature 
coefficient.  
7. The fuel composition can be adjusted at any time if necessary. The excess reactivity is 
very small and the control-rod worth is also small. A large reactivity shift by control-
rods is not required due to the very small excess reactivity in a MSR.  
8. Gaseous fission products such as Xe, Kr and T are permanently removed from the fuel 
salt, and their leakage in accidents are minimized.  
9. Provision for loss of coolant circulation: In an event of a catastrophic accident in which 
total power failure prevents power delivery to the fuel pumps, so that fuel circulation 
and residual heat removal from the reactor is interrupted, such as the accident at the 
Fukushima I power plant in Japan due to the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 
2011 [Fukushima, 2011] the reactor automatically shuts down without operator 
intervention. In FUJI reactors the fuel is already in the molten state and quite fluid. If 
fuel circulation stops, the temperature inside if the reactor would increase. The Freeze 
Valve will automatically melt open by lack of valve-cooling due to electric-power loss. 
The molten fuel salt will drain to the Emergency Drain Tank (see Figure 5) covered by a 
big borated water pool, which will be cooled by a NaK Heat-Pipe. Re-criticality cannot 
occur in such an event. 
10. The triple confinement of radioactivity is ensured in FUJI like in the other solid-fuel 
reactors. The reliability of each barrier in FUJI is much higher depending not only on 
the above (1), (2), (3), (8) and (9), but also on the soundness of the first barrier, which is 
composed of a simpler reactor-vessel, piping and intermediate heat-exchanger that 
have very thick tube-walls working at low pressure and without any serious irradiation 
and thermal-stresses. The event of a "severe accident" will never occur in FUJI even 
assuming full stoppages of primary and secondary pumps resulting in a reactor scram.  
Even in the case of "severe reactor destruction" by military attack or sabotage, FUJI might be 
the safer reactor compared with any other ordinary Solid Fuel Reactors owing to the 
following: 1.- Only a weak release of gaseous radioactivity due to the continuous fission-gas 
removal. 2.- No core melt down, and no re-criticality due to the separation of graphite and 
fuel, which might be drained automatically and/or leaked. Leaked fuel-salt is solidified as a 
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stable glass confining radioactivity, and does not produce any troublesome aerosol (See 5.4). 
3.- Graphite (MP: 4000K) with large heat-capacity and thermal conductivity is not easily 
fired by virtue of inexistence of high temperature heat-sources. Even if a fire started, simple 
suffocation extinction will be enough, because graphite is not wetted by the fuel salt.  
5.2 Nuclear proliferation and terrorism resistance  
The present 238U-Pu fuel cycle is difficult to protect, not only from nuclear proliferation but 
also from nuclear terrorism [Semenov B.A. and Oi N., 1993]. For example, an article in the 
US newspaper New York Times, 11th August, 2004 , discussed that an  “American 
Hirosima” could take place by a 10-kiloton weapon at New York killing half a million 
people. Such a weapon could supposedly be stolen from Russia and transported undetected. 
This is because concealment of 239Pu or 235U is easy due to the very weak gamma activity. 
On the other hand a weapon made from the Th - 233U fuel cycle is very difficult to conceal 
due to the very strong gamma activity of 232U associated with fissile 233U as explained below. 
(see also 2.2). Deputy-Director General, IAEA, Semenov and Oi (1993) stated that "Another 
way is to revisit the thorium/uranium cycle that is free of the stigma associated with 
plutonium." 233U in fuel salt inevitably contains small amount of 232U (about 500 ppm) and 
its daughter nuclides, produce very high radiation dose rates due to the high-energy gamma 
ray of 2.6 MeV from the daughter 208Tl.  
Even if fuel salt is withdrawn from the core, Pa separation should be done in a short time, 
because the decay of 233Pa producing pure 233U is fast, with a half-life of 27 days. The 
separation is very difficult, because spent fuel salt has very high radiation, and about 50 tons 
of fuel salts are necessary for getting 1 SQ (Significant Quantity for a weapon): 8 kg of pure 
233U from 233Pa.The required 50 tons of salt is more than the fuel inventory of FUJI. The theft 
of 1 SQ : 8 kg of ordinary (dirty) 233U is also very difficult due to the very low fissile 
concentration (about 1 wt%) and the reactor would stop. It would cause a lethal dose (about 
1 Sv/h at 50 cm distance) of 208Tl to the possible criminals. To shield this substance for 
handling, lead of about 20 cm in thickness is necessary, resulting impossible to transfer and 
fabricate the nuclear explosives, and very easy to detect by the high gamma radiation. FUJI 
produces negligible Trans-U elements (TRU: Np, Pu, Am and Cm) by virtue of the lower 
nuclear mass of fertile 232Th, six units smaller than 238U. This fact will greatly contribute to 
the non-proliferation and an effective incineration of TRU by the Th-U cycle system. In 
general the weapon usability of 233U is classified information. But the specialist of 
proliferation issues of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), W.G. Sutcliffe 
advised that “235U is most easily made into a weapon, Pu is next easily made into a weapon, 
and 233U is hardest and least desirable for a weapon”, and “any of the above can be made 
into ‘any old-type weapon’ but a dedicated arsenal builder would prefer 235U or Pu rather 
than 233U. Therefore 233U is less “weaponizable.” [Sutcliffe, W., 1994] 
5.3 Radioactive waste management  
The difficult radioactive waste management becomes significantly easier owing to negligible 
TRU production in THORIMS-NES [Furukawa K., et al., 1991; David S., et al., 2007]. The 
production of Pu and Am + Cm in FUJI are 0.5 kg and 0.3 g Am + Cm for every 1 GWe y, 
respectively, i.e. very small compared to about 230 kg Pu and 25 kg Am + Cm in Light 
Water Reactors. Furthermore, avoiding solid fuel fabrication results in a lower production of 
low level radioactive waste and the need for maintenance.  
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In the long term after about year 2070, the recession age of the Thorium Era as shown in 
Figure 1, some very long-lived radioactive wastes should be transmuted to stable isotopes 
using the neutron capture reaction. Such work is not easy within the ordinary fuel-cycle. 
However in THORIMS-NES huge amounts of low-cost neutrons could be easily obtained, 
because excess fissile fuels could be burned out generating neutrons for this purpose. The 
circulating molten-fluoride system is the “best medium” for transmutation work due to the 
high solubility of several kinds of ions, good reaction-heat reservoir and no radiation 
damage. This is the case for both circulating systems: FUJI, a thermal neutron system, and 
AMSB, a fast neutron system. Considering this scheme, managing the radioactive waste 
becomes not a   “Million Years” issue but rather a “Hundred Year” problem. This argument 
is shown in Figure 12 where the radio toxicity of nuclear waste is presented as a function of 
storage time. [Adapted from David S., et al., 2007]  
On the issue of management of non-nuclear materials at the end of reactor life: All 
components would be sent back to the regional centers for reuse or disposal. (see 2.5) 
Hastelloy N would mostly be re-melted and recycled and graphite, that has received low 
irradiation levels, would be reused after grinding the surface to 0.1 mm depth thus 
minimizing production of low level radioactive waste.  
5.4 Operation and maintenance  
Reactor systems in THORIMS-NES are quite safe (See 5.1), and their operation and 
maintenance simple and easy. Some additional evidence of this are:  1.- The reactor vessel is 
not opened in its life, and the control rods are very few (or no rods might be feasible). The 
reactor vessel is a simple welded tank without any big flange or fuel-handling machine. 2.- 
The primary circuit system is confined inside a high-temperature containment at about 
810K, which results in a simpler reactor configuration without any heater, insulator, neutron 
shield or instrumentation with the exception of some flow-meters and surface-level meters, 
etc. Therefore, fully remote maintenance, inspection and repairing would be easier, without 
any worker’s exposure. The recent advances of robot technology are a great benefit. 3.- In 
the unlikely case of leakage of fuel salt, the bottom of the high-temperature containment is a 
spill-pan, whereby leaked salt is guided to the drain-tank. (See Figure 5) If necessary, the 
salt can be washed out by clean carrier salt (7LiF-BeF2). 4.- A MSR has excellent load-
following ability by virtue of the liquid fuel and the removal of poison gas 135Xe. The output 
power can be controlled by the fuel salt flow rate due to its negative temperature coefficient 
of reactivity not using the control rod. In the event of a lowering of temperature the salt 
freezes as a water-insoluble glassy matter stably sticking on the walls. The reactor building 
will be negligibly contaminated not as in an “Aqueous Homogeneous Reactors “[Lane J.A., 
et al., 1958], where radioactive aerosol will be dissipated after fuels dry up. 
As MSR (FUJI-233U or FUJI-Pu) are self-controllable, the operational  work is simple 
comprising the following main items: (a) off-gas management, (b) redox electrochemical 
potential control of the fuel salt, and (c) semi-periodical additions of Th, Pu and/or U in the 
eutectic-salt forms: [Th] 7LiF-29 mole % ThF4 ( MP: 838 K), [Pu] 7LiF-19.5 mole % PuF3 (MP: 
1016 K), and [U] 7LiF-27 mole % UF4 (MP: 763 K). Th is added once per year holding the 
variation to less than 1 wt %. The chemical balance due to the fission reaction of 233UF4 will 
introduce some excess free F atoms, which is controlled by Be addition. But in FUJI-Pu the 
main fission depends on 239PuF3, and neutrality will nearly be held. By the above additions 
of fuel components, 7LiF content will increase, which will be corrected by BeF2 addition. 
Component additions are achieved by the use of the above eutectic salts. 
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Fig. 12. Comparison of the radio toxicity of nuclear waste produced by a uranium-based 
PWR to that produced by a Liquid Fueled Thorium Reactor (LFTR) as a function of years of 
decay time. [Adapted from David S., et al., 2007]. 
6. Conclusion 
One of the most promising philosophical and technical strategies for the world survival in 
this century has been presented. Although many more detailed design and optimization 
studies are needed and should proceed with international cooperation, we have to start 
from the very simple pilot-plant, miniFUJI, to rapidly demonstrate the rational technological 
integrity of THORIMS-NES and to make the initial step into the Thorium era. 
We hope that our work will be valuable as a reply to the sincere wish of David E. Lilienthal 
[Lilienthal D. E., 1980] a most significant American/Human of the 20th century, given on 
the final sentence of his last book ‘‘Atomic Energy: A New Start”: ‘‘What I have reflected 
upon and written about is not merely a new source of electrical energy, nor energy as an 
economic statistic. My theme has been our contemporary equivalent of the greatest of all 
moral and cultural concerns—fairness among men and the endless search for a pathway to 
peace.” 
For such purpose, ‘‘I have proposed that we make a new start toward a safer peaceful atom, 
using a technology that will not, as the present technology does, produce bomb material in 
the process of creating the peaceful atom.” And he recommended to us that ‘‘We need to 
back away from our present nuclear state in order to find a better way, a route less 
hazardous to human health and to the peace of the world and its very survival.” 
 One of the authors (K.F.) deeply benefited from the strong support of Bernal [Brown A., 
2005] in his early scientific work on inorganic liquid structure chemistry as a base of this 
work. Bernal was also one of the scientists who were most concerned to achieve a ‘‘World 
without War” [Bernal J. D., 1958], and was the first to use the phrase ‘‘weapons of mass 
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destruction”. On his birthday towards the end of his life he wrote: ‘‘I am sure that you share 
my hope that in the not too distant future science may come to be used for the benefit of all 
mankind” 
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1. Introduction 
Currently, nuclear energy is mainly utilized for the generation of electricity that is distributed 
to end users via power transmission networks. However, there are also other distribution 
forms. For example, hydrogen produced from nuclear energy is a promising future energy 
carrier that can be delivered to end users for purposes of heating homes, fuel supply for 
hydrogen vehicles and other residential applications, while simultaneously lowering the 
greenhouse gas emissions of otherwise using fossil fuels [Forsberg, 2002, 2007]. Current 
industrial demand for hydrogen exists in the upgrading of heavy oils such as oil sands, 
refineries, fertilizers, automotive fuels, and manufacturing applications among others. 
Hydrogen production is currently a large, rapidly growing and profitable industry. The 
worldwide hydrogen market is currently estimated at about $300 billion per year, growing at 
about 10% per year, growing to 40% per year by 2020 and expected to reach several trillions of 
dollars per year by 2020 [Naterer et al., 2008]. This chapter will examine the usage of nuclear 
energy for the cogeneration of electricity and hydrogen with water splitting technologies.  
In section 2 of this chapter, various hydrogen production methods will be briefly introduced 
and compared. The potential economics and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions with 
nuclear hydrogen production are examined. In section 3, matching the heat requirements of 
various thermochemical hydrogen cycles to the available heat from nuclear reactors 
(especially Generation IV) will be studied from the aspects of heat grade, magnitude, and 
distribution inside the cycles. The requirement of an intermediate heat exchanger between 
the nuclear reactor and hydrogen production plant is discussed. Long distance heat 
transport is examined from the aspects of the performance of working fluids, flow 
characteristics, and heat losses in the transport pipeline. In section 4, layout options for the 
integration of nuclear reactors and hydrogen production plants are discussed. In section 5, 
modulations of nuclear energy output and hydrogen cogeneration scales are studied, 
regarding the increase of the nuclear energy portion on the power grid through the 
adjustment of the hydrogen production rate so as to lower the needs for fossil fuels. The 
options for keeping the total nuclear energy output at a constant value and simultaneously 
varying the electricity output onto the power grid in order to approach a load following 
profile for peak and off-peak hours are discussed. In section 6, conclusions are provided for 
the cogeneration of hydrogen with nuclear heat. 
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2. Environmental and economic benefits of nuclear hydrogen production 
methods 
The growing demand for hydrogen will have a significant impact on the economy. 
However, currently the major production methods for hydrogen are not clean, although its 
usage is clean. More than 95% of the global hydrogen is directly produced from fossil fuels, 
i.e., about 48% from steam methane reforming (SMR), 30% from refinery/chemical off-
gases, and 18% from coal gasification [NYSERDA , 2010;  IEA, 2010]. Water electrolysis 
accounts for less than 4%, and even this 4% is not “clean” because the electricity used is not 
fully generated from clean sources. The usage of fossil fuels to produce hydrogen has been 
resulting in major greenhouse gas emissions and other hazadous pollutants. Table 1 shows 
the CO2 emission levels of various production methods [Wang et al., 2010]. On average, the 
CO2 emissions are 19 tonnes per tonne of hydrogen production, which results in 959 million 
tonnes of CO2 emissions per annum. Therefore, the future hydrogen economy must be 
based on clean production technologies. 
Scientists and engineers have been attempting for years to develop new technologies for 
clean and efficient hydrogen production. Among the technologies, photoelectrochemical 
water splitting, water electrolysis with off-peak hours electricity, high temperature 
electrolysis (HTE), and thermochemical water splitting are promising clean options. To 
evaluate these options, the clean extent of the energy source, thermal efficiency and 
economics are the three major criteria. In terms of the clean extent, photoelectrochemical 
water splitting utilizes sunlight to split water into hydrogen and oxygen [Sivula et al., 2010]. 
However, due to the intermittent nature of sunlight, this production method cannot deliver 
a continuous flow of hydrogen production at night and other times when sunlight is not 
available. Water electrolysis can utilize off-peak hour electricity from the power grid that 
can improve the hydrogen production economics, due to the lower price of electricity at off-
peak hours. However, it may not be clean production because the power sources 
contributing to the power grid are not fully clean. As shown in Table 1, water electrolysis 
cannot even provide a better scenario than steam methane reforming and coal gasification if 
using the existing power grid. To make the water electrolysis “clean”, the electricity must be 
derived from a clean source. Regarding high temperature electrolysis and thermochemical 
water splitting methods that utilize some heat as a portion of energy input, the same 
situation exists because the heat must also be derived from clean sources so as to deliver a 
clean production method. Solar, wind, and nuclear energy are sustainable options for 
energy sources [Steinfeld, 2005; Schultz et al., 2003; Kreith et al., 2007]. Among these options, 
nuclear energy is more mature and widespread than solar and wind in current industry. 
Overcoming the intermittency of solar and wind energy is a long-term challenging task. 
Therefore, to integrate nuclear power with hydrogen production is a promising option. 
 
Method SMR Coal gasification Water electrolysis 
CO2 emissions(a) 
CO2/H2 (Moles /mole) 
0.51 1.21 1.00(b) 
(a) Heat from fossil fuel combustion and electricity from the existing power grid. 
(b) 84% of the electricity from fossil power generation (Alberta, Canada [Government of 
Alberta, 2008]). 
Table 1. CO2 emissions with current production methods and energy sources 
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In terms of production efficiency, the thermal efficiency of a hydrogen production cycle can  
be defined as follows: 
 100%f
NetInput Electrolysis
H
H E
       (1) 
where Hf is the formation enthalpy of water with the value of 286 kJ/mol H2O, EElectrolysis is 
the electrical energy required for the process of electrolysis, and HNetInput is the net heat 
input to the cycle. Equation (1) can apply to conventional electrolysis, high temperature 
electrolysis, and thermochemical (either fully thermal or hybrid) water splitting cycles. If the 
value of HNetInput is zero, then it indicates pure electrolysis. Conversely, if Eelectrolysis is zero, 
it means a purely thermal water splitting process that only uses heat. If neither is zero, it is a 
hybrid process. The power generation process can be subdivided into three stages: (1) heat 
is generated from a nuclear reactor; (2) heat converts to mechanical energy by driving a 
steam or gas turbine, which makes an electric generator rotate; (3) rotation of electric 
generator produces AC electric power. Each stage inevitably experiences some heat loss. To 
produce hydrogen from conventional water electrolysis, all three stages are experienced, 
plus an additional stage of converting AC to DC. Therefore, although the conversion 
efficiency from DC electrical to chemical energy in a water electrolyzer could reach 80~90% 
[Forsberg, 2002, 2003], the overall thermal efficiency is only around 30%. The power 
generation efficiency of future nuclear reactors will be increased significantly, e.g., utilizing 
Generation IV nuclear reactors [WNA, 2010].  
In terms of the economics of various hydrogen production methods, lower costs lead to 
better economics. In this chapter, the word “cost” is discussed in terms of monetary 
spending per unit of hydrogen, e.g., US$/tonne H2 , in order to avoid confusion with the 
term “efficiency” because “cost” is often used interchangeably in place of efficiency in cost-
effectiveness analyses and efficiency assessments.  
Table 2 lists the thermal efficiencies and costs of various hydrogen production methods with 
nuclear energy on a comparative basis. Detailed thermal efficiency calculations and cost 
analyses were reported in past studies [Wang et al., 2010; Jean-Pierre Py et al., 2006; de Jong 
et al., 2009; Kreith et al., 2007]. In Table 2, the cost of steam methane reforming that utilizes 
the combustion heat of methane is also shown for a comparison since it is today’s major 
production method. The S-I and Cu-Cl cycles are selected as typical thermochemical 
hydrogen production cycles that will be studied in subsequent sections. It can be found that 
the costs of various hydrogen production technologies with nuclear energy are similar to 
that of steam methane reforming, especially, thermochemical cycles integrated with 
Generation IV nuclear reactors, e.g., supercritical water-cooled reactor (SCWR). The cycles 
have the potential to deliver lower production costs than other methods. 
Regarding the CO2 emissions of thermochemical cycles, as discussed previously, a hybrid 
cycle utilizes a portion of electricity for its electrolytic step. If the electricity is not derived 
from non-fossil fuel sources, then CO2 emissions will be generated. Table 3 shows the 
emission comparison for the current power grid and nuclear power plant. According to the 
structure of energy sources on the power grid, the emissions were estimated [Wang et al., 
2010]. Comparing Tables 3 and 1, it can be observed that hydrogen production with 
thermochemical cycles and nuclear energy can lower the CO2 emissions by at least one 
order, regardless of the energy sources for electricity.  
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Production
Condition 
Thermochemical  
HTE 
 
Electrolysis 
 
SMR 
S-I cycle Cu-Cl cycle 
pricing year 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 
Nuclear reactor  VHTR SCWR GenIV GenIII+ methane(a) 
T, oC 950 650 800 650 700-- 1100 
Price ratio  
Eelectricity/Eheat 
3 3 3 3 3 
production efficiency  52% 52% 52% 41% 65~75% 
ratio (capital recovery /
operating cost)  
0.77 0.40 N/A(b) 0.32 0.46 
production scale 
(tonnes H2/day) 
200 200  208  200 
 (10)  10  
Cost, US $/ kgH2 1.85 1.60  2.25   
  (2.31)  2.52 2.67 
Note:  
(a) Current SMR uses the combustion heat of methane. 
(b) Not reported in literatures for industrial scale hydrogen production. 
Acronyms of nuclear reactors: 
GenIII+ (Advanced Generation III reactor), GenIV (Generation IV nuclear reactor), SCWR 
(Supercritical water reactor), VHTR (Very high temperature reactor). 
Acronyms of hydrogen production methods: 
Cu-Cl cycle (copper-chlorine thermochemical cycle), HTE (high temperature electrolysis), S-
I cycle (sulfur-iodine thermochemical cycle), SMR (steam methane reforming). 
Table 2. Costs of various nuclear powered hydrogen production methods. 
 
Thermochemical cycle S-I, fully thermal (a) Cu-Cl, hybrid 
CO2 emissions, CO2/H2 (Moles /mole) 0 0 0.07(b) 
(a) Energy source for electricity generation has no influence on CO2 emssions. 
(b) 84% of the electricity from fossil power generation [Government of Alberta, 2008]). 
Table 3. CO2 emissions with nuclear powered thermochemical production methods 
3. Thermal integration of thermochemical cycles and nuclear reactors 
3.1 Matching the temperatures of thermochemical cycles and nuclear reactors 
Many thermochemical hydrogen production cycles have been developed to split water 
thermally through auxiliary chemical compounds and reactions. About two hundred 
thermochemical cycles were reported to produce hydrogen by thermochemical water 
splitting [Sadhankar et al., 2005; Forsberg, 2003]. Different cycles have various inputs of 
temperatures that must be provided by nuclear reactors. Table 4 shows the temperatures of 
some thermochemical cycles and nuclear reactors. Among these cycles, the sulfur–iodine (S-
I) cycle is a leading example of purely thermal cycles that has been scaled up from proof-of-
principle tests to a large engineering scale by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA, 
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[Kubo et al., 2004]). Among the hybrid thermal cycles, the copper-chlorine (Cu-Cl) cycle is a 
leading example and its scale-up is underway at the University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology [Wang et al., 2010] in collaboration with its partners that include Atomic Energy of 
Canada Limited (AECL). The maximum temperature required by thermochemical cycles can 
be met by Generation IV nuclear reactors. The temperature requirement of the Cu-Cl cycle is 
much lower than that of other cycles. Therefore, the Cu-Cl cycle can more readily link with the 
heat output of various nuclear reactors due to its lower temperature requirement.  
 
Cycle name T, oC Development status 
MSO4-NH3 (metal sulphate – ammonia) cycles 
M: Zn, Mg, Ca, Ba, Fe, Co, Ni, Mn, Cu 
1,100 Proof-of-principle 
Mn-C (carbon dioxide – Manganese oxide) cycle 977 Proof-of-principle 
Mn-Cl (manganese – chlorine) cycle 900 Proof-of-principle 
S-Br (sulfur - bromine), Cr-Cl (chromium - chlorine), 
and V-Cl (vanadium – chlorine) cycles 
850 Proof-of-principle 
S-I (sulphur - iodine) cycle 850 Under scale-up 
Ni-Fe (nickel – ferrite) cycle 800 Proof-of-principle 
Mn-Na (manganese - sodium) cycle 800 Proof-of-principle 
Fe-Ca-Br (ferrite-calcium-bromine) cycle 750 Proof-of-principle 
Fe-Cl (ferrite – chlorine) cycle 650 Proof-of-principle 
Hg-HgO (mercury – mercury oxide) cycle 600 Proof-of-principle 
Cu-Cl (copper - chlorine) cycle 530 Under scale-up 
 
Reactors T, oC Development status 
Generations II and III <450 Commercialized 
Generations III+ and IV >450 Under development 
Table 4. Temperatures of thermochemical cycles and nuclear reactors  
There are several types of Cu-Cl cycles with various numbers of steps from 2 to 5 depending 
on reaction conditions. Due to the lower efficiency and more engineering challenges of two-, 
three- and five-step cycles, the following cycle with 4 steps will be considered in this chapter 
[Wang et al., 2009]: 
Step 1. Hydrogen production step (electrolysis) 
 2CuCl(aq) + 2HCl(aq)= 2CuCl2(aq) + H2(g), in aqueous solution of HCl, 80~100 oC  (I) 
Step 2. Drying step (endothermic) 
 CuCl2(aq) + nfH2O(l) = CuCl2•nhH2O(s) + (nf - nh)H2O  
 nf >7.5, nh = 0~4, at 30~80 oC (crystallization) or 100~260oC (spray drying) (II) 
Step 3. Hydrolysis step (endothermic) 
 2CuCl2•nhH2O(s) + H2O(g) = CuOCuCl2(s) + 2HCl(g) + nhH2O(g), nh is 0~4, at 375 oC (III) 
Step 4. Oxygen production step (endothermic) 
 CuOCuCl2(s) = 2CuCl(molten) + 0.5O2 (g), at 530 oC   (IV)  
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3.2 Matching the nuclear heat and hydrogen production requirements 
Even if the temperature of a nuclear reactor can reach the maximum temperature 
requirement of 530oC, it may not match the heat distribution that is regulated by different 
temperatures at different steps. Table 5 shows the heat requirements of the Cu-Cl cycle 
[Wang et al., 2009]. It can be found that different steps occupy different heat percentages. If 
the heat source does not match the required distribution, then one or two steps may not be 
supplied with sufficient heat and simultaneously another one or two steps may be supplied 
with surplus heat. Therefore, the temperature of the heat source should cover the maximum 
temperature requirement of the Cu-Cl cycle, as well as provide a similar heat requirement 
structure. 
 
Step T, oC Net heat input (a)  
kJ/mol H2 
Compared with the total 
net heat input, % 
I <100 0 0% 
II <200 122.2 26.9% 
III ≥375 181.8 40.1% 
IV ≥530 149.4 33.0% 
Sum(b) 453.4 (226.7MJ/kg H2) 100% 
(a) 50% of the heat released by exothermic processes of Cu-Cl cycle is recovered. 
(b) The sum includes all unlisted auxiliary processes for each step.  
Table 5. Heat requirements of the Cu-Cl cycle 
The distribution of heat inputs depends on the temperatures of the working fluid, i.e., heat 
transfer fluid, entering and exiting the Cu-Cl cycle. The nuclear heat must be transported 
over a distance through a heat transfer fluid to the thermochemical hydrogen production 
plant. Due to the design and operation complexity of dealing with phase change heat 
transfer fluids, only sensible heat is considered in this chapter for the heating purposes of 
the Cu-Cl cycle. In this chapter, 250oC is selected as the maximum temperature of heat 
transfer fluid exiting the Cu-Cl cycle, which is about 100oC lower than most of the inlet 
temperatures of Generation IV nuclear reactors, so as to have a sufficient temperature 
difference for heat exchange between the heat transfer fluid and the nuclear reactor coolants. 
Later sections of this paper will discuss further details of the temperature selection criteria 
based on the calculations of heat losses. Since only sensible heat of the heat transfer fluid is 
provided to the Cu-Cl cycle, the delivered heat requirement of the heat transfer fluid can be 
estimated by variations of the fluid temperature passing through each step of the Cu-Cl 
cycle, assuming the heat capacity of the heat transfer fluid does not vary significantly in the 
temperature range of interest. The matching criterion is that higher grade heat should be 
met at a higher priority since lower grade heat may be met by the exiting heat of higher 
grade steps.  
Figure 1 shows the matching extent for various maximum delivered temperatures of the 
heat source. It can be found that 600oC can cover the maximum temperature requirement 
530oC of step IV of the Cu-Cl cycle, but it does not have a sufficient heat percentage for step 
IV, yet it provides surplus heat for steps 2 and 1. To satisfy the heat requirement of step IV, 
the mass flow rate of heat transfer fluid must be increased. However, this may also deliver 
surplus heat to other steps. As a result, the temperature exiting the Cu-Cl cycle will be 
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increased and the overall thermal efficiency of both nuclear and hydrogen production plants 
is hence decreased. Therefore, to increase the temperature entering the Cu-Cl cycle could be 
a better option for satisfying the requirement. Figure 1 shows that the temperature of the 
heat from the nuclear reactor entering the Cu-Cl cycle after a distant transport must be 
around 650oC to match the heat requirements of the Cu-Cl cycle. In addition, the 
temperature of heat transfer fluid leaving the nuclear reactor should be sufficiently high to 
offset the heat losses in the transport pipeline between the nuclear and hydrogen production 
plants, and also to avoid condensation or solidification on the inner wall of pipeline after 
leaving the Cu-Cl cycle if the heat transfer fluid is steam or molten salt. An intermediate 
heat exchanger that can heat a transfer fluid by the nuclear reactor coolant is suggested for 
the heat supply to the hydrogen production plant due to the safety considerations of both 
the nuclear reactor and hydrogen production plant, because the nuclear reactor coolant has 
a risk to be contaminated by the chemicals of the Cu-Cl cycle if there is any leak in the pipe. 
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Fig. 1. Heat distribution of Cu-Cl cycle and nuclear heat source at various temperatures 
3.3 Evaluation and selection of heat transfer fluids for heat transport in pipeline  
Heat must be transferred by a heat transfer fluid flowing in a pipeline and transported from 
a nuclear power station to a thermochemical hydrogen plant. On the basis of the heat 
requirement per kilogram of hydrogen production shown in Table 5, the heat load can be 
estimated according to the hydrogen production scale. Table 6 shows the estimate, where QT 
is the heat load in the pipeline in units of MWth, i.e., megawatts of thermal energy.  
When using sensible heat of the heat transfer fluid, the performance of the fluid can be 
evaluated by the required flow rate for per unit heat quantity transported in the pipeline: 
 
H
L
T
T T
PT
QX
C dT
   at QT = 1 MWth  (6) 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 
 
454 
where XT has the units of kg·s-1/MWth, and TL and TH are the inlet and outlet temperatures 
of the heat transfer fluid that extracts heat from nuclear reactor coolant in the intermediate 
heat exchanger. The values of TL and TH should prevent phase change and at the same time 
allow a portion of heat losses in the transport pipeline. Also, CP is the heat capacity of the 
heat transfer fluid that could be thermal oils, molten salts, supercritical water, steam, or 
helium. To transport supercritical water, the transport pipeline must withstand a high 
pressure (>22MPa), which is an engineering challenge for pipeline manufacturing and 
maintenance. Thermal oil may experience coking and decomposition at a high temperature. 
Solidification may occur in molten salt at low temperature spots. Steam may condense after 
a distance of transport if the pressure is higher than its saturation point. The condensation of 
steam indicates the need for an intermediate steam generator and two-phase flow in the 
transport pipeline. This may significantly increase the construction capital and operating 
cost. Therefore, in this chapter, the pressure of the steam is not suggested to be sufficiently 
high such that the steam can remain in a gaseous state during circulation.  
 
H2 production scale, tonnes/day 100 200 400 
Heat requirement by Cu-Cl cycle , MWth 263 525 1050 
Heat transport load (QT) in pipeline, MWth 316 630 1260 
Table 6. Heat requirement and heat load in pipeline for various hydrogen production scales  
Since step II of the Cu-Cl cycle has a temperature range of 80 - 200oC, it is assumed the 
heating fluid exiting the step is 230oC. To avoid condensation, the pressure of the heating 
fluid is 2 MPa, which is slightly lower than the saturation pressure of steam in case steam 
serves as the heating fluid. For a comparable study, helium is designed to have the same 
temperature and pressure as steam. Table 7 gives the values of XT, the suggested operating 
parameters for the heat transfer fluids (helium, superheated steam, and molten salt), and the 
thermodynamic properties of the fluids [Petersen, 1970; Wang, 2010]. Among the three 
fluids of Table 7, both steam and molten salt have a phase change issue in the transport 
pipeline, and molten salt has an issue of chemical stability when the temperature is high. 
Therefore, helium is a comparatively good option for working as the heat transfer fluid. 
 
 
Fluid in pipeline 
Thermodynamic properties(a) XT 
kg·s-1/MWth P 
MPa 
Cp 
kJ/kg·K 
ρ 
kg/m3 
k 
w/m·K 
Helium TL = 230oC 2 5.196 1.916 0.238 0.520 
TH = 600oC 2 5.196 1.100 0.330 
Steam TL = 230oC 2 2.735 9.495 0.042 1.189 
TH = 600oC 2 2.247 5.010 0.081 
Molten salt(b) 230 -- 600oC 0.1 1.549 1794 3.635 1.745 
(a) Cp – heat capacity; ρ – density; k – thermal conductivity. 
(b) Averaged values for the properties are used here due to the condensed state of molten 
salt. For comparison purposes: 60% NaNO3 and 40% KNO3; Melting point: 222oC; Boiling 
point: 704oC. 
Table 7. Values of XT, suggested operating parameters, and thermodynamic properties of 
heat transfer fluids 
 
Water Splitting Technologies for Hydrogen Cogeneration from Nuclear Energy 
 
455 
3.4 Flow characteristics of the heat transfer fluids in the transport pipeline 
The heat loss of the transport pipeline is greatly influenced by the flow characteristics. The 
flow parameters such as flow velocity and pressure loss must be controlled in an acceptable 
engineering range in the pipeline. The velocity is determined by the flow rate and pipe 
diameter. The flow rate can be calculated from XT and the heat load. Figure 2 shows the 
dependence of helium flow velocity on the heat load and pipeline diameter. It can be found 
that the velocity depends strongly on the pipeline diameter. Utilizing a smaller diameter 
pipeline can reduce the construction cost. However, a smaller pipeline diameter may lead to 
a higher velocity and larger pressure drop, which requires an increased pressure boosting 
for the pipeline transport.   
To estimate the pressure drop, the following equation is adopted: 
 
21
2
P uf
L D
      (7) 
where ΔP/L is the pressure drop per unit length (Pa/m), D is the pipeline inside diameter, ρ 
is the helium density (values given in Table 7), u is the helium velocity (values given in Fig. 
2), f is the friction factor determined by the Reynolds number and the pipeline inner wall 
roughness. Then from equations (6) and (7), the pressure loss can be calculated by: 
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Fig. 2. Dependence of helium flow velocity on the heat load and pipeline diameter 
Figure 3 shows the dependence of pressure drop on heat load and pipeline diameter. For the 
pipeline diameter of 1.0 m, the pressure loss may reach 500 kPa/km (5 bars/km) when the 
heat load is 500 MWth (about 150 tons H2/day). To pump helium 10 km away, the pressure  
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Fig. 3. Dependence of helium pressure drop on the heat load and pipeline diameter 
loss is about 50 bars (5 MPa). This is a large pressure loss that may need significant 
compressor work. To lower the pressure loss, the pipeline diameter must be increased or 
multiple pipelines must be utilized. 
3.5 Heat transport load and heat loss in the transport pipeline 
When heat is transported by helium from a nuclear station to a hydrogen plant, it will 
experience heat losses. The influencing parameters include the helium flow rate, heat load, 
temperature, pipeline diameter, insulation, and weather conditions, among others. The heat 
loss is transferred from helium to the pipeline wall mostly through convection, and then 
through the conduction of the insulation of the pipeline, and lastly to air through convection 
and radiation if the pipeline is on the ground surface. If the pipeline is buried underground, 
the heat loss mostly goes to the soil. Since the thermal conductivity of metal is usually at 
least one order larger than most types of soils, the soil can also serve as insulation if the soil 
moisture is not significant. Due to the variations of soil types, buried depth and transport 
length of pipeline, the investigation of the heat loss for underground pipelines is not 
discussed in detail here. To simplify the evaluation, this paper will mainly examine the heat 
loss of the surface pipeline.  
Since the pipeline is sufficiently long compared with its diameter, the axial flow effect can be 
neglected. The heat transfer can be approximated as a one-dimensional flow in the radial 
direction. The heat loss per unit length of the pipeline can be calculated with the following 
equation [Lienhard et al., 2008]: 
 2 ( )ln( / ) ln[( ) / ]1 1
( )( )
He air
o i o o
He air
pipe insui convec convec rad o
T TQ
R R R RL
k kR h h h R
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   (9) 
where Q/L is the heat loss per unit length, THe is the average helium temperature in the 
pipeline, Tair is the air temperature varying with days and seasons, Ri and Ro are the pipeline 
inside and outside radius (not including the insulation), kpipe is the thermal conductivity of 
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the pipeline material, θ is the insulation thickness, Heconvech  and airconvech are the convection heat 
transfer coefficients of helium flow in the pipeline and wind outside the insulation, and hrad 
is the radiation heat transfer coefficient.  
To have a safe design approximation, the upper value of the thermal conductivity of 
insulation for a very high temperature environment (600oC) is adopted. It is also assumed 
that the outer surface of the insulation will be oxidized after use of some time so that the 
emissivity coefficient is higher than that of a well maintained condition. In addition, extreme 
cold weather conditions may take place occasionally. Table 8 shows the parameters of the 
pipeline, insulation and weather conditions for the calculation of heat losses. 
 
Pipeline Insulation Air 
Thermal conductivity Thermal conductivity Emissivity 
 
T Wind speed 
15 w/m·K 0.25 w/m·K 0.31 -50oC 6.0 m/s 
Stainless Steel AISI 
304L [Assael et al., 
2003] 
Ceramic fiber blanket wrapped by heavily 
oxidized aluminum foil [Desjarlais et al., 
2002; Engineeringtoolbox, 2010] 
Ontario, Canada 
[Ontario Government 
Data, 2010] 
Table 8. Parameters of pipeline, insulation and weather conditions for heat loss estimate 
Figure 4 shows the estimated heat losses for the heat transport loads of 200 - 700MWth. It can 
be found that the heat loss can be controlled to below 2 MWth/km if the insulation thickness 
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Fig. 4. Heat losses of pipeline for the heat transport loads of 200 - 700MWth  
is larger than 1.0m. This suggests the key importance of the pipeline insulation. If 
considering both the pipeline diameter (e.g. 1.0m) and insulation thickness (1.0m), the total 
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diameter would be about 3.0m, which creates a barrier for animals and human activities if 
the pipeline is constructed on the ground surface. To bury the pipeline underground is 
another option. An underground pipeline will increase construction and maintenance costs. 
Assume the cost of insulation is much lower than the pipeline so that the insulation 
thickness can be constructed larger than 1.0 m. Then the heat loss of 2.0 MWth/km can be 
considered as a typical value for the transport. When the heat load is higher, the heat loss 
percentage is lower. When the pipeline length is 10 km, then the heat loss is 20 MWth. If the 
heat load is 500 MWth (about 150 tonnes H2/day), the two-way heat loss is then about 12.5%. 
However, Fig. 4 also shows the limit of heat loss reduction by insulation: to increase the 
insulation thickness does not always have a significant heat loss reduction effect when the 
thickness is larger than 1.5m. Considering the heat loss through pumps and other 
components such as valves and expansion joints, the heat loss for a two-way transport 
pipeline design is assumed below 20% when the transport distance from a nuclear reactor to 
a hydrogen plant is within 10 km. The analysis shown in Table 6 of the former section is 
based on this value. 
4. Layout options for the integration of nuclear and hydrogen production 
plants 
When a nuclear reactor is coupled with a hydrogen production plant, the layouts for the 
heat and fluid flows are important for safety and economics. The layout options depend 
strongly on the reactor types. Since the indirect or reheat cycle nuclear reactors have a 
secondary coolant or circulation that can provide heat to the heating fluid of a hydrogen 
plant through an intermediate heat exchanger, the integration of a hydrogen production 
plant with an indirect or reheat cycle nuclear reactor may provide safer and more flexible 
layout options. Therefore, the focus of this section will examine the direct cycle nuclear 
reactors, which are represented by SCWR in this chapter.  
Figure 5 shows the arrangement of a supercritical water-cooled nuclear reactor (SCWR) and 
a hydrogen cogeneration plant with the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle. The values of 
temperatures and pressures of the flowchart were calculated according to the water stream 
enthalpy change and expansion ratio that were reported in the past [Yamaji et al., 2005; 
Naidin et al., 2009]. The streamlines for the supercritical water are based on existing fossil 
fuel power plants that use a supercritical water turbine after changing the fossil fuel 
combustion chamber and supercritical water tank to SCWR [Yamaji et al., 2005; Naidin et al., 
2009; Buongiorno et al., 2002]. The water stream circulation passing the lines A-B-C-D-E and 
A-B-F-E in Figure 5 has the typical features of a no-reheat system that uses a preheater and 
two types of turbines, i.e., high pressure (HP) and low pressure (LP) turbines. From the 
temperatures shown in Figure 5, it can be found that point A, i.e., the location downstream 
of the nuclear reactor but upstream of the turbines, can provide around 100 oC of a driving 
temperature difference for step IV of the Cu-Cl cycle that requires 530 oC. At this location, a 
bypass line of the supercritical water stream passing points A and N can be designed for 
heat extraction from supercritical water to the Cu-Cl cycle. An intermediate heat exchanger 
can be arranged on the line A-N-B to provide heat to helium that is used to heat the 
hydrogen cycle through the circulation of H-I-J-K-L. For step III of the Cu-Cl cycle, the 
temperature requirement is 375 oC. The heat for this step can be supplied by the helium 
stream exiting step IV that still has a temperature higher than 530oC at point I. The helium 
stream exiting step III at point J still has a temperature higher than 375oC, so it can be used 
for step II. Since step I of the Cu-Cl cycle needs electricity for electrolysis, the electricity can 
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be conducted from the generator to the Cu-Cl cycle, as shown by the line passing points O 
and M.. 
As to the water stream for the power generation, there could be a number of preheaters, or 
the water stream circulation could be designed as a multiple reheat cycle. The details of 
these layouts will not be discussed in this chapter since these designs can provide multiple 
options for the heat extraction bypass lines and the water stream circulation layout. Also, a 
single reheat cycle layout, including its steam turbines and generator, is most widely 
employed in current BWR and PWR technologies that can be applied to SCWR so as to 
reduce the design complexity. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Layout options for the integration of SCWR and Cu-Cl cycle (coolant passing through 
high pressure and low pressure turbines in series) 
5. Modulation of nuclear energy output and hydrogen cogeneration scale 
The demand on power varies hourly, daily, monthly and seasonally on the power grid. 
Figure 6 shows an actual power load profile on the power grid of a day (January 18, 2010) in 
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Ontario, Canada [IESO, 2010]. It can be found that the power demand varies significantly at 
different hours. The gap between peak and off-peak hours can even reach 70% of the base 
power load. Since the power grid comprises various energy sources such as nuclear, fossil 
fuels, hydro, solar and wind, the modulation of the power output from these sources is very  
 
 
Fig. 6. Typical power load profile of a day in Ontario, Canada (January 18, 2010). 
important. This means some power plants cannot operate at a constant power output. The 
selection of energy sources to be adjusted upward to meet the peak power demand will 
influence the amount of greenhouse gas emissions. To increase the nuclear power output for 
the peak hour demand can reduce the greenhouse gas emissions, so there are some 
countries employing and developing nuclear modulation technologies to adjust the power 
output. The modulation technologies include the adjustment of control rod insertion depth, 
the velocity of circulation steam, new types of grey rods, or a combination thereof [WNA , 
2011; Gilbert et al., 2004]. However, the adjustment of nuclear power output may directly 
influence the operation of the nuclear reactor and introduce more safety issues than a 
constant power output, so most countries use other energy sources such as fossil fuel and 
hydroelectric power to follow the power demand on the grid. The percentage of nuclear 
power in the base load in Figure 6 is maximized to lower the portions of other energy 
sources. However, the base load varies monthly and seasonally, so the nuclear power plant 
can rarely operate at its full design capacity of power generation, except if the nuclear 
portion in the base load is small.  
Using nuclear energy (either in the form of electricity or heat) to produce hydrogen at off-peak 
hours and surplus generation capacity is a promising option. As shown in Figure 7, both the 
heat and electricity outputs are controlled to be constant. The electricity delivered to the power 
grid can follow the power load profile on the grid (either fully or partly), and the rest of the 
electricity goes to conventional water electrolysis. This option has no requirement of 
modulating the heat and electricity output of the nuclear reactor, but the hydrogen production 
facilities must be able to accommodate the modulation of production rate.  
Figure 8 shows another option that has no requirement of modulating the heat but must 
modulate the electricity generator to accommodate varying heat input, and at the same time 
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to modulate the hydrogen production rate. In both options, the total heat output from a 
nuclear reactor is constant, so it is anticipated to be safer than the measure of varying heat 
output. In comparison, option 1 is safer and more simple in principle, but the hydrogen 
production efficiency with water electrolysis is lower than with thermochemical cycles in 
option 2, which may influence the hydrogen production scale and economics. 
 
 
Fig. 7. No modulation of both nuclear heat and electricity with water electrolysis 
 
 
Fig. 8. No modulation of nuclear heat with thermochemical cycles 
Table 9 shows the hydrogen production rate at different hours of a day. The values are 
calculated on the basis of the design capacity of 1,000 MWe for a Generation IV single 
supercritical water-cooled nuclear reactor (SCWR). The SCWR operates at its maximum 
capacity with cogeneration of hydrogen. The available heat for hydrogen production is the 
difference between the design capacity of the SCWR and the power generated that is 
following the power demand profile of the power grid shown in Figure 6. The heat supplied 
to the Cu-Cl cycle from SCWR for the thermochemical Cu-Cl cycle is assumed to have a loss 
of 20% within 10 km, as discussed in the former section. The data in Table 5 is used to 
determine the heat requirements of the Cu-Cl cycle. The overall efficiencies of water 
electrolysis and the Cu-Cl cycle are assumed to be 30% and 45% respectively, which 
suggests a smaller efficiency gap than shown in Table 2 so as to have a conservative 
estimate. It can be found that a single SCWR at off-peak hours and surplus design capacity 
can produce at least 100 tonnes of hydrogen each day. This production rate is equivalent to 
the production capacity of an industrial plant with steam methane reforming, which is the 
major technology employed today.  
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Time 
 
hour 
Generated power and 
design capacity, MWe 
Available heat for H2 
production, MWth 
H2 production rate 
Tonnes/day 
% of full 
design 
capacity 
Generated 
power 
 
Unused 
power 
capacity
Unused heat 
quantity(a) 
Water 
electrolysis 
Cu-Cl 
cycle 
1-5am 53% 530 470 1044 265 318 
5-6am 56% 560 440 844 248 298 
6-7am 62% 620 380 978 215 257 
7-8m 66% 660 340 756 192 230 
8-9am 70% 700 304 676 172 206 
9am-16pm 74% 740 260 578 147 176 
16-17pm 75% 750 250 556 141 169 
17-18pm 78% 780 220 489 124 149 
18-19pm 80% 800 200 444 113 136 
19-20pm 78% 780 220 489 124 149 
20-21pm 74% 740 260 578 147 176 
21-22pm 66% 660 340 756 192 230 
22-23pm 60% 600 400 889 226 271 
23pm-1am 54% 540 460 1022 260 312 
(a) The thermal efficiency of power generation is assumed to be 45% for SCWRs [Kirillov, 
2008, Yamaji, 2005; Naidin, 2009; Buongiorno, 2002]. 
Table 9. Hydrogen production scale and quantity with nuclear energy at various hours  
6. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the usage of nuclear energy for the cogeneration of electricity and 
hydrogen with water splitting technologies, so as to improve the economics of power plants 
and at the same time reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The hydrogen economy is discussed 
and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by use of nuclear generated hydrogen as a 
substitute of fossil fuels is quantified. The thermal efficiencies and economics of various 
hydrogen production methods with nuclear energy are examined. The methods include 
thermochemical water splitting cycles, conventional electrolysis, and high temperature 
electrolysis. Among these methods, thermochemical cycles have the most promisingly high 
efficiency and economics. It is found that the relatively high temperature requirements of 
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numerous thermochemical cycles are the common threshold of utilizing nuclear heat to 
produce hydrogen. The copper-chlorine (Cu-Cl) cycle has a minimum temperature 
requirement (about 530oC) that can be met by most Generation IV nuclear reactors. The 
temperature of a nuclear reactor should not only meet the threshold, but it should also 
match the heat distribution of the thermochemical cycle. Also, the nuclear reactor 
temperature must be high enough to offset the heat losses in the heat transport pipeline. The 
future studies of thermochemical hydrogen production can be conducted toward lowering 
the temperature requirements. An intermediate heat exchanger is suggested between the 
nuclear reactor and thermochemical cycle so as to minimize the mutual influence between 
the plants and improve the safety and operating flexibility.  
Various heat transfer fluids for the heat exchange and transport pipeline were compared and 
evaluated. Considering the heat transport complexity in the pipeline and the importance of 
being chemically inert, phase change fluids and thermal oils are not suggested. Pressurized 
helium is a promising option for serving as the long distance heat transport fluid in the 
pipeline. A challenge of the heat transport in a pipeline is the pressure boosting requirement to 
overcome the considerable pressure losses if the pipeline diameter is smaller than one meter or 
the heat transport load is too large. Another challenge is the large diameter of the pipeline and 
thermal insulation. In order to control the two-way heat loss below 20%, the diameter must be 
larger than 3 meters (thermal insulation inclusive), which is a challenge for either 
underground or surface transport. The overall layout options for the integration of nuclear 
reactors and hydrogen production plants are also discussed, including the distant heat 
transport from nuclear reactors to a hydrogen production plant. Direct cycle nuclear reactors 
are discussed in more detail due to less flexibility than indirect cycle reactors.  
The modulations of nuclear energy output and hydrogen cogeneration rates are also 
discussed in this chapter. The energy output modes of nuclear reactors include constant and 
variable output. Similarly, the hydrogen production scales also have two modes that are 
determined by the modulated heat availability of the nuclear reactors. It is concluded that a 
constant total heat output can be approached if the hydrogen is produced from 
thermochemical cycles. A constant total electricity output can also be approached with 
conventional water electrolysis. The constant energy output (either in the form of heat or 
electricity) from a nuclear reactor can provide a load following pattern that can meet the 
power load profile on the grid, so as to reduce the usage of fossil fuels for peak hours. The 
thermal energy of a single Generation IV nuclear reactor at off-peak hours and surplus 
design capacity are sufficient to power an industrial hydrogen plant with a  thermochemical 
cycle or water electrolysis.  
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1. Introduction  
In the last few years, significant developments in membrane science and the vision of 
process intensification by multifunctional reactors have stimulated the academic and 
industrial research focused on membrane reactor application to chemical processes (Mendes 
et al., 2010, Dittmeyer et al., 2001, Basile et al., 2005a, De Falco et al., 2007). From these 
works, the increase of the reactants conversion above the equilibrium values appears to be 
possible when a reaction products at least is removed through the membrane. As stated in 
the following, the integration of selective membrane in a chemical process can be twofold: 
 directly inside the reaction environment (Integrated Membrane Reactor – IMR); 
 after the reaction step (Reaction and Membrane Module – RMM). 
In this chapter a methane steam reforming (MSR) RMM pre-industrial plant, designed and 
tested to investigate at an industrial scale level the plant performance, is presented.  
A major benefit of the proposed RMM configuration is the shift of steam reforming reactions 
chemical equilibrium by removing the hydrogen produced at high temperature, thanks to 
the integration of highly selective Pd-based membranes and enhancing the final product 
yield. By this way, the process can operate at a temperature as low as 600-650°C in 
comparison to 850-880°C needed in conventional plants, and enable the use of low 
temperature heat source as helium heated in a nuclear reactor. 
This chapter reports, firstly, membrane reactor concept, selective membrane typologies and 
integration strategies; then it discusses the experimental data gathered over 1000 hours of 
testing on an industrial pilot unit in terms of feed conversion at different operating 
parameters and elaborates such data in order to optimize the overall architecture, defining 
the maximum achievable feed conversion under different scenario of heat integration. 
Finally, a membrane reactor perspectives analysis, mainly focused on integration with 
nuclear reactors for steam reforming reactor heat duty supplying, is reported in order to 
understand which technical and economical targets have to be reached in the next future for 
a commercial diffusion. 
The plant discussed in this chapter, placed in Chieti Scalo (Italy), is characterized by a H2 
design capacity of 20 Nm3/h and it operates with three Pd and Pd/Ag based membranes for 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 
 
468 
hydrogen separation. It was developed in the framework of the Italian FISR Project “Pure 
hydrogen from natural gas reforming up to total conversion obtained by integrating chemical 
reaction and membrane separation”, which grouped Italian universities, and the engineering 
society Tecnimont KT (TKT), cooperating in the development of each critical point of this 
innovative technology, such as membrane manufacture and assembling and catalyst 
optimization, resulting in the plant design and operation finally carried out by TKT. This 
installation, the first of this type and size, makes it possible to completely understand the 
potential of selective membrane application in industrial high-temperature chemical processes. 
2. Membrane reactor concept and benefits  
A membrane reactor (MR) is a system coupling reaction and separation of one or more 
products, with the separation operation performed by a selective membrane. Although not 
yet very used at industrial scale, MRs are attracting the attention of scientists and engineers 
in the last two decades and many interesting papers have appeared in the literature on their 
performance and possible applications in many fields of chemical and biochemical 
industries. An excellent review about these topics has appeared in 2002 by Sanchez Marcano 
& Tsotsis (Sanchez Marcano & Tsotsis, 2002). Moreover, the Italian company Tecnimont-KT 
has developed and fabricated a membrane reactor methane steam reforming pre-industrial 
prototype with a pure hydrogen production capacity of 20 Nm3/h (De Falco et al., 2011a) 
and described in paragraph 3. 
MR concept is based on the removal of a reaction product in order to avoid the reaction 
equilibrium conditions to be achieved and promoting reaction kinetics.  
Most of industrial chemical reactions are reversible reactions, thermodynamically limited 
since equilibrium conditions cannot be overcome in the reacting mixture. From a 
thermodynamic point of view, equilibrium is represented by a constraint, i.e. equilibrium 
constant, on mole concentrations, temperature and pressure, derived from the second 
principle of thermodynamics. When equilibrium conditions are achieved, no net change in 
state variables is observed.  
From a kinetics point of view it means that at equilibrium the reaction rate of the direct 
reaction is equal to the reaction rate of the inverse reaction. Taking as reference an 
elementary reversible reaction: 
 A ↔ B (1) 
the kinetics scheme is characterized by a direct reaction rate (A → B) and an inverse reaction 
rate (B → A). Initially, if only component A is fed to the reactor, the direct reaction is 
promoted. Then, as the concentration of component B  increases, the inverse reaction is 
supported as far as the direct reaction and inverse reaction rates assumes a similar value 
(equilibrium conditions) and reaction stops. 
Integrating a selective membrane into the reaction environment allows to remove the 
reaction product (B), avoiding the increase of inverse reaction and promoting the direct 
reaction kinetics. By this way, two main benefits are reached: 
 removing one or more reaction products as they are generated allows to obtain 
conversions higher than equilibrium values; 
 if the membrane is very selective with regard to a specific product, it is possible to 
support reaction and product separation in one single compact device, obtaining a very 
pure compound. 
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In this paragraph, the two main MR configurations are described and compared; then 
properties of selective membranes, suitable to be integrated in industrial chemical processes, 
are reported. 
2.1 MR configurations 
A selective membrane can be integrated in a chemical process by two different 
configurations: 
 when the selective membrane is integrated directly in the reaction environment and the 
reaction product is removed as it is produced, the system is called Integrated 
Membrane Reactor (IMR); 
 if the selective membrane is placed outside the reactor, in a proper unit located 
downstream, the system is called Staged Membrane Reactor (SMR) or Reactor and 
Membrane Module (RMM). 
2.1.1 Integrated membrane reactor  
An Integrated Membrane Reactor (IMR) is a compact device in which a selective membrane 
is directly assembled inside the reaction environment. The simplest configuration is 
composed by two concentric tubes, where catalyst pellets are packed in annular zone (Fig. 1) 
or in the inner tube (Fig.2), which is the membrane itself. Therefore, the reactor is composed 
by two zones: 
 the reaction zone, where the catalyst is packed; 
 the permeation zone, where the product permeated through the selective membrane is 
collected and carried out by a sweeping gas fed co-currently or counter-currently. 
The membrane integration can be made also assembling many smaller tubes, so thus 
increasing the specific membrane surface on reactor volume and consequently the global 
permeated hydrogen flow.  
 
 
Fig. 1. IMR with catalyst packed in the annular zone. 
2.1.2 Reactor and membrane module 
The RMM configuration is composed by steps of reaction followed by steps of products 
separation through selective membranes. Fig. 3 shows a two reaction-separation modules 
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process layout: taking as reference the reaction (1), the reactant A is fed to the first reaction 
step where it is partially converted in the product B; then, the mixture A+B is sent to the 
separation module where component B is partially separated and recovered. The A-rich 
mixture is then fed to the second reaction step where the direct reaction is further promoted 
and the B produced is separated again in the second membrane module. 
 
 
Fig. 2. IMR with catalyst packed in the inner tube. 
 
 
Fig. 3  RMM configuration. 
2.1.3 MR configurations comparison 
Both MR configurations assure crucial benefits in respect to the traditional technology. In 
order to compare the traditional technology and the membrane based one, we take as an 
example the methane steam reforming, which is the most applied process for industrial 
production of hydrogen. The conventional steam methane reforming system is composed of 
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a steam reformer, a shift converter and a hydrogen purifier based on the pressure swing 
adsorption (PSA). 
The reactions that occur during this process are the following (2-4): 
CH4 + H2O = CO + 3H2 Methane steam reforming  H0298K= +206 kJ/mol  (2) 
CO + H2O = CO2 + H2 Water gas shift   H0298K= -41 kJ/mol  (3) 
CH4 + 2H2O = CO2 + 4H2 Overall reaction   H0298K= +165 kJ/mol  (4) 
Steam reforming process is highly endothermic and equilibrium limited. To sustain global 
endothermic reaction and achieve high feed conversion, it is necessary to burn a part of 
methane feedstock in furnaces and operate at high temperature (800-850°C). This implies a 
reduced process global efficiency, increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and a 
stronger dependence of hydrogen cost on the natural gas cost. Thus, on these bases the 
integration of a hydrogen selective membrane would allow: 
 a strong reduction of the reaction temperature to about 450-650°C, since a high 
temperature is not required to reach natural gas conversion to hydrogen > 90%. The 
lower operating temperature leads to: a higher efficiency of the heat transfer from the 
external source to the reactor; a lower exergy of the heating fluid in comparison with 
the high temperature combustion gas used in the furnace, which means a lower heating 
cost; the possibility to use different heating fluids, depending on their availability; the 
possibility to fabricate tubular reactor by cheaper alloy steels. 
 Process efficiency increase. The global process efficiency increases from the 65-80% of 
the traditional technology up to 85% and more for all the plant sizes.  
 Combustion fuel saving. Reduction of reaction temperature leads to the reduction of 
process heat duty. The heat flux from the external source to the catalytic bed should be 
30-40 kW/m2 instead of 80 kW/m2 about of the traditional process (Dybkjaer, 1995).  
To make a comparison between IMR and RMM configurations (De Falco et al., 2011b), it is a 
worth assessment that: 
 at the same operating conditions, IMR leads to better performance, since an integrated 
membrane reactor is equivalent to an infinite series of reactor + separator modules. 
 On the other hand, in the RMM configuration, reaction and separation operating 
conditions can be optimized separately. In some cases it could be a crucial benefit. For 
example, in a methane reforming process, dense supported membranes (as Pd-based 
membranes on ceramics or Porous Stainless Steel) are assembled to selectively remove 
the hydrogen produced by the reactions. These membranes have to respect a stringent 
temperature threshold (T < 500°C) in order to guarantee a proper selective layer – 
support adherence. But a too low temperature limits the endothermic reaction 
thermodynamic conversion and the reaction rates. If an IMR is applied, a compromise 
solution has to be found, while in a RMM process the operating conditions of reaction 
and separation units can be imposed separately.  
At the actual selective membrane state-of-the-art, RMM seems to be the leading architecture 
for membrane safety, for the multi-optimization potentiality and for its maintenance 
easiness. Surely, a future improvement of membrane performance, mainly for operating 
stability, would promote the applications of IMRs. 
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2.2 Selective membranes properties 
Figure 4 shows a general classification of membranes, based on their nature, separation 
regime and geometry. 
The classification based on the membrane nature distinguishes them into biological and 
synthetic ones, differing completely for functionality and structure. 
Biological membranes are easy to be fabricated but they present many drawbacks such as 
limited operating temperature (below 100 °C) and pH range, problems related to the clean-
up and susceptibility to microbial attack due to their natural origin (Xia et al., 2003). 
Synthetic membranes can be subdivided into organic (polymeric) and inorganic (ceramic, 
metallic). Polymeric membranes operate between 100 - 300 °C, inorganic membranes above 
200 °C. Surely, for industrial chemical process, the inorganic membranes are the most 
interesting.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Scheme of a general classification of the membranes (De Falco, 2011b). 
Concerning with separation mechanism, there are three mechanisms depending on specific 
properties of the components (Mulder, 1996): 
 separation based on molecules/membrane surface interactions (e.g. multi-layer 
diffusion) and/or difference between the average pore diameter and the average free 
path of fluid molecules (e.g. Knudsen mechanism); 
 separation based on the difference of diffusivity and solubility of substances in the 
membrane: solution/diffusion mechanism; 
 separation due to the difference in charge of the species to be separated: electrochemical 
effect. 
In the following paragraphs, a pre-industrial application of selective membrane is described: 
the membrane applied is a Pd-alloy based supported membrane (dense inorganic 
membrane) for the separation of the hydrogen produced in a methane steam reformer. The 
Pd-based membranes are characterized by much high hydrogen selectivity and follow a 
solution/diffusion mechanism, composed by the following steps (Fig. 5): 
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 dissociation of molecular hydrogen at the gas/metal interface; 
 adsorption of the atomic hydrogen on membrane surface; 
 dissolution of atomic hydrogen into the palladium matrix; 
 diffusion of atomic hydrogen through the membrane; 
 re-combination of atomic hydrogen to form hydrogen molecules at the gas/metal 
interface; 
 desorption of hydrogen molecules. 
 
Low pressure
Pd based membrane
High pressure feed 
gas 
 
Fig. 5. Mechanism of permeation of hydrogen through metal membranes: 1) dissociation, 2) 
adsorption, 3) ionization, 4) diffusion, 5) recombination, 6) desorption (De Falco, 2011b). 
When the pressure is relatively low, the diffusion is assumed to be the rate-limiting step and 
the permeation flux is described by Sieverts-Fick’s law (5): 
 J
H2,Sieverts-Fick
 = Pe
H2
 /δ · (p0.5
H2,ret 
 p0.5
H2,perm
)  (5) 
where δ is the membrane thickness, p
H2,ret 
and p
H2,perm
 are the hydrogen partial pressure in 
the retentate and permeate respectively, PeH2 is the membrane permeability calculated by 
Arrhenius law thus defined (6): 
 Pe
H2
= Pe0
H2
 exp (-Ea/RT) (6) 
where Pe0 is the pre-exponential factor, Ea the apparent activation energy, R the universal 
gas constant and T the absolute temperature.  
Although a strong effort has been devoted to Pd-based membrane development by research 
and industrial institutions during these years, these membranes have not yet reached a 
commercial stage due to some technical issues as long term permeance and selectivity 
stability, but also to the cost related to their manufacture. In the following paragraphs, the 
pre-industrial plant fabricated by Tecnimont-KT in Italy is described and experimental tests 
results are reported. Then, the concept of coupling membrane reactors to nuclear reactors is 
analyzed from a technical and an economic point of view. 
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3. Reformer and membrane modules (RMM) plant  
3.1 Plant description 
As reported above, a pre-industrial natural gas steam reforming RMM plant has been 
developed by Tecnimont-KT in Chieti Scalo. The plant process scheme is reported in Figure 
6a together with a bird-eye view (Figure 6b) of the constructed industrial test plant which 
covers an area of 1000 m2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Process scheme (a) and bird-eye view (b) of the industrial test plant 
The plant is composed by two-step reformers and two membrane modules working 
respectively in the temperature range 550-650°C and 400-450°C. 
Natural gas is supplied from battery limits or from cylinders at 20 barg. A portion of natural 
gas is fed through a flow controller to the desulphurisation reactor (DS) for sulphur 
compounds removal to content lower than 0.1 ppm. The residual is used as fuel gas, 
reduced at 0.3 barg. The desulphurised feed is mixed with steam, produced separately by a 
real hot oil boiler, preheated in the convection section and fed to the first reforming stage. 
More specifically, each reformer module is composed by two main sections: (i) a radiant 
tube, charged with the catalyst and (ii) a convection section, where heat is recovered from 
the flue gases, having a temperature higher than 800°C, for preheating and superheating 
feed and steam. 
The design of the radiant chamber differs from the conventional one for the heated length of 
the reformer tube which is around 3 meter, the tube metallurgy and the contained catalyst. 
In particular, it must be observed that, owing to the lower operating temperature relevant to 
the use of this innovative architecture, a low cost stainless steel instead of exotic and quite 
expensive material as HP25/35 chromium/ nickel alloy was employed. 
The reformed gas product from the first reformer is cooled down at the temperature chosen 
for membrane module operation and enters the first separation module. A retentate, 
recycled to the second reformer stage and a mixture of H2 plus sweeping steam, are 
produced. The second reformer stage is cooled down from 650°C to the temperature chosen 
for membrane operation and routed to the second separation module. H2 from both 
modules are mixed together and sent to final cooling and condensate separation. Retentate 
from the second stage is sent to the flare. The pressure of both shell and permeate sides are 
controlled using a back pressure regulators. Both membrane modules are protected using a 
pressure relief regulator installed on the income lines. All the vent points are connected to 
main vent system and routed to the flare. Heat of reaction in both reforming steps is 
provided by two independent hot gas generators in order to set the reforming temperatures 
as required by the tests. 
(a) (b) 
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The main parameters such as the temperatures and pressures before and after each reformer 
and separation step as well as the pressure drop along the catalytic tube were monitored 
respectively with K-type thermocouples and differential pressure sensors. A constant flow 
of the exhaust stream is sent through a cold trap maintained at fixed temperature (0°C) to 
NDIR analyzers (Uras 14, ABB) for real-time CH4, CO, CO2 measurements, while the 
concentration of H2 was performed with a thermoconductivity analyser (Caldos 17, ABB). 
Three different membrane separators, Pd and Pd/Ag based, able to work at high 
temperatures (480°C for ECN and Japanese membranes, 500°C for MRT), were planned for 
installation on the prototypal plant. Their main features are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Developer Substrate/support Membrane selective layer 
Thickness selective layer, 
m Geometry 
ECN Al2O3 Pd 3-9 Tubular 
MRT SS Pd/Ag 25 Planar 
Japanese Al2O3 Pd/Ag 2-3 Tubular 
Table 1. Main characteristics of the employed membranes (De Falco et al., 2011a) 
Figure 7 show the installed membrane modules. The relevant permeation surfaces (A) are 
also reported. 
 
 
Fig. 7. ECN (a), MRT (b) and Japanese (c) membranes 
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Another innovation of this work is represented by the catalyst employed for the catalytic 
activity tests. Typically, methane steam reforming catalysts for industrial production of 
hydrogen and synthesis gas are based on pellets shaped nickel/nickel oxide or cobalt 
compositions on refractory alumina or supports such as magnesium alumina spinel, often 
promoted with alkali or alkali-earth compounds to accelerate carbon removal (Faur 
Ghenciu, 2002). However, also noble metals based catalysts are often employed. 
Furthermore, the consideration that in the steam reforming process, the kinetics, and 
therefore the throughput, is limited by the rate at which the heat generated in external 
burners can be transferred to the catalytic bed where the endothermic reforming reactions 
take place, led for this plant to the choice of open cells foam structured catalysts, whose 
particular irregular network may greatly contribute to an intensification of heat and mass 
transfer along the catalytic bed in both axial and, more important, radial directions. In 
particular, the catalytic activity tests performed at the University of Salerno in collaboration 
with TKT in the framework of the above mentioned FISR project, on a pre-pilot scale 
autothermal reforming reactor showed how such structured supports, in particular when 
fabricated with high thermal conductivity materials, may contribute to an enhancement of 
heat transfer along the catalytic bed resulting in a flattening thermal profile (Palo, 2007; 
Ciambelli et al., 2007).  More specifically, the catalyst loaded in the industrial steam reformer 
in Chieti Scalo was characterized by a commercial formulation Rh-Pt based (SR10, BASF) 
deposited on high thermal conductivity SiC open cells foams. Each cylindrical shaped 
element was 150 mm long with a diameter of 60 mm and twenty-one elements were loaded 
in each reformer. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Structured steam reforming catalyst 
The catalytic activity tests were carried out in the following operating conditions: 
3.8<(H2O/CH4)w <4.8, 550°C<Treformer<680°C, P=10 barg, 4,300 h-1<GHSV<6,900 h-1 where 
the GHSV value is defined as the ratio between the total gaseous flow rate fed to the reactor 
(referred to 0°C and 1 atm) and the total catalytic bed volume. For membrane 
characterization in terms of hydrogen flux and permeability, the following syngas 
composition was employed (Table 2). 
 
H2, vol% CH4, vol% CO2, vol% CO, vol% H2O, vol% 
24-30 6-9 6-9 1-2 54-59 
Table 2. Typical syngas composition used for membranes characterization (De Falco et al., 
2011a) 
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3.2 Plant performance 
The first preliminary catalytic activity tests without membrane integration were performed 
aiming to evaluate the effect of the main parameters, i.e. reformer outlet temperature, steam 
to carbon feed ratio and gas hourly space velocity, on CH4 conversion. The obtained results 
are reported in Figure 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Effect of reformer outlet temperature (a) and steam to carbon ratio (b) on CH4 
conversion and residual CH4 
It can be observed a decrease in the residual methane at the reactor outlet and a 
corresponding increase in methane conversion at increasing both the reformer outlet 
temperature (from 32% at 550°C to 64% at 680°C) and the steam to carbon feed ratio (from 
39% at S/C=3.8 to 44.8% at S/C=4.8). A detrimental effect was on the contrary noticed upon 
changing the GHSV value in the range 4,300-6,900 h-1 since a decrease in methane 
conversion from 48.7% to 46.5% was observed (De Falco et al., 2011a, De Falco et al., 2011b). 
However, in time on stream tests performed over 1000 h, any catalyst deactivation occurred, 
as evidenced by stable methane conversion over the entire test period (De Falco et al., 
2011a).  
Membrane integration resulted in an enhanced overall plant performance. A comparison of 
methane conversion obtained in the absence or in the presence of membranes for hydrogen 
separation is reported in Figure 10 as a function of GHSV values. The results are collected 
(a)
(b)
GHSV=5150 h-1
(H2O/CH4)w=4.8 
GHSV=5150 h-1
T=620°C 
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over 200 h of operation at 10 barg, at a reformer outlet temperature ranging between 610-
620°C and at a steam to carbon ratio of 4.8 (De Falco et al., 2011a). 
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Fig. 10. Effect of hydrogen removal on plant performance at changing the gas hourly space 
velocity  
All these catalytic activity tests enabled for a membranes permeability characterization. In 
particular, by assuming the Arrhenius law for the dependence of permeability from 
temperature and the Sievert-Fick’s law for hydrogen flux expression (Ockwig and Nenoff, 
2007), the following results were obtained for the tested three membranes (Table 3, De Falco 
et al., 2011a): 
 
Membrane Pre-exponential factor, kmol/(m h kPa0.5) 
Activation energy, 
kJ/mol 
Permeability at 450°C, 
kmol/(m h kPa0.5) 
ECN 1.72 x 10-1 77.0 4.67 x 10-7 
MRT 5.75 x 10-4 35.3 1.61 x 10-6 
Japanese 9.31 x 10-2 80.4 1.44 x 10-7 
Table 3. Permeability membranes characterisation results (De Falco et al., 2011a) 
Furthermore, starting from permeability expression above reported, for ECN membrane 
several parametric studies were performed, enabling to predict the overall CH4 conversion 
with both: (i) a larger membrane surface (De Falco et al., accepted for publication) and (ii) a 
higher membrane thickness as parameters. In both cases, the experimental operating 
conditions were the following: Pref=10 barg, (H2O/CH4)w =4.8, Pperm=0.4 barg, Tmem=430°C. 
The CH4 conversion evaluation was carried out by commercial process flow modeling (PRO 
II) integrated with a subroutine to simulate membrane behaviour. 
The first case was more specifically developed by assuming in the calculations the same 
permeance of 30 Nm3/m2 h bar0.5 obtained at 430°C. The CH4 conversion was found to be 
enhanced with an increase in the reforming temperature and membrane area. In particular, 
the membrane area can be increased to achieve the same conversion at lower reformer 
temperature (methane conversion of 60% can be achieved at 603°C with A=1.2m2, at 623°C 
with A=0.4m2). Methane conversion increases more slowly when the membrane area 
Reformer and Membrane Modules 
(RMM) for Methane Conversion Powered by a Nuclear Reactor 
 
479 
exceeds 0.8m2. By comparing such data with those obtained in the absence of membrane, it 
was possible to evaluate the conversion increase with such open architecture. At 620°C such 
increase ranges from 11 to 19 point percent respectively, with a membrane surface of 0.4m2 
and 0.8m2. 
In the second case, the membrane permeance was extrapolated at different selective layer 
thicknesses ranging between 2.5 and 100 micron. The results are reported in Figure 11, as 
well as those obtained from literature review. 
Obviously, the thickness of the separation layer greatly affects the membrane permeance 
which resulted lowered from 2.12 x 10-4 to 5.3 x 10-6 at 350°C and from 7.85 x 10-3 to 1.96 x 10-
4 at 550°C by increasing the thickness of the separation layer from 2.5 to 100 micron. The 
obtained results pointed out on the continuous industrial efforts aiming to develop 
composite membrane made of a very thin Pd layer. It is worth nothing that reducing the 
selective layer thickness allows membrane cost to be decreased (decreasing the Pd thickness 
by a factor two reduces the total Pd cost by a factor four) and increasing the hydrogen flux, 
which is in inverse proportion with the film thickness. On the other side, a too high decrease 
in the selective film thickness may result in an excessive embrittlement of the membrane 
which becomes too mechanically fragile for the condition of high temperature catalytic 
processes.   
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Fig. 11. Effect of membrane thickness on ECN membrane permeance 
In terms of CH4 conversion, the influence of the selective layer thickness is reported in 
Figure 12, even at lower value than those reported in Figure 11. 
At each operating temperature investigated, the decrease of membrane thickness resulted in 
higher methane conversion. In particular, at 630°C, a reduction of membrane thickness from 
2.5 micron to 0.5 micron may enhance methane conversion of 10% due to the higher 
hydrogen removal. It is interesting to note that thickness thinner than 0.5 micron have no 
more significant effect on the overall performance. Such a thickness could be considered as 
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the technological limit to be overcome. Globally it is possible to reach CH4 conversion 
higher than 90% with a permeated H2 flux of 300 Nm3/m2 h bar0.5.  
The achievement of this goal shows the industrial feasibility of this option up to now 
demonstrated only on a laboratory scale, even if the last gap to be overcome for the 
technology commercialization is represented by the optimization of membrane preparation 
procedure with enhancement of their stability. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Effect of membrane thickness on CH4 conversion with ECN membrane 
3.3 Application to nuclear power  
In order to sustain the global endothermic steam reforming reaction, a part of the methane 
feedstock must be burned in a fired heater. To reduce this consumption, purge gas coming 
from PSA unit or retentate from the membrane separation unit have to be burned. The 
calorific value of these streams is a function of composition and consequently of the 
achieved conversion. A self-balance of heat exits with a fixed external natural gas supply, at 
an appropriate level of feed conversion. Therefore, conversion should not exceed the point 
closing the heat balance (around 60%). 
Furthermore, it must be considered that owing to the high process temperature, the thermal 
efficiency of this process is about 65 to 75%. Also, a substantial amount of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) is emitted as CO2 produced along with hydrogen. Moreover, carbon dioxide is also 
emitted during the burning of a part of methane feedstock in order to sustain the global 
endothermic balance of the steam reforming reaction. In total, a typical steam reforming 
process emits up to 8.5 – 12 kg CO2 per 1 kg H2. To prevent the emitted CO2 to be released 
into the atmosphere, it needs to be captured. Presently, all commercial CO2 capture plants 
use processes based on chemical absorption with amine solvents as monoethanolamine 
(MEA) or (methyldiethanolamine) MDEA, which is a considerably energy intensive step 
and thus is unfavourable to the overall process energy efficiency. 
Therefore, a higher methane conversion is required to reduce the carbon dioxide emission 
per unit of hydrogen produced. This could be achieved by using heat from an external 
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source such as a high temperature nuclear reactor. Replacing the burning of natural gas by 
nuclear heat allows avoiding, at least partially, all the CO2 production related to fuel 
burning (De Falco et al. accepted for publication, Iaquaniello and Salladini, 2011). 
High temperature helium-cooled reactors are the best understood nuclear technology that 
can supply high temperature heat for thermal processes for producing hydrogen. Nuclear 
reactor designers became interested in high-temperature helium-cooled reactors more than 
40 years ago because of the new possibility for heating the helium at the reactor exit up to 
1000°C and the enhanced safety of the reactor (Mitenkov et al., 2004).  
The synergistic production of hydrogen using fossil fuels and nuclear energy is considered 
to be extremely advantageous, especially when performed through a recirculation-type 
membrane reformer (Hori et al., 2005).  
In particular, even assuming an idealistic case, in which all the heat generated by 
combustion of hydrocarbon is used for the heat of endothermic reaction of steam reforming 
as well as a portion of the heat released by exothermic water gas shift reaction, the 
consumption of methane for the nuclear-heated steam reforming reaction is 17% less of that 
of the conventional steam reforming reaction for producing the same amount of hydrogen. 
In the actual case of conventional steam reforming as the heat utilization and the reaction 
yield are limited, the efficiency of the process will be around 80%, that is 2.7 mol of 
hydrogen produced from 1 mol of methane feed. In the case of nuclear-heated recirculation-
type membrane reformer, as no methane is consumed for combustion and the yield of 
hydrogen is nearly stoichiometric, the nuclear-heated SMR reaction will produce 4 mol of 
hydrogen from 1 mol of methane. Therefore, this process scheme will save about 30% 
natural gas consumption, or reduce 30% carbon dioxide emission, comparing with 
traditional process (Hori et al., 2005). Furthermore, typical merits of this process are: (i) 
nuclear heat supply at medium temperature around 550°C, (ii) compact plant size and 
membrane area for hydrogen production, (iii) efficient conversion of a feed fossil fuel, (iv) 
appreciable reduction of carbon dioxide emission, (v) high purity hydrogen without any 
additional process and (vi) ease of separating carbon dioxide for future sequestration 
requirements. 
Figure 13 reports a plant configuration of hydrogen and pressurized CO2 production 
coupled with a nuclear reactor cooled by He.  
Natural gas is compressed, heated and mixed with hydrogen recycle before entering the 
hydro desulphurizer reactor (HDS). The desulphurised feed is mixed with steam, preheated 
in the convective section CC-01 and fed to the first reforming step (R-01). The reformed gas 
reaction mixture at 600-650°C is cooled down to a proper temperature for membrane 
separation, i.e. 450-470°C, before entering the first separation module. Sweeping steam is 
sent to the permeate side of the membrane to reduce the hydrogen partial pressure with a 
consequent improvement of hydrogen permeation. The permeate side stream, composed of 
hydrogen and sweeping steam, is sent to the cooling and water condensing section. The 
retentate from the first membrane module is sent to the second reforming rector (R-02) for 
further methane conversion.  
A part of the final retentate is recycled to the post combustion chamber. The hydrogen 
permeated is separated from water stream by condensation and routed to a compression 
section and to a PSA unit where final purification is carried out. A portion of the H2 
produced is recycled to the feed where it is needed to keep the catalyst in the first part of the 
reformer in an active state. 
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Fig. 13. Process scheme of hydrogen and pressurised CO2 production coupled with a nuclear 
reactor cooled by He 
Thermal fluid used to transfer thermal energy from the nuclear cycle to reforming reactors is 
CO2 circulating within a closed loop. CO2 is firstly heated up by the heat exchange medium 
of a nuclear plant in an intermediate heat exchanger. Its temperature is further increased in 
the post-combustion chamber where all the purge gas from the PSA unit together with a 
portion of retentate are burned to achieve a correct temperature. Thus, the thermal fluid is a 
pressurized mixture of only CO2 and H2O due to the use of pure oxygen in post combustion. 
After heat recovery, thermal fluid is cooled down to separate water from CO2. The latter is 
recycled back to the nuclear reactor while a portion, corresponding to that produced in post 
combustion, is removed from the closed loop. Water, produced in post combustion, can be 
recycled to the process. This kind of separation is much simpler and less energy intensive 
than a traditional physical absorption process with amine solutions. Moreover, providing 
the reformer duty through pressurized carbon dioxide instead of, e.g., air allows to achieve 
a higher heat transfer coefficient due to the higher heat capacity and gas emissivity. 
By applying the proposed scheme, hydrogen and pressurized carbon dioxide are produced 
with a nuclear heat source and with a reduced carbon dioxide emission. In this way, the 
major portion of the heat required for the steam reforming reaction is not provided by the 
combustion of fresh hydrocarbons but is supplied from a separate unit without carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
The scheme presented in Figure 13 realises a feed conversion of 90% with a carbon dioxide 
production equal to 6 kgCO2/kgH2 corresponding to 0.55 kgCO2/Nm3H2. From the energy 
point of view, using a RMM architecture allows to produce hydrogen with a higher overall 
energy efficiency. The reduced reforming temperature achievable only by membrane 
application, allows performing the exothermic water gas shift reaction simultaneously with 
the endothermic steam reforming reaction reducing in this way the net heat duty. The 
proposed scheme achieves a hydrogen production with an overall energy efficiency of more 
than 85%. Such a scheme could be also considered a first step in producing ammonia and 
urea by reacting ammonia with CO2 recovered (Figure 14). 
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Fig. 14. Process scheme for urea production coupling a membrane steam reformer with a 
nuclear reactor 
4. Economic analysis 
An economic analysis was performed at first focusing attention on membrane production 
costs, further the analysis was extended to the coupled process scheme proposed in the 
previous section.   
In order to tackle this issue and to be able to forecast a production cost for thin Pd-based 
membranes, it is important to introduce the concept of ‘‘economics of learning’’ in 
understanding the behaviour of all added costs of membranes as cumulative production 
volume increased. Such economics of learning or law of the experience may be expressed 
more precisely in an algebraic form (7): 
 cn = c1n-a (7) 
where c1 is the cost of the unit production (square meter of membrane for instance), cn is the 
cost of the nth unit of production, n is the cumulative volume of production, and a is the 
elasticity of cost with regard to output. 
Graphically, the experience curve is characterized by a progressively declining gradient, 
which, when translated into logarithms, is linear. The size of experience effect is measured 
by the proportion by which costs are reduced with subsequent doublings of aggregate 
production. 
Constructing an experience curve is a simple matter once the data are available. Of course 
for the Pd-based or ceramic membrane such dates are limited to minimal surface (less than 1 
m2), which can, however, be used as starting point of the curve. The other issue associated 
with drawing an experience curve is that cost and production data must be related to a 
‘‘standard product’’, which is not the case due to the fact that in the membrane technology 
no standard is yet emerged and there is a lot of discussion on the membrane composition 
and preparation method, supporting matrix and other mechanical and construction details. 
It is, however, a fact that costs decline systematically with increases in cumulative output. 
The assumptions made in the following are that c1=50,000 € and a=0.25, where c1 value 
derived by Tecnimont-KT recent experience in building a pilot unit, meanwhile the ‘‘a’’ 
factor was assumed as average value typically between 20 and 30%.  
Using such a data is possible to forecast the cost for m2 of membrane module versus the 
cumulative value of production, expressed in terms of m2. Table 4 shows such data. 
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Cumulated production m2 € cost per m2 
1,000 8,900 
10,000 5,000 
100,000 2,800 
1,000,000 1,600 
10,000,000 900 
Table 4. Cost per m2 of membrane module versus cumulated production  
From the drawn experience curve, some implications for the membranes market business 
strategy can be extracted. The first and more important question to answer is when a 
1,000,000 m2 of membrane module cumulative production could be reached in order to have 
a unit cost around 1.600 € per m2 of membrane. 
In order to answer such a question, further considerations need to be developed, to relate 
surface to membrane module to the H2 production and to the introduction of such a new 
technology in the market. 
On previous published data, Iaquaniello et al. (2008) were calculating for a open membrane 
reactor architecture a surface of 1,000 m2 for an installed capacity of 10,000 Nm3/h of 
hydrogen. The envisaged installed capacity in the hydrogen market is today around 1 MM 
Nm3/h of capacity per year, which translated into a production of 100,000 m2 of membrane 
year, once the new technology will supersede the conventional one. 
To derive the rate of membranes technology introduction in the market a Volterra equation 
was considered (8): 
 x = A/(1+e(Bx))+ C (8) 
where A, B, C are constants and x is the cumulative production. 
Such equation, also called ‘‘S logistic curve’’ is used to describe a process with a low growth 
which accelerate with time to seem an exponential growth. A 10-year period (2012–2022) is 
considered to achieve 50% substitution in the conventional market starting from 2012, which 
roughly implies that over the next decade half a million of square meters of membranes 
modules could be produced. With such cumulative production around year 2020, the 
membrane cost per m2 could reach the target of 1.600 € per m2 and the overall market will 
have a size of 1 billion of € per year. 
Figure 14 represents the cumulative production coupled to the ‘‘S’’ curve. 
The approach used to determine the growth of the membranes market, together with the 
cumulative production does not, however, identify the real factors that determine its 
dynamics. As matter of fact, the experience curve combines four sources of costs reduction: 
learning, economics of scale, process innovation, and improved production design. 
Economics of scale, conventionally associated with manufacturing operations, is probably 
the most important of these costs drivers and exists wherever as the scale of production 
increases unit costs fall. A plant capacity has then an economic sense if a minimum 
efficiency plant capacity is reached.  
This will imply that to reach the required reduction in the membrane cost, not only a few 
specialized technologies must emerge, but the production market will be concentrated in 
few highly specialized production plants. 
Regarding the proposed process scheme coupling a membrane based steam reformer with a 
nuclear reactor, a preliminary investigation was carried out under the basic assumption that 
the cost of electric power from nuclear source is 0.03€/kWh (Romanello et al., 2006). Thus, in 
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order to produce 1000 kWhe the total costs amount is 30€. Considering an efficiency equal to 
around 34%, so that 3000 kWhth (or 2580000 kcal) should be produced to obtain our power 
target, this will translate into a cost of 12€/MMkcal against more than 30€ for heat produced 
from natural gas. The variable costs of producing H2 are then reduced of more than 20% 
without considering the beneficial effects of reduced CO2 emissions in the atmosphere.  
 
 
Fig. 15. Cumulative production coupled to the “S” curve 
Compared to the thermochemical processes, hydrogen production by nuclear-heated steam 
reforming of natural gas is considered to be much closer to commercialization and is viewed 
as an intermediate step to nuclear-driven hydrogen production from water. 
Alternatively such process could be modified to produce urea without any additional CO2 
emissions.  
5. Conclusions and future perspectives  
Membrane reforming with recirculation of reaction products in closed loop configuration is 
a particularly promising nuclear application, even if one of the last gap to be overcome for 
the technology commercialization of membrane reformers is represented by the 
optimization of membrane preparation procedure with enhancement of their stability. 
Because the nuclear heat is needed at below 600°C, it employs a compact membrane and 
reformer, and gives efficient conversion of the hydrocarbon feed and high-purity hydrogen 
without additional processing. With all these benefits, the synergistic blending of fossil fuels 
and nuclear energy to produce hydrogen, ammonia and urea, can be an effective solution 
for the world until large-scale thermochemical water splitting processes, which may benefits 
from economy of scale, are available. For both the fossil fuels industry and the nuclear 
industry, this approach offers a viable symbiotic strategy with the minimum of impact on 
resources, the environment and the economy.  
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Hydrogen Output from Catalyzed 
Radiolysis of Water 
Alexandru Cecal and Doina Humelnicu 
“Al.I. Cuza” University, Department of Chemistry, Iasi,  
Romania 
1. Introduction 
Energy is the source of the vitality of industrial civilization and a necessary condition to 
save the world from poverty. 
Current methods of generating energy for the industrial civilization undermine local, 
regional, global environmental conditions, and are based mainly on the processing of fossil 
resources. 
Nowadays, the dawn of a new renewable energy revolution is occurring. It is the use of 
hydrogen instead of using oil and its derivatives. The stakes are global. The fight against the 
greenhouse effect requires finding a solution for the production of green energy.  
The relatively new method of producing electricity is based on conversion, in fuel cells, of 
heat and energy of certain chemical substances, in electricity. 
Since fuel cells convert fuel directly in electricity two to three times more efficiently than the 
thermodynamic conversion, the fuel cell is, by definition, a very efficient technology and, 
being a potential source of high energy still, clean and, compatible with renewable energy 
policy, reliable and sustainable over time (does not contain moving parts).  
Hydrogen is the key to the future of energy having the highest energy content per unit 
weight of all known fossil. When burned in an engine, hydrogen produces zero issues; when 
the power source in a fuel cell, clean waters it is the only residue at 250-300 ºC (International 
Atomic Energy Agency, [IAEA], 1999; Ohta&Veziroglu, 2006; Veziroglu, 2000). Combined 
with other technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, renewable energies, fusion 
energy, it is possible that the fuel cell will generate in future energies without harmful 
programs. Hydrogen is the only energy carrier making it possible to drive an aircraft using 
solar energy. 
At the beginning of the XXIst century it is assumed that fuel cells will become a pervasive 
technology; hydrogen as fuel is becoming increasingly presented as the "solution", also by 
carmakers, ecologists, and governments who do not want to impose unpopular measures to 
limit car traffic. 
The use of hydrogen will extend from cell phones to electric power plants. 
Implementing the "hydrogen economy" will lead to changes not seen in the XIX century and 
early XX century when the world went through the experience of the last energy revolution. 
Environmentalists argue that there is no alternative to a hydrogen based energy system 
because the reserves of exploitable oil and natural gas, indispensable resource materials not 
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only in energy industry, but also in petrochemicals (holds might miss today plastics), will be 
completely exhausted in less than a century.  
T. N. Veziroglu summarizes some properties that recommend the use of hydrogen as energy 
carrier produced from unconventional technologies, because hydrogen is a concentrate 
(energy) sources of primary energy, presented to the consumer in a convenient form, having 
a relatively cheap production cost as a result of technological refinements. Moreover 
hydrogen has a high efficiency of converting in various forms of energy and represents an 
inexhaustible source, considering that it is obtained from water, and by use it becomes 
water. 
Hydrogen production and consumption is a closed cycle, that maintains constant power 
production – water, and represent a classic cycle of raw material recycling – it is the easiest 
and cleanest fuel. Burning hydrogen is almost without polluting emissions, excepting NOx, 
which can also be removed by proper adjustment of combustion conditions. It has a 
gravimetric "energy density" higher than any other fuel.  
Hydrogen can be stored in several ways: gas at normal pressure or high pressure, as liquid 
or solid form of hydrides and can be transported long distances in any one of the above 
mentioned forms. 
Assessing the effects of global economic shift to energetic system based on hydrogen it can 
be established that environmental pollution through energy production will not be a 
problem and hydrogen economy will lead to industrial transformations comparable to those 
produced in the microelectronics industry; 
Moreover economic resources, financial, intellectual, intended for energy today and 
environmental and ecological problems, will be geared towards solving, for the good of 
mankind, other productive tasks. Life will get better. The literature state that the idea of a 
"hydrogen economy" would have been born and developed under the impact of oil shock, 
using hydrogen as fuel being presented as the last cry of modernity. In fact, however, using 
hydrogen as a "universal fuel" devoid of pollutant emissions appeared long before the oil 
shock in 1973. 
The literature state that the idea of a "hydrogen economy" would have been born and 
developed under the impact of oil shock, using hydrogen as fuel being presented as the last 
cry of modernity. In fact, however, using hydrogen as a "universal fuel" devoid of pollutant 
emissions appeared long before the oil shock in 1973. 
2. Hydrogen production using the heat resulted in nuclear reactors after 
splitting the U-235 or Pu-239 nuclei 
A series of tests are known to produce hydrogen by water splitting by making calls to the 
thermochemical cycles (hybrid) initiated by heat inside the reactor cores from fission of U-
235, Pu-239, etc. (Besenbuch et al. 2000; Rahier et al., 2000; Tashimo et al., 2003, Verfondern, 
2007) 
An outline of such a plant for water decomposition through cycles of thermochemical 
reactions initiated by heat from inside a nuclear reactor is presented below: 
To this end it used a series of thermochemical cycles or hybrid cycles that have been 
developed in different types of specialized research institutes or companies with business in 
areas of nuclear energy: General Atomics (USA) JAEA, Julich JRC, NRC -Ispra and other 
units from France, China, South Korea, Russia etc. 
Hydrogen Output by Means of Catalysed 
Radiolysis of Water Using as Irradiation Source the Spent Nuclear Fuel Elements 
 
491 
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            gas
Water spliting
Steam turbine Electric generator
H2 output  
a. Sulfur-iodine cycle is shown by the sequence of reactions that occur at different 
temperatures: 
(9I2)l + (SO2)g + (16H2O)l  120 C  (2HI + 10H2O + 8I2)l + (H2SO4 + 4H2O)l 
 (2HI + 10H2O + 8I2)l 230 C  (2HI)g + (10H2O + 8I2)l 
 (2HI)g 330 C H2 + (I2)g 
 (H2SO4 + 4H2O)l 330 C  (H2SO4)l + (4H2O)l 
 (H2SO4)l 360 C  (H2SO4)g 
 (H2SO4)g 400 C (SO3)g + (H2O)g 
 (SO3)g 870 C (SO2)g +1/2O2 
At first, through the Bunsen reaction, there result two-phase nemiscible acids: HI and 
H2SO4. 
These oxides, under the influence of high temperature, will decompose releasing hydrogen 
(and oxygen), and I2 and SO2, which will restore (as reactants) the Bunsen reaction. 
b. Westinghouse cycle takes place through two reactions, due to sulfuric acid: 
 (H2SO4)g 850 C (SO2)g + (H2O)l + 1/2O2 
 (SO2)g + (2H2O)l 100 C (H2SO4)l + H2 
The second reaction takes place in an electrolytic cell at low temperature when there result 
hydrogen and sulfuric acid in the aqueous phase at a potential of 0.17 V and at a pressure of 
about 1 MPa. Then the cycle is repeated with gaseous H2SO4. 
c. UT-3 cycle, developed in Japan, is represented by the following reactions: 
CaBr2 + H2O 750 C  CaO + 2HBr 
CaO + Br2 600 C  CaBr2 + 1/2O2 
Fe3O4 + 8HBr 300 C  3FeBr2 + 4H2O + Br2  
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3FeBr2 + 4H2O 600 C Fe3O4 + 6HBr + H2 
on the account of salts or metal oxides in solid form, as "spherical pellets”. Due to the CaBr2 
high melting point, the efficiency of the hydrogen production process is of only 40%. 
(H2SO4)g 700 1000 C  (H2O)g + (SO3)g 
(SO3)g 700 1000 C (SO2)g + 1/2O2 
(SO2)g + (Br2)l +(2H2O)l 100 C (2HBr)g + (H2SO4)l 
(2HBr)l 200 C H2 + Br2 
d. The Mark-13 or the cycle of H2SO4 - Br2, is described by the following chemical 
transformations: 
(H2SO4)g 700 1000 C  (H2O)g + (SO3)g 
(SO3)g 700 1000 C (SO2)g + 1/2O2 
(SO2)g + (Br2)l +(2H2O)l 100 C (2HBr)g + (H2SO4)l 
(2HBr)l 200 C H2 + Br2 
Here hydrogen is released by decomposing electrolytic HBr, with an efficiency of 37 %. 
e.  Metal-metal oxide cycle developed at PSI, Switzerland, schematically as follows: 
MmOn → MmOn-x + x/2O2 
MmOn-x + xH2O → MmOn + xH2 
If water splitting occurs at 650 ºC, the reduction of the metal oxide is at a temperature of 
2000 ° C. The research was done on the system: Fe3O4/FeO; Mn3O4/MnO, ZnO / Zn; 
Co2O3/CoO or MFe2O4, where M = Cu, Ni, Co, Mg, Zn. 
f. Thermochemical cycle methane- methanol - iodomethane was tested in South Korea and can 
be played as follows: 
CH4 + H2O    CO + 3H2 
CO + 2H2  CH3OH 
2CH3OH + I2   2CH3I + H2O + 1/2O2 
2CH3I + H2O   CH3OH + CH4 + I2 
Transformations occur at 150 °C and a pressure of 1.2 MPa. 
There are also known other hydrogen production processes based on thermochemical 
cycles, such as another one, HHLT and others. 
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g. High-temperature electrolysis. Hydrogen can be produced by electrolysis of water vapor 
at 750-950 ° C, by the reactions: 
K(-):  2H2O + 4e- → 2H2 + 2O2- 
 A(+):  2O2- → O2 + 4e- 
3. Radiolytic split of water molecules in several experimental conditions 
In this sense, it know a number of studies respecting the hydrogen obtaining by catalyzed 
decomposition of water under the influence of nuclear radiation emitted by some sources, 
including fission products recovered from spent nuclear fuel.  
Thus, Maeda and co-workers have studied obtaining of molecular hydrogen by irradiation 
with γ radiations of silicagels and metal oxides dispersed in water. 
They found that a higher radiolytic yield was obtained in the silicagels case with pore 
diameter of about 2 nm, and the most active area against water decomposition under the 
action of γ radiation was the SiO2 dried at 100 ºC (Maeda et al., 2005). 
Yamamoto and collab. have used in their investigations nanoparticles of TiO2 and α- and β- 
Al2O3 noting that the radiolytic yield of molecular hydrogen production when irradiated 
with γ  radiation of aqueous solutions with  α- and β- Al2O3 is 7-8 times higher than water 
irradiation without catalyst (Yamamoto et al., 1999) 
Jung and collab. studied the effect of adding EDTA on the reaction of water radiolysis 
containing TiO2 and noted that the presence of this organic compound increased the 
radiolytic  yield of molecular hydrogen (Jung et al.,2003). 
Rotureau and collab. studied the obtaining molecular hydrogen from water radiolysis in 
presence of SiO2 and of mesoporous molecular sieves obtaining a value of radiolytic yield of 
molecular hydrogen H2G = 3 (Rotureau et al. 2006).  
Recently, Kazimi and Yildiz studied the obtaining of hydrogen through alternative 
nuclear energy, including radioactive wastes that result from nuclear plants (Yildiz & 
Kazimi, 2006).  
Brewer and colleagues have used complex supramolecular of ruthenium and rhodium in the 
study of water decomposition under the action of radiant energy (Brewer & Elvington, 
2006).  
Masaki and Nakashima  studied the gamma-irradiation of Y zeolites both in form Na (NaY) 
and form H (HY). Discussions on obtaining H and H2 were based on comparing values H2G  
and GH  between systems NaY- and HY-water. They obtained higher values of radiolyitc yield 
of H2 due to energy transfer from zeolite to absorbed water (Nakashima & Masaki, 1996). 
The G(H2) values of HY system were 3 times higher than those of system NaY.  
Seino and co-workers observed that the nanoparticles of TiO2 and Al2O3 dispersed in water 
would lead to a significant increase of radiolytic yields of hydrogen to radiolytic yield of 
pure water. They also noted that radiolytic yield of hydrogen depends on gamma radiation 
dose absorbed and metal oxide particle size (Seino et al., 2001; Seino et al., 2001). 
Yoshida and collab. proposed to get hydrogen by gamma irradiation of water in the 
presence of Al2O3 particles of different diameters. The maximum amount of hydrogen 
produced was 3.48 µmol/cm3 for water containing Al2O3 particles with diameter of 3 µm, 
value three times higher than the one obtained for the systems with pure water (Yoshida et 
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al., 2007). Hydrogen produced from catalyzed reactions of water radiolysis was determined 
by gas chromatography.  
Cecal and others (intended to obtain hydrogen through water radiolysis in the presence of 
solid catalysts, in different experimental conditions, under the action of gamma rays emitted 
by a source of Co60. The produced hydrogen was determined by a device specially adapted 
for mass spectrometer (Cecal et al., 2001; Cecal et al., 2003; Cecal et al., 2004). This study may 
be accomplished using as irradiation γ source so called spent nuclear fuel elements extracted 
from nuclear plants as high level radioactive wastes, instead of the β-γ Co-60 or Cs-137 
radionuclides. 
4. Irradiation characteristics 
Qualitative and quantitative effects of phenomena suffered by substances after interaction 
with ionizing radiation are determined by the characteristics of the irradiation process.  
Irradiation process is characterized by the following quantities (Arnikor, 1987; Ferradini & 
Pucheault, 1983): 
- radiation intensity, 
- absorbed dose, 
- absorbed dose rate, 
- dose equivalent, 
- linear energy transfer radiation (LET). 
Radiation intensity: This feature expresses the amount of energy emitted by source, and 
expressed in J/s.  
Absorbed dose, denoted Da, represents the amount of energy transferred by incident radiation 
to unit mass of matter, energy absorbed by matter, respectively. In I.S absorbed dose is 
expressed as Gray (Gy): 
1 Gy = 1 J/kg = 6, 24·1013 eVg-1. 
Absorbed dose rate represents the energy received by the unit of mass per unit time. It is 
usually expressed in Gy/s, but there are also used kGy/h, Mgy/h, as well as rad/s, 
rad/min, rad/day if necessary.  
Equivalent dose represents the radiation effect on the organism. Even at the same absorbed 
dose biological effects on living organisms may be different. This differential action is 
quantified by introducing a quality factor of incident radiation. As unit of measurement in 
I.S. there is used Sievert (Sv), which is defined as equivalent dose to the body (tissue) 
exposed to radiations with quality factor equal with unit when absorbed dose is 1 Gy. 
1 Sv = ν x 1 Gy,  where: 
ν – coefficient which depends on radiation quality, for X or γ,  ν= 1.  
Linear energy transfer radiation (LET) 
As a result of interaction with matter, electromagnetic radiations continuously lose energy, 
photon beam intensity gradually decreasing as they penetrate matter. The phenomenon is 
called linear energy transfer noted LET, and it is expressed quantitatively by the radiation 
energy loss per unit length, LET = -dE/dx, with the unit keV/μm. 
Linear energy transfer should increase as the particle slows down towards the end of the 
journey so that much of the ionization and excitation produced by fast electrons is produced 
on the path of gamma radiation, where  linear energy transfer value is much higher than 
average. 
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With the linear energy transfer there can be characterized, by a number the „quality” of a 
radiation, not always describing the type of radiation and its energy. 
5. Water radiolysis 
5.1 General considerations 
A permanent presence of water and ionizing radiation in nature, show the appearance of 
water radiolysis on Earth and outside it. Laboratory experiments and computer simulations 
of the processes induced by radiolysis relate to radioactive action of 40 K in the ocean 3800 
Ma (1 Ma= 1 000 000 years ago) and natural radiation from the groundwater nuclear reactor 
of the Earth in its infancy.  
Radiation-induced decomposition of water molecules, water radiolysis, is carefully studied 
for several authors, as Debiern, Marie Sklodowska Curie, O. Fricke, J. Franck, J. Weiss, Hart, 
Boag using different experimental conditions.  
5.2 Mechanism of water radiolysis 
As a result of water radiolysis with a beam of high-energy radiation as γ radiation or an 
accelerated electron beam, it occurs excitation and ionization of water molecules, 
phenomenon that leads to the formation of various ion species, radicals and new 
molecules – radical theory of water radiolysis (Belloni &Mostafavi, 2001; Kiefer, 1989; 
Majer, 1982). 
According radicals’ theory, radiolysis of water flows in three distinct phases: 
a. Physical stage 
A few pico-seconds after irradiation it is discovered the occurrence of excited molecules, 
H2O* and ionized H2O+ as of secondary electrons with high kinetic energy: 
  H2O  e ,
  H2O*  (1.1) 
 H2O *  →  H2O+   (1.2) 
Secondary electrons, Compton or photoelectric are fast slowed down and thermalised, after 
which they are promptly captured by water molecules, hydrating themselves, (eaq-). 
Highlighting the hydrated electron is of great importance in the development of radiation 
chemistry. Electron hydration corresponds to the stabilization phase through dipole of 
solvent molecules: 
 e-  + H2O   →  eaq-  (1.3) 
 e-   + H2O →  H. + OH- (1.4) 
At physico-chemical stage, which takes about 10-13 s, absorbed energy is redistributed through 
interactions with other stable or excited molecules and ions by splitting olyatomic molecules 
or through ion-molecule reactions. 
It is noticeable that ion-molecule reactions do not necessarily imply ionized molecule 
movement; interactions can take place in liquid and at a distance of order of several 
interatomic distances: 
 H2O*  → H.  +  .OH (1.5) 
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 H2O+  +  H2O →  H3O+ + OH (1.6) 
Ionized molecule can be neutralized by an electron: 
 H3O+ + e-  → H3O (1.7) 
which quickly dissociates: 
 H3O  →  H2O  + H. (1.8) 
 H3O  → e- +  H3O+ (1.9) 
Formed radicals can combine with each other, forming molecules:     
   H.  +  H. → H2  (1.10) 
 .OH +  .OH → H2O2 (1.11) 
 .OH  +  H. → H2O. (1.12) 
Chemical stage, which takes about 10-10 s is the phase in which there occur reactions between 
species formed in previous steps: recombination between radicals, ions, molecules and free 
electrons: 
 .OH + H2  →  H2O + H. reaction that inhibits radiolytic decomposition water  (1.13) 
 H.  + H2O2  → H2O + OH.  (1.14) 
 e-  + H2O2 → .OH  + HO-  (1.15) 
 HO2. + H.   → H2O2 (1.16) 
reaction which allows to explain the increase concentration of H2O2. 
Molecular oxygen is produced through the following reactions: 
 OH + H2O2  → HO2. +  H2O (1.17) 
 HO2. + HO2.  → H2O2 +  O2 (1.18) 
In the presence of dissolved molecular oxygen reaction takes place: 
 O2  +  H. →  HO2. (1.19) 
Hydrated electron eaq- has both properties: 
 - reducing: e-  +  H2O → H + HO- (1.20) 
 - and basic: e- +  H+ → H. (1.21) 
Therefore, a few nano-seconds after irradiation, in water there are present the following 
species ionics,  radicalics and molecules: 
H3O+, HO-, H., .OH, HO2., H2, O2, H2O2, of which the following are stable: H2, H2O2, H3O+, 
and short-lived free radicals eaq-, H., .OH, HO2.. 
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5.3 Physical and chemical properties of primary species formed in water radiolysis 
The properties of some primary species formed in water radiolysis are presented in Table 1. 
 
Property e-aq H. .OH 
Absorption maximum(nm) 720 <200 225 
ε, molar extinction coefficient, (L/mol.cm) 19.000 (720nm) 
1620 
(188nm) 
240 
(240nm) 
Diffusion coefficient (cm2s-1x105) 4.9 8 2.3 
Mobility (cm2V-1s-1x103) 1.98 - - 
ΔH ionization, kJ/mol - 9.6 11.9 
Electrons affinity (eV)  0.776 1.83 
Table 1. Properties of some primary products of water radiolysis.  
1. The hydrated electron e-aq, is present in system a few milliseconds in the most favorable 
case. The hydrated electron is considered as a chemical species with a very high 
reactivity being a very strong reductant; it attaches immediately to radicals molecules 
or to meet ions. The formed new product containing an extra electron is generally 
unstable and dissociates forming new radicals or ions in an unstable valence state. 
Except  s block metals other metal, cations are reduced as following: 
 Mn+aq   +   e-aq    → M n-1aq (1.22) 
Anions F-, Cl-, Br-, I-, CN-, OH-, SCN-, with complete electronic layers and oxoanions (SO4)2-, 
(PO4)3-, (ClO4)-,  (CO3)2- do not react with the hydrated electron. 
Organic molecules, aliphatic hydrides, alcohols, ethers and amines practically do not react 
with e-aq, while aliphatic carbonyl compounds such as aldehydes and ketones present a high 
reactivity.  
Redox potential of water has high value Eo (nH2O/ e-aq) = -2. 87 V and it is not annihilated 
by any other species present in the system except the hydrated electron (e-aq) within 
dismutation processes. 
 e-aq   +   e-aq   → H2    +   2HO- (1.23) 
2.  Hydrogen atom, H 
The hydrogen atom or atomic hydrogen is a strong reductant, almost as vigorously as the 
hydrated electron, with the standard potential Eo (H3O+/H.)= -2.3V, at pH=0. 
It can uproot hydrogen from a C-H link from an organic compound to form H2. It may also 
be a supplement to a double link. 
Radical HO·  
Radical HO· is a strong oxidant, extremely energetic with standard potential E0(HO.H2O) = -
2.76 V; it is a species considered very dangerous for living cells in radiobiology. Oxidant 
properties of radical HO· depend on the pH of the medium. It is considered that at pH > 9, 
the radical is completely dissociated: 
 HO.    H+  + O- (1.24) 
Radicals ·OH may participate in reactions with various components of the system:     
 HO. +   H+  +  e-aq    H2O (1.25) 
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 HO. +  H2   H.  +  H2O (1.26) 
 CO +  HO.   CO2  +  H (1.27) 
Radical HO· reacts with organic compounds as it follows: 
- extracting a hydrogen atom; 
- can addition to a double bond; 
- oxidizes primary alcohols to aldehydes in aqueous solutions; 
- oxidizes aldehydes to acids, acids from peroxoacids etc. 
In favorable conditions it can strip an electron from one molecule to form a cation. 
4. Radical HO2. 
HO2 radicals are obtained by the reaction of HO. With H2O2 in general on the radiation 
trajectory or, possibly, in mass solution, if there are  no HO. Radical traps and, of course, 
with a considerable concentration of H2O2. In accordance with this, the yield of these 
radicals would be higher in the case of low specific ionization radiation. Indeed, it was 
found that when water radiolysis with α radiation of 210Po, radiochemical yield of HO2. 
radicals is 0.23, while at the   radiolysis GHO2=0.02. Also, HO2. radicals are obtained  from 
radiolysis of aqueous solutions containing O2, according to the reaction: 
 H.  +  O2 → HO2 (1.28) 
The presence of these radicals in aqueous solutions was highlighted both by indirect 
methods and direct methods. Indirectly, there was studied the variation of the conductivity 
of irradiated water containing O2, in which case it has been detected  the presence of some 
intermediate products with a lifetime in excess of 0.1 s and was attributed to O2- -ions 
radical, which could come from HO2.. HO2. radicals were revealed by direct methods using 
pulse radiolysis of water containing O2 . 
Due to the complexity of the phenomenon taking place in a watery liquid system when it 
interacts with γ radiations this methodology was used for many purposes. This way, a new 
practical method for obtaining the most diverse products appeared, known as radiolytic 
method. 
Within the research required in this paper, the radiolytic method is used to obtain hydrogen 
in the presence of different catalysts, using high-activity nuclear radiation about 5 x 104 Ci, 
emitted by spent nuclear fuel or 60Co sources, process studied by other researchers, too. 
5.4 Radiolytic yield 
Radiolytic yield concept was introduced in order to quantify the effect of radiation, i.e. in order to 
calculate the amount of products formed depending on the dose of radiation absorbed.  
There can be distinguished: 
- Ionic-yield, g, also called ion pair yield, which is the ratio between the number of 
equivalents turned, the number of molecules that interact and the number of the formed 
ions. 
- Radiolytic yield, G is the number of molecules (M) transformed by an energy equivalent 
to 100 eV absorbed 
 MG =
100eV
 (1) 
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This definition does not conform to International System units. 
A new definition expresses G yield, as expressed in mol·J-1, equivalent to 
9.65 x 106 molecules  100 eV, so that the defined value can be converted in I.S. units through 
multiplication with the 0.36 x 10-7 factor. 
To determine the yield of radiolysis products there are considered the maximum yields of 
radiolytic decomposition of water in which: 
- Wa – the average ionization potential of water in the gas phase (30eV); 
- Ia – minimum ionization potential of water (12.56 eV) 
- Ea – the minimum excitation potential of water molecules (6.5 eV) 
100 eV absorbed will form 100 / Wa water molecules ionized.  
Formation of an ion consumes excitation energy equal to (Wa-Ia) eV, so, for 100 Wa ions, at 
absorption of 100eV there results an excitation energy of 100 Wa (Wa-Ia) eV. 
In this way, due to excitation, there will be radiolysed 100(Wa-Ia) Wa Ea = water molecules. 
 
100(W - Ia W - I100 a) 100 a aG = + = 1 +a W W I W Ea a a a a
   
molecules/100eV (2) 
Ga max = 12 molecules100eV. 
In liquid phase Ga max is approximately two times smaller. 
In neutral aqueous solutions deaerated and irradiated with gamma radiation from a 60Co 
source, the primary yield for radicals and molecules, in molJ and atoms100eV is shown in 
Table 2. 
On the other hand, (Majer, 1982) radiolytic yield depends not only on the concentration (Cx) 
of the transformed reactant or on the reaction product occurred, but also on the irradiation 
time (t) with nuclear radiations having a rate dose (D): 
 
C NxG = 100x D t
   (3) 
N – Avogadro’s number. Product D·t = Da is dose of absorbed energy, expressed in eV·L-
1·mol-1. Radiolytic yield for different species stable or unstable: H·, HO·, HO2·, H2O2, H2, etc. 
is determined from the slope obtaining by plotting the previous relation (3) in coordinates 
Cx = f (Da). 
The concentrations of chemical species encountered by primary irradiation (H· and HO·) or 
subsequent reactions (HO2·, H2O2, H2..) can be determined by physico-chemical methods 
such as: electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR), the pulse radiolysis, spectrophotometry etc. 
or from measurements of luminescence or radical capture. 
Henglein proposed a similar formula to determine the radiolytic yield (Heinglein et al., 
1969): 
 
C N 100 C 8x xG = = 9.66 10x 13 D gD g 1000 6.24 10 aa
       ,  mol·J
-1 (4) 
Given the sequence of chemical reactions initiated by nuclear radiation: 
 H2O+ + H2O- → 2H2O* → 2H·+ 2HO· (1.29) 
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 H2O → H2O* → H·+ HO· (1.30) 
 H·+ H· → H2 (1.31) 
 HO· + HO· → H2O + O (1.32) 
 HO· + HO· → HO2· + H· (1.33) 
 HO· + HO· → H2O2 (1.34) 
 H2O2 + HO· → H2O + HO2 ·(1.35) 
 H· + O2 → HO2· (1.36) 
It appears that the formation of a single pair of radicals H· and HO· (reaction 1.30) 
decomposes with a single molecule of water. For the appearance of molecular hydrogen (the 
stable product of radiolysis – reaction 1.31) two molecules of water will decompose, while 
producing a molecule of hydrogen peroxide (as a stable product) needed also two molecules 
of water (reaction 1.34).  
The balance equation becomes: 
            2 2G =G +2G =G +2G +3GH× HO×-H O H H O HO ×2 2 2  (5) 
 
Type of  γ 
radiation, 
0.1-10MeV 
Linear 
energy 
transfer,
keV/μm
 2HG  
μmol/J 
 2 2H OG
μmol/J 
 aqeG  
μmol/J 
 HG  
μmol/J 
 HOG  
μmol/J 
 2HOG  
μmol/J 
pH=3-11 0.20 0.047 0.073 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.0027 
pH=0.46 0.20 0.041 0.081 0 0.378 0.301 0.0008 
   2HG  
at/100eV
 2 2H OG at
/100eV 
 aqeG  
at/100eV
 HG  
at/100eV
 HOG  
at/100eV 
 2HOG  
at/100eV 
pH=3-11 0.20 0.45 0.704 2.7 0.579 2.79 0.026005 
pH=0.46 0.20 0.39 0.78 0 3.64 2.9 0.0077 
Table 2. Primary radiolytic yield values for ions and radicals from irradiated water at 25 oC. 
The values from Table 2 show that the prevalent species are the solvated electron and the 
OH radical. 
In the range of pH = 3-12, forming efficiency of primary species does not vary, but the 
radicals may be located in various chemical forms depending on pH. 
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These existing acid-base equilibria are characterized by constant acidity / basicity. 
For example, at pH = 7, HO2., over 99 %  of the  radicals formed according to the reaction: 
 HO2. →  H+   +   O2-    (1.35) 
are represented as oxide, O2-. 
Table 3 shows acidic and basic forms of data and pK radicals. 
 
Radicals Acidic form Basic form pK 
H. H. e-aq 9.6 
e-aq H. e-aq 9.6 
.OH .OH O- 11.9 
HO2. HO2. O2- 4.8 
Table 3. pK values for acidic and basic forms of the radicals formed from water radiolysis.  
Among the primary species formed in the radiolysis reactions, important are the reactions of 
free radicals and radical solution. 
Free radical reactions: the most species of free radicals are unstable in solution and hence 
highly reactive. They quickly recombine with each other to form stable molecular products. 
As shown above, most of the molecular species formed during irradiation are formed by 
recombination of free radicals: 
 H.  +   H.  → H2 (1.36) 
 .OH  +  .OH  →  H2O2    (1.37) 
Radical reactions take place, generally, in solution and have fast kinetics. 
Free radicals can react with molecules to form other molecules or free radicals, according to 
the general equation: 
 Radical 1 + Molecule1→ Radical 2  +  Molecule 2 (1.38) 
5.5 Considerations on the radiolytic yield ( H2G ) 
Mass spectrometer was calibrated before measurements of irradiated samples on the basis of 
resulted hydrogen in a total chemical reaction: 
 Zn + 2HCldil → ZnCl2 + H2 (1.39)  
From 1.08 g Zn  0.01 mol H2  the spectrogram corresponds in the table  to a bit of 1.58 
·106 a.u. intensity (for anionic and cationic clays) and 2.68 ·107 a.u.  for the species with mass 
number 2, respectively. 
Schematic diagram of the measurements performed is given below: 
Sample→ Mass spectrometer →  PC→ Mass spectrogram 
Before each measurement, to avoid any contamination of samples by chemical species 
remaining from the previous sample, the mass spectrometer was ensured a vacuum of 2.10-6 
Torr. Mass spectrogram was recorded by a computer in coordinates peak intensity = f (Mass 
number), and recorded data were processed with chemistry program Origin 7.1. 
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It is well known that radiolysis of water through two stages, primary and secondary, leads 
to the formation of various chemical species such as: H2, O2, H2O2, HO·, O, HO2·, etc. 
through a series of reactions with excited species, ionized and free radicals: 
 H2O →H2O* → H. + HO.  (1.40) 
 H2O → H2O+  + e- (1.41) 
 H2O + e-→H2O-   (1.42) 
 H2O+ + H2O- →2H2O* (1.43) 
 H. + H. →H2 (1.44) 
 HO. + HO. →HO2. +H. (1.45) 
 H. + O → HO. (1.46) 
 HO. + HO2. → H2O2 + O. (1.47) 
Considering that energy transfer from the catalyst to water molecules plays an important 
role in the decomposition of water in the presence of catalyst, radiolysis can be expressed as: 
 XX*(activated state) (1.48) 
 X*+ H2O → [H2O.X]*(activated complex ) (1.49) 
 [H2O.X]* →H. + HO. + X + hν (1.50) 
To calculate the radiolytic yield of hydrogen, Henglein’s formula: 
 8
c N 100 cAG = = × 9.66.1013 D ρD ρ 1000 6.25.10 aa



   (6) 
where: 
Da – absorbed dose Gy (1Jkg or 6.24. 1013 eVg ) representing the product of dose debit  (D) 
and irradiation time (t) 
   -    density of irradiated material (gcm3) 
NA –Avogadro number 
Considering that: 
 
Ixc = b
Iet
  (7) 
Radiolytic yield of hydrogen resulted from radiolysis are calculated with the expression 
derived: 
 
b I 6xG = 9.66 × 10H D t ρ I2 et


    (8) 
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where: 
 D·t = Da – is absorbed dose in  Gy (9) 
ρ – density of irradiated material (g/cm3)  
b – amount of hydrogen resulting from the spectrometer calibration (mol H2/1kg H2O) 
Iet – intensity peak corresponding to molecular hydrogen from the reaction mass 
spectrometer calibration  
Ix – intensity peak corresponding to molecular hydrogen from the reaction of catalyzed 
radiolysis  
Radiolytic yield was calculated for:  
b = 1.53 mol H2/ 1kg H2O, Iet = 2.68 ·107 arbitrary unit (cationic and anionic clays) 
b = 1.556 mol H2/ 1kg H2O, Iet = 1.58 ·107 arbitrary unit (catalyst with and double 
perovskitic oxides) 
In mass spectrograms there have identified a number of species (H2, O2, H2O2, HO·, O., 
HO2·), but radiolytic yield was established only for molecular hydrogen, which is a stable 
product of radiolysis. The other identified species (HO·, HO2·…) may occur in the ionization 
source mass spectrometer from the decomposition of molecules of water (as vapor), whereas 
as free radicals, disappear immediately.  
6. Experimental part 
In order to study the catalyzed radiolysis of water under the action of nuclear radiation, 
with hydrogen release, there were used two types of catalysts: 
a. Clays. 
In this case natural anionic clays have been used, such as: (MgZn2Al, Zn2Al, Zn2CuAl, 
Mg2Al) and cationic R1 and C1 pillared with: Cr, Fe, Al and Ti. 
Raw clay (R1, C1) have a complex mineralogical composition: SiO2 – 69.61 %, Al2O3 – 19.7 %, 
MgO – 2.41 %, Fe2O3 – 1.27 %, Na2O – 1.31 %, K2O – 0.18 % etc. The cation exchange capacity 
(CEC) of 82 mEq/100 g clay was determined with ammonium acetate, and the specific 
surface area is between 140-142 m2 / g. 
At first there were prepared clays of the type C1-Na and R1-Na by cations exchanges 
naturally present, by dispersing those raw solid mass skins in a solution of 1M NaCl at a 
temperature of 22 ºC and a contact time of 12 hours. 
After that, the solid clay was separated by centrifugation as C1-Na or R1-Na of the remaining 
solid solution and dried at 110 ºC. Clay particle size range was 0.2-0.8 mm (Van Olphen, 
1963). 
To obtain a microporous material with increasing interlamelare space and volume of pore, 
was performed Keggin inserting of the polications Al137+ between the layers of clay, 
resulting in  pillared samples (C1-Al and R1-Al) with a specific surface of 280 m2/g and 320 
m2/g, respectively. Pillars of the  cationic clays C1-Na and R1-Na with other cations were 
obtained by ion exchange Na-Mn+ where Mn+ is Cr3+, Fe3+ and Ti2+ (Asaftei et al., 2002; 
Popovici et al., 2006). 
b. Site zeolites and mesoporous silica MCM-41. 
The Pt2+-ZSM-5 samples with different SiO2/Al2O3 ratios were prepared by ion exchange: H +-
ZSM-5-Pt2+ in a solution of H2PtCl6 (10-3M) at a temperature of 22 ºC and at a time 10 contact 
hours. Afterwards, the zeolitic precipitate was washed with distilled water and dried at 110 ºC. 
Platinum content was 1-2%. The same process was applied to NH4 – ZSM-5. 
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In order to prepare mesoporous silica MCM-41, there was made a mixture of: 27.3 % SiO2 and 
10.8 % NaOH, hexadecyl-trimethyl ammonium bromide, C16H33N(CH3)3Br and H2SO4 (95 %), 
having the following molar ratio: 1m SiO2: 0.297 m NaOH: 0.414m C16H33N(CH3)3Br: 0.277m 
H2SO4: 82.54m H 2O. After a contact time of 30 minutes, there has been obtain a gel which was 
then placed in an autoclave at 105 °C for 48 hours. After that, the resulting solid product was 
washed and dried at room temperature (Mastalir et al., 2008;  Zholobenko et al., 1997). 
The experiments proceeded as it follows (Cecal et al., 2008; Hauta et al., 2009): different 
amounts of each catalyst were weighed and introduced in 50 ml bottles, over which 30 ml 
distilled water were added. Then the glass vials were sealed with rubber cork, paraphyned 
outside and subjected to various doses of radiation energy. The stable radiolysis product, 
H2, resulted in the above reactive systems, was determined quantitatively by a mass 
spectrometer, previously calibrated. The relationship between the irradiated sample and 
mass spectrometer was performed with a special device, which had at one end a 
chromatographic syringe needle that pierced the rubber stopper. 
The obtained experimental results are represented in the following figures: 
 
       
 
a. b. 
Fig. 1. Plots of radiolytic yield vs catalyst mass for a) Pt2+-ZSM -5 and b) NH4-ZSM-5 with 
different SiO2/Al2O3 ratios SiO2/Al2O3 = 140, (2) SiO2/Al2O3 = 80, (3) SiO2/Al2O3 = 15. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Plots of radiolytic yield vs. catalyst mass for Pt0-MCM-41 impregnated for 1) short 
temps 2) long temps, 3) before irradiation. 
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3.1 
 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
 
 
3.3 
 
Fig. 3. Dependence of radiolytic yield of molecular hydrogen on the catalyst amounts for: 
(3.1) anionic clays; (3.2) R1-clays and (3.3) C1-clays. 
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4.1 
 
 
 
4.2 
 
 
 
4.3 
Fig. 4. Variation of radiolytic yield ( H2G ) vs. absorbed dose for: (4.1) anionic clays, (4.2) R1-
clays and (4.3) C1-clays. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Fig. 5. Plots of radiolytic yield vs. absorbed dose for: a) Pt2+-ZSM-5 and b) NH4-ZSM-5 with 
different SiO2/Al2O3 ratios (1) SiO2/Al2O3 = 140, (2) SiO2/Al2O3 = 80, (3) SiO2/Al2O3 = 15. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Plots of radiolytic yield vs. absorbed dose for: a) Pt0-MCM-41 impregnated samples 
for 1) short temps 2) long temps, 3) before irradiation, 4) after irradiation. 
It is worth mentioning that the release of hydrogen was obtained only in the catalyst 
samples, previously subjected to irradiation with γ radiations. 
Explanations of the catalytic effects could be: the catalytic role of clay could be explained by 
facilitating the appearance of intermediate structures. 
In the case of clays studied as catalysts in water radiolysis, it can be considered that in active 
status, the catalyst creates a structural availability so that dipole water molecules can 
penetrate its pores. 
In this excited configuration of the catalyst, water molecules are subjected to Coulomb forces 
of attraction-repulsion of the ionic species in the clay structure. 
Si
O
O
O
O O O
O
Al
-
O
H H
1/2 +1/2  +
 -
 
Under the action of gamma radiation, H-OH bonds in water molecules adsorbed on the 
catalyst surface will be easier to split towards non-adsorbed water molecules. 
It has been noticed an increasing amount of hydrogen resulted from water radiolysis in the 
presence of clays in comparison with the reference sample, irradiated under the same 
experimental conditions. In the case of pillared clays, greater efficiency in the decomposition 
of water have the pillared with Ti.. Pillared clays R1-metal had an important catalytic effect 
 
Nuclear Power – Deployment, Operation and Sustainability 
 
508 
towards C1-metal, probably due to SiO2/Al2O3 different ratio and the presence of 3d series 
microelements. Ionic species in the composition of clay acts as Coulomb attraction-repulsion 
forces on the dipole water molecules, facilitating H-OH bonds break under the action of 
nuclear radiation. 
In the case of zeolites, through the interaction of nuclear radiation on the surface, there 
might appear “charge carriers” e- and goals+, namely: 
  zeolit → (g+, e-) 
Water molecules can be broken down as it follows: 
 
g+ + O
H
H
..
..
H+ +H2O+ HO.
 
 e- + H+ →1/2H2 
 HO· + HO· → H2O + O 
 O + O → O2..... 
The differences reported in the radiolytic yields are due to the respective catalyst involved 
in the radiolytic splitting of water (Chemerisov et al. 2001; Gondal et al. 2004). 
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